1 20 107 https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/48/14377/sdsp_skyl_000036_001.pdf 62b867b2cd2bee62d1a3d381462f110a PDF Text Text m 14 £VY\ APOLLD NASA INTERNAL USE ONLY APPLICATION XCSM LEM LAB APOLLO BOILERPLATE APOLLO BOILERPLATE XCSM CSM XCSM LEM LAB LEM SHELTER LEM TAXI VEHICLES NASA in (SA 218-228 AND SA 517-525) mi USE ONLY XCSM XCSM LEM LAB i\ APOLLO BOILERPLATE XCSM APOLLO BOILERPLATE APOLLO BOILERPLATE , XCSM LEM LAB J2) LEM TAXI XCSM - XCSM LEM LAB LEM LAB 1 <v >K1 " 7 9J7 w r " 7HH3 THE 219 Remote Suriace Sensing/Operations 120 -200-N. M. 90° EO 45 Days LEM LAB j) cust 218 LEM TAXI APOLLO BOILERPLATE -I XCSM LEM LAB "LIGHT NUMBER - MISSIONS" ORBIT •iTAYTIME PROGRAM 5 17 Astronomy 19, 350 -N. M. 0° EO 45 Days 220 221 Space Operations/Technology 200-N. M. 28. 5° EO 45 Days 222 518 Space Applications 19, 350-N. M. 0° EO 45 Days 519 520 Lunar Surface Rendezvous Lunar Surface Landing 21 Days 223 224 Space Operations/Technology 200-N. M. 28. 5° E O 90 Days 225 522 Lunar Surface Sensing TBD* * 90° LO 35 Days 523 Astronomy/Applications 1 9 , 350-N. M. 0° EO 45 Days 227 Remote Surface Sensing/Operations 200-N. M. 90° EO 45 Days 228 524 . 525 Lunar Surface Rendezvous Lunar Surface Landing 21 Days " A s defined in MSF p r e l i m i n a r y copy "Apollo Applications P r o g r a m E l l g h t Mission As stgnment s , " dated December 1965 Io be determined. DECEMBER 27, 1965 DRAWING NO. 65-0014 R-P8VE-AV e-i o 1 . e* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Walter W. Jacobi Collection Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Walter W. Jacobi Collection Description An account of the resource Walter W. Jacobi was born on January 13, 1918 in Saalfeld, Germany. On November 16, 1946, Jacobi arrived in the United States under Operation Paperclip with a group of 118 fellow scientists in Dr. Wernher von Braun’s team. The Paperclips started to work for the War Department of the United States at Fort Bliss, Texas, in White Sands, New Mexico, and finally in Huntsville, Alabama in 1950. The team continued to work on their rocket research, which culminated in the Apollo/Saturn Program and man landing on the moon in 1969. Jacobi spent his entire career with NASA; even in retirement, he followed the events and projects at NASA and the Marshall Space Flight Center. Jacobi passed away on August 19, 2009 in Huntsville, Alabama. Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/113">View the Walter W. Jacobi Collection finding aid on ArchivesSpace</a> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000036 Title A name given to the resource "APOLLO APPLICATION PROGRAM VEHICLES." Description An account of the resource This image depicts various Apollo launch vehicles. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965-12-27 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1965-1970 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Apollo applications program Saturn launch vehicles Type The nature or genre of the resource Diagrams Posters Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Walter W. Jacobi Collection Box 6, Folder 9 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/200/14399/sdsp_skyl_000064_001.pdf 2c1987d169a5152b241ab7b61b46fa1c PDF Text Text 50M02416 SEPTEMBER 2 3 . APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT SEQUENTIAL FLOW PLAN PREPARED BY ASTR1 ON ICS LABORATORY ��r Hire FORM ui (VERTICAL) (AUSUST IHOl MOTICf — When Government drawing®, apoclf kotiona, or ether data ere weed for any parpeeo other then In connection with • definitely related Govsrs«a*l •roc«r*m«M oeeratlon. the United Statee Covarnmtni thereby Inovre no roe oonelbllltv noT obligation whatsoever: and the 'act thai the Government may have 'emulated. 'wrnlahed. or In any way supplied the aald drawings apoclflcatkno or other data la not to bo regarded by Im plication ar ©therwlee aa In any nannar licensing the hnldor or any otbor paraon or corporation, or oonvoylng any righto or pormiaelon to menufaetora. vao. or aoll any potantod Invention that may In any way bo related thereto. NEXT ASSY MF PART NO. APPLICATION REVISIONS 8YM USED ON [ DESCRIPTION | DATE | APPROVAL I > l EUGENE H . CAGLE E n g i n e e r i n g M a n a g e r f o r ATM R-ASTR-0IR UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED DIMENSIONS ARC IN INCHES TOLERANCES OHi rtACTIORt OICIRAL1 ORIGINAL DATE OF DRAWING 1 LLI'STR ATO" ANCLII . H.S .i-rrtnMu on CEORCE 9-23-68 CHICHI ATM CHECKCN TMCIR NATIONAL AERONAUTICS SEQUENTIAL MATERIAL AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION nO'M FLOW P L A N submitted HEAT TREATMENT v .. M • ( • Tsii'Vca FINAL PROTECTIVE FINISH C. MARSHALL SPACE FLICHT CENTER 2 -jC —Sa- ft) EV f.-T7 Dwa SCALE UNIT WT SIZE 50M02416 SHEET | o» 125 ��2 50M02416 ��CD sz 4-» xi 4-» o c: 13 ZD •— CO CD a zz o 4-» k_ — o oo CD X3 O E CD 3EE oo I— oo CO CD rsi •— v_ E o k— **— TO =F I— < EE CO CD **— XI 4—' o 4—' **— O 00 •— o 4-' — c M— — z CD CD LU co GO CD Q_ CC CD E 3 CO o •— o 4-» -a zz CD oo 3 CT sz CD 4—' 00 o !•_ o CD 4—' CI o c o o 00 a. o CD =3 o. CD XI h- 4-» c CD 00 CD i— CL 50M02AI 6 �»— o 4—' o TO CO c o •— 4-' TO rvi co i— •— 4-» xz — 1— o o 4—' CD •— c 4-» •— CI =3 4-» TO TO TO XI CxO i— "O o c O i— O- TO «x CO «a: z CO 4-' CI o E DO • —, 4—' c ZD o 2E TO — — U_ XI c TO 4—' i— TO C TO TO a. ZD CI o X CD TO TO TO CO CL TO CD 4—' O TO 4-» O V*_ — X3 CS4 •— z CD •— CD U_J CSi CD CO CL CL •— Y— •— •— TO4-» O c CO TO 4-» C o CO o 4-» a. XI DO TO TO TO E =3 o o •o CO xz 4-» XI 4—' •4— o C — — — u_ 2E h— TO XI 4-* CO l_ o 4—' 4— o •— •— 4-^ CO — •— o uQ_ DO C XI 4-» 4-» o DO CL 4-» •— TO TO U CO TO TO4—* TO 4-» c TO a. CL CL c o TO o TO TO 4—' TO CI CI c TO sz C 4-» c: >• *— •— — — — >— CD C •— \— Q- o CO i— TO CL E 3 CD o X3 50M02416 �L. o 1 CD) CD CD TO EE 3: O — H- -ID 4-' CD CD 1— CD LU OO —1 -a: cn 111 *• i z LU CD SZ CO CD o 4—' TO k__ CD CDCD o CD CD >• TO sz CD. CD "CD CO ID o CD o »— ID EC o c CO TO => -ID 4-' CO c — — — TO CD __ CD 4— TO CD 3: S <o v— <x CD -ID H— TO CO 4-» O CD CDCO . TO 4—* CO CD 4—' i CD OA i— o CD CD >— -CD 4—' CD SZ h- CNJ o CD) r— E o o H— o ID TO CO CD o V— o • — 4-' ID o o CD k— D3 4-» E LO CD 4—' o O M —— CD -CD 4-» O 4—» «*— O —— -CD E CD CO CO CD CO TO -CD o o CD 4-» k_ V— TO O- TO >« E CD **— +-> LO TO 4— O CDCD CO CD 4—' CD a) TO CO CD O CD •c£ CD <— 4-» TO TD CD 4-J CO CD 4—* CO 4—' TO CD '— 4-J CD •— 3= ~D) CD O 4—' O o t*— CO — a. CD -O CD CD -ID ID O TO t— CO 4-» •— CO E o o k__ CD CD E TO 4—* CD o o — O CD CD I— .d 4-» SZ CO CD CD 4—» CDCD CD CD - CD to XD CD TO XD CD CO O JD 4—» CD i O E o CD -c: 4-* •— * — EC TD ID TO •— 3: CD ID) <o 4—> —— SZ OA CD d TO — CD. 14- 1— TO o — CDL CO •— TD CD CD. k— CD 4—* CO TD CD 4-» o 4—* O k— Q_ CD O k_ 4—* CD o o 4—' f OA •— — u_ CD -CD 1— CD 4—' CD TO TO o CD =e o — — o *•— 4—' TD CD OA i_ k_ D) CD Q_ CD. TO h— -ID 4-' CD o •— -a ID O TO 4-» TO TO CD »— OA CD CD TO TD CD OA k_ 3 C"L CO -ID 4-» l_ CD o 4—* k— • — k— o E o CD- OA LO CO CD .a CD TO TO -CD 4-* •— "0 CD TO »— o i— 4-» CD E ' 4—' CO CD CD O CO CD CD O TO CD *— CD 4~> CO CD TO > > 4-J TO i CD OA i CD E CD O k_ •— TO 4—' k_ TO O TO CD — —— • CD "3" CD 4—' _ CO CD E +1 - CD OA k ID CD- TO TO E o u— CD. O 4—' TO u_ CD o CD — Li_ o O CD -O TO r—ID O -CD 4-» i— 4—* TO CO CD . CD CD k— D3 4—' CD k— CD. 3: O TO k__ CD CDE CD 4-» •— > sz i— o CD DJ TO CD CD. 4—' ID CD CD CD CD *o CD TO CD +1 TO CD CO E o o u. 4—' 4—' O ID •— — •— -CD Li— O LO sz CD CD. X CD c: •— TO 4-* —— CD l— CD TO o 4-' CD CD E TO i— TD ID •— -CD "O CD — TO 4J i— CD > o TO — CD l— O E TO CD — 4-* "a CD 4-» o "a CD •— 3: CD CDCD \ • — *— OA CD c > TO c: 4-J TO CD E TO TO CD >— CO I CD > o o CO CO CD o -d •— 4—* 4-' a. 4— o O E o o CD k_ - CD CD t— 4-' 4-» CD CD E D3 O o •CD E= D3 -CD 4—' CD CD E •— k_ CD CDL X CD CD -CD 4—» TO • TO k— CD. O k— CDCD- TO CD o CD CD D3 CDCD CO 5 50M02416 ��50M02A16 �o o ce <1 UJ _J o in in =r CD >—I to 2 — UJ CO >ct: O l— <£ en o CO <t CD cc UJ O <1 Q UJ 21 or 0 u_ a: uj a. CO CO 2: UJ CO _l LU O X I— CO — o x z »- <t CH UJ x 1— cc a; <1 o a. u. to UJ UJ z x O I— —I —I — to 12 o z — l— 1— «t <c 1— UJ CO X I— X ce: u- o o 3 CL. 3 3 - CD =3 CO CO UJ _J --J —J <t — — 3 H— UJ Z QC — UJ X z C£ CD <t <t 1— to Z V- CD z o — H-d —I _j O O z o t— Z o UJ 2: — cc Ul Ox UJ a: o • ce z: UJ o x o Hcr o 1 8 50M02416 ��2 o o en z <c UJ -J o - in LO r=r CD t- z UJ 2: zz CD z o —1 — =3 CO — — _J <1 1— zz. UJ 2 a: UJ Q_ — X UJ >- en O »— -=c cc o m c _i CD Z — CC UJ UJ z CD z — UJ CD z cc z 1— o < u_ ZD z <t 2 — z o 1— cc o 1— co Q — UJ M — 2 — z 2 O H- l— z CD UJ o z 3 UJ cc CC UJ UJ u_ 1— UJ z en ZD o UJ CJ z — UJ UJ z hhUJ 2 z • CD UJ o _J z •« <t —I »— <t z CQ UJ CC 2 UJ — 1— cc z UJ z CC o X o UJ — UJ _J CD _J <£ — »— 3= z — — — CO 1— z UJ 2 — cc UJ 0_ CO z o — h- c o t- u_ Q en Z UJ <c > h- fz z UJ UJ 2 2 z z CD CD — — —- _J _J •« _J en <r I— — z — o u_ Q UJ Q en UJ O z O 1— UJ cc CD z UJ CD 3: _J O _l _J _J o 3 . u_ CO Q UJ CO z UJ z o > —J — CD z cc z o O cc 2 — y— <c UJ — > y— o X Q_ en f— o UJ CO z _J UJ UJ UJ UJ CD 2 <£ z cc re z t- 1— _J CD UJ z o — I <t o 1— 3 10 50MCJ2416 ��. 2: 0 0 cc z LU _J O in LO r=r CD z 0 — 3D CO Q_ >- =3 o 0 t— <t en a: O CO _l CD —I «5 CD z C£ LU LU Z — CD z LU CD Z oc z t— O <1 U_ 33 Z <1 3 >- 1— z LU 3 Z CD — _] < _l < — H— z — CO —I —1 <1 O — • CO LU < O CO z LU LU a CO LU Li_ _J UJ _J QC — 3= O — CO CO LU <1 1— CO Z CO LU 1— 3: Z 1— (— O — I/O h- <t a <r uj a >• CO — J— ZD Ll_ — — > LU CO < CO LU QC > CD O »— t- CD z z *- LU — z 2: t-J LU Z — 21 CD —1 Q_ — — — —I »— Z <1 Z O LU CC UJ 2: h ILJ z 1— t— UJ C3 C/3 2 >Z _J CO CD _J — «t —I —1 <r <t Q O Z — UJ < tz a. t- LU O t— — Z CO <t 12 z 33 CO CD LU z — Ll_ 2 I— <t LU Z »— LU Z O tQ 1 1I UJ z CD — _i O LU < _1 Q- UJ CO _J —1 — CO t— z LU 2 — LU en <c C/J —i cr. UJ QX UJ <C I— LU Q _1 —1 <* LU «£>s 2 C\J ~ z =r >- CD CO 1 _J — O _J 31 -I o in 0 CO <1 CO CO Q_ 50M02416 ��15 50M02416 �2: 0 0 ce >- CO Q UJ 2! ce 0 u_ ce 1UJ i1 a_ z <1 UJ _J 0 _ z o — h— <1 Z — 2! CC UJ (— LU Q in in Is=r UJ CO _J _J — S — Q _J z 0 — ZD CO — 1— z - >- 1— — > <r ce CD U_ 0 A: UJ J— z 1UJ 11 O —J ac UJ t— >- — O I— 2: or UJ QC HUJ *X CH O CO • _J 1— CD z > <1 <T >- ce ce CD UJ z u_ 0 — III UJ Q oc 0 UJ z — CD z UJ 1— 1— Z UJ UJ 2: 0 z _J 0 <t — ce co UJ z 1— UJ <t h- CD z — CC z H0 <T LAZD —I z <£ 21 UJ z 1— 16 50M024I 6 ��UJ CO 2: o o cc UJ CO z <r UJ o - in in rrr z <r Z CO CO z — Q —1 — CD 03 - >- 1C o <t cc o CC o I— <t cc o CO 1 >- I CO CO CO < CO z cc LU LlJ — CO z UJ CO z — cc CD 1— o UZ z <r 2 _J —1 — 3 Z Ul CO 1— 1— => Z O Ul z z o <t z 2 z o — o o —I UJ < CO o o — 1 1— o z z O UJ _J —J — 3: —i 1 — CO 3: CO z — O 3 <t cc cc <t UJ —I z o h- CO z O — H<t Z — 2 cc uj I— UJ Q o z cc UJ lCO — z <x o Q UJ 1— Z ZD O 2: >_J UJ 1— UJ -J z 2 o o o <t Z CO z o — Z UJ <1 CO CC UJ >- 3: 1- o — _J > <t cc CO u_ o CC UJ 1— Z UJ O UJ z 1— CO co z — 3 z <1 Q_ CO Ul z h- U1 O z t— tQ Z UJ UJ _J I— CO z :£ < UJ CO CO <t 18 2 h< UJ Z I— - Q UJ _J _J <s: I— CO z — z UJ 1— CO — z •C O CO <1 CO z 1— — 3 Q UJ cc CO UJ CO Z z < t— CO o co UJ CO 50M02416 �19 50M02416 �<t CO z o — 1— <r z 2 cc UJ 1— UJ o >- z CD — Z in in r=r CD z — o — > <t cc CD u_ o cc UJ 1— UJ o 21 t— <c Q UJ _J CO 2 UJ CO to <1 z CO - >- cc o 1— <x cc o 00 <r CD Z — cc UJ UJ Z — CD z UJ CD — CC zo I— c_> Uz Z UJ <t cc 2 -a: 2 cc UJ t— UJ Q 11 1 III CO cc UJ z — <t 1— 2z t— o < c_> —J _J — 3 Q CD UJ Z _J — CO Q_ 2 o_ UJ — CO z CO CO «a 2 UJ fZ <1 I— UJ Ll— Z O h>1— — > <c cc CD o 1— z — 1— — U_ CD oz — CC Q UJ •< 1— o Z _J UJ o o 1— UJ z cc 1— o — cc cc 20 5CM02416 ��CO o r=r CD Z Q —I =3 CD O 1— ID LO r^z CD z a _i cc o Z to z <c cc Z CO Q LU 1 to z _J o z l— z o O cc 1— • Z 3: >- O _i Q _J < Q 1— Z Z LU LU 2 z Z =3 O CO z — LU > z Z 1— LU z 11 Li-I1 |I— CO — 3: CD z -J >— _J 3: _l z O Q O LU 1— CD Z z O — z a_ to z z LU CO z z CO h- CO 2 to 1— — <t 2 LU hz <t 1— LU z I— 2 o z Z Q Z hZ O Z CO z •< z I— X 1— •< LU Z 1— — <x 2 1— <t z z 1— z — Q z z o z LU CO z <r o z o — 1— <t t— z o z to z <t z t— • -—• O C\J CaCCl o 2: o _J in —I •—• <t z z o _J z to —I z — o — h— 1— Z -c Q 1— z o z 22 50M02416 ��_1 Q LU o > • CO o hZD O o LU z o CD z — cx z I— o - Cd O 1— <t Cd O CO «t _l UJ o z <r CX =5 CO CO <t >- > 1— — 1 — — (X cr <t Z — CO — 2: i— <t _J LU (X oO >- J— — 1 Z o o LU 2 z 1— LU CO o t— _J —1 1— — z 3: LU o - cx LU o z — c >- 1- _J z LU o Ho — CD Q z LU — 2 0_ 2 Q_ — — z <r CO LU Cd LU <X z t— LU z -a: O o i— CO z CO — o • r- CD LU =r z — — CD CD z Z CD 3: — <t Q CO z « 2 J— <1 — ZD CO z cx o LU LU u_ Z Q 1— — 2 CO o z — 2U o cx 50M02416 ��z <t LXJ _J o - CO o r=r CD z — o i — CO >-~ QC z: t— LU z Hcd z Q -X O —I z ZD O t— <c qc o CO <t —1 LU O z <1 QC ZD CO to <1 >- t— — _J — CO <t — —J LU OC °0 >»— -J 21 <t O O LU O <1 —I Q_ LU CO -J —I — 3 Q Z CO <1 CD <x QC CO LU Z 0 — — •< I— H- to z <C 0 —1 0 Q_ CD LU CD z z z — Q_ Q_ (- • — 1— to — ze: LU Z 0 t— to 0 Q: 5: LU LU z z Hhto LU >2: _J CO 0 O CO QC ZD Ll_ LU to Z O 1— QC LU O > LU U_ O Q SI — z LU tO 0 QC Z — — 1— LU <t CO O QC z <1 —1 <x Q_ —1 1— LU — to QC O3: I— CO Z t— LU <£ J— Q LU LU LU Zz > »- J- O 2: z UJ 0 QC ZD O O QC 26 50MC24 1 6 ��< UJ _J o 00 o r=f CD CO CD to UJ t- CO >CO CO zd CO >ex o I— <t cx o CO <1 o z <t cx ZD CO CO <£ (X <1 _J o CO 21 U_ I— — <x Q UJ UJ Z > UJ H- o z 2 • I— o UJ UJ 1— ex 2 Q UJ t— O UJ z u_ z o I— o CO UJ UJ 1— CO UJ t— CO CO —1 — —J z —— H5 »— (X -a: UJ I— Q CO UJ 1— UJ z O I -1 0 1— — 0 Q is z z 0 O O —1 z 0 UJ UJ CD Z UJ uj -a z en _i ex zd _J to —1 -I Q _J 1— - UJ — CO 1? z 0 v— CD UJ • z z zc CO — UJ 1— UJ 1— UJ -J CO CD • CO UJ CD <X \— CO UJ 0 <t z> 2; UJ ex ZD I— X ZZ O Z UJ 2: 1- H- CO 2; UJ CD CO UJ H- ex z <1 UJ UJ _J UJ CO z h»- -1 z ZD ex UJ 1— U. <£ Q UJ ex — ZD O <t cx oO _1 CD >CO CO CO < o — — 3 -I u_ CO CD DZ Z t— O ex 3: * ex >- ZD O CD z ex ZD 1— o <1 u_ Z3 Z *1 2 • —o — zr CM o 2: 0 10 •—• z 1— <r 1 CO o ex Qt— t— CO ZD UJ O 1CO «t UJ Z 0 — 1— *-*• 2 ex 0 u_ z • <a I— CX UJ o o <s <1 CD z Q — UJ z _J z CO -a _J ex CO — 0 UJ _J — <1 t— UJ Q UJ z 1— CO to ex o 0 X u_ o _ _ III — UJ 28 50M02416 ��cc . CO o =r CD z — Q — Z CO - >1— cc to o 1— UJ T— 1— z UJ S: >- <£ CC o CO o UJ (J z o z <t cc z CO CO _J QUJ Q — 3: <T >- 1— z CO — z UJ cc oB >3— — z z o UJ z 3— X to — o u_ z o z z UJ 3— z 3— o 1— z — Q Z Q Z UJ o 1— <t z 3— z 1— o <C s z UJ CO CO z z z z — — 3 3 CD UJ z cc — z 3 3— X z — o u_ <t z 3— z UJ s: 3— >o z z Q- z UJ 3— Q z CD o z UJ >>1 z z z •c O o z cc <r z 3o o z z z s: z Q z Z CO CO to <c UJ 3— z <t • cc 1 CO 0 z z 3— — z -I 3 CD Z Z CD o 21 — z — cc CO z 3 Q- z z 21 <r z z 0 — 3z • z <t z CD z s: z 0 — 0 z 3- cc 2: z <1 3— 2: 3— 1— 2 <r <c 3— <x z <t z z z o z z 3— l— •» — Q O 3 z 3>O >- o Q z — 3; 1— z Z 0 Q- 3— <x — UJ 2: Z O z — O Z cc z 3— X z z o Q z 3— cc z 0 z o_ 0 — Q z <t to UJ Q O cc <t —I o to CD UJ z o UJ >o _J Q_ UJ Q Z Q UJ UJ z 3= ^ O UJ z o $ .» I 30 5CK2A16 ��CO <t CO l— _J • — UJ Z 3: z < < 2 UJ o a. 2 O Q O Z °° 0 2 O Z — _J Z r- ZT co CO - >- CO hCO LlJ CC CD z o 0 Z - Z — r-j O 2: X 1— — CC ZD 0 t— —1 — 0 u_ 0 s-c O UJ - CO 0 UJ z O <x CC 1— ZD 0 CO <1 0 z <t CC DZ UJ 1— t— _l CO <t _J UJ DC 1— z <1 UJ —I — CC ZD 1— O — <t U. • UJ 0 z <t 1— CO UJ -J -J — > 2 1— — 3 UJ 1— Q CO z 0 CO —1 0 O- VCO 0 CC UJ — UJ 1— 1— z z 1— 2 CO 2 UJ 1— CO >co 2: 0 0 oc CO z 3: UJ CO >- _i UJ O- CO CO >- ZD UJ 2: U- CC ZD oO CD CC CD 0 <x Ul CO H- <t CC CO CO >- z • 0 0 32 ZD — CO CO 0 0 Q CO z z — 0 «X — 2 H 0 UJ z z z 1— U_ t— <1 UJ _J z 2 — CO <r 50M02416 ��cc 0 Q Ul U°a 2 <r 2 0 CO —I . LlJ —1 IT) Q O 2 Z O K<1 CC CO _l z —CO —1 Z z < Z Q oO O Z O Z O H<C —1 -I »— CO z CD O r^z CD z — 0 _1 — z CD >- z 0 I— <t cc 0 CD <t 1 UJ O Z -a; a: => CO CO «=c >- »— _J — CO <1 1 UJ z oO >- f— —I •d ZD 0 z 0 — »— <1 z CO 2 — _J > UJ UJ UJ z z z UJ Z H- 1— t— z z 1— 1— - 1— z <t 0 - 0 2 z I— 0 • 0 0 0 cc UJ Ul — z —I _J 1- 0 z ZD _J <t — 0 <r Z hUl 0 l— z —I 2 00 z I— z O z 0 0 z — Ul 0 CO z — co z — UJ 1— H- CO z z 1- <t -a: z 0 CC —I »— CD —1 Z 1— — — 0 z 1— > 3: z 0 z Ul 2 Z O Z O —I 0 — <1 — 1— a —5 LLl t— z z Q z <t —I CO »— H- Z CO z 2 <C >- Z Ul O CO — 2 0 z Ul ZD I— Q CC Z CO <£ UJ h- 0 — -J CO Z _J Q —I z =) —1 — UJ <t — • 3C 21 1— 2! CO Ul CO — Z H- z z — _J — <£ — 1— =5 <r Ul Ul z CO Q cc CO Z z 0 <c O 1- 2 —I z Ul _J z z z z — z 0 0 t— 3c < — — 1— h<X «=£ z _l — Ul z cc cc z 2 CO CO <r — — — z 1— > > 34 50M02A16 ��en z •d LU _J o - CO o rcr — ZD CO >- O t— <t en z — o CO •d 1 CD z — en o CO 3= 2 1— •d LU Z >V- h— - —J z — o o — -d 1— Ll_ •d z z LU O O- — O h•d CO Z — CO z — t— > CD z —1 — — LU 3c CO z CO o — — 1— •d _i Vz LU LU Z (— z cc 1— 1— •d CO z z l— — 2 LU O z <c 2 en cd CO CO <1 >- t— LU — 2 — CO •d Li_ O z o — 1— J<t LU z CO < — > CO 2 1 LU en LU o z z I— >d 03 >- »— — —• -d =3 o 1 _J — z LU CO — en CO LU CO o LU CO - 1 J •d t— o LU CD CD •d CO —I •d 1— CO en z (— — — Q <£ en o u_ - O LU 1— Z LU 21 CD CD Z z o — t— 2 •d 1— _i «t O CO LU Z LU 1— DC (— Z o 2: o O cr t— CO •d CD z — LU Z 1— z o o — H- y- LU Z -1 o o_ — 2 1— O <t o »— en z o o o_ Q- CO C3 Z <X en i— 36 50M02.16 ��o o bC o LLJ or o CXJ en CJ <x. en UJ en o a. to z -a: ce CO o o_ o q: to z <t CC >I— — _J o CO z — o f— <t <t cc CO 38 50M024 16 �"39 50M02416 �o CO o zt o Q en CO DC O Q_ 00 o oc •d ce CO UJ <a: QC O O CO <x cn CO Q O >O — I— <s cc — O <r U- CO zz. — o S <£ _J cc CO uo % 50K)24 16 ��• - cr> — to =r to z — hco LU 1— z o — I— cr CD — > en o U_ to z — h- •< 2 2 t— <t oa 2; CO z — Q —I — Z CO UJ en z i— X — u_ z o t— «a: en CO — - >- en o H<r en. o CO c —1 co z — en UJ UJ z — to z UJ UJ _l o — z UJ > °B z o — CO _J Z QO CC Q- > UJ z 1— z o Q UJ _J —I <C 1— CO z — UJ CO o z o <1 UJ —1 UJ _J —I <t O hCO CO z z o — o UJ 1— CO CO UJ 1 I— —1 UJ 3C z t- o _J O UJ 1— — z Q CO UJ h- CC o <r UJ _l z o Z CO o O UJ z UJ I— CO • _J z • t— CO UJ (— z o — 1— cc CO — > UJ z _J Z »— _J — CO _J 3: UJ u_ — CO o UJ 1— to en en <t z hQ. co cc UJ UJ z t— HCO — o z H<t c_> cn o UJ — z cc 1— CL 3: z O 2: — t— i— < •« hQ z Z UJ <T 2 z 2 CC _J 1— CO UJ Z z — t— UJ z 1— U2 5 CM)2116 ��O Z <1 O) TD =3" CD C3 X J CO T— CO O_ — -A: ^ • I— CO <O UJ IN CX CO Q I— UJ UJ 1— Z — DC CO — O Z — _J U_ <R CO >- Z Z -J •< <1 - Q_ O LU T— _J CO T— DX O LU TO CO CO o T— S < (O o Q U J I U UJ X CD < C_> UJ Z DC — CD o CD CO <t CO CO <£ to CO CO UJ CO z — z to C x o z UJ _l o Z LU > CO <1 o O- 2: O I— *X DC CO CD I— LU CO UJ > O O _J -a _J LU UJ to co z o CO Q_ O tx Q_ — H- TO to < >>- DC CO to UJ CD LU CO A- O CO > U_ O I— 3E CO S O LU LU I— «T —I I— Z UJ o SL z CO — UJ O CN OC CO UJ CO >- o to u_ UM 50M02416 ��Q UJ I— <C z cc O UJ — Q_ OL (— CO cc UJ =r o <T CO CO CD O -a: Z _J — —I Q — CO CO UJ >cc o I— <R cc o — CD Z O —I CO 2! UJ I— CO >UJ CO CO <r cc CO «x O I— CD z z cc UJ UJ z Q CD CD z O O Z UJ ID > CD O UJ 2E CO UJ T— CO CO — UJ O J— CD J— < Z CO UJ Q T— Z UJ < CC CO O CO —1X1— UJ u_ CD a. O cc Q_ CO cc UJ ZD J— O U6 50M»16 �2CD ujq: CD Z CDO >17 50M02416 �CD Z Q —I O) CO =r ZD CO o CD CO >CC O F— <r <* 2: UJ Q CE O CO «A CC O Q- co z <1 cc. cn O O 21 F— CD Q CC UJ -A 2; UJ O CD CO -a: z z O ^ O UJ Z UJ O UJ UJ —J O °a z O CO Q_ O cc CL 3: <X cc 2; CO I— — < > Q F— z CO •*t O Q_ 2; —J CR O OD O R=F M3 50M02A16 ��CO o Q_ CC O CC o r=r CD CO O hIco z CO O r=r CD CO o Q LU z CC CC CC UJ CO *3 Q Z -X I— < Q z < o c o UJ z o 2: z —I o z I— <t CC CO 50 50M02416 ��<1 LU _J o CO o r- =T Q CD CO Q <X y— CO >o CO on CD —l <1 O z <r t— CO I— <r cc o CO LU O z •< o <t o Q — cc I LU CC -j 2: LU CC >- —1 < I— CO Z — o o _l on O O 52 50M02416 �53 50M02416 �CO o =T CD O UJ CO co >CC z LU Q z <t o h- <x cc CD o «x CO UJ _l o z o z <t cc CO CO CO Q UJ <r t— Q CO UJ Z Q — CC O UJ O CO UJ CC CO <c cc 2: oO o >- o CC 3 UJ 2 2 Z _J CD UJ _1 z <1 _J -a <1 UJ o o 54 50C2416 ��O LU O O =5 Z Q z 00 o LU O cc o R^=T ZD CD CO LU Z CO CO LU CO Q LU CO CO >ce o CO >CO cc o 2Z CC — O HLL_ CO A LU <T CO CO O CC LU co az CO CO •<£ CO »— CO CC ZD CO CO <T zn LU Q CO LU CO ZD — Q CO I— CO CO I— >- O CO LU Q_ o Q- CO <1 O Ll_ — <X O LU CC CO CO <1 Z LU Z — CC U Z H LU Q < _J OO LU CC OQ O O >- CC —I <1 ZD _J <a: LU 2I I— O LU CC Q LL. o c_> 56 50M02A16 ��1 X — u_ CO O rzr CD z — 1— CO LU 1— 1— Z UJ >- o Q. UJ Cu CD Z — 3 Z O — (~ <t cc CO — > t— CO o Q_ Q 1 — ZD CO - >- cc o 1— <c CC O CO <£ —I UJ CD Z cc ZD co CO <r >- — i — CO <t — LU CC oS >- 1— — 1 < CD o O 1— 1 ZD LU CD 1 UJ ZD CC Q O >z cc UJ Z Ho 1— <r <t UJ CO CD z — O h- 3 LU z 1— LU LU <X > Z — >- (— 1— — o _l o Z Q_ 1— — LU Q T CD 1— z UJ <c — z LU t— LU CO z z 1— co o o 2: z Q o «c LU cc z t— LL. z Z o z O o o UJ y I— z o t— CD LL. z z 3: <t z o Q o o UJ LU >Z LU O o CO _J <r QI— _J LU LU —1 o Q — 3: UJ LU CD CO CO LU —I _J _l _l CO — — <1 3 3: o CO CO cc CD CD UJ ~Z z Q. — s 3 s ZD LU LU Z z • 1— (— LU CC CD ZD zz (— -=r LU cc t— LU <x CD CC — <X z z CD c_> _J 1 Q — z <t 1 CO CD 3 z — __ CO 3 Q_ y UJ <t z _i Hu_ O . CO _J UJ T<c Q_ CD °3 CD UJ Z h- y O CC u. 58 UJ LU DC 3 z 1— UJ cc CO - Q LU >- o _J Q_ UJ O .—. O CC —J CO LL. CJ t— Z UJ CC cc =3 o CO LU _J rz> O o 2: z UJ >z u_ cc 3 — o CC 1— LU > —I 50M024 1 6 ��o z <1 ex CO ex o o r- Q_ CO zt z < CD cc Q CO >• cc o H- >: i— •c LU I— z ex I— o 0- z ex <1 CD z Q <r o CC o CO *r <£ Q LU _J O <t <r z _J LU LU o z o_ CO QC O <t •ct QC ZD CO CO <t >- Q O LU I— CD CO CD Q <t LU CO CX CO CO <t CX Q <t CX >- o I— LU Q_ _j <t ro H- Z < CC o z CO 60 50M02416 ��OT <T UJ CD d cr CL CO CD or d O UJ d or co Q z ro O UJ O QT UJ ORO CO OR I— U_ CO O T- OR CJ UJ O X CD C\J O CO 2: 2; O O 10 or o or D O O UJ Z cc o O- CO T— CD CO CR CD UJ UJ CO cr or o GCO Q d d Z-UJ CO CR <1 or UJ L— >OR CL. O C. 0- =3 CO CD ZR D OR 1— 2 I— D Q DC I— O OR O_ UJ CO OR UJ O. N> CO UJ OR O CO CO D CD O OR CO O 2: — hd or UJ -I. UJ O UJ co cc o rr CO > D O SL or zr d <S) UJ — UJ F— OR CO — CO D U_ o o >CO O >Q_ CLCO CD CD <T O H- zr or i— hco d *2 CD CD UJ O G. O CO ZR O d or on D — CO — cc CD O 1— UJ zr _) UJ — 2! d zr I— O UJ or O — 50M02416 ��o CE O CE CE O to 2: to Q to <T CE — >- A. QCD CD CE UJ CE RO CO CE O DC 3: TO O 1 —IX U_ LU (— LU CO LU —I CO _J <1 — CO 3 LU >- O cc CE a- o Z3 LE CD CE CE — UJ < CE E3 Z CO O I— LU CD LU 6U 50M02416 ��HLI_ 1• O CD CC <x o cc 1Li1—11 31 1— O z <1 O i— z o o LU o <t o cc LU 1— cc o QCO z <x rv* t— S t— <C CD Z co <r X LU 1— — Q <r o _J z z) » LU CO <t CO LU o o: O Li ce — Z o t— CD z — _) LU :TJ LU CO —I —1 — 3 CC LU o CO 2: o t— Q LU t— a: O Qco zr <r QC 1— Q z <r z o 1— CD z — 1— 1 cc _J o LU Q_ CO <r ~T CC .—- 1— I— —i •y o P -d — cc LU LU z 1 — <t CC •— 66 50M02416 ��UJ UJ a: or t— t— <C o CC O O UJ O CD Q <t I CD O o cc CD CD Z o CO UJ UJ UJ S < I— UJ —; X) CO 2 O o cc <t <1 CD Q <1 o R UJ CO DC I— CC UJ O u_ 1— CO z o <c UJ cc ^R o <C LU 2 CQ X — I- -a UJ lCO Q o: Z — -I < CJ I — Q CJ 3= UJ — > R Q CD CC Q. UJ R Q cd z O -a: UJ —J o cc I— CD <x cc o UJ CD <t Q_ CO Q CC O CO cc cc a. O QCO Z <t CC I— CC UJ > o CD CC UJ X R Lu O < CC - O V UJ X re co q I— z u. -a: 3 cc h 68 50M024 16 ��o UJ o z: iuj z: Q Q UJ z: > <C o 21 o z o <t z h- o o tx CO I— cc cr: UJ <C U_ O CO <t UJ z cc <* UJ CX UI— CO o o z CO UJ «I z: ix o O cu • O UJ —1 o CD —J z o <t • IX I— 21 UJ CO o O CO CX cc CO CO CD _j _1 — 3: UJ u_ CO Z <£ CX 2: t- z < UJ _J o 1O <t UJ o CO UJ X CO 2; CO o o CO CX —I u_ o 70 5>C CM M' 0 2 4 L 6 ��o 0 z <c 0 Q z LU LU LU _J CD CO <r 1 Q. LU _J —1 1— LU Q CC 3: LU <1 CO — Z <1 2: 0 0 hCC <t 1— Dr LU 2 1— <t O CO lu zz z: 1— <x LU — Li_ 1 CO z 2 H- t— cd 2: O Q: <r z z — O O ce I— — z CO <1 0 Q- LU —1 O - l£> ro CD z — Q —I — ZD CO - CD CO 2: CO LU 0_ O z Z <c LU 3 co 1— CO _J 1— <t CD Z LU 2 co a_ • t— CO H3 z LU — 2; 1— <r CO — O 2: 2 z CD LU 1 DC <1 1— LU :c t— CO <t CD Z. LU zo <t I— CO LU I— Li_ z CO ZD zz O CO t— LU T CO LU LU CO O LU > O O LU CO <1 Q_ LU O LU CO z <£ LL- CO LU Q LU CO 0 CD 2! LU a: LU 2 2: CD — _l <r O LU > LI_ — O LU — U_ — f— O 2 <c oc l— LU q: 0 u. 0 LU —I O co Z CD 2 CD LU _J CD — H- 1— CO <z Q_ O z: 0 — CO >Z < —I —I —i CD <t ZD CO LU — LU > zxz tQ Z LU LU CD Z CD 3 <r CO z ZD 72 50M02416 �t^msr. '*r. OF ;v i^^Miiiac«*a.'^r^5a«\,*rwjr»'»*F*-J i 73 50M02416 �cc UJ Q Q UJ Q UJ 2: cc cc UJ CO O u_ cc UJ Q_ UJ CO •D O CO z CD O CD cc UJ > O z F— — O I— z UJ 2: 2 CD I <r < z o o cc <T UJ _1 O TO CO CD z • _J ID CO O O — <x CC |— UJ 01 > O Q_ I— CO z z UJ <T 2: CC Z F— 3: <R I— cr cr <r o _J o_ O CO CO z •d UJ ct: 01 -O UJ O 2: UJ z or CD <t — O_ —I UJ CD <1 CC 2 J- CD z o — z 3: -d CL. CO < UJ O —I O _J UJ <1 UJ U. CD I— CJ> O O CD CO UJ CO cc 7U 50M02416 ��>- cc o t- o •— <r h- Z cc o CD <T _J Z O — LU O CM CO ""5 Q <£ — z O o _J 1 cc o _J — ID CD <1 >- <r X o I— <t c t— — — CO Z LU 2 z o cc cc o CD <r — > z _l CD t— <C _J _J <1 1— LU CD z — z z — • DC LU > o o DC LU 1— DC O D_ CO z «I QC t— LU _J _J LU o Z UJ o cc b- UJ O <r 0co I— LU CD i 21 _l —J m CC LU CO 2 <1 — — o L— CO s z o LU t— <r cc LU Kcc o Qco 2 ID ID C_> <r CC o Oco T~ <c cc 1— c_> >— z LU 2 z o cc — > z LU 21 t— <t LU o <t Q_ CO z <t cc >• 0 LU z 0 — 1— — CO c D_ O z <C h- 00 DC LU Lc CO cr <r DC 1— s O •< z 2: DC LU LU DI DC 1— 1— > LU in I— O 2 LU DC t— Q LU 76 50M02416 ��<r QZ LU CO 2: •< zc o o 1— oz LU 1— oz o CL CO Z <t oz t— 2: o oz Li_ CD LU QZ QZ LU Li_ CO z • CM CO CD z — o —I — zd CO - >- qz O I— -=r oz C CO •et 1 Z o — 1— <r i z 2! — CO _J t— <E oz h- LU 2 2: t— <r o QZ — z z > z LU UJ O <t Q_ CO LU zc O 1— LU z ZC o — 1— (— CD O Q LU 1— z —I < —1 1— 1— o QZ CO QZ <t O QZ LU LU CO LU ZC ll_ CO 1— ZZL _l <1 — 2 QZ 3= o QZ t— - LiLU CO CD o: t— — LU <t h2: QZ CO — O QZ z O Li. o zc Q o LU LU LU CO I— \— CO Z —1 — zz> —1 o o — QZ 2: 3: LU - 2: CO i— I— QZ <t _J <1 _J O LU — ZC 3: LU (— QZ 2: 1— • i— QZ -a • LU Q t— CO QZ 2: LU CD <1 <r CD O QZ <t o CO QZ LU Z> LU U_ \ QZ CO t— I— Z <t LU QZ oz 1— t— 78 CO LU _J o • Z O — t— — CO O CL. z 3 O o O 2= LU zo CO LU ZC hz — o LU o <1 _J Q. CD Z <£ CD Z <t i— CO 1— ZD O S»Z o LU zc o o — 1— 1— OZ I— <t QZ o_ CD ZD o o o QZ o CO o QZ — LU CO cd 21 z -=t ZC o >1— LU — ZC CD h- — 2 CD Q5 z ZC <r LU - > Q — LU 1— CO o —I —I LU o OZ LU ti5 CO O =r _1 —I — li_ 3: o in QZ O CO O ZD CD Z QZ LU CO 2: <z QZ O LU QZ 1— — 21 QZ o CO ZD _J Q- • QZ LU CD QZ <r _i CD z <r CO z o QZ O — 21 Ll— o in o r- o 50M02416 ��CO 1l_l_J 11 f— t— CO =3 CO s 1U_J 11 I— CO • CO co CO CO LU CO Z — Q —I — ZD CO CO >CO >- <t s ce i UJ ce Q_ CO CO U_ -=c o z z CD «=t - CO CO s Z LU ZD Q 1— CD LU CO S 1— ><1 CO CO — _l > —I LU LU Z ce <t •c en O o CO <c _l z o — t— <1 _J ZD LU or I— z 3= O — CO _J <r l— z LU S Z o or — > z LU LU O <r Q_ CO CD CD 1 <r ' ce Ce 1r— <1 t— CO LU CD <t LU re 1— >- CO CD Q III °3 U-i ce CD o i— i1 1• 1i re z I— CD LU DL Q_ S o o CO ce z LU Ll. CD _— re h- o \— UJ CD >- _i Z Ll_ _i ZD — o U— ce ce CO > z z — LU t— Q CD CO o O z t— — LU Q_ Q CO UJ 21 33 S a_ ce —J CD o u_ i— ce UJ ce Qo — UJ ce CO CL. z CD —I 1 — 3s ce z o —I — UJ ZD 00 03 S <x CO or — — CD or 3 t— LU CO or z l— — o — UJ o 1— CD UJ <t — f— ce CO <1 LU 1— CD Q- ZD CD o CD _l 80 50M02416 ��CO cc <x 1 _J 1 LU o z CO 1— Q 2: z z <x t— <x CO Q LU LU _J z 1 LU 1— o z z 1— cn CO cc z o cc Q_ LU o LU —I CO cc DC 21 z 1— <x LU 1— 1— t— CO . z cn Q >- LU Tcn CC o III U_J LU u_ 3= 1— CO o o _J CO —J z o —1 CO o_ o — LU 5 cc 1— LU -a: CO 1 CC cc O. o Q o z 1— 2: CD Q LU <r c_> «=r 1 _j LU z ZD LU z CD 2: Z cc cn t— LU CO > <t co o 1 z o <r >- H- 2: CO cc - LU o —I Q CC DC 1 LU LU t— o t— CO U_ <r 2: CO (— z o DC 3= cc O — CL ZD Q LU I CO O C\J ro co ZT — Q —i — ZD CO >- cc o 1— <1 cc o CD <£ _J Z o o o cc o — 1— •< 1 ZD 2! — cn —j <t I— z LU 2 Z o cc — > z LU LU O <1 Q_ CO — — - — • — — — — 82 50M02416 �83 50M02416 �LU O -J cc <r cc l— CC z Li_ S Q UJ LU CC Q I— Q Z ZD Z OJ ro CD CO CO o <t >cc o V*1 cc o CO <C cc LU LU Q CC CO <r =5 CO z 3 O CD Q <1 O O LU Q Q_ LU o LU CO <1 o CO CC <t CC LU Lu CO o <t <1 3= >- CC CO LU CO O S LU <C Q CC =3 c 2: cc UJ CC CO H- CO (— O LU zc. z I— <x _J U_ Q_ O I— O CC UJ or cc CO I I— CO T— LU CD CO CO Z CO — Z LU o cc _J LU — O • 3= Q CC LU S LU T- h- CO CC <r S -a: <r o <1 o_ co i— LU zx: co Z CJ I— (— LU CO 8U UJ =3 O ZD O CC <C LU > CC <t =3 S Lu CC 50M02416 ��1 CD z Z LU 3 — — Z o 3: 3: I— CD (M 00 z 3: O O Q Z LU 1 Z ZD 00 o hS t— <1 u_ o z o — t— <t t— o cc CD z — o _J — ZD CD - >- a: o i— z UJ UJ O <r CC to LU CC a Q CD <r 2 z <1 <t LU O o •S) O z CC LU z — UJ D» CO z O UJ 1— ~*T UJ z LU z • 1— CC t— - o LU o 1— <r CD HCO CD LU _J Q 1 LU f- O LU — 1— s Q 3 < ZD _J 1— ZD o CO o o u_ Q cc <c 1 > o UJ UJ z — CD •c z CO _J —J s LU cc z cc — LU < <E 3 z _J _J 1— CC o 2 CO t— <r Lc CC O <c o z z UJ z z <£ z o _J h— to LU cc 1— LU z o Q _l 1— I— UJ <r f— cc 2c o _J CJ O t— z LU z O Q — z LU LU CO o Z CC o h- LU —I to 3 •< — 1— O S Q <t _l cc UJ UJ UJ z CO CD t— CD 86 • a LU i— o LU T z o o LU CC LU CO CD Q Z z o — 1— — CO o cc 50M02416 ��CO CCJ I— CO UJ 1— CO _ UJ (— CO >_ co — 2: CC UJ >— UJ CO >CO LxJ or 00 Q h- O O U_ ZD Q uj S CC O U_ CC UJ 3: — o _i — CO >- CC o o — 1— <C CC UJ O- Q_ o S O I— O <1 > O co <t -J —1 az — o 2: CC UJ nr I— O — I— <c —1 CO UJ UJ 2 I— ZT o co cc co o Q_ — co H- z co UJ >- _l < CO t— 3: uj Q <r uj a. 1— co O > UJ CC CO co <r ro ZD <t CO CO — > z uj UJ O <x OCO UJ UJ CO 31 h- UJ C_) zr. I— U_ o t— z o <t UJ u_ UUJ 88 50M02416 ��Q UJ CD CD d CO UJ 2: o o oz Q Z d z d UJ —I o QZ UJ CO UJ 21 CO d z —I o 1 — UJ 3: z 1 r~ cc CM ro CD z o —J — ZD CO 1— z UJ 2: Q_ — Z to oz o UCD z — Q <r o - >- CC o hd cc o CO d i z o CM CO CD z Q 1 2T (— Ud O — z CO UJ t— Z z 1— o UJ z 1— t— o CO UJ UJ —J 1— _J o to oz 2 » UJ t— 1— CO cc >- d CO o o 1— ilZ o d CO — • f— UJ QZ oz z UJ UJ 1— U- 1— co QZ u_ z o o d a_ oz co z 1— z d o — UJ cc J— z t— UJ t— _J UJ Q_ o z 2: t— t— o o Q o UJ UJ I— z DZ CO — ir o o >— z UJ <t o o d z —I d Q- < ZD 21 — CO 1 <t t— z UJ 2: z o QZ — > z 1 1J1 U UJ o d o_ CO 90 o UJ i— QZ o QCO z d oz 1— O ~ " — U- QZ UJ UJ CO > UJ _l QZ _J — \- 3 Z UJ 2; s 1— z d CD UJ _J Z d 1— oz o u_ 50M02416 ��z o — I— < CO — U— cn LLI > t— z UJ 2 Z CO — _l <£ 2 zd ZD O c > \ _i <s 2; cc UJ Z t— 1— CO 0 Q_ • 21 O O cn z «i UJ _J CO - CD CO CO z 0 1 — ZD CO CO co 2: z 0 2: cn UJ 1— UJ Q t— <t cn O hQ UJ 2 C£ O • U_ 1— cn z UJ UJ o- 2 z UJ 0 m cr — —1 > _J z — UJ 3: 2 Z Z3 O ZO — CO t— <1 < > O — —I u_ <s — 2 OC CC UJ UJ > z i— 1— Z UJ UJ z 2 Hz CO u_ 0 —I < CO t— 2 CO 1— UJ < U_ u Z Ul «a: UJ Z V— 92 <t QUJ QC o_ Z — O UJ CO CO < CO UJ cn UJ CO _j — 3 2 1— UJ z y« 1— z UJ 2 z z CO 0 — — 1— <1 1— CO 0; T" 0 CD3 CO O z _J <r _l DC O tu_ CE O U_ 50M02416 ��l— U1 >- o CD cc <r o CC UJ m 1— Q_ QZD CD UJ CU ZD CO 2: o cc o t— u_ zz Q UJ — cc UJ I— cc > • z CO <t X UJ 1— cr h- UJ o Q_ CO CD ~2Z — Q <£ O 1 - CO < CO UJ o cc o u_ cc — <t zzz o 1— CD zz. _J i UJ o 2 UJ CO >- _1 Q—1 Q. — ZD 3: CD cc UJ 1— CC O QCO z <r cc h- cc UJ Q_ ZD CO UJ in h- o i— 2 z: f— — <r cc UJ UJ m _i 1I c cc h- 94 50M02416 ��z 0 1 r~ <t 1— UJ 0 1 Ll- Q- CO 2; zc 2 O 0 O z UJ <1 ZD O I— O <1 CO - DC UJ h- CD <1 cc _J LU cc <X H- li ce: 0 Q 1— O O —1 UJ CO CO u_ ZD 1— O O LU Q cc cc O O 0 2 O- Ll- z 1— — CU 00 t— z O H<t ZD cc z LU cc — L— t— CC <t f— UD O UJ «I CD CL. cl. —1 1— Lt- — UJ UJ to CO H- to CC 21 z <t z cc — Q Z z <t _] <t cc —1 H— — LU 0- Z >- — t— UJ ZD ZD 1— O <1 LU > CO z — 1— J to J LU — — ZD 1 t— • <C O 2 cc Q. 2 cc 2 Q_ UJ UJ 1— <1 CD _J O O cc JZ h- >t— Ll_ t— 2 LU ZD ZD O O O CC a. 1 3 2 ZD J O O O > 2 J z t— C m 2 (— CD CC UJ — UJ 0 1— _1 1 <1 Q_ u_ ZD (— UJ UJ ZD O 2: UJ zc 1— • 1— zc O UJ 1 z: l— 11 1 O DC t_J 11 1 LLJ zz LL- ZC — CI CD 96 30M02416 ��cc 111 LU —I <t cc 1— 1— Ll. 1 o CC CC 1— CO Q CD <t o cc — o o co CO iC 1UJ 1 1 cc (— S z o — it: co it: o cc 11 LL. Q ILU II o <x Q I1 11 1 (— CC O CC CO z <1 cc (— T 1— c 1 Q. —i CO LU O CO CO • <t Q — cc o _l Li_ •» Q_ — CC 1— CO o — iC CO o CO iC _J 2: _l LU — 31 3 hcc o LU I— 1— cc o O LU cc CO z <r t— cc o cc CC CO 1- z <r LU CC 3= I— I1 Q z <t 98 50M02416 ��CD O LU CO z 2: I 1— UJ 0 z 1r~ I CD O CO . en O UJ en en UJ u_ en z <t en > UJ —J CO CO 1L—I1 —1i z en Li_ — UJ 0 _J 1— z en 0 -a 0 z UJ o_ UJ _J en 0 z t— -a: CO UJ oc UJ z h- X bo O h- 1 UJ - CD Z — O _l — ZD CO en z 0 — b<1 en UJ Q_ 0 I— u_ <t en 0 UJ O c Q_ en CD UJ z z «t 2: 21 UJ 0 1— z 1— <t 1— CO UJ 1— <x <1 z I— CD 21 UJ "5T O — O O u_ en QC — u_ 1— z en CD <t UJ UJ UJ 0 en _J en 0 UJ o_ u_ 2: ZD en 1— z <x. CD <t UJ en UJ _J b- z <1 (— UJ UJ CO CD z — UJ CD —J 0 — z _J 3= <t —1 CD UJ CD CD <r CD -y z b- — 2; "5" en 3: H1— -a: <t l— 2; ZD 0 UJ UJ O 0 z z zn Q: 1— 1— 0 UJ UJ 0 z z z 0 b- <1 100 50M02416 ��O UJ UJ ZD ZD 2 o o O: Z <t UJ CO LU —I o s 1— <t - CD z — >- o —I Q_ UJ Q CD Q _J — ZD CO CO Z O 1— <r — CD U1 1— UJ _1 zz DC — UJ CD 3D 3= 2: >- CD oZ Q —J <x UJ Q_ CD UJ CD ZD Q UJ CO 1— <z CD CD UJ ZZ UJ 2; Q— 3= CO UJ z CO UJ — ZD 1— z — Q UJ CD —I _J 1 _J 3= <r >- ZD CD CO UJ — 3= O o. <r UJ Q_ CO <r z O _J z UJ —i ZZ «=t f— 3z Q <r UJ CO UJ —I > o —I 3D s UJ 1— > — UJ CD • -z- O 1— — — CO o 0_ o LU CD CD O. O UJ <C t— o CO 3D _J o CD Q_J CO — UJ Q 1 — UJ 'S- DC u_ UJ h- O 3D HCD UJ h- u_ <r CD CD UJ CD <t Q_ CO • UJ z zz <t ZZ — Z: CD • CO >- Q ZD Z cz Z <t — CO CO DC UJ CD CD <r — <r zz> UJ \— 3D CD X h— Ll_ 3 3: — 102 50M02416 ��<t 2: LU 03 CD LU CC a. O —J LU CO I— —1 33 <t — I— CD 3 • — o o cc Z O — I— <1 CD — cc z I— O O CO U- — LU I— > O <t Z LU CD — —J — —1 Lu _J lu <r — <t LU o < CD z CD • ZD CO CO z o <t CC LU Q. O CC o LU o <r Qco Q — h- CC CL CC CO LU — LU Z > (J LU Z CC CD LU Q. CD CD CD — — <t — 3; -J LU <c s < >- _l CO . (— — <t (— Z Lu Z Q Z LU QC UJ LU 2: h- LU N S — CO I Z CC UJ Z D CD LU (— o. X LU CD < LU CC LU — LU _l D CD < O Z LU J K CC CC —I LU LU CO I— — x :x C — LU (— Z I— H- Z CO LU — <T <1 CO ^ z Z 1— a_ — o z — CD Lu LU 21 2: o — LU CC ZD LU >Z O CC Lu f— Lu H- I CC CO CO CC LU Z LU LU a_ I 04 50M02416 ��UJ a: (— o z <c I ) UJ t er CO z UJ 1— CO >- CO z o o en 2: <t UJ _i o 1— ZD o o UJ re o CO 2 UJ 1— CO >CO 21 1— z (— <r - Q UJ t— o UJ z z o o UJ CD — CD z — o _J — J UJ z <r Q. CO Q U— o z o — 1— UJ _J Qz o o UJ re H1— <r • z ZD en °S o O I— =3 UJ Q_ o — (— c a: UJ Q_ o I— u_ <t en o UJ o <r Q_ CO Q UJ z z <x z >1— O 1— o en Cn Q z <£ UJ rC 1— • or UJ o UJ 1— <t z hu_ O CO z (— «s. o_ co z <r Q z <t Q UJ CD CD <1 CQ UJ CO Z _J en o u_ z o t<1 or <c o_ UJ en en z — o UJ re o CO z UJ 1— CO >- CO UJ O c en UJ 1— Q_ <r <t CO Z ZD o z z i— <r _J 1 z — (— 3= <£ z i— UJ re H- UJ re t— u_ o < en - o t— 1— ro o UJ _j it: re <t o t— z UJ — re o Li o 1— 06 50M02416 ��Q zz. <r Q LU t— o 2 O o LU o o ac z ZSZ o CD <r LU >- zzz 1 _l _J <r LU 1 o s: h- <X o s: i— <c LU cc t— - cd ZZL o I— —1 —I — zz cc <r LU CD o — cc — 1 2 1— <t zz *2o (— LU CC <x. 1— CO LU o <s t— Q z <t Q o LU LU LU _J zxz > LU H- o • — zz zz. O — «=r — ZD CD (— cc _J o <r Q_ . LU to CC _l 00 LU CD CD cc LU <t < CD I— o CD ZD Q_ o <1 cc s cc CD LU L— CO <r Q_ <r . s: LU cc ZD LU 1— CD LU ~Z> CC ZD CO ZZZ O — 1— <1 a: LU D_ —I HQ LU C o to LU CD _J itC s L±o 1 LU LU CC CC CC LU CD 1— o to o 3: 1— Ll_ <t cc o UJ o I— CD <t — cc cu CO cc Ho ZD o cc (— cc \— o ZE 1— Ll_ o o LU >1 1 o LU LU (— o DC CC 1— <x LU 1— Q LU ZZZ h- Z3Z <t z ZD o s. z 108 LU CC t— z z: o o o LU _J LU 50M02416 ��en LU o <t QCO en Z <r LU o 2 tC - CD z — o — ZD CO CO z o (— <r DC LU Qo LL- <£ QZ CJ LU CJ C 0_ CO i 11 i• _J 1— LU •Z 1— - 1— I— zr. z z nz • T O O LU CO Z <c CO LU ZD > LU o 2 Q_ O z ZZ) 1— CD 1 1— CO 1 zn LU <£ CD 1— o CI LU LU O 3: ry CO z 2! 2 CD LU _i CD CO o o >- z LLZ 2 ZD 1 CO o LU LU en. •=1 ZJZ CD z o LU — o 00 en — LU t— _i 1— CD — <£ LU 00 21 — _J — 3= LU zo t— o U- CO Q CD o LU Z <t 00 _J <z CO LU LU «a CO zc ziz CJ LU h1I 1r— en <x O Li_ LU 2 (— o o_ ~5" >- QZ z ZD LU _I zn o — <T 1— O CD LU LU — 1 CO z Q_ ZD 2 Ll_ O o Q z LU <x zc <c 0= UJ zn i— Lu O t— CD LU Ll_ LI_ LU LU Z1Z t— z CD 1UJ 11 oz CJ o 1— CD CO <r QC LU 1— Li_ — — en en CD <c LU LU I— 2 CO - LU > LU en z z H- en o ziz LU or LU LU (— CO 1— <1 1— I— en <r Q_ LU • -=T 2 _J LU z <x _u -a 3 f- Q LU <c O O h- — zc 50M02416 ��3 2: 0 0 3 z <t LU 3 O 2 h<c 1 CO =D UJ OO 3 1— 3 O X 0 OO 3 UJ 3 — 3 Q UJ UJ CO 1— <c <c 3 LU 3 3 O O CD 3 Q 3 3 CO 00 3 0 h<1 3 LU 3 O 1— 3 <t 3 O LU O <1 QCO BE 3 CO CD 3 3 f— z - 1— CO UJ f— 0 0 00 3 O _J — CO 3 CO — 1— X co UJ 0 1— UJ 1— UJ I— _J <x 3 2 X Q CO 3 «=t O 3: 3 -a: 2: 1— <t 0 X 2 LU _l X —i UJ 3 1— Z — 3 h— — 3 Q UJ t— Z 3 O X 1 LU Z <1 3 O °o O - Q LU Z z <x 2 UJ X 3 LU y- f— CO >- co 0 X 3 3 t— 3 CD — 3 3 1— 00 3 t— 3 1— <C "^7 Q 3 <1 3 3 3 1— 3 O Z O 1— 3 3 3 X O C-3 3 3 h1— -=r 1— CO — 3 <t 0 1— O CO 3 3 <r 1— 0 3 CD 3 t— 3 3 3 — i— <1 2 H3 3 3 00 0 3 3 3 2 — 3 > 3 3 3s I— 0 CO < 1 CO 3 0 3 3 O 3 3 3 CD 3 0 — <1 JC 3 — i— > O 3 3 3 3 3 3 O 3 CD — 3 CO 3 = > CD <1 CD 0 2 1— <t 3 3 — CO CO 3 0 (- 3 <r 3 — 0 3 — 1— 3 — 3 3 3 1— CO CO CO — <t 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 <1 t— 3 3 3 O CO 3 — O 3: O <C 3 3 3 • CO •< CO 0 3 3 3 O CO 0 3 1— — X — 3 CO > CO t— 3 3 H3 O O 0 <r 3 0 O 3 <t — O O 3 3 3 0 3 3 X 3 3 l— O (— 3 CD O • f— 3 3 0 3 3 O — <r 3 0 3 3 3 — >- O 0 t- 3 3 CO — CD 0 — 00 CO 3 O 3 — 0 3 3 — 0 3 1— O 3= 3 sc 3 0 — O 3 3 3 3 - 1— CO CO UJ Hc X o 3 <£ 3 0 3 > • 3 h<t 3 CD 3 1— 3 1— CO <r 3 3 3 t— 0 l— 0 3 t— 3 0 3 CO 3 <t 3 h- • 3 3 <t 3 0 Q Q 3 <r 3 3 Q 3 3 3 H- > 3 0 — 3 3 3 X i— h<r >-. • ^ CO X 3 0 3 3 -=r 3 1— 1— co <t I 12 50M02416 ��<z —1 I— CO LU t— LU z h- o LU — (- Q LU z <c or CD LU t— z — CO or Ui 3= O _J 1— CO <r LU z h— z 2: t— <r 2: i LU or ZD 1— X — U— — ZD CO CO V CD o — L— <C or LLJ Q_ O z — c zz. <r DZ Q 1— Li_ <t or O LU CD <r OCO Q LiJ z z <r 21 DZ CO 3S — Q —I 3 Q LU t— <t 21 — — Z ZD o or CD s: V— <t Q z <r hCO LU z 1— CO • Q Z c or <£ LU _1 or O ZD CO 1— X 2 — 1— LL. <T CD LU z DZ — 1— _J Q Z O <r z DZ <c f— Q CO Z ZD 1— o CO or LU CD hLU Q DZ LU 1— T— <T o or 1— CD z LU — h— Z o — LU or »— LU CO 3= <t O LU _J i m CD z — • LU DZ t— — LI_ o 2: or or o ZD LU h3= I— O o O —1 CO LU CD LU LU or ZC ZC ZD 1— 1— O- or LU 3 — o s —I Q —J LU _l —I CD LU z L— LU CO <r hCO z LU CO - <t <1 _J CO LU or ZD 1— X — Ll. CD 2 — _J Q Z <r zc o z ZD o or CD LU DZ t— Ll. O Q_ O 1— Z o Q LU O <1 1 CL. 0 0 >1r~ 1 1I —i o <r LU ZD Q z Z LU o — Z <r 1— CD I— z — t— o _1 o <t LU LU Q CO CO z <r z LU o DZ — LU 1— 3: _i 1 or <r 1 LU iI— Ir— CO 3= CO — z — Q —I <r LU LU CD CO — ZC 2 _J CO L— C — or <r 3r LU _J Z 2 o HI— CO <r • 21 2 LU 1— T— DZ <T <T t— LU LU Z Z i— i— — z o — 1— <t or LU OO CO — z i— 50M02416 �I I5 50M02416 �o I— <r _i <t i— co o o Q Z <T (— CO 1— CO UJ 1— Q UJ I— -a: cn. CO CD UJ 1— z Q z <r 1— CO <r UJ o cc UJ I— Q_ <t O <£ Q O cc <t -=I cc c_> UJ o <t Q_ CO cc UJ Q_ O- CD z — Q —I — ZD 03 CO z o — t— cc UJ Q_ O hU_ -=t CC o UJ o >=t Q_ CO Q UJ ZZL Z <r s o_ o o 1— UJ cc —I UJ z _l t— o <1 cc 1— o UJ CO a. o z CO <x z —J <t o_ UJ cc CO ho (- _J o Z _J —I — —I 3: o Q Q_ UJ cc <1 CC UJ UJ > UJ s o z o o t— -J X o o UJ UJ 1— _j CO 1— Q_ CO Q s —J <1 UJ o —I —I cc o — Q_ cc 3 UJ z u_ CD UJ _J CO z z CO z o <r <1 o cc cc UJ 1— UJ 3 UJ CO o UJ z o 1 cc Hz z UJ 1— o o z o f— z t- z cc z . 1— o <t CO — 1 —I hCO CO UJ <t cc 1— cc cc — cc UJ UJ 1— o Q. s Q_ Q_ o UJ CO z 1 -c UJ <r UJ UJ z cc z z 1— f— 1— 1— Q cc u_ z o o <£ u_ 50M024L6 ��j j I Z o 33 — t— X 33 CO — —1 «I 33 3 1— —1 <t y CC 03 <1 _l hr- t— — n CO 1— 33 z CO r^n X LU 1 CO s o o X UJ —i CO 2! O o m o z z> <=c —1 o 1— o 1— t— o LU 1— CC o QCO z <t cc 1— LU CO — CO z <t cc f— Z — t— <t T _l —I _J — 3 s H<r s: i LU z t— Z. — o 33 o LU y —I LU O — 03 o 3C cc S _J 1 z o — <t LU LU z _J o cc o LU 1— 1— y CO 1— o <1 z — z o <c LU o o 2! h- X —I s: 1— co _l <1 LU <t > s LU <1 OC Z LU LU 1— Z I— • t— CC — LU LU 03 1— LU cc —1 o — _J CO 1— — CO 3 2 LU < **7~ <r CC 1— _i 1— CO s; o o LU cc CC _J Lo — o 1— Q_ Q z <c LU LU CD LU CC LU 3C 33 z I— Q- I— |— 50M02416 ��CE 1UJ •1 hQZ O 0_ CO ZZ <t ce I— O —i i O a. <t UJ DC t— 2 O CE u_ Q IUJ II 1— U— CD iE O <1 f— CO CO ro LU o — _i CO l— — Z =D 1> s: UJ S ZD cc hCO z IUJ II DC 1— —1 1— <£ 1I I11I CO Q UJ —1 1— —1 <£ — 2 S Q 2 1— <X o o o zz ZD <t <1 CO CO X UJ —1 Q_ 2 o o zc o z: ZD •a: —i I 20 X UJ 2 _J —1 c_> O ZSZ UJ UJ Q > ZD O CE zc CO z UJ UJ zc t— DC O z: ZD <r _J UJ zz t— o 1— 50M024 16 ��LU 03 CC t- d 1 rr o — CO CO 33 LU 1— CO X CO LU _J o LU or LU CD — LU > CC n: iC o ro 3= CJ s Q_ <r UJ h- cc cc CC Z 1— LU o LU hit; CC CO co — o <c LU I— —1 z: or CO d <_> — o - 3= CO cc LU s: o CO or LU CO CD I— 1— z: d CO LU CO >- CO u_ CO o Ll_ z — O o oo i— 1 LU CO CO t<r Ll. 1— — d LU — CO CL _J > cc LU ro cc LU CC o LU CC CO o 1— O CO CO LL_ d s — LU 1— Z CO z d d d o CO LU CC LU or I— ro > rr o d LU re OT • 33 re — CM o ic o LU or o Q d Q_ CO rn o o o CO —1 O CC — 1 — LU — 1— CL. >3= — X _J . u_ u_ O 1 1— Ll_ — _J — 1— Z —: Z o — Hd CC LU Q_ o ro u. CO LU LU S o 1— sc Q_ o d — \— <x z s O d LU LU LU X CO iC or o I— o CD cc _J d z Q_ _J 1— — Q. — CO 3E d 3: 22 50M02416 ��z 1 — ZD QZ CO 1— CO 2: LU z t— — QZ UJ t— u_ <1 I1 _i ID <t 1— • z Q <C UJ 2 QZ QZ — O ZD O O UJ UJ UJ zr oz CO t— u_ >- — _i — _J z CO S O 1— — CO zn ZD 1— 1— O z — oz UJ 3= — 21 0 QZ LL LL QZ UJ O UJ Q_ 1 f— X f— <Z UJ U- UJ — ZC CO <r -J CO <1 _l — zc UJ 3= 0 3£ ZZ3 21 CO CO H•c <t CO 2 z z 1 O O >- ctz <r CO CO UJ 0 UJ z • (— z UJ 2: >- 0 -J CO LLI Q CO z — 3= O z — — CD UJ 1— I— z zc c <c — 1— QZ 1— ZxZ UJ O Q- UJ O O 2 • 124 50M02416 �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Tony O'Neil Apollo Telescope Mount Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000064 Title A name given to the resource "APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT SEQUENTIAL FLOW PLAN." Description An account of the resource This is a manual that describes the handling and use of the Apollo Telescope Mount prior to launch. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1968-09-23 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1965-1970 Subject The topic of the resource George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Skylab Program Apollo applications program Apollo Telescope Mount Type The nature or genre of the resource Technical Manuals Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Tony O'Neil Apollo Telescope Mount Collection Box 1, Folder 1 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/199/14390/sdsp_skyl_000055_001.pdf 696ad6a094f47e3b934bf3d9e5fa7221 PDF Text Text GEORGE C. HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA APPENDIX TO SPENT STAGE EXPERIMENT SUPPORT MODULE PROPOSAL JUNE 1966 FOR NASA INTERNAL USE ONLY National Aeronautics and Space Administration MSFC - Form 454 (Revised September 1961) ��TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SECTION 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1-1 SECTION 2.0 DESIGN GROUND RULES 2-1 SECTION 3.0 MISSION SEQUENCE 3-1 SECTION 4.0 VIBRATION AND ACOUSTIC TESTING 4-1 SECTION 5.0 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM SCHEMATICS 5-1 SECTION 6.0 INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM AND COMPONENTS 6-1 SECTION 7.0 HANDLING SEQUENCE (SSESM) 7-1 SECTION 8.0 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 8-1 SECTION 9.0 TEST AND SIMULATION FACILITIES 9-1 SECTION 10.0 CREW FAMILIARIZATION PLAN 10-1 ��SECTION 1.0 INTRODUCTION This Appendix contains supplementary material on selected subjects which complements the MSFC Spent Stage Experiment Support Module (SSESM) Proposal. Presented are the design ground rules upon which the SSESM design is based, mission and mission task sequences, structural testing criteria, electrical system schematics, instrumentation equipment list and measurements, maintenance con cepts, handling procedures, and crew familiarization requirements. 1-1 ��SECTION Z. 0 Z. 1 DESIGN GROUND RULES MISSION DESIGN GROUND RULES Z. 1.1 General The Saturn IB Design Ground Rules, revision Z, R-P&VE-VAD-65-10 1, will apply except where specifically stated otherwise. a . Mission. - Mission objective of the S-IVB Spent Stage Experiment is to activate the AS-Z09 S-IVB LH2 tank into a large pressurized workshop in which astronauts can operate in a shirt-sleeve e n v i r o n m e n t f o r 4 h o u r s p e r 1 6 - h o u r p e r i o d f o r ZO d a y s . M i n i m u m change to the Saturn IB launch vehicle and Block II Command Service Module (CSM) and maximum use of developed and qualified subsystems, operational procedures and techniques should be employed whenever possible. A design objective is to retain a readiness and capability on the S-IVB stage and CSM for use on a standard Apollo mission. (1) Orbit Conditions. - It will be determined if CSM propulsion must be used for orbit circularization to meet the minimum mission duration. (Z) Experiment Definition. - The p r i m a r y experiment is the passivation and activation of the S-IVB spent stage into a workshop capable of supporting manned activity and the activation of the Spent Stage Experiment Support Module (SSESM) and associated support systems. A limited number of corollary experiments will be incorporated in the S-IVB Spent Stage Experiment. Experiment equipment will be stowed or installed inside and/or outside the SSESM during launch into orbit. (3) Orbital Operation (a) The transposition and docking maneuver will be accomplished after orbital confirmation and systems checkout. (b) The planned Apollo docking procedure will be followed which includes fold-out of the spacecraft Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) adapter panels to their normal 45-degree deployment position. It will be determined what the subsequent deployment will be. Z-l �(c) The S-IVB stage will stabilize and control its own attitude during the CSM transposing and docking maneuver. (d) The CSM will provide all stabilization and control required for the spacecraft after the transposing and docking maneuver is completed. (e) Attitude control of the spacecraft will be pro vided when required for experiment operation and thermal control of t h e w o r k s h o p . I t w i l l b e d e t e r m i n e d if o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o t h e r than those stated dictate attitude control for the spacecraft for specified periods of operation. (f) Propulsion capabilities for the CSM for orbital abort will be maintained throughout the entire mission. (g) After transposing and docking, the CSM will provide all orbital guidance and earth communication. (h) Service Module (SM) propellant loading will be in accordance with mission requirements. (i) Preparation for activation of the workshop will be made after the transposing and docking maneuver and normal inflight checkout have been accomplished. (j) All equipment required for S-IVB LH2 tank habitation and experiment utilization will be carried external to the S-IVB LH2 tank at launch and assembled manually in orbit. (k) LH2 tank will be vented prior to astronaut egress from the air lock. (1) T h e S - I V B L H 2 t a n k w i l l b e m a d e r e a d y f o r occupancy by astronaut removal and storage of the LH2 tank dome hatch, followed by attachment of a stowed flexible pressure sealing boot between the aft end of the air lock and the LH2 tank dome hatch mounting surface. (m) LH2 tank passivation functions will be tele metered via the Instrument Unit (IU) for ground monitoring. 2 - 2 �(n) The LH2 interior tank wall will have a p r o tective coating to inhibit burning of insulation if the tank wall is penetrated by a micrometeoroid. (o) Titanium spheres located within the LH2 tank will either be removed or protective covers will be installed. b. Configuration. - The Saturn IB spent stage experiment launch vehicle will consist of an operational Saturn IB launch vehicle and air lock unit. The Saturn IB launch vehicle is composed of the S-IB stage, S-IVB stage, and IU. The first Saturn IB launch vehicle utilized will be AS-209. Modifications to the Saturn and Apollo hardware will be held to a minimum. Modification to AS-209 which could prevent the accomplishment of its primary mission a s an Apollo backup will not be permitted. Existing or off-the-shelf hardware will be used to mini mize cost, schedule, and development problems. S-IVB/IU subsystems which represent a potential hazard to the astronaut will be modified to provide a method(s) of passivation. Add-on type S-IVB subsystem passivation modifications will be installed at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Subsystems to be investigated for passivation should include, but not be restricted to, the following: Electrical System, Hydraulic System, Stored Gases, Ordnance System, and Propellant. c. Interface Requirements. - MSFC will control the following interfaces in addition to the Saturn IB launch vehicle interfaces: Air lock to CSM, Air lock to S-IVB Stage, Air lock to IU, Air lock to SLA, Air lock to the Launch Complex, and Air lock to the Government Furnished Support Equipment. All interfaces will be controlled in accordance with the Interface Control Documents (ICD's) in the Apollo Intercenter Interface Control Document Log (1A01) and the Saturn Interface Control Document Log (1S0 1). 2-3 �2 . 1 . 2 Expe riments a. Experiment Integration. - MSFC will integrate experi ments and develop interface specifications. b. Weight. - The maximum weight of corollary experi ments and associated equipment will not exceed 1, 000 pounds. 2 . 1 . 3 Launch Facilities The Saturn IB Spent Stage Experiment launch vehicle will be capable of being launched from Launch Complexes (LC) 34 and 37B. 2 . 2 S-IB STAGE DESIGN GROUND RULES Configuration of the S-IB stage for the Saturn IB Orbital Workshop launch vehicle will be identical to the S-IB stage for the operational Saturn IB launch vehicle. 2. 3 S-IVB STAGE DESIGN GROUND RULES 2-3.1 General a. Configuration. - The S-IVB Orbital Workshop is an operational S-IVB/IB stage, with minor modifications to support the spent stage experiment. b. Interface Requirements (1) Interface Tooling. - The a i r lock flexible bellows adapter interface tooling (master mating gauge) will be manufactured by the S-IVB stage contractor. 2 . 3 . 2 Structure (Propellant Containers) a. The LH2 tank forward dome access opening will be enlarged to a 43-inch diameter. 4 2-4 �b. Provisions will be made for the storage of the LH2 tank forward access dome hatch. c. A hand valve will be provided in the LH2 tank forward dome hatch, or in the near vicinity, for manually venting hydrogen gas which is liberated from the LH2 tank insulation. d. The LH2 tank forward dome will have provisions to mate and make a pressure tight connection with the flexible bellows adapter. e. One hundred holes will be drilled and tapped at the intersections of the waffle pattern grids in the LH2 tank for the pur pose of mounting equipment and experiments. Work will be accomplished in accordance with MSFC SK10-8270. f. An atmosphere circulation blower system will be required within the LH2 tank. 2 . 3 . 3 Propulsion System (Propellant Evacuation) a. Venting of the LH2 tank will be accomplished by the nonpropulsive vent system. b. Method (s) to be employed to evacuate residual and flight performance reserve LOX will be determined. c. Existing controls will be modified to accomplish evacuating and/or venting of propellants. 2.3.4 Environmental Control System The environmental control system which is located on the air lock support structure will provide atmosphere supply to the workshop. 2 . 4 SSESM DESIGN GROUND RULES 2. 4. 1 General The SSESM is defined as an independent air lock unit which interconnects the CSM and the S-IVB LH2 tank and is mounted at the 2-5 �LEM attach points in the LEM adapter. The SSESM will include docking capability with the CSM and will provide environmental control system, electrical power, and life support to the S-IVB spent stage for the entire mission. The air lock and docking structure will not be connected to or transmit loads to the S-IVB stage hydrogen tank forward dome during powered flight of the launch vehicle. a. Configuration. - The SSESM will include an air lock, docking structure, environmental control system, electrical power system, and support equipment, as defined below. It will also include the support structure for these systems, expendables, and experiment stowage. The air lock will have the capability for independent and integrated operation with the CSM and S-IVB Workshop. b. Interface Requirements (1) Interface Tooling. - Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and/or the spacecraft contractor will provide the air lock/ space craft interface tooling. The S-IVB stage contractor will provide the air lock/S-IVB adapter interface tooling. (2) Field Splice Connecting Hardware. - MSFC will supply the connecting hardware for all air lock unit field splices. The interface hardware will be specified and documented in vehicle assembly documentation by the S-IB stage contractor. The hardware will be delivered to Cape Kennedy in compliance with the vehicle assembly schedule for AS-209. c. Alignment. - Air lock unit to S-IVB forward bulkhead alignment is not critical as the design of the flexible adapter will allow for minor misalignment. Internal alignment of the air lock unit compo nents will be controlled by an MSFC drawing "to be released. " This drawing will govern pertinent design documentation but will not be used for manufacturing, procurement of hardware, inspection of manufactured items or assembly. d. Reliability. - The reliability goal for the SSESM has not been established. 2-6 �e . Weights. - The maximum weight of the SSESM and corollary experiments is 10, 996 pounds. The control weight is presently established as 9, 000 pounds without the carry-on experiments. These weights are preliminary and will be revised. 2.4.2 Test Requirements The complete SSESM test item and subsystem will be functionally tested to verify the capability to meet the structural loads, natural and induced environments expected during mission lifetime. Human factor task tests will be performed to assure man/machine compatibility. Electrical power requirements during ground test operations will be provided from an external source. 2.4.3 Flight Mechanics a . Natural Environments. - Design of the SSESM will be based on applicable natural (space) environmental conditions, as given in NASA reports TMX-53273 and NASA TMX-53023. b. Induced Environments. - Design of the SSESM will be based on applicable induced environmental conditions, as given in MSFC Report IN-P&VE-S-63-1. 2.4.4 Structure a. General. - The operational air lock will provide minimum environment perturbation on the CSM, micrometeorite pro tection as great as CSM, even lighting distribution, local voice communi cations, and operational sensing equipment to all systems required for the operations of the workshop. The docking structure will make maxi mum use of existing CSM/LEM design and components. The a i r lock will be capable of accommodating two suited astronauts, and a locking through cycle will normally be done for two astronauts. The air lock will allow for astronaut suit donning and doffing. b. Emergency Facilities. - The air lock will provide for emergency occupancy by two astronauts independent of the CSM. c . Factors of Safety. - The following factors of safety are the minimum values to be applied. They are to be used in addition �to consideration of vibration magnification and shock given to surge phenomena, coupling between stages and propulsion system vibrations. Analytical investigations and test results will be used to validate the actual factors of safety of hydraulic and pneumatic systems. Safety factors different from those specified in the guide will require approval by the procuring agency. (1) General Structure Manned Vehicle Yield factor of safety Ultimate factor of safety s 1.10 = 1.40 (2) Hydraulic o r Pneumatic Systems Flexible hose, tubing, ducts, and fittings less than 11/2 inches in diameter. Proof pressure Burst pressure = 2.00 X limit pressure = 4.00 X limit pressure Flexible hose, tubing, ducts, and fittings 1 1/2 inches in diameter and greater. Proof pressure Burst pressure = 1. 50 X limit pressure = 2. 50 X limit pressure Actuating cylinders, valves, filters, switches. Proof pressure Burst pressure = 1. 50 X limit pressure = 2. 50 X limit pressure Reservoirs Proof pressure Yield pressure Burst pressure = 1. 50 X limit pressure = 1. 10 X limit pressure: 2. 00 X limit pressure d. Pimensions. - The cylindrical air lock will be nominally 65 inches in diameter and a minimum of 110 inches long (gross length). T h e l e n g t h m a y b e g r e a t e r t h a n 1 1 0 i n c h e s if n e c e s s a r y . 2-8 �e. Access. - The air lock will contain three hatches: Top hatch (Apollo command module exit) identical to LEM docking hatch. Side hatch (exit to LEM adapter area). Bottom hatch (entrance to S-IVB stage hydrogen tank) will be 48 inches in diameter. All equipment for the workshop will pass through the air lock. f. Docking Structure. - The top of the a i r lock and support structure will include a docking structure compatible with the Block II Apollo spacecraft and similar to the LEM docking adapter. The docking structure will be capable of carrying all loads induced by the SM propulsion system a s a result of orbit change maneuvers in addition to docking loads. g . Adapter (air lock/S-IVB). - Provisions will be made for a pres sure-tight connection to the S-IVB LH2 forward dome mounting surface after removal of the dome cover which provides a pressure environment for passage from the air lock to the hydrogen tank. h. Equipment Support and Storage. - The air lock support structure will be capable of supporting all experiment and support equipment as well as the air lock. Equipment to be used inside the S-IVB hydrogen tank during operation in orbit will be stowed on the air lock unit during launch. i. Umbilicals. - Two pressure suit loop umbilicals will be provided in the air lock. Umbilical length will be sufficient to allow the astronaut to move to the S-IVB common bulkhead. j. Lightning Protection. - The air lock unit will have the capability to receive and discharge lightning without damage to the vehicle. For additional information see Kennedy Space Center policy memorandum dated November 30, 1964. k. Electrostatic Compatibility. - It will be determined if a positive shorting system is required to make the air lock/docking mechanism and CSM compatible during docking maneuver. 2-9 �2 . 4 . 5 Propulsion System There is no propulsion system associated with the air lock unit. 2.4.6 Astrionic Systems a. Electrical System (1) Battery power will provide a maximum of ele c t rical power with an average of 750 watts for 4 hours/16-hour cycle for Environmental Control System (ECS), housekeeping, scientific purposes, and lighting requirements. (2) Provisions will be made for electrical and i n s t r u mentation support for activities inside the S-IVB LH2 tank. (3) General lighting requirements will be determined and provided for the air lock and the S-IYB LH2 tank. (4) Necessary electrical controls and displays of critical S-IVB spent stage parameters will be centralized on panels to be located within the air lock. b. Instrumentation System ( 1 ) B a s i c i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n w i ll a l l o w m o n i t o r i n g o f air lock environmental control system and housekeeping during pad checkout, ascent, and orbit. Basic system does not include visual coverage or data storage. (2) Telemetry will utilize existing IU antenna system. (3) System checkout and procedures will be compatible with present system. CSM. (4) Vehicle-to-ground voice communication will be by Local voice communication will be by spacecraft system. (5) Lighting requirements for television o r film cameras will be defined if the requirement exists. (6) It will be determined if monitoring of experiments i s required. 2-10 �2.4.7 Environmental Control System (ECS) Flight qualified Gemini, Saturn, or Apollo hardware components will be used whenever expedient. Refurbished flight components are acceptable. a. Function. - The environmental control system will provide atmosphere supply to the S-IVB LH2 tank and the air lock. b. Display. - ECS displays will be located in the air lock c. C o n t r o l s . •• and LH2 tank. (1) ECS controls for the a i r lock and LH2 tank will be located in the air lock. (2) The pressure in the a i r lock may be reduced to vacuum from the air lock or LH2 tank with the aft hatch closed. (3) Dump valves will be provided at the fore, aft, and side hatches of the air lock. (4) The a i r lock and LH2 tank pressures will have the capability of being equalized from the LH2 tank. (5) The a i r lock will have the capability of being pressurized or unpressurized manually. d. Atmosphere Requirements. - The ECS will be com posed of four 20-cubic-foot spheres of metabolic oxygen for pressurization of the LH2 tank and a i r lock and one 3. 5-cubic-foot LEM sphere for resupply of the Portable Life Support System (PLSS). The ECS will permit: (1) Two men to work in the LEM adapter, air lock, and S-IVB hydrogen tank areas for an average of 4 hours per 16-hour period for 20 days. (2) 1.25 charges of the stage hydrogen tank (approxi mately 10, 000 cubic feet) and for 30 pressurizations of the air lock. 2-11 �(3) Leakage rate will be approximately 30 pounds per (4) Fifteen hours of day. extravehicular activity by two men, or a total of 30 manhours. (5) Temperature: 6 5 + 25 ° F w i t h m i n i m a l t e m p e r a t u r e oscillation. (6) Pressure: 3. 5 to 5. 5 psia. (7) Relative humidity: 30-70 percent. (8) Carbon dioxide: 0. 1 psia. 2.4.8 Human Engineering The human engineering design principles presented in MSFC-STD-267A will be used. Criteria in this document will be used as guidelines, 2.4.9 GSE a. MSFC will provide all necessary electrical GSE. b. Maximum use will be made of existing Saturn IB launch complex facilities and equipment. c. Checkout will be conducted in accordance with MSFC document SR-QUAL-64-13, Space Vehicle Stage Analysis and Checkout Guidelines, dated May 1, 1964. d. System checkout equipment and procedures will be compatible with present systems. Systems must also conform to safety regulations of KSC operations. e. No new umbilical plates or swing arms will be permitted. f. Necessary controls and displays for critical parameters will be provided in the launch complex. 2-12 �2.4.10 Weight and Balance Prior to shipment to KSC, measurements will be made to determine weight and 3-axis center of gravity. 2.4.11 Crew Training Requirements Flight crew training will be provided for the activation of the SSESM, passivation/activation of the S-IVB LH2 tank and installation, and operation of the corollary experiments. 2. 5 INSTRUMENT UNIT DESIGN GROUND RULES 2. 5. 1 Configuration Modification of the IU to support the spent stage experi ments will be held to an absolute minimum. 2.6 CREW SYSTEM GROUND RULES The following crew systems criteria reflect astronaut requirements and limitations which have impact on hardware design and mission planning: a . The normal location of the crew when not engaged in S-IVB Workshop, extravehicular, or experimental tasks will be in the CM. b. The crew will be periodically rotated in their tasks during the mission. c. Two crewmen at a time will perform activities outside the CM. d. Pressure suits will be worn by the astronauts when entering a pressurized area for the first time. e. The pressure suit umbilical will not be disconnected in a vacuum on the AS-209 mission. f. Voice communications shall be maintained at all times between the task performers and the CM. 2-13 �g. One crew member shall remain within the CM.at all times except in an emergency. h. The astronauts will not require a maneuvering unit for activities within the Spacecraft LEMAdapter (SLA). A Portable Life Support System (PLSS) and tethers will be utilized for SLA activities. i. The crew will maintain two separate compartments at all times as a safety precaution. j. A 10-minute portable oxygen supply is provided each spac-e-suited astronaut. k. The normal eating, sleeping, personal hygiene, and other station-keeping tasks will be performed in the CM. 1. After the initial entry to a pressurized compartment, and the compartment is verified operational, subsequent entries to the pressurized compartment may be conducted in shirt sleeves. m. The Block II Apollo full pressure suit will be utilized. n. The water-cooled undergarment will be used for astronaut thermal control when the PLSS is required. Three of these will be stored in the air lock. o. The suit pressure will nominally be 3. 5 psi above ambient when the suit is pressurized. p. The nominal suit inlet temperature will be 50°F. q. The nominal suit atmosphere will be 100 percent 02. r. A thermal outergarment is required for all activities in vacuum. s . The optimum size access opening for astronaut transfer while wearing the PLSS and thermal outergarment is 38. 5 inches. t. The two PLSS units normally carried in the LEM will be stored in the air lock. A third PLSS is stowed in the CM. The PLSS will be used for emergency operations or as an alternate mode to the suit umbilical. 2-14 �u. Due to sizing, hygiene, and drying requirements, and to provide the astronaut with immediate access to a space pressure suit, three additional pressure suits will be provided. Two of the suits will be stored in the air lock. v. Tethers will be available for all activities outside the air lock. w. Two pressure suit umbilicals, in addition to those provided in the CM, are located in the air lock. The air lock suit umbilicals will reach all parts of the interior LH2 tank. x. A habitable environment is provided in the pressurized air lock with the following nominal atmospheric conditions: (1) 100 percent Oz (2) 5 psia (3) 70° F (4) 30-50 percent relative humidity y. The air lock has sufficient volume to accommodate two men, pressure suited and pressurized, and the storage of their equip ment. Each man can don and doff the pressure suit, thermal garment, and PLSS in the air lock. z. The air lock pressure will nominally be 5 psia 02 upon reaching orbit. aa. The air lock will be secured to the LH2 tank bulkhead opening during orbit by the astronauts. / bb. The air lock and LH2 tank atmospheric pressures may be equalized at any time from the air lock. cc. The air lock will provide access to the LH2 tank as well as the SLA. less tools. dd. The manhole cover bolts will be removed by reactionConventional tools will be available as backup. 2-15 �ee. The LH2 tank is vented prior to crew egress from the ff. T h e L.H 2 t a n k w i l l n o t b e p r e s s u r i z e d u n t i l a t t a c h m e n t CM. to air lock. • gg. The LH2 tank and air lock are at vacuum when the manhole cover is removed. hh. The LH2 tank and air lock atmosphere must be monitored whenever astronauts are present. Capability must be pro vided to monitor atmosphere both from the CM and locally to provide direct readout and redline alarm. The following must be measured constantly for shirt-sleeve operations: (1) COz Partial Pressure (2) T o t a l P r e s s u r e (3) T e m p e r a t u r e (4) Humidity ii. Vehicle attitude control may be required for thermal control inside the LH2 tank. 2-16 �SECTION 3.0 MISSION SEQUENCE 3. 1 GENERAL This section presents a general and detailed sequence for each event currently defined in the design reference mission. In addition, a typical crew time line summary is presented for the first few mission days. 3.2 GENERAL MISSION SEQUENCE Presented in Figures 3.2-1 through -6 are the initial releases of the S-IVB spent stage experiment design reference mission general sequence for use in analysis and planning. While this sequence is based upon the latest available conceptual design information, it is expected that subsequent design effort will dictate numerous changes to the sequence and provide more data for expanding the sequence to a more detailed level. These changes and additions will be reflected in subsequent releases as necessary to keep the sequence accurate and current during the course of this program. This design reference mission sequence covers the period from the initiation of launch vehicle countdown through the completion of the 20-day S-IVB spent stage experiment. Data presented herein are limited primarily to gross level vehicle/experiment peculiar sequence with such information as the launch vehicle normal countdown and flight sequences being referenced. 3. 3 DETAILED MISSION SEQUENCE Each event scheduled for days 1, 2, and 20 is sequenced in detail on Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-26. This information supplements the summary presented in paragraph 3. 2. Additional events for days 3 through 19 will be defined as mission plans become better defined. 3. 4 CREW SCHEDULE SUMMARY Data are presented in Figures 3.4-1 and 3.4-2 which define a typical crew schedule for each mission day through five. Specific experiments have not been selected; therefore, only gross times were included in the schedule for experiment activity. The following data describe the assumptions and legend: �a. Astronauts sleep at same time, 7.5 hours/day - divided into two periods of 6 and 1 . 5 hours nap. Time between sleep varies from 6 and 10 hours. b. Two meals and one snack per day - 45 minutes per meal and 30 minutes per snack. c. A CSM check every 8 hours, + 1 hour. d. Periodic safety check by each astronaut each 12 hours. e . Two personal hygiene periods of 30 minutes each - one period after each sleep. f. For each 4-hour period (max) in tank, a period of 12 hours out is required. Two astronauts maximum in tank at one time. 3-2 �Prelauncl 1. FIGURE 3.2-1. - AS -209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Complete Manual Equipment Check 2. Install Airlock/Workshop Batteries 3. Checkout S age Pa3si< ation Capability 4. Airlock Purge and Leakchecl 5. Pressurize Airlock 6. '•ox Sphere Purge and Ueakcheck 7. Gox Sphere Prepressurizatic n ( i 50C p s i ) 8. Gox Sphere Pressurization (3000 psi) 9. Airlock/'A'orkshop Internal Power Mode on _i -14 -~0 -16 -l -8 -4 HOURS NOTE: I' o r a . y p i c a l d e t a i l e d S a t u r n I B c o u n t d o w n s e q u e n c e see MSFC drawing I )M3T0?. C LO �Li'toff thru S-TV13 "utoff j. . S-IB Ignition 2. Liftoff 3. S-IB Boost 4. S-IB Cutoff 5. S-IB/S-IVB Separation 6. S-IVB Ignition 7. S-IVB Boost 8. S-IVB Cutoff FIGURE 3.2-2. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE 10 MINUTES NO""E: I For a typical Saturn IB Flight sequence -see M S F C d r a w i n g I Q M 3 0 1 5 7 . �Day 1 1. S-IVB Engine Cutoff 2. Confirm Orbit Systems Check 3. LH2 Tank Venting 4. box Tank Passivation 5. Separate and Dock 6. CM Experiments 7. Withdraw Docking Probe 8. Enter Airlock and System Check Stage Passivation Airlock Area 10. Depressurize Airlock 11. Stage Passivation - SLA Area 12. Remove & Store Bulkhead 13. Connect Bellows 14. Pressurize Airlock 15. Return to CM I LP FIGURE 3.2-3. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE �Day 2 FIGURE 3.2-4. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Enter A1 Depress Airlock Transfer and Install Equipme from Airlock Storage to Workshop Transfer and Install Equip ment from SLA to Workshop Workshop Experiments in Lnpressurized Atmosphere Workshop Pressuriz.ation Return to C'. i— 0 ours �Day 3 thru 19 FIGURE 3.2-5. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE A detailed sequence on Day 3 thru Day 19 will be generated when the detailed list of approved experiments becomes available. �Day 20 FIGURE 3.2-6. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE 1. Enter Workshop 2. Complete Workshop Experiment 3. Secure Equipment in Workshop 4. Transfer Experiment Containers to CM 5. Enter CM 6. Install Drogue Assembly 7. Install CM Hatches and System Check 8. Ready Earth Return T3D 15 30 45 Minutes 60 75 90 I 105 120 �Day 1 T—— Event 3 FIGURE 3 . 3 - 1 . - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE — LH^ Tank Venting Hours �D.y 1 Evtr.r 4 F I G U R E 3.3-2. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Man Sub-Eve nt LOX Tank Venting T h e m e t h o d of L O X t a n k p a s s i v a t i o n h a s n o t y e t been determined. Based on Recent proposals, however, it is assumed that passivation can be accomplished within a three to four hour time. v. u> •—< o »* • . ! f * t �Day 1 Even: 7 Sub-Eve nt OJ 1. Open CM Dump Valve 2. Remove CM Pressurization Hatch 3. Store CM Pressurization Hatch 4. Remove CM Thermal Hatch 5. Stow CM Thermal Hatch 6. Remove Docking Probe 7. Stow Docking Probe 8. Remove Drogue Assembly 9. Stow Drogue Assembly 10. FIGURE 3.3-3. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Man Withdraw Docking Probe Secure Final Docking Latches 10 15 MINUTES 20 25 30 �D iy 1 Ev. r: 8 fIGURE 3.3-4. Sub-Event Man 1. O p e n A i r l o c k I n t e r l o c k Dump Va l v e 2 2. O p e n AL F o r w a r d H a t c h 2 3. Enter Airlock 2 3 4. D i s c o n n e c t CM S u i t U m b i l i c a l a n d C o n n e c t AL S u i t U m b i l i c a l 2 3 5. Communications Check 2 3 6. C l o s e CM P r e s s u r e H a t c h 1 7. C l o s e F o r w a r d AL P r e s s u r e H a t c h 3 8. C l o s e CM I n t e r l o c k Dump V a l v e 1 9. C l o s e AL I n t e r l o c k Dump V a l v e 3 Verify Operation Complete 1 2 3 10. AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Enter Airlock and Systems Check — — — — r u> 1 •— rv d 2 4 6 8 MINUTES • • * 10 �D «> 1 Ev» • FIGURE 3.3-5. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE S u b - E v i nr 1. Activate Passivation Panel 2. Activate Switch to Vent Engine Start Bottle, Engine Pneumatic Bottle, Cold Helium Spheres 3. Activate Switch to Vent Stage Pneumatic Helium Bottle 4. A c t i v a t e S w i t c h t o V e n t APS Helium 5. Monitor Pressure Decay on a l l Bottles 6. P r e p a r e f o r EVA ( S u i t s , PLSS, e t c . ) Ma n STAGE PASSIVATION - AIRLOCK AREA oj i Trr "*T 25 Minutes 30 35 -40" �i) i\ 1 11 Evt FIGURE 3.3-6. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Stage Passivation - SLA Area Man Sub E\ i nt 1. Open Airlock Side Hatch 2 2. Translate to SLA Area 2 3. Deactivate S&A Device 2 4. Check LH-, Pressure and Vent if Needed 2 5. Translate to Airlock and Enter 2 6. Close Airlock Side Door 1 wmmmm , O) i 0 •— * 2 • -< 1 4 6 8 MINUTES **- - » j ' 10 12 �Di v 1 Ever.: 12 FIGURE 3.3-7. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Sub-Evi nt 1. Open Airlock Aft Hatch 2. Attach Lights 4. Remove Reactionless Tool from Storage 5. Loosen 72 Bolts 6. Stow Reactionless Tool 7. Remove Airlock Umbilical, Open Airlock Side Door and Translate to SIVB Forward Area 8. Remove Bolts and Place in Utility Bag 9. Remove Bulkhead and Slide out to number 3 10. Secure Bulkhead to Cable Rack 11. Return to Airlock and Connect Airlock Umbilical Man Remove and Store S-IVB Bulkhead Cover oj i w 10 20 30 MINUTES 40 50 60 �Day 1 E v » r.: 1 3 FIGURE 3. 3-8. - S u b -Evi nt 1. Release Bellows from Retainers and Allign at S-IVB Tank Opening 2. Thread 72 Bolts to Connect Bellows to Tank 3. Remove Reactionless Tool from Storage 4. Tighten Bolts 5. Store Reactionless Tool A S - 2 0 9 D E S I G N KEl- E K E N C E M I S S ! J N S E Q U E N C E Ma n Connect Bellows i »— 10 20 MINUTES 30 40 �• * Day 1 E v i ' r.r. 13 FIGURE 3.3-9. - Sub-Evi nt 1. Open Airlock Interlock Valve 2. Open CM Interlock Valve 3. Open Airlock Forward Pressure Hatch 4. Open and Stow CM Pressure Hatch 5. Pass CM Umbilicals into Airlock 6. Disconnect Airlock Umbilicals and Stow Connect CM Umbilicals 7. Enter CM 8. Close Airlock Forward Hatch 9. Check Interlock Valve Position 10. Install and Close CM Pressure Hatch 11. •— -J y Man * AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSUN SEOuKiMGF Return t o CM Check Interlock Valve Position *>• 10 MINUTES 12 �Day 2 Even: 1 FIGURE 3.3-10. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SFOUENCE Sub-Event 1. O p e n CM I n t e r l o c k Dump V a l v e 2 2. R e m o v e CM P r e s s u r e H a t c h 2 3. S t o r e CM P r e s s u r e H a t c h 1 4. Open Airlock Interlock Valve 2 5. Open Airlock Forward Hatch 2 6. Enter Airlock 2 3 7. Connect Airlock Suits Umbilical s 2 R e m o v e CM S u i t s U m b i l i c a l 3 8. Check Communications 9. I n s t a l l CM H a t c h — — — — — 1 2 3 1 10. Close Airlock Forward Pressure Hatch 3 11. C l o s e CM I n t e r l o c k Dump V a l v e 1 12. Enter Airlock Man MB MB M . r* f r Close Airlock Interlock Valve » 3-18 0 3 6 » 9 12 MINUTES a • • « • » 15 . �D iy 2 Evii 3 FIGLRE 3.3-11. - Sub-Evt nt 1. Install Temporary lights Ma n AS-209 L)ES.REFERENCE MISS.ON Sb'UuENCE T r a n s f e r and I n s t a l l E q u i p m e n t f r o m A i r l o c k S t o r a g e t o Workshop 2 3 2. Attach Tethers 2 3 3. T r a n s f e r and i n s t a l l H a n d h o l d s 2 3 4. Transfer and install Tool Kit 2 3 5. 6. 7. Transfer and install six Equipment Racks T r a n s f e r a n d i n s t a l l L i g h t s and Fixtures T r a n s f e r a n d i n s t a l l two F a n s 2 3 2 3 2 3 20 40 60 80 MINUTES oj •— vO NOTE: The events on this page are broken down into more detail in the following seven pages. 100 120 �D»y 2 Evi r: 3-1 F I G U R E 3 . 3 - 1 2 . - A S - 2 0 9 L»ES'. . . N R E F E R E N C E N E S S I J N S E O U ' E N C F Man Sub-Evi nt 1. Open Aft Airlock Hatch 2 2. Remove L i g h t B a n k F r o m A i r f l o w Storage 3 3. Enter Workshop 2 4. Transfer Light t o Workshop 3 5. C l a m p L i g h t t o LH„ T a n k F u e l Probe 2 Workshop Entry - I n s t a l l Temporary Lights — —i 0 5 MINUTES UJ tNJ o * f « �D.«, 2 Ever.: 3-2 F I G U R E 3 . 3 - 1 3 . - A S - 2 0 9 U E S ! ..M KEir E K E N C t : MESS. J N S F U G K N C K Sub-Event 1. Remove Tethers from Airlock Storage and Hand t o number 2 2. Attach Tethers to Probe 3. Enter Workshop 4. Attach Tethers t o S-IVB Aft 5. Attach Second Tether Attach Tethers Man 2 3 i— 12 0 MINUTES M r "" 15 �D-»y 2 Ev. r- 3.3 FIGURE 3. 3-14. - A S - 2 0 9 L>ES . W K E F E K E . V C E M I S S ! J N S F O u K N G F Transfer and Install Handholds Ma n Sub Evt nt 1. Enter Airlock (From Workshop) 3 2. Remove H a n d l o a d s f r o m A i r l o c k Storage and Transfer to number 2 3 3. Attach Handholds on Probe 2 4. Transfer and Permanently Attacl Handholds 2 u> — — \ i 0 2 1 4 MINUTES I 1 I 6 8 10 t\J (SJ > • • f « �D-iy 2 Evi r: 3-4 FIGURE 3.3-15. - AS-209 DESV.N KEr EKENCfc: M:SS; JN SKOOfWLf Sub-Evt nr 1. Remove Tool Kit From Airlock Storage and Transfer to number 2 2. Attach Tool Kit to Probe 3. Transfer t o Permanent Tool Kit Location and Install Man Transfer and Install Tool Kit 10 MINUTES W i IV OJ 6' �D ,y 2 E v f r.r ^-5 FIGURE 3. 3-16. - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE M.SS'.J N SKOO K NCF Transfer and I n s t a l l Six Equipment Racks Man Sub-Eve nr 1. Remove Equipment Racks from Airlock Storage and Transfer t o number 2 3 2. Attach each Rack t o Probe (Temporary) 2 3. Enter Airlock to Assist number 2 3 4. Install Racks - one at a time 2 3 — ^0 UJ • 10 20 30 MINUTES # • • �D ,y 2 E v . t.: 3 - 6 F I G U R E 3 . 3 - 1 7 . - A S - 2 0 9 L>ES~^N K E r i l K t N ' C K M I S S I O N S h ' O u K N L K Sab-Ev». nr 1. E n t e r A i r l o c k ( f r o m Workshop) 2. Remove L i g h t s a n d F i x t u r e s from Airlock Storage and hand t o number 2 - o n e a t a t i m e 3. Attach to Probe 4. E n t e r Workshop t o A s s i s t 5. Install Lights and Fixtures One a t a t i m e t o p e r m a n e n t location OJ tNJ Man Transfer and Install Lights and Fixtures 2 3 20 10 MINUTES 30 �D »y 2 Ev. • : 3-7 FIGURE 3. 3-18. - AS-209 UES'.'..N KEi E HENCE MISS1JN SE(jO EHCF Sub-Evi nt 1. Enter Airlock (from Workshop) 2. Remove F a n s f r o m A i r l o c k Storage and Transfer to number 2 3. Attach Fans to Probe 4. Enter Workshop t o Assist 5. Attach to Permanent Locations Man T r a n s f e r a n d I n s t a l l Two F a n s —k. oj i o 2 6 8 10 12 MINUTES J 14 �•Diy 2 E v i r.: 3-6 FIGURE 3.3-17. - AS-209 Sub-Evi nt 1. Man K E r E k r . V t K M^SSI J N S h ' U u K W L F T r a n s f e r a n d I n s t a l l L i g h t s and F i x t u r e s E n t e r A i r l o c k ( f r o m Workshop) Remove L i g h t s a n d F i x t u r e s from Airlock Storage and hand t o number 2 - o n e a t a t i m e 3. Attach to Probe 4. E n t e r Workshop t o A s s i s t 5. Install Lights and Fixtures One a t a t i m e t o p e r m a n e n t location OJ i M 2 3 20 10 MINUTES �Dxy 2 Ev,-- 3-7 F I G U R E 3 . 3 - 1 8 . - AS-209 DESI.-N REFERENCE MISSION SKUub'Wtt' Sub-Evx nt 1. Enter Airlock (from Workshop) 2. Remove Fans from Airlock Storage and Transfer to number 2 3. Attach Fans to Probe 4. Enter Workshop to Assist 5. Attach to Permanent Locations Man Transfer and Install Two Fans 2 3 —i. w i o 2 6 MINUTES 8 10 12 14 �D iy 2 Ev» ? 4 FIGURE 3. 3-19. - Sub Evi nr Man AS-209 UES .N KEr E KE.VCt; lMISS. JN Sb'UuKNCF Transfer and Install Equipment from SLA to Workshop Transfer and Install three Equipment Storage Assemblies (ESAs) Transfer and Install one Scientific Equipment Pod. 16 32 48 MINUTES u> ru -j NOTE: The events on this page are broken down into more detail on the following two pages. 64 80 �D i> 2 Ev* r . r 4-1 FIGURE 3.3-20. - AS-209 DES \.N KEr'EkENCK ivlISS. JN St'Uu t-'i-JC F Sub -Evi nt 1. Enter Airlock Man Transfer and Install Three Equipment Storage Assemblies (ESA's) 3 2 2. Disconnect Airlock Umbilicals 3. Open Airlock Side Door and Translate to SLA 4. Unlatch ESA and Transfer to Airlock Access Hatch 5. Attach Tethers to ESA (both ends) 6. Transfer ESA to Airlock (to Workshop Opening) 7. Enter Airlock 8. Enter Workshop and Translate to Point of EAS Attachment 9. Move ESA to Attachment Point V oo 3 2 3 2 3 10. Translate to ESA Attachment 11. Attach ESA to Probe (Permanent 2 3 12. Return to Airlock 2 3 13. Repeat 2 thru 11 twice for 2 ESA's 2 3 L- 0 10 20 30 MINUTES 40 50 60 �D.y 2 Ev> i 4-2 F I G U R E 3 . 3 - 2 1 . - A S - 2 0 9 D E S ! > N K E F E k E N G f c : M I S S .J N S F U u F H C F Sub-Evt nt 1. Enter Airlock 2. Enter SLA 3. Unlatch SEP and Transfer to Airlock Side Hatch 4. Attach Tethers •* Both Ends 5. Pass SEP into Airlock (to Workshop Opening) o>6. Man Transfer and Install One Scientific Equipment Pod (SEP) Enter Airlock -o 7. Enter Workshop - Move to SEP Attach Point 8. Move SEP to Attach point 2 3 9. 10. Enter Workshop and Move to SEP Attach Point Remove Equipment from POD 2 3 11. Install Equipment on racks 2 3 12 MINUTES 16 20 �O»y 20 Evi r: 3 FIGURE 3.3-22. - A S - 2 0 9 D E S T . N K E r r ' K c ' X C E M I SS I U N S E ( j u F H C F Man S e c u r e Equipment i n Workshop Sab-Evi nt 1. S e c u r e E q u i p m e n t i n Workshop Aft Area 2 3 2. T r a n s l a t e T o Workshop F o r w a r d Area 2 3 3. Secure Forward Area Equipment 2 3 4. Enter Airlock 2 3 5. Close Airlock Aft Hatch 3 • • • > 0 w w o « 5 1 10 • 15 20 —. 25 1 30 1 35 MINUTES f * , r• /• • • , 40 �D «y 2 0 Evi t 4 F I G U R E 3 . 3- 2 3 . - A S - 2 0 9 UES Sub-Evi nr 1. Open Forward Airlock Interlock Valve 2. Open CM Interlock Valve 3. Open Airlock Forward Pressure Hatch 4. Open CM Pressure Hatch and Stow 5. Remove CM Umbilicals from Storage and Pass into Airlock OJ 6. OJ Man .N KEIEKENOE MISS. J N St'OOEiMCE Transfer Equipment Containers to CM Connect CM Umbilicals 7. Disconnect Airlock Umbilicals and Store 8. Transfer Experiment Containers to CM 10 MINUTES 15 20 25 30 �D 20 E v i r: 5 FIGURE 3. 3-24. - AS-209 D Sub-Evi nt 1. Enter CM 2. Close Airlock Forward Pressure Hatch 3. Verify Interlock Valve Closed 4. Release Manual Docking Latches .N REFERENCE MISS1JN SEOUENCE Enter CM 10 MINUTES �Day 20 Evi r 6 FIGURE 3.3-25. - AS-209 DES1• >N KErERENCt MISS.GN Sh'UuKHCf' Sub -Evt nr 1. Remove Drogue Assembly from CM Storage 2. Install Drogue Assembly Man Install Drogue MINUTES �D a y 20 Event 7 FIGURE 3 .3 - 2 6 . - AS-209 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION SEQUENCE Sub-Event 1. Remove CM Thermal Hatch from Storage 2. Install CM Thermal Hatch 3. Remove CM Pressure Hatch from Storage Man 4. Install CM Pressure Hatch 5. Disconnect Umbilicals and Stow 6. Remove PGA Suits 7. Review Tasks Preformed Checklist 1 u> Install CM Hatches and Systems Check 1 3 10 MINUTES 15 20 25 �F I G U R E DAY - C R E W S C H E D U L E 1 8 0 » 3 C«KirO-rj' T ( liTABi-ISH asrCS CCNf n*o Of pec i SLA r/tNfi S GKS'T * f f.-. SLEEP J < J ft l-.C. 5 • p " * . Aft i» p / . C % V »• srp&t ! SLEEP * V , A / V K ( *& •!' pfiSSII/PT/oN f V Hr. £XPMii?:£'VrS 5L • CP 1 ' L / 0 / 8 I u !M SltrP / ! Z * LAUNCH, DAY 3 . 4 - 1 . o \ j G| ip S,Lt£P » — V * P 2 8 c . '•ji 5 A / T T . 1 1 : . r I r - 8 I 1 V " T T T 1 1 t T ' -r T 1 1 T .. / V f NAP SLEEP SLEEP—— t 8 4 ' f ' 0 Aft 7 Aft ft 8 / 6 ' & /ft e SLEEP ' 5 A M p *C i HHP A F A' t i -NAP �FIGURE 3.4-2. - CREW SCHEDU ~ DAY DAY J �SECTION 4.0 4. I VIBRATION AND ACOUSTIC TESTING ACOUSTIC TEST PROCEDURES 4. 1. 1 Requirements Acoustic environmental qualification testing will be performed in a reverberation chamber. Requirements are outlined in Table 4. 1 -1. 4.1.2 Reverberation Chamber Testing a. The test chamber volume shall be such that the physical b u l k of t h e i t e m u n d e r t e s t w i l l n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e g e n e r a t i o n a n d maintenance of test conditions. b. The sound pressure field shall be measured with the test item or a suitable dummy mounted in the test chamber. Acoustic measurements shall be made in proximity to each major, dissimilar s u r f a c e of t h e t e s t s p e c i m e n . T h e o v e r a l l s o u n d p r e s s u r e l e v e l , reduced by six decibels, shall be introduced into the test chamber and adjusted to conform with the specified acoustic spectrum. The time required to conduct the survey shall be less than one-fourth of the specified test time, unless the specimen is replaced with a dummy. The sound pressure level and the survey time are reduced to avoid possible premature damage to the test item. The microphone shall be moved around the test item maintaining a distance of approximately 1 inches from the specimen. The measurements made within this volume shall then be averaged and the extreme values shall be noted. c. When (b) is accomplished, the sound pressure level shall be raised to the design specification value and the test shall commence. 4.1.3 Test Spectrum The acoustic test levels shall be those in the specification. 4.1.4 Test Duration Generally the test shall consist of a high-level exposure, immediately followed by a low-level exposure. Time durations for the high- and low-level exposures are given in the specification. 4-1 �TABLE 4. 1-1. - EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ACOUSTIC SPECIFICATIONS External Sound Pressure Levels One-third Octave Band Geometric Mean Freq. (cps) 5.0 6. 3 8.0 10.0 12. 5 16.0 20. 0 25.0 31.5 40. 0 50. 0 63.0 Internal Sound Pressure Levels Low Level (dB) High Level (dB) Not Applicable o o oo o O o o o 100. 0 125. 0 160. 0 200. 0 250.0 315.0 400. 0 500. 0 630. 0 800.0 1000.0 1250.0 1600.0 2000.0 2500.0 3150.0 4000.0 5000.0 6300.0 8000.0 Overall Sound Pressure Level 4-2 Not Applicable High Level <dB) Low Level (dB) 106. 5 109.0 112. 5 115. 5 118. 0 121. 5 124. 5 127. 5 130. 5 133.0 136.0 139.0 139. 5 139. 5 140.0 140.0 140.0 140. 5 140. 5 141.0 138. 5 136. 5 135.0 134.0 133.0 131.0 129. 5 127.0 124. 5 121. 5 118.0 115.0 111.0 107. 5 100. 0 102. 5 106. 0 109. 0 111.5 115-5 118. 0 121.0 124. 0 126. 5 129. 5 132. 5 133.0 133. 0 133. 5 133- 5 133. 5 134. 0 134.0 134. 5 132.0 130. 0 128. 5 127. 5 126. 5 124. 5 123.0 120. 5 118. 0 115. 0 111.5 108. 5 104. 5 101.0 151.0 144.5 �TABLE 4.1-1.- Concluded STAGE: S-IVB MAJOR ZONE: 15, Station 1541 to Station 1663 - The portion of the S-IVB Stage lying between the plane of juncture of the LH^ container cylindrical section with the forward LH^ bulkhead and the plane of the field splice with the IU. One-Third Octave Band Acoustical Specifications in dB re 2 X 10 High Level 3.0 Minutes Low Level 15.0 Minutes Test Duration: N M �4.1.4 Tolerances a . The test time shall be within -0 to + 10 percent of the time set forth in the test specifications. b. For reverberation chamber testing, the overall sound pressure level and the individual one-third octave band, sound pressure levels shall be within -0 to +4 decibels of the levels set forth in the test specification with the test specimen installed. 4. 2 VIBRATION AND SHOCK CRITERIA 4. 2. 1 General Preliminary flight vibration and shock criteria for the S-IVB Spent Stage Experiment SSESM are presented below^ and in Figures 4.2-1 through 4.2-10. Vibration criteria are presented for (1) Saturn IB primary structure input to the SSESM assembly, and (2) primary unloaded SSESM structure. Detailed individual component vibration test specifications will be derived as required. 4. 2. 2 Air lock Assembly Shock and Vibration Criteria a. Sinusoidal Vibration Criteria (see Figure 4.2-1) 5 to 14 cps @ .044 In. Double Amp. Disp. 14 to 50 cps @ 0.44 g's peak 50 to 111 cps @ 0. 0034 In. Double Amp. Disp. 111 to 600 cps @ 2.2 g's peak 600 to 2000 cps @ -1 g's Peak/Octave 2000 cps @ 0.46 g's peak b. Random Vibration Criteria (see Figure 4.2-2).- Shall consist of three minutes of random noise over the frequency band 5 to 2000 cps at the following input levels: 5 cps @ 0.000204 g2/cps 5 to 35 cps @ 6 db/octave 35 to 400 cps @ 0.01 g2/cps 400 to 2000 cps @ -2 db/octave 2000 cps @ 0.00343 g2/cps Composite Level =3.5 Grmg 4-4 �c. Assembly Shock Criteria (1) Lift-off and separation shock pulse shall consist of a 10-g half sine wave for a duration of 10 milliseconds. (2) Docking shock pulse shall consist of a 20-g half sine w a v e f o r a d u r a t i o n of 1 0 m i l l i s e c o n d s . 4.2.3 SSESM Unloaded Structure Vibration Criteria a. Skin Panel Structure (1) Sinusoidal Vibration Criteria (a) Lift-off and mainstage sinusoidal vibration criteria (see Figure 4.2-3). b to 70 cps @ 0.03 In. Double Amp. Disp. 70 to 210 cps @7.5 g's peak 210 to 305 cps @ .0033 In. Double Amp. Disp. 305 to 500 cps @ 15.6 g's peak 500 to 2000 cps @ -6.45 g's peak/octave 2000 cps @2.7 g's peak (b) Mach 1 and Max Q sinusoidal vibration criteria (see Figure 4 . 2-4). 5 to 66 cps @ 0.0705 In. Double Amp. Disp. 6 6 t o 210 c p s @ 1 5 . 6 g ' s p e a k 210 to 305 cps @ 0.0069 In. Double Amp. Disp. 305 to 500 cps @ 33 g's peak 500 to 2000 cps @ -13.8 g's peak/octave 2000 cps @ 5.4 g's peak (2) Random Vibration Criteria (a) Lift-off and mainstage random vibration criteria ( s e e 1 i g u r e 4 . 2 - ) . - S h a l l c o n s i s t of 2 m i n u t e s o f r a n d o m n o i s e o v e r t h e frequency band 20 to 2000 cps at the following levels: 20 cps @ 0. 0023 g2/cps 20 to 63 cps @ 9 db/octave 63 cps @ 0.07 g2/cps 63 to 380 cps @3.4 db/octave 380 to 420 cps @ 0.54 g^/cps 4-5 �420 to 800 cps @ -3. 75 db/octave 800 cps @ 0.24 g2/cps 800 to 2000 cps @ -9 db/octave 2 0 0 0 c p s (30. 1 5 5 g 2 / c p s Composite Level =17.41 G rms (b) Mach 1 and Max Q random vibration criteria (see b igure 4. 2-6). - Shall consist of one minute of random noise over the frequency band 20 to 2000 cps at the following levels: 20 cps @ 0.01 g2/cps 20 to 63 cps @ 9 db/octave 63 cps @ 0.31 g2/cps 63 to 380 cps @3.4 db/octave 380 to 400 cps @2.4 g /cps 400 to 8i0 cps @ -3.5 db/octave 850 cps @1.0 g2/cps 850 to 2000 cps @ -1.5 db/octave 2000 cps @ 0.065 g2/cps Composite Level = 45.38 G rms (3) Shock Criteria. - The shock pulse shall consist of a 2 0 - g h a l f s i n e w a v e f o r a d u r a t i o n of 1 0 m i l l i s e c o n d s . b. Skin Stiffener Structure (1) Sinusoidal Vibration Criteria (a) Lift-off and mainstage sinusoidal vibration criteria (see Figure 4.2-7) 5 to 50 cps @ 0.0354 In. Double Amp. Disp. 50 to 158 cps @ 4. 5 g's peak 158 to 200 cps @ 0.00351 In. Double Amp. Disp. 200 to 500 cps @7.2 g's peak 500 to 2000 cps @ -2.4 g's peak/octave 2000 cps @ 2.4 g's peak (b) Mach 1 and Max Q sinusoidal vibration criteria (see Figure 4.2-8) 5 to 50 cps @ 0.075 In. Double Amp. Disp. 50 to 169 cps @9.6 g's peak 169 to 210 cps @ 0.0066 In. Double Amp. Disp. 210 to 500 cps @ 15 g's peak 500 to 2000 cps @ -4.8 g's peak/octave 2000 cps @5.4 g's peak 4-6 �(2) Random Vibration Criteria (a) Lift-off and mainstage random vibration c r i t e r i a ( s e e F i g u r e 4 . 2 - 9 ) . - S h a l l c o n s i s t of 2 m i n u t e s o f r a n d o m n o i s e over the frequency band 20 to 2000 cps at the following levels: 20 cps. @ 0.0008 g^/cps 20 to 72 cps @ 8 db/octave 72 cps @ 0.027 g^/cps 72 to 400 cps @2.8 db/octave 400 cps @ 0. 13 g2/cps 400 to 1000 cps @ -3 db/octave 1000 cps @ 0. 052 g2. cps 1000 to 1600 cps @ -10. 5 db/octave 1600 to 2000 cps @0.01 g^/cps Composite Level = 6. 76 G rms (b) Mach 1 and Max Q random vibration criteria (see Figure 4.2-10). - Shall consist of one minute of random noise over the frequency band 20 to 2000 cps at the following levels: 20 cps @ 0. 0035 g2/cps 20 to 70 cps @ 3 db/octave 70 cps @ 0. 12 g /cps 70 to 400 cps @ 2. 65 db/octave 400 cps @ 0. 56 g2/cps 400 to 1000 cps @ -2.8 db/octave 1000 cps @ 0.24 g^/cps 1000 to 1600 cps @ -10.8 db/octave 1600 to 2000 cps @ 0.044 g2/cps Composite Level = 10.85 G rms (3) Shock Criteria. - The shock pulse shall consist of a 20-g half sine wave for a duration of 10 milliseconds. * 4-7 �FIGURE 4. 2-1 AIRLOCK ASSEMBLY SINUSOIDAL FREQUENCY (CPS) * 7A TION ��FIGURE 4 . 2-3 SKIN PANEL STRUCTURE LIFT-OFF AND MAINSTAGE SINUSOIDAL VIBRATION CRITERIA loo /ooo FREQUENCY (cPs) �« S/K/N PANEL STRUCTURE MACH 1 AND MAX Q SINUSOIDAL VIBRATION CRITERIA FREQUENCY (cPs) �PANEL STRUCTURE m /LIFT-OFF £* :M W# AND MAINSTAGE RANDOM VIBRATION FREQUENCY CRITERIA (cPs) 9 �MACH / SKtN PANEL STRUCTURE AND MAX Q RANDOM VJBRAT/ON CRITERIA FREQUENCY (cPs) ��MACH I SX/M STtFFENER STRUCTURE AND MAX Q .SINUSOIDAL VIBRATION /ooo FREQUENCY (cps) �IOOO 0OOB FREQUENCY frs) �FIGURE 4. 2-10 MACH / SKIN ST/FFENER STRUCTURE AND MAX Q RANDOM V/BRATION CRITERIA /oo FREQUENCY fas') /ooo ��SECTION 5.0 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM SCHEMATICS Preliminary schematics are provided here to further define the design and electrical system interfaces as presented in the proposal document. Figures 5.0-1 and -2 define the cable interconnect diagram lor the entire electrical power system. Figures 5.0-3 through -19 are schematics outlining, in detail, interfaces of the electrical power distribution system. No provision has been included in this distribution system for corollary experiments. �Figure 5. 0-1 CM iN'lNfACl OMIT SUIT J2 BATTERY BATTERY NO 4 NOT TOSA7 70JA4 701 AlftLOCK OXYGEN HEATER NO I TOiAS INTER** SUIT OXTCEN HEATER NO 2 70IA4 Jl A. HLOCK 0*rt£H HC AT £P AlROX* LICHT 70«AS Jl 41 8ATT£«* NO 12 IO.NM2 BAT T tRY NO I 5 TONUS Jl BATTERY NO 21 70SA2I BATTERY NO IB 705AI9 SV RMER V*VL* ACCU.SHCN LICHT 70SA2S TOJA25 (SATC) (ARM J OS-70S FREUMNARY A|)H S-EB/V INTERTACC (PASSIVATION) sscsy . CABLE INTERCONNECTION Diagram 40M 3SS7I �jy JZ j* j* MCAS RACK THIS SH 602A7QI jy j2 MCAS RJCK 60?A70? Jl J? jy J-* J6 'y MULTlPuEXCR *2 JO MCAS RACK MCAS RACK 6O2A70S 60?A704 MCAS RACK 60? A70S J9 f y TM ASSY ASSY 60?A706 60?A707 J|l 60? A706 •703*14 F3RF ASSY 60?A709 S-IV6 STAGC UNIT «00 1 uCL TAN* EXP INTERFACE NOT OCClNCO TANK LIGHT NO I 400ASO TANK LIGHT BLOWER NO? 408ASI NO I 408AS? Jl Jl S-170 TANK blower no ? BLOWER NO 3 BlDwCR NO 4 OXYGEN HCAT£R 406AS6 408AS3 4O0AS4 408ASS NEUMINARY SSESM CABLE INTERCONNECTION Diagram # 40MJ557I �Figure 5. 0-3 • \.r - gplBlpiS - ***"| — [ —• j « SSESM ELECTRICAL SCHEMATICS «WR« ndlES WT PTVCNATKJF.S. I ft NQTTS C0*PC*F-T INO€*.POWR^OLF QL^LAT PAS'L PO»C« OCSOATlONS ARE N ACCORDANCE WITH IX IHT OVISJON OF IK SSESM IS SHOWN TO IKS SKIT I PARTIAL REFERENCE CCSOUTIOMS ARE SHOWN WKRE IK "W-SJTC LPATS. ASSEMBLIES. H*> SoOASVKA.CS ARE CWOENT FCFL CCMPLETE RE FT HENCE KWAIW PREFK WITH T»I ANO/OR ASSEKA.Y OCS)GNATCN ANO O.'-.PT AY PFLNF I P\>XFM P»-.THINNR>0^ REFERENCE TK LEFT OF QISIWOUTTON P<»*»P P<STB«INI»R»ON.RPMNIN ELECTRON MSFC-ST0-SA9 COMPQNfNr iNPf X CONTPQC Pflsfi 1 S-IVN VAF.F PFTSS VAIION SRV>Y TTLFVF FH» PQWTH P'.TTMK) HQN TFI R VT TNT tHY*l P C*STN.OTITIQN EACH MEASUREMENT IS OCNOTCO Br A' UEASLOEMENT (AAFFICR AS L6TC0 W IK WSTRVJMCNTATCN PROGRAM ANO COMPONENT LOT THIS NUMBER IS COMROSEO OF A LETTER ACICATING TK PARAMETER UEASUREO. ONE OB MORE OTLTS INDICATING TK SCO/ENCE Of EACH MEASUREMENT Of A PARAMETER A OAS- HUM OCR INOICATNC TK UNIT N WHICH TK MEASUREMENT ORIGINATES MFAS MAC* • O.-A/QL (*MAN*IL IS I-IQ MFA', PACK CO?A7Q, CMA'.NFTS M-?Q VFAS P.VK . J?AW? CMAVNM S I-10 TK PARAMETERS ARE A - ACCELERATION B- ACC0OSTCS MAT* «Q?A/Q» OW.NFIS >1-TO CCS PNTS'-UHF CESIGNATEO AS ANO . FOLLOWS". C- TEMPLHAIVRE CVCNT MCASCPTVTNTS 0- PRESSURE E- VIBRATION FLOW RATE CL*WCNT VQYTACF ASQ GVFNT MC - C- POSlTON H- CUOANCE B CONTROL J - «' t TELEMETRY K - SIGNAL • I. E - LOjiO LEVEL M- VOLTAGE. CURRENT B FREQUENCY N- MISCELLANEOUS R-"ANGULAR VELOCITY S- STRAIN R- RPM « CONTACTS OF CEKRAL PURPOSE RCUTRS ARE SHOWN WITH COO OC-CNCROZEO MACNETIC LATCH AEUW CONTACTS ARE SHOWN WITH CEILS 81-tt OR El-IB LAST EHRGUEO S • • • ASTERISK Sruea. OENOTES SHIELO TCRMPOJ1DN POUTS FOR DISTRIBUTORS ANO FOR CABLE SHCLOCO WRES UNLESS SHOWN ROVOUJLLF TERMINATED PREUMHMT NIL* �Figure 5. 0-4 MilC TcTxr.r foi.r S5Ei: « T O A'"4 �mUWNAW «.!»«• �MIT hOi row RATT. Ni2 703A2 RAM VI 3 703A3 RAM NO 5 703AS 70C.-N 703*>J1 RATI. NO 6 703AR BATT NO 7 703A7 BATT *0 6 703A8 R»TT. NO. 9 703A9 BATT NO K> 703A.0 70COM 70C0M 703W.J. 70C0V 703*U 703WW BATT NO 21 703A?I 70COM 703*<JI VO.TACC 0€T£CT0» NO I VOUAGC OCTCCTO* NO 2 . A2 •7030 •7DIO • 7030 • 7031 70C0M 70 OM 703*1/ 70COM 703*1J 70C0M '03*1/ 70C0M 70C0M 70CGM 703*UI ' BATT. *11} L-,I'H I H'M MTT. W I. | _'0i±'s_ 1— _L UI.J-J BATT. NO IS _ios« | BATT. NO 16 _J _ T22*'« L-w^J I BATT.NO.,' L_ '—<l'l— | _L H'!"— BAT'. NO. '8 | _1 BATT. NO. IB U|.|-J | 703*2 JL 1 BATT NO 20 | l_ tojmo J_ 703£l CFFCCHVT ON [ AS-209 SSCSU ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC RO-Cfl OtSTSOOTON 40U5SS72 �Figure 5. 0-7 �•70V •701' •7050 «70'0 • 70 0 • 7050 «' •703O •70»O CB33 TOCOV 7C«"C"4 C«i5 C»i7t C«i9t CR20* 70 COM 70CCW TOCO* Jl AIRLOCK HCHT 701A 2 POt*OA LIGHT 703 A 51 TANK LIGHT HO I 400*30 TANK LIGHT HO ? 400*3* BLOWER HQ I 40«*3? BLO*C« HQ 2 400*33 8LO*'C R HO 3 400*34 tfElLWNAM QflCTivE <>n AS - 203 SSESU CLCCTRICAL <ri.» ItfiHf, 70»C» f-V" •»**«• 40V33372 �Figure 5. 0-9 �« Figure AS53 "Tf5 jf'i - _ . fr Pf I |*p. "?P.[ 3 S;tj: - *-V— AS-IGJ ,52 !? ^^ • C7, ptsh SI | * '-JV 4. I?! PLIX 701AG APT UMBILICAL APT UMBILICAL APT UMBILICAL APT UMBILICAL APT UM9IUCAL pjsn J AFLM « APT UM?-LlCAL - pi| «>|« PLUG 70*U 7C*C _ L ARM AMU PLUG ARM PLUG _J0.il 5.0-10 -4'_ 1 I J' «*"» ^ " A^ I JIJ, #• — j PI i — — T 'jv CM;PS!NCY sule-APO — T 1 > -1- H A~y *4I I— • 1!; P1 •i AOCOM «un/MT HYL'MV CLAPILO" ASS CAI? XLW I ±$$8. _l ! I APS I 0« TASK y.oi | APS I fuCL TANK ' J | APSI01 TINA | _«JLTNH*^AAsI1 L^-l^X. APS fUEL TANK —- — [C'EECTIVE ON | AS-2O» SSESU 'ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC J J-BBSTACC 1 PA5SlVAT.CH SYSTEM 40USSST2 �Figure 5.0-11 • t �Figure 5.-0-12 EEC11 — 1 •ro»o est* 1 •Toy Y •TCO cnj 4TOO au TCOCCM DO COM J I--4 !S • M .L — JI AJQA4 j« Pi - - I a T05W2JI I 70CCAJ •h . U . _LL I "O _ A »2 c 4' j H » "~l MCAS RACX 602AT05 I 1 i r MCAS PACK 402AT04 • I • MfAS RACK GCZATui i PREUVJMARY J*II — ~W«. •>>! - E'fgCTivg "• SSCSM ON 1AS-20S n |S ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC PO*»ER frSTRifcjTON V-ji 40Mjyw? �Figure 5.0-13 ' '3 ^\LT»U»cn ASS* *02 A 70* , 2 | / CHAN | ^ j CHAN 2 y / CHAN 3 r^A-J.-fc-^ -frlr-fo-* -fc-f.• r 1i '3 MU.Tir\.£UR ASS* A02A70* T Tf a F3 Wuv.TiPuC*CR ASS* 602A70* y CHAN 4 Is t'T" , MEASURING RACK A02A7C4 -CHAN 5 > CHAN * . CHAN 7 c ~ ' ~ J 1 - CI-703 -f—,-sU-L-j f f-jjU-u . ez-roj CJ-7CS . ' CI-TO, -J 1 1 J JL 64-701 . C%-701 1 — z T ~r i 1I Is ' I2 1 1 * 1 . pi ~ 1 1 - 70 H PRELIMINARY *» i > eu tOCClivC ON|AS-20+ SSCSM ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC MCASuRisO RACK •02A70I CHANNELS l-O 40M35S72 �Figure 5.0-14 �'3 mw.TIJI.CBI* ASS* 602A704 UCASU*INC "AC* 60?A7Q2 Cham 5 CHAH 9 C»«AM 10 SSCSM ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC VcAS^^.NC AACK tC2A702 CMAWCLS I-IO <0v»3SS72 \ �Figure 5.0-16 I J FI MULTLOLT»T ry MULiii»tCic« ASSF 402AP06 - H —I r .\n ~I MEASURING RACK 402A702 N T ¥ LL5 I f, II 2 1 1* J 1^ A TT JL — — CHAW 13— *_ *_ J « — CHAN 13 V' / — CHAN 20- CHAN 14- F 4 J - •r 1 ! 33 O OW 3 *?© ©y T " " i j Is 1 i _ j PRELIMINARY J»i>n CYKIIVC I — o« IAS-;OS SMSU ELCCTRLCAU SCHEMATIC MCASU**S RACK 402A702 CMANSLLS 11-10 >- mcsi I— II M i l C IIIIULL" »"«I CIIIII 4 0M 33*72 �rj I to?*'04 c*t* 'J WATPLC*£» 402*704 402*704 K3-I 706 COM TO»COM .4SOA7J, 0O-7C* preummaot *** crrccrivc on SSE5M I *wo* CLfCTHiCAL SCIICMATIC CCS rnis'-o«c MCASuNcucnrs 40V33372 ��Figure 5.0-19 �SECTION 6.0 INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM AND COMPONENTS A listing of the measuring system hardware, composed of telemetry, measuring, and RF components, which are not associated with particular measurements is presented in Table 6.0-1. Also presented, in Tables 6.0-2 through -13 is the complete instrumentation program, which consists of measurements, telemetry channels, applicable measuring components, range, and other pertinent infor mation. 6-1 �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS PARAMETER L 1 N E MEAS. NR. Equipment VEHICLE SSESM PWG. NO MEASURIMIN! NAME AND RANGE OR FLT * INS TELEMETER OR COMPONENT PART NO PER POS ERR ENG CHANNEL Measuring Rack 703A404 50M12271 Measuring Rack 703A405 50M12271 Measuring Rack 703A406 50M12271 Measuring Rack 703A407 50M12271 Measuring Rack 703A408 50M12271 F 1 RF A s s y 7 0 3 A 4 0 1 50M12205 F 1 Tm A s s y 7 0 3 A 4 0 2 50M12206 F1 Multiplexer 703A403 50M12212 Tm C a l i b r a t o r A s s y 50M12416 TABLE 6.0-1 RES. PAGE F L T. c A L R E Q REMARKS 2 4 5 . 3 MC �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS PARAMETER MEAS Temperature NR. VEHICLE MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR FLT. PART NO. PER SSESM DWG. NO % INS. TELEMETER POS ENG. CHANNEL PAGE REMARKS ERR Cl-703 C2-703 C3-703 C4-701 Temp. Oxygen Storage Tank No. 1 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -125 to +100°C Temp. Oxygen Storage Tank No. 2 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -125 to +100°C Temp. Oxygen Storage Tank No. 3 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -125 to +100°C Temp. Reg. (8A) Inlet Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -125 to +100°C EF3-X-01-01 12S 01 4) EF-X-01-02 12S 01 4) EF3-X-01-03 12S 01 4) EF3-X-01-04 12S 01 4) 5OM12400 5QM12400 50M12400 50M12400 TABLE 6.0-2 �PARAMETER MEAS C5-701 C6-408 C7-701 C8-408 C9-701 NR INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM & COMPONENTS VEHICLE SSESM DWG. NO Temperature MEASUREMINl NAME AND RANGE OR OR COMPONENT PART NO Temp. Reg. (8A) Outlet Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -125 to 70°C Temp. Valve (5c) Outlet Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -75 to +4Q°C Temp. Suit Loop Supply Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 5 to 15°C Temp. Reg. (9B) Inlet Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier -125 to +100°C Temp. Airlock Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier FLT PER INS. POS. |ENG. ERR PAGE TELEMETER REMARKS CHANNEL EF3-X-01-05 12S 01 EF3-X-01-06 12S 01 4) EF3-X-01-07 12S 01 4) EF3-X-01-08 12S 01 5) EF3-X-01-09 12S 01 4) 4) 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 -100 to +125°F 50M12400 TABLE 6.0-3 �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS r~ PARAMETER MEAS C10-703 Cll-703 C12-703 C13-703 C14-703 NR Temperature MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT Temp. Battery No. 1 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier VEHICLE RANGE OR FLT. PART NO. PER SSESM PAGE DWG. NO % INS. TELEMETER POS ENG. CHANNEL REMARKS ERR 3 to 70°C EF3-X-01-10 12S 02 EF3-X-02-01 12S 02 EF3-X-02-02 12S 02 EF3-X-02-03 12S 02 ;F3-X-02-04 12S 02 50M12400 Temp. Battery No. 3 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 5 Temp. Gauge pC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 7 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 9 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 TABLE 6.0-4 �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM & COMPONENTS PARAMETER L 1 N E MEAS. NR C15-703 C16-703 C17-703 C18-703 C19-703 C20-703 _ Temperature MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR PART NO. Temp. Battery No. 11 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 13 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 15 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 17 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 19 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C Temp. Battery No. 21 Temp. Gauge DC Amplifier 0 to 70°C VEHICLE FLT PER % INS POS ENG ERR SSF.SM TELEMETER CHANNEL DWG PAGE NO RES. F L T C A L R E O EF3-X-02-05 12S Y 02 EF3-X-02-06 12S Y 02 EF3-X-02-07 12S Y 02 EF3-X-02-08 12S Y 02 EF3-X-02-09 12S Y 02 EF3-X-02-10 12S Y 02 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 50M12400 TABLE 6. 0 - 5 t REMARKS �« I N S T R U M E N T A T I O N PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS PARAMETER L 1 N MTAS. NR. Temperature MEASUR1MI N! NAME AND OR COMPONENT VEHICLE RANGE OR PART NO. FLT. PER SSESM % INS. POS ENG. DWG. NO RES. R E O EF3-X-05-02 12S Y 01 5) EF3-X-05-03 12S Y 01 5) EF3-X-05-04 12S Y 01 5) EF3-X-05-05 12S Y 01 5) EF3-X-05-06 12S Y 01 6) EF3-X-05-07 12S Y 01 6) EF3-X-05-08 12S Y 01 6) EF3-X-05-09 12S Y 01 6) TELEMETER CHANNEL ERR E C21-408 C22-408 C23-408 C24-408 C25-408 C26-408 C27-408 C28-408 T e m p LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r 30 to 65°C T e m p LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r 30 to 653C Temp LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r Temp LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r T e m p LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r T e m p LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r PAGE F L T C A L REMARKS 50M12400 50M12400 30 t o 65°C 50M12400 30 to 65°C 50M12400 30 to 65°C 50M12400 30 to 65°C 50M12400 T e m p LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r 30 t o 65°C Temp LH2 T a n k , I n t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r 30 t o 65°C 50M12400 50M12400 1 xO o TABLE 6. �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM & COMPONENTS PARAMETER MEAS NR. Temperature VEHICLE MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR PART NO. FLT. PER «4 POS SSESM DWG. NO INS TELEMETER ENG CHANNEL PAGE REMARKS ERR C29-409 C30-409 T e m p LH2 T a n k , E x t Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r -60 to 100°C Temp LH2 Tank Ext Temp Gauge DC A m p l i f i e r -60 to 100°C EF3-X-05-10 12S 01 6) EF3-X-06-01 12S 01 6) 50M12400 50M12400 TABLE 6.0-7 �I N S T R U M E N T A T I O N P R O G R A M 8c C O M P O N E N T S Pressure VEHICLE MEASURI.MI NT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR PART NO. SSESM DWG. NO PAGE TELEMETER POS CHANNEL REMARKS ERR Pressure Oxygen Storage Tank No. I Press. Gauge 50M12344 Hardwire Display for preflight 4) 6) 50M12344 Hardwire Display for preflight 4)6) Pressure, Oxygen Storage Tank No. 3 Press. Gauge 50M12344 Hardwire Display for preflight 4)6) Inlet Pressure, Oxygen Supply System Press. Gauge 50M12344 Pressure, Oxygen Storage Tank No. 2 Press. Gauge D3-703 D4-701 TABLE 6..0-8 �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM & COMPONENTS PARAMETER L 1 N E MEAS. NR. Pressure VEHICLE MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR PART NO. INS. FLT. % PER POS ENG. ERR SSESM TELEMETER CHANNEL PAGE NO RES. F L T. C A L R E O REMARKS D5-701 Regulator (8A) Outlet Pressure Press Gauge 0 to 400 PSI EF3-X-03-05 12S Y 01 4) D6-701 Pressure, Suit Loop Supply Press Gauge 0 to 15 PSI EF3-X-03-06 12S Y 0 4) D7-701 Regulator (7A) Outlet Pressure Press Gauge 05 to 1500 PSI EF3-X-03-07 12S Y 0 4) D8-701 Airlock Pressure Press Gauge 0 to 20 PSI 50M10259 EF3-X-03-08 12S Y o: Hardwire Display for preflight 4) 5) 6) D9-408 P r e s s u r e , LH2 T a n k Press Gauge 0 to 10 PSI EF3-X-03-09 12S Y o; 4) 50M10262 TABLE 6.0-9 • r t 5) 6) �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS PARAMETER MEAS. NR. Pressure VEHICL MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR PART NO. FLT. PER * POS £SESM INS. ENG DWG. NO TELEMETER CHANNEL PAGE RES. REMARKS ERR D10-201 C02 P a r t i a l Pressure Airlock Gauge Assy 0 to .15 psi EF3-X-03-10 12S 01 4) 6) Dl1-408 C 0 2 P a r t i a l P r e s s u r e LH2 T a n k 0 to .15 psi EF3-X-04-01 12S 01 4) 5) TABLE 6.0-10 �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS PARAMETER L 1 N E MEAS. NR. F1-408 F^OW VEHICLE MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT F l o w - ECS F l o w m e t e r DC A m p l i f i e r RANGE OR PART NO. FLT. PER % POS ERR 0.2 to 3 lb/hr 50M12400 TABLE 6.0-11 INS. ENG. SSESM TELEMETER CHANNEL EF3-X-05-01 DWG. NO RES. 45 PAGE F L T. C A L Y R E Q 01 5) REMARKS �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM & COMPONENTS PARAMETER L 1 N E MEAS. NR. Signal VEHICLE MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT RANGE OR PART NO. FLT. * INS. PER POS ENG ERR SSESM TELEMETER CHANNEL PAGE . NO RES. F L T. C A L R E O Kl-701 Voltage Sensor No. 1 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-04-02 12S Y 02 K2-701 Voltage Sensor No. 2 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-04-03 12S Y 02 K6-701 Lights LH2 Tank 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-05 12S Y 02 K7-701 Lights LH2 Tank 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-06 12S Y 02 K8-701 Blowers On 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-07 12S Y 02 K9-701 Oxygen Heater 701A6 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-08 12S Y 02 K10-701 Oxygen Heater 701A7 On 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-08 12S Y 02 Kll-701 Exterior Lights On 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-09 12S Y 02 K12-701 Airlock Light On 0 or 5 VDC EF3-X-05-10 12S Y 02 On TABLE 6.0-12 REMARKS �INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 8c COMPONENTS PARAMETER MEAS. NR. Voltage, Current & Frequency VEHICLE RANGE OR MEASUREMENT NAME AND OR COMPONENT PART NO. FLT PER % INS. POS. ENG. ERR SSESM PAGE DWG. NO. TELEMETER CHANNEL REMARKS Ml-701 V o l t a g e Bus 7D10 0 t o 2 8 VDC EF3-X-04-04 12S 02 4) M2-701 V o l t a g e Bus 7D30 0 t o 2 8 VDC EF3-X-04-05 12S 02 4) M3-701 V o l t a g e B u s 7D30 0 t o 2 8 VDC EF3-X-04-06 12S 0 4) M4-701 C u r r e n t Bus 7D10 DC A m p l i f i e r 0 t o 1 2 0 Amps EF3-X-04-07 12S 0 4) M5-701 C u r r e n t B u s 7D30 DC A m p l i f i e r 0 to 2 4 Amps EF3-X-04-08 12S 02 4) 12S 02 4) 4) 12S 02 M6-701 C u r r e n t B u s 7D50 DC A m p l i f i e r 0 t o 1 2 0 Amps EF3-X-04-09 M7-701 V o l t a g e 5 VDC M e a s u r i n g Supply 0 t o 5 VDC EF3-X-04-10 T A B L E 6. 0 - 1 3 �SECTION 7.0 HANDLING SEQUENCE 7. 1 GENERAL This Section describes receiving the SSESM at KSC, checkout of SLA, SSESM installation in SLA, SLA and IU mating, and spacecraft mating and forward buildup. 7.2 RECEIVING OF SSESM AT KSC (Figures 7.2-1 through -3) 7. 2. 1 The SSESM is shipped from MSFC, Huntsville, to KSC. 7.2.2 The SSESM is transferred to Manned Spacecraft Operations Building (MSOB), MILA. 7. 2. 3 The SSESM is removed from the shipping container by: a. R e m o v a l o f u p p e r s e c t i o n of t h e c o n t a i n e r . b. Installation of handling ring on SSESM. c. Removal of all clamping devices on the SSESM, freeing i t f r o m t h e l o w e r s e c t i o n of t h e s h i p p i n g c o n t a i n e r . d. Using a hoisting sling and the crane facilities at MSOB. w 7-1 �F I G U R E 7 . 2 - 1 - A R R I V A L O F SSESM A T T H E T E S T A N D C H E C K O U T F A C I L I T I E S 7-2 �THE METEROID LHHLL H, I I TIC--EL IN 4 PLACES HOR CLA.V.P INSTALLATION HOISTING FIGURE 7.2-2 - METHOD OF HOISTING SSESM 7-3 I �HO SL AIRLOCK UNIT FIGURE 7.2-3 - REMOVAL OF SSESM FROM STORAGE CONTAINER 7-4 �7* 3 CHECKOUT OF SLA PRIOR TO SSESM INSTALLATION ( F i g u r e 7 . 3 - 1) 7. 3. 1 Receive SLA and install in the work stand at MSOB. 7.3.2 Perform inspection. 7.3.3 Install open items: a. Separation system b. Umbilical c. Associated wiring d. Instrumentation 7.3.4 Perform continuity check. 7. 3 . 5 D e m a t e S L A . 7.3.6 Transfer SLA upper section to the next station. 7-5 �FIGURE 7. 3-1 - SLA SEPARATED 7-6 �I 7.4 SSESM INSTALLATION IN SLA LOWER SECTION (Figures 7.4-1 through -3) 7.4. 1 Install SSESM in the SLA lower section. 7.4.Z Adjust the attachment fittings. 7.4.3 Verify the alignment. 7.4.4 Mate the electrical connectors and verify their compati bility. 7. 4. 5 Demate. 7.4.6 Transfer the SSESM to the next station. I f * 7-7 ��FIGURE 7.4-2 - SSESM AND LOWER SLA ASSEMBLY 7-9 �t �7. 5 SLA LOWER SECTION AND IU MATING FOR TEST AND CHECKOUT (Figure 7. 5-1) ~~ " 7. 5 . 1 Receive IU. 7. 5. 2 Mate SLA lower section to IU. 7. 5 . 3 P e r f o r m m e c h a n i c a l f i t c h e c k a n d v e r i f y m e c h a n i c a l alignment. 7.5.4 Perform electrical fit check. 7. 5 . 5 D e m a t e S L A f r o m I U . 7.5.6 Transfer IU and SLA lower section to the next station. 7. 5 . 7 N o t s h o w n : V e r i f i c a t i o n of C M / S L A m e c h a n i c a l c o m patibility and storage of SLA. 7-11 �F I G U R E 1 0 - i - L O W E R S L A M A T E D T O I U F O R T E S T AND C H E C K O U T {-Li �# 7. 6 SPACECRAFT MATE AND FORWARD BUILDUP (Figure 7.6-1 through -3) 7. 6 . 1 I n s t a l l c o m p l e t e S S E S M i n S L A l o w e r s e c t i o n . 7. 6 . 2 V e r i f y i n t e r f a c e a n d a l i g n m e n t . 7.6.3 Mate SLA upper section to SLA lower section. 7.6.4 Install internal access platform set. 7. 6 . 5 M e c h a n i c a l l y m a t e C S M t o S L A . 7.6.6 Verify CSM/SLA mechanical alignment. 7. 6 . 7 Electrically mate CSM to SLA. 7.6.8 Verify CSM/SLA electrical interfaces. 7.6.9 Buildup forward deck. 7. 6 . 1 0 I n s t a l l f o r w a r d h e a t s h i e l d . 7. 6 . 1 1 I n s t a l l o r d n a n c e d e v i c e s . 7.6. 12 Spacecraft transferred to Launch Complex (LC). 7-13 �AIRL^C UNIT LOWER SLA HANDLING RING F I G U R E ( . D - 1 - S S ES M I N S T A L L A T I O N I N L O W E R S L A P R I O R T O M A T I N G WITH THE FLIGHT VEHICLE 7-14 ��t-IC.LRE i . o - i - CM/SM/SLA/ SSESM MATING TO VEHICLE i - lo �SECTION 8.0 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 8. 1 INTRODUCTION 8. I. 1 Purpose The maintenance concept for the SSESM is presented in this Section. It shall be used by MSFC and contractors when developing maintenance program plans to insure adequate maintenance for the SSESM. 8.1.2 Scope This concept applies to all orbital maintenance activities occurring on the SSESM system after docking takes place. 8.1.3 Objectives The principal objective of this maintenance concept is to provide a baseline for systematic maintenance planning for the SSESM logistics support. Systematic maintenance planning is required in order to accomplish the following: a. Increased equipment availability. b. Increased repair reliability. c. Increased safety for equipment and personnel. d. Reduced probability of human e r r o r . The above objectives are attained by achieving the following: a. Verified maintenance procedures and maintenance technical support data. b. Compatible man-machine relationships for successful completion of maintenance activities. c. of the SSESM. Adequate training for personnel to perform maintenance 8-1 �8.1.4 Concept Revisions This concept provides the preliminary maintenance program for all organizations performing logistics planning functions. As analysis and program definition proceed, this concept will be subject to additions, deletions, and modifications. These changes should be justified by appro priate technical or management studies. 8.1.5 Applicable Documents The following documents shall be used for reference to aid in the maintenance planning for the SSESM. In case of conflict between this document and the referenced documents, the referenced documents shall apply: Astronaut Training Plan (not released) Apollo Logistics Support Plan (NHB 7500. 1) SSESM Maintenance Plan (not released) 8. 2 BASIC CONCEPTS 8. 2. 1 Mission Concept The present mission concept requires that, in the event of a malfunction in any critical system, the mission will be aborted. It is the intent of this maintenance concept to extend the mission concept to permit an attempt to repair the system prior to issuing an order to abort. 8. 2. 2 Spares Concept A limited number of spare parts will be provided for inspace maintenance. Candidates for spares will be identified as the result of performance of a maintenance requirements a n a l y s i s . The actual spares to be transported with the SSESM will be determined from a detailed spare parts analysis. This spare parts analysis will consider, a s a m i n i m u m , t h e f o l l o w i n g : ( a ) R e l i a b i l i t y ; (l>) C r i t i c a l i t y ; ( c ) F e a s i b i l i t y ; (d) Weight Constraints. Spare parts will only be considered for support of the Environmental Control System (ECS). 8-2 �8.2.3 Maintenance Concept Maintenance on the SSESM will be performed by removing and replacing malfunctioned components. Disposal of defective components will be accomplished by stowing them in appropriate locations in the Spent Stage. No attempt will be made to return defective components to Earth. Structural repair will be considered, depending on development of adequate repair techniques. The maintenance requirements, tool requirements, astronaut training requirements, etc. , will be identified by a maintenance analysis (to be performed in accordance with NHB 7500. 1). Repair, in lieu of component replacement, will be considered if justification is provided by means of maintenance analysis or other trade studies. Components which a r e capable of being removed and replaced o r repaired will be identified in the SSESM maintenance plan (to be developed at a later date). Maintenance will be considered only on the SSESM Environ mental Control System (ECS) due to the high mission criticality of this system. 8. 3 TYPES OF MAINTENANCE 8.3.1 Preventive Maintenance (Scheduled Maintenance) Preventive maintenance is defined as any planned mainte nance action which is performed to maintain the system in a satisfactory operational condition. This consists, normally, of systematic inspections, servicing, and the detection and correction of incipient malfunctions before they occur or develop into major malfunctions. 8.3.2 Corrective Maintenance (Unscheduled Maintenance) Corrective maintenance is any maintenance action which is performed as the result of a failure and is performed in order to restore the equipment to satisfactory operational condition. 8. 4 MAINTENANCE LEVELS Levels of maintenance have been identified in order to categorize maintenance activities on a functional and location basis. Levels of maintenance for the S-IVB Workshop are described as follows: 8.4.1 First Level First-level maintenance includes all maintenance activities accomplished directly on system-installed hardware. This includes fault 8-3 �isolation, removal and replacement of components, servicing, replenishing, inspection, and repair-in-place activities performed on the Workshop whether it be in space or on the ground prior to launch. 8.4.2 Second Level Second-level maintenance includes all activities performed in direct support of first-level maintenance and involves disposition o r repair of hardware removed during first-level maintenance activities. In view of the philosophy discussed in paragraph 10. 2. 3, no second-level or lower-level maintenance will be required. 8. 5 MAINTENANCE STANDARDS Space maintenance activities demand the application of high quality standard maintenance proctices. Specifications must be developed which delineate in-space maintenance requirements to be met in regard to torque, cleanliness, bonding soldering, and lockwiring. Maintenance directives and procedures shall implement these specifications as applicable. 8-4 �SECTION 9.0 TEST AND SIMULATION FACILITIES 9. 1 GENERAL Substantial test facility capability exists at the MSFC with present and planned facilities. The applicability of the existing facilities to the development and test of a SSESM is discussed in this Section. 9.2 EXISTING FACILITIES To supplement the mechanically-induced vibration spectrum, use could be made of the recently-completed acoustical Test Position 116. This unique facility provides a clean acoustical environment which can subject the SSESM to a simulated acoustical spectrum equivalent to that encountered during CM detaching and docking maneuve rs. The structural integrity of the air lock and the docking structure could be verified by tethering both the assembled air lock and CM from the top of the 425-foot-high Saturn V Dynamic Test Stand. The extreme length of the suspension cables would induce negligible horizontal components and permit simulated in-space docking maneuvers. The Saturn V Dynamic Test Stand also houses the largest U.S. Low Gravity Test Facility. This facility could be utilized to verify the design and to establish in-flight fluid flow characteristics such as would be encountered by the environmental control and other gaseous or fluid systems. The CTL Area can accommodate component system development and verification tests involving hazardous propellants and high-pressure gases as employed by the slug environmental control system. In addition, newly and especially developed components, such as valves, regulators, switches, gauges, and heat exchangers, could be evaluated for system compatibility and response characteristics. The recently-completed Test Position 500 could be employed in the development of hazardous cryogenic handling, transfer, storage, and dumping techniques as would be encountered during orbital hydrogen tank blowdown, as well as facilitate the solution to inevitable unforseen problems which frequently occur in system design and development efforts. �The currently-functional GSE Area could be utilized in develop ment of SLA panel explosive removal techniques. The random motion devices could be employed to simulate the action of the S-IVB Workshop in a perturbed orbit while activating SLA panel deployment. In general, the aforementioned test facilities are but a few of those existing which could considerably benefit an austere in-house development of the SSESM. All of the test positions and areas a r e fully instrumented to sense and record the required design and test phenomena. As the program guidelines and operational requirements solidify, it is anticipated that other existing Test Laboratory facilities and component test positions can be used to greater advantage than presently envisioned. 9-2 �SECTION 10.0 10. 1 CREW FAMILIARIZATION PLAN GENERAL A description of a proposed Crew Familiarization Program for the S-IVB Workshop and spent stage experiments is presented in this Section. This plan will assure timely identification and integration of all familiarization resources and services necessary to insure adequate, timely, and economical familiarization support for the crew members. This plan shall be conducted within the guidelines and ground rules established for the overall astronaut familiarization program and shall be controlled and monitored by MSC. This plan conforms to NHB-7500. 1, Apollo Logistics Require ments Plan, November 1965; MSFC Logistics Support Requirements Plan, January 1966; and NPC 500.1, Apollo Configuration Management Manual, May 1964.. 10.2 FAMILIARIZATION CONCEPT 10.2.1 Description This familiarization concept is a proposed method of accomplishing crew familiarization for the S-IVB spent stage, the SSESM, and the experiments. This concept will assure the effective control and management required to identify, develop, provide, and maintain a familiarization program for the orbital workshop. All crew members will be trained in the deployment and use of air lock and workshop equipment, including equipment required in MSFC-developed experiments. Contingency time will be included throughout the familiarization program to allow for unexpected events or task difficulties. It is estimated that three or four months will be required for actual crew familiarization. This will cover five primary familiari zation areas and will be divided into four phases. 10-1 1 �10.2.2 Familiarization Areas The primary familiarization areas are as follows: a. Crew system equipment handling and operation. b. S-IVB Workshop activation and passivation procedures c. Experiment equipment transfer, operation, and data collection. d. S-IVB Workshop shutdown. e. Safety procedures and contingencies. 10.2.3 Familiarization Phase The program will be divided into the following phases: a. Orientation of mission requirements and subsystems capabilities. Astronaut/equipment interface will be defined and component functions will be introduced. b. Simulation of man-machine mission requirements to validate equipment locations and layout. c. Simulation of man-machine mission requirements incorporating recommended modifications. d. Total mission simulation; reduced gravity, high fidelity simulation of equipment and man-equipment functional requirements. After the orientation period, integrated mission simulation will be conducted in a Spent Stage functional mockup. Reduced gravity, vacuum, and atmospheric conditions to be encountered during the actual mission will be simulated where necessary. A con tinuous evaluation of the familiarization program will be conducted to determine that familiarization course objectives are met. 10-2 �10.2.4 Elements Required The elements required to identify, provide control of, and manage the familiarization program are the following: a. Familiarization Requirements Analysis. - A systematic familiarization requirements analysis will be made of the post docking to CSM-SSESM separation sequence of events, systems analysis, maintenance analysis, and experiment outputs to identify those crew member tasks that require familiarization and associated lamiliarization equipment. The familiarization requirements analysis will be made along the guidelines detailed in paragraph 10.3. The analysis will form the basis of the familiarization plans and familiari zation equipment specification. b. Familiarization Plans- -Familiarization plans will be developed to cover equipment and familiarization requirements identified in the familiarization requirements analysis. Each will be developed along the guidelines detailed in paragraph 10.4. A program plan will be developed that will give visibility to the total familiarization requirements and will indicate areas for cross-training and unscheduled redundancies. c* Implementation. - Some of the prime considerations during the implementation period are inter-Center schedule milestones, interface familiarization requirements, and mission requirements. MSFC will provide a technical coordinator to NASA Headquarters and MSC. d. Management. -MSC will provide the necessary program coordination and control to assure that the familiarization program covered herein meets MSC program milestones and standards. Necessary management control through directives, instructions, and procedures will be provided. Techniques such as PERT, EDS, con figuration management, etc., will be utilized for effective and econo mical management of the familiarization program. 10• 3 FAMILIARIZATION REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 10. 3. 1 Purpose The purpose of the familiarization requirements analysis is to identify specific familiarization requirements and 10-3 �familiarization equipment for the S-IVB Workshop mission- This analysis will be a systematic review of the SSESM experiments and their related operations and maintenance tasks. A part of this opera tions and maintenance analysis has already been accomplished. 10.3.2 Flight Equipment Analysis Flight equipment that requires crew familiarization for satisfactory operation will be identified and categorized in accordance with its mission criticality, complexity of operation, physical constraints imposed upon crew members, interface with other equipment, safety considerations, and contingencies. Expend able and recoverable equipment will be identified and their stowage procedures defined. 10. 3. 3 Task Analysis Tasks required to perform each normal/emergency operational function will be defined. A comprehensive and systematic review of the flight equipment and task analyses will be conducted to determine total task familiarization and individual task familiarization requirements. Specific task procedures will be defined. Estimates of time, in minutes, required to perform each task will be made. T h e s e estimates will be revised a t the end of the crew familiarization program to indicate a more realistic task time factor based upon simulated operation time. Each task will be identified to indicate its criticality to mission success, degradation of equipment, perceptual requirements, motor skill demands, judgmental requirements, and number of crew members required. 10.3.4 Familiarization Equipment and Facilities Analysis Familiarization equipment and facilities analyses will be made to determine requirements and availability dates. Selection and provisioning of familiarization equipment will be made based on this analysis. Before fabrication, familiarization equipment specifi cation will be prepared and approved for each familiarization equip ment end item. Appropriate configuration control procedures will be implemented to maintain familiarization equipment end item compati bility with the operational program equipment. 10-4 �10.3.5 Nature of Familiarization The most economical and effective methods of teaching will be used. Familiarization aids, components, operational equip ment, and simulators will be used for orientation and task-based familiarization. Orientation of mission requirements, subsystem capabilities and component functions is required to familiarize the crew members with tasks to be performed. Equipment built to actual operational system specifications and simulators will be used to develop exact unique skills and to meet specific familiarization objec tives. Existing operational equipment and simulators will be fully utilized. Familiarization facilities, as determined by the facilities analysis, will be provided. Extensive renovation will not be accom plished unless it is considered critical to the familiarization program mission. 10.3.6 Familiarization Outline A familiarization outline will be prepared from the familiarization requirements analysis data. The outline will define the courses, equipment, integrated resources, and services necessary for crew familiarization in each program phase as stated in para graph 10.2. This outline will provide a basis for the familiarization plans, and the estimated time required to complete each course. 10. 4 FAMILIARIZATION PLANS 10.4. 1 Purpose The familiarization plan will provide documented sources for identifying lesson plans, resources and controls to assure that familiarization requirements are met. 10.4.2 Course Description and Outline A course description and outline will be prepared from the familiarization outline data for each program phase (see para graph 10.2). It will contain the basic organization material and an itemized listing of each familiarization requirement, including the time clement required for familiarization. The data will contain information such as security classification, course objective and 10-6 �scope, course length in manhours, location of familiarization, familiarization methods to be used, required familiarization equip ment, and contingencies. The course description and outline data will be used to develop lesson plans. 10.4.3 Lesson Plans Lesson plans will be prepared for each program operation to define the familiarization accomplishments required for daily performance. In addition to operational and equipment procedures, the lesson plans will include contingencies, equipment relationships and interfaces, mission criticality, safety procedures, evaluation data, and conditions that would necessitate abort. Simul taneous crew participation at different work stations will be covered. 10.4.4 Schedules Schedules will be developed from the course descrip tion and outline, the latest Apollo Program schedules, and MSC astronaut familiarization schedule. They will contain provisioning data relative to familiarization equipment, facilities, lesson plans, instructors, and crew members. This part of the familiarization plan will give visibility to the total crew familiarization program and will clearly portray major familiarization milestones, critical familiarization events, schedule slippage or compromise provisioning inadequacies and current status. 10.4.5 Familiarization Evaluation A performance measurement system will be developed to assure an effective familiarization program and crew-system integration. MSC will evaluate the crew proficiency in relation to the familiarization course objectives. Approval of crew efficiency to successfully conduct mission operations will be the responsibility of MSC. 10-6 �10.5 IMPLEMENTATION The preparation for crew familiarization will consist of the following: a. A detailed preparation and presentation of data identified in the familiarization requirements analysis and familiarization plans. b. Design and fabrication of additional familiarization equipment defined in the familiarization requirements analysis. c. Utilization of equipment and facilities identified in the familiarization requirements analysis. d. An evaluation of knowledge and skills required to conduct crew familiarization. To assure crew proficiency, crew familiarization will be conducted using the course description and outline, lesson plans, familiarization equipment and facilities identified/developed in the technical requirements analysis and familiarization plan developed phases. NASA configuration management techniques will be used for familiarization equipment provisioning and control to assure that the equipment is current with flight hardware configuration and program schedules. A monthly status report will be submitted. In addition to the information required by the reporting procedures, the report will contain any problem encountered and the solution, schedule slippages with justification and recommended corrective action, and current status. Familiarization evaluation reports will be submitted by the instructor at the completion of each lesson. This report will contain lesson number and title, name of instructor, names of crew members participating, actual time required for course completion, evaluation of crew proficiency, degree of familiarization equipment efficiency, recommendations to improve lesson plan, and recommen dations concerning crew-system interfaces. 10-7 �10.6 FAMILIARIZATION MANAGEMENT The methods and procedures specified herein will provide assurance that the crew familiarization requirements for the S-IVB Spent Stage Experiment will be satisfied. It will assure that requirements are identified and satisfied in a manner and time frame permitting effective integration and control of this program with the MSC astronaut training program. Major milestones, program elements, and functional flow paths are shown in Figure 10.6-1. Each function is shown within its program element and is defined within the program element text shown for that function. Each function will be further defined and maintained during the life of the program. The documentation developed for each of the functions is shown in Figure 10.6-2. The documentation used will be structured to per mit common use in establishing the familiarization baselines and in performing program requirements. Documentation will be revised throughout the program to maintain familiarization and equipment current with program configuration and schedules. 10-8 �FIGURE 10.6-1 FAMILIARIZATION PLAN FLOW PATH FAMILIARIZATION EQUIPMENT FAMILIARIZATION PROVISIONING EQUIPMENT / SPECIFICATION MSC * 'FAMILIARIZATION \ I SCHEDULE 4 I \APOLLO PROGRAM ' SCHEDULE / I / OPS 4 MAINT ANALYSIS 4 EXPERIMENTS \ SSESM J COURSE FAMILIARIZATION FLIGHT DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT » EQUIPMENT CREW FACILITIES ANALYSIS . / EVALUATION FAMILIARIZATION OUTLINE ANALYSIS FUNCTIONS TASK SCHEDULES ANALYSIS PROGRAM PROGRAM FAMILIARIZATION LESSON OUTLINE PLANS _ FAMILIARIZATION IMPLEMENTATION DEVELOPMENT (CREW FAMILIARIZATION!" FAMILIARIZATION ANALYSIS ELEMENTS _ « M W « « N T S V COMMENCE MILESTONES: OF DETERMINATION FAMILIARIZATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS COMMENCE FAMILIARIZATION PLANS DEVELOPMENT FAMILIARIZATION PLANS CREW APPROVAL AND PROFICIENCY IMPLEMENTATION OBTAINED �FIGURE 10.6-2 - FAMILIARIZATION FUNCTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTATION * DOCUMENTATION �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Richard Heckman Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000055 Title A name given to the resource "APPENDIX TO SPENT STAGE EXPERIMENT SUPPORT MODULE PROPOSAL." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966-06-01 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1965-1970 Subject The topic of the resource George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Skylab Program Apollo applications program Spent Stage Workshop Saturn launch vehicles Experimentation Space habitats Airlock modules Multiple docking adapters Provisioning Onboard equipment Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Richard Heckman Collection Box 1, Folder 12 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/53/14373/sdsp_skyl_000028-000028.pdf 40ceaae72fe42f66294974f091fde373 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Werner Sieber Collection Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Werner Sieber Collection Description An account of the resource Werner Hans Sieber (March 27, 1912 to April 3, 1995) was a guided missiles expert during WWII (Wade). He received his education from Technical University, Hanover (Lundquist). Sieber was taken to the United States through Operation Paperclip, where he joined von Braun's Rocket Team. By 1960, [Sieber was the] “Head of Measuring Consoles and Instrumentation Division, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Test Division, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center" (Wade). “In the February 1969 MSFC Directory (five months before the first lunar landing) he is listed as Chief of the Test Instrumentation and Control Division of the Test Laboratory” (Lundquist). Sources: Lundquist, Charles. "Transplanted Rocket Pioneers," 2015. Wade, Mark. "Sieber, Werner." Encyclopedia Astronautica, <a href="http://www.astronautix.com/s/sieber.html">http://www.astronautix.com/s/sieber.html</a>. Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/150">View the Werner Sieber Collection finding aid on ArchivesSpace</a> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000028-000028 Title A name given to the resource "ASTRONAUT GARRIOTT PERFORMS SKYLAB 3 EVA." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Extravehicular mobility units Garriott, Owen K. Experimentation Apollo Telescope Mount Skylab 1 Skylab 3 Lousma, Jack R. Type The nature or genre of the resource Color Photographs Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Werner Sieber Collection Box 7, Folder 43 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/23/14363/sdsp_skyl_000011-000012.pdf 551a17f3a0d2c58f1a6d4c540c1af3d8 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Charles A. Lundquist Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/46" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">View the Charles A. Lundquist Collection finding aid in ArchivesSpace</a> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Charles A. Lundquist Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000011-000012 Title A name given to the resource "EARTH TERRAIN VIEWS AS SEEN FROM SKYLAB SPACE STATION." Description An account of the resource This poster depicts the Kyushu Island of Japan, Seattle and the Pacific Northwest, South Island of New Zealand, and Alps Mountains of Europe, as seen from the Skylab Space Station. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Earth Resources Program Type The nature or genre of the resource One-Sheet Posters Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Charles A. Lundquist Collection Box 60, Folder Photograph University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/46/14394/sdsp_skyl_000059_001.pdf 3ff315ee3a31d38ca47b444286c6c981 PDF Text Text s» .w WTELEDYNE BROWN ENGINEERING TECHNICAL LETTER ASD-ASTN-20102 TO: J. W. Stokes S&E-ASTN-SMH FROM: Human Factors Engineering Branch Systems Engineering Department Aerospace Support Division SUBJECT: Final Crew System Corollary Experiment Input to the Skylab Final Mission Evaluation Report DATE: Fe b r u a r y 1 5 , 1 9 7 4 In response to AVO No. 140, dated February 8, 1974, and in partial fulfillment of Technical Directive S-3-500, paragraph I. D. 1, the subject report is enclosed. Originated by: R. A. Curtis "Originated by: D. W. Dodson APPROVED: ( A- / / J. H. Ofenloch, Task Manager Man/Systems Engineering Section, ASD-SHE R. L. Edgeton, 'Manager Man/Systems Engineering Branch, ASD-SH 1 Enc: As stated cc: S&E-ASTN-SM, Mr. Thompson, w/oenc. ASD-S, Mr. Turney, w/o enc. / S&E-ASTN-SMH, Mr. Reaves AF-01-PP (38732) �MISSION E V A L U A T I O N R E P O R T SKYLAB COROLLARY EXPERIMENTS Prepared by: C R E W S Y S T E M S MISSION S U P P O R T G R O U P MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION February 9, 1974 �13.22 COROLLARY EXPERIMENTS 13.22. 1 General - The corollary experiments involved three major i t e g o r i e s of e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g o f ; t h e s c i e n t i f i c , w i t h o b j e c t i v e s > acquire photographic data of solar and stellar phenomena; the technological, with objectives to measure contamination levels surrounding the Orbital Assembly; and the operational, with objectives to assess technological innovations which assist the crew in performing space related tasks. Performance of the corollary experiments during the three Skylab missions achieved most of the designed and planned functional objectives. The know ledge obtained from their operation and the acquired data have provided insight that will be implemented into the design and operational require ments of future manned spacecraft. Significant information has been acquired a s a result of the corollary experi ment activities performed during Skylab. Ihe following are some conclusions derived from the on-orbit corollary experimentation that is applicable to future spacecraft hardware designs and operations. • An adequate maintenance workstation with appropriate tools and restraints should be included in future space craft design. • Crew manipulation of large experiment equipment caused no problems. Multiple, small items were �found to be difficult to constrain and handle. It is recommended that handles be provisioned on all large mass items to facilitate their manipulation. Also, a system is required to control the manipulation of multiple, small items. Of the experiments requiring extension/retraction through the Scientific Airlock (SAL) to space, it was found that the retraction forces were somewhat higher, as anticipated, and that a warm-up period was required prior to final retraction and removal of experiments from the SAL to prevent formation of condensation/ frost. Through operations of M509 and T020 the feasibility of a one-man maneuvering unit was successfully demonstrated. Corollary experiment T013 demonstrated that crew motion within a large spacecraft does impact its stability and guidance control and should be considered in future designs. �13.22.2 Scientific Experiments 13.22.2.1 S009 - Nuclear Emulsion a. Operations - Experiment S009 was scheduled to be performed throughout the SL-2 mission to investigate aspects of cosmic radiation. Prior to experiment initiation, the S009 detector package was to be removed from the OWS film vault, transferred to the MDA and installed in the S009 experiment housing. The crewman was then to initiate experiment operation by setting the proper beta angle and activating the open-close cycle for the experiment. S009 was to operate automatically throughout SL-2 with the crew making periodic checks and/or corrections to the experiment beta angle and open-close cycle. At the completion of the experiment, the S009 detector package was to be removed from the experiment housing and stowed in the CM for earth return. b. Usage/Anomalies - The S009 experiment was conducted on SL-2 despite a concern of possible S009 detector emulsion degradation due to the high OWS temperatures present during the beginning of the SL-2 mission. During the S009 detector package installation considerable difficulty was encountered. It was determined that due to the high OWS temperatures, the emulsion package had expanded thereby reducing the tolerances between the package and experiment housing. After two we ks of operation the door on the S009 experiment housing began to bind and finally would not close properly. The crew performed �malfunction procedures and concluded that the motor/drive train for the experiment door had failed. As a result the S009 door was left open, the automatic open-close cycle was inhibited and manual pointing was maintained throughout the duration of the SL-2 mission for data collection. At the end of SL-2 the S009 detector package was stowed in the CM and returned to earth. On ground analysis of the package revealed that the emulsion layers had been fused together due to the high OWS temperatures and the data was of little use. On SL-3 a new S009 door motor was launched for replacement but replacement was not accomplished due to scheduling reasons. On SL-4 a new emulsion package was launched. During malfunction procedures the crew replaced the defective door motor (an hour operation) and installed the resupplied detector package. S009 was then activated and performed satisfactorily throughout the remainder of the SL-4 mission. completion of the experiment, the detector package was stowed in the CM and returned to earth. c. Assessments/Recommendations - Experiment S009 operations, including malfunction procedures, were straightforward and no crew interface problems were experienced. The hardware unstowage and experiment activation was a one-man operation and the restraints Up �provided in the MDA for S009 operations were considered adequate. No problems were encountered during the SL-4 S009 motor replacement and resupply of the detector package. 13.22.22.2 a. S019 - UV Stellar Astronomy Operations - The S019 UV Stellar Astronomy experiment was scheduled to be performed during 12 selected night orbits in each of the first two missions, SL-2 and SL-3. The equipment to be used was an optical canister and the Articulated Mirror System (AMS), launched in individual stowage containers, and the film canister, launched in the OWS film vault. One crewman was to be required to set up and operate the experiment hardware in the Scientific Airlock (SAL) to obtain a total of 150 slides of data from a minimum of 36 starfields. Three starfields, with three exposures per starfield, were to be photographed during each operation. To maximize the scientific return of S019, the astronaut was to be allowed as much flexibility in the choice of starfields and exposure times a s possible. b. Usage/Anomalies - During the initial activation of the AMS a problem occurred in the operation of the tilt mechanism. this S019 operation was aborted and no data was acquired. As a result, Through extensive malfunction procedure checkout and finally, disassembly of the AMS tilt mechanism, the crew discovered an Allen screw binding on a �small gear of the tilt mechanism. This was corrected and the unit functioned properly during the remainder of the experiment's data acquisition operations. During the repair of the AMS tilt mechanism, the m i r r o r was inadvertently touched leaving a finger print on the mirror. At the request of the Principle Investigator (PI), no corrective procedure was implemented, to remove the finger print. This was to prevent possible additional damage to the mirror surface. Trying to clean the mirror could have been more degrading to the mirror's viewing function than the imposed finger print. During SL-3 operations of S019 it was reported that the luminescence h a d c o m e o u t o f t h e d i g i t s o n o n e of t h e r o t a t i o n d i a l s . However, by close inspection, the operator could still distinguish the engraved impressions of the digits to permit proper operation of the rotational dial. The S019 spectrometer mechanism jammed during retraction following a SL-3 pass. Retraction was eventually accomplished some 30 hours subsequent to the initial failure and normal operations were restored. Due to this S019 experiment retraction failure, warm-up procedures for all experiments placed in the SAL were observed prior to exposure of their mechanism to OWS environment for all subsequent experiment operations. �During a SL-3 S019 pass the crew reported that the film advance/ shutter lever stopped at the carriage retracted position, and could not be moved on to the slide retracted position. This film canister was replaced with the new canister and the remaining exposures were taken as scheduled during SL-3. The failed canister was taken to an area of subdued light (the head, with lights out and door closed), the cover was removed, and the sliding film hatch was opened. Inspection by feel was performed on part of the carriage and shutter mechanism. The crew identified no apparent damage or discrepancy that could be corrected by their action. Consequently, the film canister unit was returned to earth for malfunction analysis. It was found from the review of acquired data that during performance of the S019 experiment, the system was extremely sensitive to motion and some blurs occurred on one S019 slide. It was felt that this could have been caused when the canister was used as a writing surface. The PI requested that the S019 system not be touched when taking data. was necessary to the acquisition of clear photography. This The crew had no difficulties complying with this request except when opening or closing the shutter. At this time momentary jiggling of the S019 system could not be prevented. Although S019 operations were not originally scheduled for SL-4, the �SL-4 mission extension created additional crew experiment time and allowed assignment of S019 to SL-4. New S019 film canisters replacement S019 mirror were launched. and a During replacement of the S019 AMS mirror the crew reported the new mirror was dusty and had three very narrow white streaks. The new mirror was touched by the crewman leaving a 3/4 inch long smudge which extended 3/ 16 inch in from the edge. This was caused by the gloves being packed under the mirror and the crewman having to remove the mirror bare handed. Numerous problems were experienced with the S019 canisters jamming during SL-4. The canister would not go into the slide retract position and the problem was believed to be with the nylon sleeve on the film slides. The first canister to jam was placed in stowage however when the second canister jammed the crew decided to use brut force to put the lever in the slide retract position. The canister then operated normally except higher forces were required on the operating mechanism. This canister eventually jammed again and broke when the crewman forced it into the slide retract position. Malfunction procedures were performed but the canister was considered completely broken. The first canister was operated using excessive force but the crew felt it could jam at any time. Both canisters were returned for evaluation. �There was a continual gradual degradation in the indicator on the rotation dials of the AMS. In addition to the luminescence coming out of the units digit,the crew reported they were experiencing slippage between the mirror rotation attitude control knob and the indication dial. The belt broke and the degree indicator did not move even though the crank was turning. No repair was attempted due to the radioactivity from the luminescence in the sealed dials. For all subsequent operations the crew had to count the number of turns of the crank to determine the rotation settings. The T002 sextant was used to check misalignment of the m i r r o r . A failure of the S019 reticle light was identified on one S019 canister. The crew reported earlier that the reticle light was dim and it was assumed that the battery charge was too low to illuminate the bulb. The bulb and battery were not replaceable but the reticle was for reference only and no data was lost due to the failure. No corrective action was necessary except the crew turned off the reticle light when it was not required to verify pointing accuracy. An additional S019 operation requirement was incorporated during SL-4 to reduce possible S019 data degradation due to OWS influenced disturbances o n t h e SO 1 9 p o i n t i n g a c c u r a c y . During SL-4 all ergometer and Mark I exerciser operations were prohibited during S019 operations. �c. Assessment/Recommendations - The crew recommended that the first couple of S019 pads be relatively easy to give them a chance to re-familiarize themselves with S019 operations. The crew felt that 80% of all crew e r r o r s would probably occur during the first runs of the experiment. They also stated that S019 procedures needed to be updated with more exact information concerning photography exposure times. Differences existed between the forces required to operate the controls of the different S019 canisters. Some canister's carriage retract systems operated easily while others were quite stiff. normal as they were not all the same. The PI stated that this was The operating controls should have been designed with appropriate stop positions to eliminate the necessity of counting crank turns to the full extended or full retracted position. The crew also recommended not using the locks on the shaft rotation or extension controls as they were no longer required after placing the controls in the unlocked position. The S019 timelines were too close and the crew recommended that 30 seconds to 1 minute be allocated for the operator to perform a change in S019 pointing. They also suggested allowing 15 to 30 minutes extra to the timeline for the first running of the experiment to allow familiarization with the equipment. �The crew requested that the same crewman not be asigned to an ATM pass and a S019 pass with no time in between. Otherwise any falling behind in the ATM pass immediately impacted the S019 operations. The crewman should be allowed to go into S019 with nothing else on his mind and not cluttered with what he had just finished. The crew suggested having a T-handle on top of the winding valve instead of the knob. The knob was very slippery when their hands were moist and a T-handle would have been better for winding the film. E x p e r i m e n t SO 1 9 h a n d l i n g w a s e a s y o n o r b i t c o m p a r e d t o g r o u n d h a n d l i n g . The crew felt that the carrying handle for the optical canister was a necessity. T h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r c h a n g i n g t h e v i e w i n g c o o r d i n a t e s d u e t o t h e NTJ Z were very satisfactory but there was a definite source of potential error with the sign and albegraic manipulations required to compute the rotation. The crew had never trained for these calculations and felt that they should have had such training for the calculations to be apparent. There was no problem with dark adaptation when operating experiment S019. The critical adjustments required to prevent dark adaptation problems were the position of the eye to the eye piece and the focus. The repair work performed on the AMS tilt mechanism would have been �aided by the addition of a Skylab Inflight Maintenance facility composed of a work bench and a high intensity light. An optics cleaning kit would have been valuable to remove the finger print contamination from the AMS mirror and should be provided on future flights. 13. 22. 2. 3 S020 - UV X-Ray Solar Photography a. Operations - Experiment S020 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 and SL-4 through the solar Scientific Airlock (SAL) to photograph x-ray and extreme ultraviolet spectrums of the sun in wavelength regions from 10 to 200 A. Two crewmen were to perform the setup and checkout of the experiment in the SAL. When notified that a solar flare might occur, the crewmen were to point the equipment at the solar disc and obtain quiet on active sun flare exposures as required. b. Usage/Anomalies - Due to the parasol thermal shield occupying the solar SAL, additional operating methods were devised. special EVA bracket was designed and launched on SL-3. A The EVA bracket was fit checked and an operational decal was installed by the SL-3 crew. S020 was successfully performed on three SL-4 EVA's with exposures up to one hour being obtained. During deployment of the S020 camera the crew experienced some slight difficulty in attaching the mount to the ATM truss. the knob to tighten it the whole mount twisted. In screwing down The ball joint on the mount was also difficult to adjust and the crew felt a larger ball would have made it easier to adjust. �During S020 preparation for the final SL-4 EVA the crew reported a number of pin holes in each of the two filters. Some were detected by the naked eye and others were detected with a flashlight and magnifying glass. It was felt that the size of the holes a s described by the crew would not allow enough light through to cause any problems. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The interface between the S020 equipment and the EVA bracket was well designed. The experi ment hardware and procedures were adequate and experiment operations were accomplished without any anomalies being reported. 13.22.2.4 S063 - UV Airglow Horizon Photography a. Operations - Experiment S063 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 and SL-4 to photograph in the visible and ultraviolet (UV) spectra the earth's ozone layers and twilight airglow. The equipment to be used included the visible and UV cameras, with related accessories, and the respective mounting structures for the related cameras at the Scientific Airlock (SAL) and wardroom windows. One crewman was to attach the cameras to the SAL or wardroom window, make appropriate exposure time and shutter settings, and perform exposures during approximately 28 selected orbits of the mission. �b. Usage/Anomalies - Some difficulty was experienced during the loading of a new Nikon camera for S063 operations. Upon investigation it was found that a bit of epoxy-like material prevented the film system from positioning properly. The crew removed this material with a knife and the camera operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. Due to solar SAL obstructions by the parasol thermal shield, the S019 Articulated Mirror System (AMS) was utilized to obtain some of the S063 data. �During initial S063 operations there was a problem with a timer mal functioning. Analysis established that the motor drive switch was out of configuration and that the timer was being operated incorrectly. This problem necessitated the use of the crewman's wristwatch in conjunction with the timer for all subsequent S063 operations. Additional lighting was required for S063 operations as the crewman had to use a flashlight to read the watch and timer. The crew also requested an additional 45 seconds preparation time between S063 exposures. At the reque of the crew, information on how to interpret the S063 optical sight reticle was provided by the ground and posted next to the experiment for future reference by the crew. S063 operations called for eight second exposure times but due to a problem encountered in setting the viewing equipment some exposures may have been 10 second exposures. The marker on the viewing equipment had a bright edge and light glinted off the leading edge of the marker through the window. The viewing equipment was set on this leading edge rather than the white mark. This added about two seconds to the exposure. One visible photography portion of a S063 run was not obtained because a battery powering the visible camera had tape covering one terminal. This tape was removed and no futher problems were encountered with the battery. �The crew reported that during hand-held photography through the ward room window they tended to point the camera so as not to view through any of the contamination on the window. During SL-3 it was noted that an adapter between the AMS and the S063 window was missing a bolt. This missing bolt did not interfere with S063 operations but a requirement for a replacement bolt was provided for SL-4. The crew also reported fixing a looseness of the interface between the mounting shear and the optical sight of the camera. Tape was used to tighten and thus reduce the wobble in this interface. This provided better resolution than previously with the camera wiggle in the system. During the initial SL-4 S063 operation the remote timer did not operate. This complicated the S063 operation in that the crewman had to use manual timing in addition to tracking and controlling the rotation and tilt settings. The problem with the timer occurred when the crew mistakenly used a timer without any batteries. the problem. A new battery in the remote timer fixed For subsequent operations the crew removed the batteries after each use and taped them to the timer to insure nothing in the timer would drain the batteries down. The crew reported the ring site was looking in the wrong direction and that it should be looking more towards the axis. Part of the sight was obscured such that you could not see the whole mirror. The crewman �assumed that although his sight was getting a truncated view the camera was getting the full view,therefore he centered it in the circle and not the truncated portion of the field of view. The crewman found that by looking right below everything, straight at the AMS mirror,he could get a better field of view than looking through the sights. A problem was experienced with the S063 reticle light not illuminating. The crew checked the prime and backup batteries and they checked out a t 1.6 v o l t s c o m p a r e d t o a 3 . 1 v o l t s p r e f l i g h t . The battery contacts were scraped however neither battery would illuminate the reticle light. A substitute battery pack was fabricated from two (2) spare "C" cells, tape, and two (2) multimeter leads. The substitute battery pack was installed by inserting the probe ends of the leads into the female terminals of the optical sight housing and normal reticle operation was restored. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The SO63 stowage and unstowage went as planned and the S063 procedures related to the equip ment went very well. In some instances the crew had to hurry to get two photographs on the same target, but the tracking task using the hardware was reasonable. The time allocated for stowage and preparation for S063 and AMS equipment was adequate. The stowage location of the twin filter underneath the S063 stowage container lid was inadequate because of poor lighting and visibility in �in the area. This filter stowage inadequacy was identified in training but never corrected. The crew stated that they should have had one extra Nikon camera body and a minimum of six extra cassettes of 2485 fast film for photography of targets of opportunity. to properly photograph board. A great opportunity may have been missed the Aurora because these items were not on The crew recommended replacing the Hasselblad in the CM with a Nikon. The crew recommended that some type of suction-cup type mount be supplied for cameras used in hand-held photography. could then be restrained at any window. These cameras Such a restraint should be light, have a shutter release, and so provisioned that it could be moved to any position. The crew recommended that the Principle Investigator (PI) provide a small color chart identifying the different shades of gray or white that the night airglow might look like to the crew. This would make identification easier for the crew and provide a commonality point between ground and on orbit data. Crew training for experiment S063 appeared to be inadequate as the timer was operated incorrectly and the crew had to request information on how to interpret the S063 reticle. The crewman stated that the problem with the timer was 25% incorrect configuration and 75% his e r r o r . �The SL-4 crew stressed that due to the lack of a simulator the first couple of runs with the S063 would have to be accepted a s training sessions. Any operations that called for manual dexterity could not be learned by talking through them. The crew stated they had more difficulty with S063 than with other more complicated experiments which they had trained for. Even with a relatively simple task, when you encounter something new, a couple of familiarization runs a r e required before it goes smoothly. There was a confusion factor in determining the frame count from the UV Nikon camera. The frame count on the top of the Nikon read differently than the frame count on the bottom of the c a m e r a . decided to use only the bottom frame count indicator. only one frame count indicator provided on a camera. The crew There should be �13. 22. 2. 5 S073/T027 - Gegenschein Zodiacal Light and ATM Contamination Measurement a. Operations - Experiment S073/T027 was scheduled for operation during SL-2 and SL-3. The purpose of S073 was to measure surface brightness and polarization of night glow in visible spectrum. The purpose of T027 was to determine changes in properties of optical samples due to deposition of contaminates and to measure sky brightness background due to solar illumination of contaminates. The experiment employed the T027 Photometer canister with the automatic programmer. The combined photometer system and Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) system, which was attached to the T027 Universal Extension Mechanism (UXM), was to be mounted to and deployed through the SAL into the space environment for acquisition of data. S073/T027 was to require one crewman for operation. b. Usage/A noma lies - During SL-2, the S073/T027 photometer system was activated and operated with no major difficulties. ware anomalies were identified. No hard During one T027 retraction, the photo meter system could not be lined up to effect/permit its retraction into the Scientific Airlock (SAL) and the T027 canister. This was a T027 �systems operations problem in that the system had been driven hard over, past the desired alignment. After being bumped against the OWS and physically forced, the system was retracted into the SAL and T027 canister as required. During SL-3, the first crew operations with the T027 UXM system was to retract the S149 system which had been left extended through the SAL during the unmanned period between SL-2 and SL-3. with some difficulty. This was accomplished The final extension rod lacked about one inch from full retraction and engagement of the UXM capture latch. the SAL door was closed to permit warm up of the system. up, the final retraction was accomplished. At this point After warm The T027/S149 system was removed from the SAL and stowed as required. The SL-3 crew had performed the T027 photometer extension and data gathering for only a short time when during the retraction mode it failed to align to the required position to permit its retraction as had previously occurred during the SL-2 mission. All malfunction operations performed on the system to effect its retraction failed. Consequently, the UXM with the photometer and S073 system attached was jettisoned on MD-8 of SL-3. �The SL-3 and SL-4 crews utilized the T025 hardware to perform some S073 Gegenschein and Zodiacal light photography. The equipment was installed upside-down in the anti-solar SAL and the occulting disc was moved out of the cameras view. No anomalies were reported with this mode of operation. c. Assessment/Recommendations - Experiment T027 handling was a one man operation and was facilitated by the canister handle's proper location through the center of gravity. On movable items of large volume and mass (i.e. T027, S183) handles were definitely required. These handle(s) should be located such that the crewman would have complete control of the object during maneuvering operations. No problems existed during photometer head changeout/maintenance even with the compressed operational envelope caused by the parasol canister/ tripod protrusion. Instead of restowing T027 in its launch container between operations, the crew recommended that leaving the photometer attached to the launch container lid become the nominal stowage procedure. As T027 operations progressed, the crew noticed that the photometer UXM rods became increasingly difficult to screw together. This was thought to be caused by a buildup of moisture and contamination. Also, during rod retraction, the crew reported that the thermal gloves were indeed required and did not hinder the crewman's rod retraction operations. The SL-3 crew indicated that the T027 system should have been checked out completely and possibly operated inside the OWS prior to its use. �13.22.2.6 S149 - Particle Collection a. Operations - Experiment S149 was scheduled to be performed in four different exposure periods; during SL-2, the unmanned period between SL-2 and SL-3, during SL-3, and the unmanned period between SL-3 and SL-4. Its design objective was to acquire data to assist the determination of mass distribution of micrometeorites in near-earth space. On orbit, the S149 Motor Drive/Cassette Support Unit (MD/CSU) was to be unstowed, fitted with the detector cassettes, and attached to the 1027 Photometer Universal Extension Mechanism (UXM). The T027 canister was to then be installed in the anti-solar SAL and the S149 MD/CSU extended into space. Power was to be applied to the experiment and switches configured for ground activation of cassette exposure. In the event of a ground command failure, the experiment had a manual control capability which could be operated by the crew. At completion of the exposure time, the crew was to be notified and was to retract, remove, and stow the hardware. The S149 detector cassettes were to be removed from the MD/CSU and stowed in the CM for earth return. b. Usage/Anomalies - During SL-2 the first of four s e t s of S149 detector cassettes was deployed through the anti-solar SAL. Prior to crew return to earth, ground commanded the MD/CSU to "Open" for cassette exposure and subsequent data collection between missions. A problem was reported by the SL-3 crew during retraction of the SL-2 �deployed S149 MD/CSU. During retraction operations by the crew, the UXM tended to extend back out to space by itself. The crew had to maintain a continuous retraction force on the UXM rod while the SAL door was closed (this involved a two man effort). closed the system still lacked full retraction. Once the SAL door was The final extension rod lacked about one inch from full retraction and engagement in the UXM capture latch. After allowing the system to warm up, the full retraction and engagement of the capture latch was accomplished. The T027 UXM system canister containing S149 was then removed from the SAL, dis mantled and stowed. Prior to the SL-3 deployment of the second set of S149 detector cassettes, the T027 Photometer / UXM malfunctioned and was jettisoned, thereby losing the hardware required to nominally deploy and expose the S149 detector cassettes. As a back-up method for S149 deployment, hardware had been fabricated and launched on SL-3 for EVA deployment. Therefore, during the first SL-3 EVA, the crew mounted the S149 MD/CSU and bracketry on the ATM thermal shield lip and manually exposed the detector cassettes. It was later retrieved by EVA on SL-3 and the two sets of detector cassettes were stowed and returned to earth. On SL-4 the third set of cassettes was deployed and later retrieved by EVA. During retrieval the crew reported that the small discs on S149 �were debonding and popping off. Several discs were lost and the others were peeling up due to their bonding not holding. stowed and no further action was taken. The experiment was The fourth set was deployed during the final SL-4 EVA and has been scheduled for possible retrieval during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program (ASTP) in 1975. �c. Assessments/ Recommendations - S149 hardware, for both nominal and contingency operations, was well designed and operated as planned. The contingency hardware used in EVA deployment of S149 functioned well during EVA. The bracket used in mounting the MD/CSU on the ATM thermal shield was a little loose but caused no problems. The ATM thermal shield paint was scratched as the mounting clamp was attached but this was not considered to be detrimental. Concern was stated that proper precautions be taken to mark the return container that housed the exposed cassettes to assure that the CM returned cassettes were those that had been exposed. 13.22.2.7 S183 - Ultraviolet Panorama a. Operations - The S183 experiment was scheduled for performance during each of the Skylab missions to obtain photographs of a wide field of view of individual s t a r s and extended s t a r fields in the ultraviolet. P r i o r to activation of S183 for operation, the crewman was to be required to prepare the S183 support hardware; the Scientific Airlock (SAL) and �the S019 Articulated Mirror System (AMS). Once the SAL was prepared, the S019 AMS, used for S183 pointing, was to be inserted. The S183 e x p e r i m e n t w a s t o b e u n s t o w e d a n d a t t a c h e d t o t h e SO 1 9 A M S . The S183 film carrousel was to then be removed from the OWS film vault and installed into S183 along with a 16mm Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) for comparison photographic data. The crewman was to then power up S183, open the SAL door and extend the AMS mirror. The S019 AMS mirror was to be aligned to the desired starfield and S183 photography was to commence as outlined by the checklist. Once this photographic sequence had been completed, the S183 experiment was to be deactivated, the S019 AMS retracted and the SAL closed. The experiment hardware was to be dismantled, removed from the SAL and stowed. b. Usage/Anomalies - Throughout the entire Skylab mission all crew comments and other related data to on-orbit operations of S183 experiment identified no operational/handling anomalies. Problems experienced with the S183 system were of a mechanical nature. After two nominal SL-2 performances with S183, the film plate jammed and the operations were discontinued. Malfunction procedures were performed and the problem was isolated to the film carrousel. Due to this problem all subsequent photographic data for the SL-2 and SL-3 performances was obtained through use of the 16mm DAC. One other anomaly was �reported and involved a focus problem with the 16mm DAC. Changing to another DAC did not alleviate the problem but indicated that the S183 DAC optic system was the problem. On SL-4 a replacement DAC optic system was launched and interchanged with the original. S183 DAC. This corrected the focus problem associated with the In conjunction with the optics replacement, the crew performed additional malfunction procedures and were successful in correcting the S183 film carrousel anomaly. This permitted the experiment to be operated as scheduled throughout the mission to acquire S183 photographic data as originally planned. Both DAC optic systems were returned for evaluation. Upon removal of the carrousel from the spectrograph during the second S183 operation on SL-4, a fragment of the SC-5 glass film plate was discovered. It was reported that the carrousel was misaligned 45° from the "00" position. A plate was protruding and the crewman pushed it into the carrousel and stowed the carrousel. Prior to the next operation an alignment procedure was performed with no problems or loose glass being reported. position. Pliers were used to rotate the carrousel 45° to the "00" During the fourth operation of the spectrograph an additional fragment of the SC-5 plate was discovered. glass was jamming the carrousel. the plate was unsuccessful. It was concluded that the A malfunction procedure to remove In addition, an "E" clip retaining a spring �used to force the carrousel into the indexing detents was lost. This did not eliminate the use of the carrousel but it did require that the crewman check the orientation marks prior to each usage. Extreme care had to be used when inserting the carrousel into the spectrograph as any sudden torquing around the cylindrical axis would misalign the unit and cause difficult if not impossible installation. The SL-4 crew experienced sequence problems with the logic counter and the carrousel index due to hardware problems and procedural mix-ups. The SL-3 crew had failed to reset the logic counter. The SL-4 crew cycled the plate advance reset switch and returned the reading to 01. However the logic counter i s completely independent of the carrousel indexing and the film carrousel rotated to plate 33 and not back to plate 1. This resulted in plate 34 becoming detached from the carrousel and thus being exposed to cabin light. The extent of the anomaly appeared to be the loss of one plate and degradation of two others. The operation of S183 spectro graph and film carrousel was not affected. In an effort to eliminate the condition which caused the film plate to slip out of place a malfunction/ synchronization procedure was done to sychronize the carrousel with the logic counter. The SL-4 crew experienced a jamming problem with the DAC camera and S183 magazine 04. After performing trouble shooting procedures the �problem was isolated to a blown fuse inside the S183 spectrograph assembly. The malfunction was duplicated on the quality test unit in France and the French experiment developer recommended a workaround procedure which would bypass the blown fuse by connecting an existing wire from a DAC connector on the spectrograph assembly to an adjacent connector. The procedure was successful and S183 operations were resumed with the carrousel. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The S183 experiment activation and manipulation was easily a one-man operation. The latching technique and decals on the experiment launch stowage structure were adequate. The crew stated that for maneuvering the large mass of S183, the handholds supplied were a definite necessity. In addition, the crew recommended that on large masses (i.e. S183, T027) it would be best to have handles provided to facilitiate two-handed manipulation for better control during large mass handling/maneuvering. The maneuvering technique used was to stabilize one's body and carefully push the mass in front of oneself. Then let the mass and oneself move to the terminal location making positional corrections while in flight. considered a problem. Braking was not This maneuvering technique was documented by experiment M151, Time and Motion Study. The S183 operations timeline did not allow enough time between exposures. One minute was added to these times to allow for crew adjustments �in pointing and timing for the upcoming exposure. The crew also complained about being rushed between an ATM pass and S183 operations. The timeline did not allow enough time to debrief the ATM pass and then get started on the S183 operations. During S183 operations, the crew reported no problems associated with the OWS lighting levels. 13.22.2.8 S201 - XUV Electronographic Camera a. Operations - Experiment S201 was scheduled to be performed on SL-4 to photographically collect Extreme Ultraviolet (XUV) imagery data on comet Kohoutek. The experiment consisted of a canister-enclosed XUV electronographic camera (with film-transport box), a second film-transport box, and an EVA bracket. The experiment was to be used in two operating configu^itions; (1) through the anti-solar Scientific Airlock (SAL) utilizing the S019 Articulated Mirror System (AMS) a s support equipment or (2) bracketmounted to the ATM truss for EVA operations. Power was to be provided by the Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) cable during the EVA and SAL operations. Experiment S201 data was to be recorded on special NTB-3 film and returned to the Photographic Technological Laboratory at JSC for post-flight processing. b. Usage/Anomalies - While performing a S201 experiment operation through the anti-solar SAL the crew noted that the green exposure sequence indicator light was actually brownish red and very low in brightness and would probably be difficult to read during the EVA operations. During the second SL-4 EVA, three S201 data takes were �performed even though the crew could not see the comet. It was hoped that the comet would be detectable on the photographic data. c. Assessment/Recommendations - S201 experiment operations were performed as scheduled through the anti-solar SAL and during the SL-4 EVA's. The procedures and equipment were adequate and the crew reported no significant problems in performing S201. 13.22.2.9 S228 - Trans-Uranic Cosmic Rays a. Operations - Experiment S228 was scheduled to be performed on SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4 to obtain knowledge of the abundance of nuclei with an atomic number greater than 26 in the cosmic radiation. A crewman was to deploy the detector module harness on SL-2 from floor to ceiling in the OWS experiinent compartment using velcro straps. Thirty- six detector modules were to be launched and deployed with the harness. At the conclusion of the SL-3 mission, one module was to be removed and returned. One S228 detector module was to be launched on SL-4 and deployed during the first SL-4 EVA. It was to be retrieved during the last SL-4 EVA and returned to earth along with the remaining harness detector modules. b. Usage/Anomalies - Experiment S228 was performed as scheduled and no anomalies were reported. During the SL-4 EVA deploy ment, the crew observed some expansion of the experiment package which was an indication of outgassing. normal limits. This bulging was expected and was within On the final Skylab EVA, this experiment package was �retrieved and was stowed with the remaining harness detector modules for return to earth. c. Assessment/Recommendations - Experiment S228 deploy ment and retrieval went as scheduled and no crew systems assessments were reported. �13.22.2.10 a. S230 - Magnetospheric Particle Composition Operations - Experiment S230 was scheduled for perfor mance during SL-3 and SL-4 EVA's. Its purpose was to acquire data for measuring fluxes and composition of precipitating magnetospheric ions and trapped particles through the use of a foil collection technique. The experiment hardware was composed of two (2) collector spools, two (2) inner collector assemblies, two (2) outer collector assemblies and two (2) return pouches. The collector spools, providing support for the inner and outer collector assemblies, were to be launched on SL-1 attached to the ATM deployment truss D2 handrail. During an EVA on both SL-3 and SL-4 the crew was to retrieve one (1) of the two remaining collector assemblies. These collector assemblies were to be stowed and returned to earth for analysis. b. Usage/Anomalies - On the first SL-3 EVA the two (2) outer collector assemblies of S230 were retrieved and a calibration shield was installed on the forward inner collector spool. During the final SL-3 EVA the crew retrieved one of the two remaining inner collector assemblies. It was stowed in the CM with the previously retrieved outer collector assemblies and returned to earth. On SL-4 a new inner collector assembly was launched and on the first �SL-4 EVA was attached to the empty collector spool. During a sub sequent EVA for ATM film resupply and Kouhotek photography the crew reported that the S230 calibration shield was missing. Evidently, the shield had been brushed by one of the crew during EVA operations and knocked loose. On the final SL-4 EVA the remaining two (2) inner collector assemblies were retrieved. During AM repressurization operations, one of the two samples was damaged by the rush of air from equalization valve 311. 10% of the sample. The crew reported the damage to effect approximately The samples were placed in the CM stowage and returned to earth. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The EVA procedures for the collector assembly retrievals were straightforward and no problems were reported. The crew reported that they were very careful during retrieval so as not to touch and consequently contaminate the collectors. The calibration shield and the one (1) collector assembly deployment were performed without any reported crew interface problems. The restraint/ stability provisions were considered adequate for performing the S230 crew tasks. �13.22.2.11 a. S232 - Barium Plasma Observations Operations - Experiment S232 was scheduled to be per formed on SL-4 to obtain data necessary for determining the effects of plasma conductivity and geomagnetic activity upon the motion of barium plasma. The experiment operations involved one crewman whose objectives were to photograph the barium cloud injected to outer space by a ground launched rocket. The crewman was notified three hours prior to the scheduled launch as to the photographic settings and procedures. A Nikon 35mm camera was attached to the universal mount and then mounted to the OWS wardroom window to obtain the photographic data. A total of seven barium rocket launches were scheduled during SD-4 with the crewman obtaining a minimum of 40 photographs. b. planned. Usage/Anomalies - Experiment S232 was performed as Due to problems involved with the rocket launches and resulting launch cancellations all premission planned photographic data was not obtained. The crew reported that the experiment set-up was a lengthy operation and took approximately two (2) hours to complete. The barium injection was visible to the naked eye and was photographed by the crew using numerous time exposures. During these photographic sessions the crew reported some difficulties with damping the oscillations of the camera/universal mount after exposure actuation. As the experiment �progressed and the crew technique improved these oscillations were reduced. c. Assessment/Recommendations - S232 experiment photo graphy was performed during SL-4 and photographs of the barium plasma infection were obtained. Other than the initial oscillation problem with the camera/universal mount the hardware performed satisfactorily. 13. 22. 2. 12 a. S233K - Kohoutek Photometric Photography Operations - Kohoutek Photometric Photography, experiment S233K, was scheduled to be performed during SL-4 to obtain a series of visible light photograph's suitable for photometry and to provide a synoptic history of the comet Kohoutek. Experiment S223K used the Nikon 35mm camera and mounting braketry to obtain photographs through the left viewing window of the CM and the STS window. The crewman was required to take a sequence of photographs every 12 hours throughout the comet acquisition periods. b. Usage/Anomalies - S233K was performed throughout the designated periods of SL-4 and photographs of comet Kohoutek were obtained. All pre-mission scheduled photographic exposures could not be obtained by the crew due to window field of view limitations and faintness of the comet. c. Assessments/Recommendations - The S233K operations were straightforward and were performed as scheduled. anomalies were reported. No hardware �13.22.3 Technology Experiments 13.22.3.1 D024 - Thermal Control Coatings a. Operations - Experiment D024 sample panels retrieval was scheduled for the SL-2 EVA and for the last EVA of SL-4. The equipment for experiment D024, consisting of two thermal control coating sample and two polymeric film sample panels, was mounted and launched �externally on the AM support structure. Experiment D024 was not to require a specific EVA for its performance as it was to be performed in conjunction with the ATM experiments film retrieval. D024 sample retrieval was to require two crewman (designated EV1 and EV2). EV2 was to retrieve two sample panels, stow them in the return container, then pass the container to EV1 who was to temporarily stow it in the AM. Upon completion of the EVA activities the sample return container was to be stowed in the CM for return to earth. b. Usage/Anomalies - Experiment D024 sample panel retrieval was performed as scheduled on SL-2 with one thermal control coating sample panel and one polymeric film strip sample panel being returned. Due to the total time in orbit it was decided that the remaining two sample panels had received adequate exposure by the end of SL-3 and that they should be retrieved on the last EVA of SL-3 and returned to earth. To alleviate handling of multiple items the crewman placed the sample into the return container prior to removing the pip pin. It was noted that some of the samples were becoming slightly debonded, although none were actually loose or lost as the samples were put into the return containers. After the return of the remaining two samples on SL-3, two additional sample panels with return container were launched on SL-4 for deployment on the first EVA and retrieval at the end of the mission. �During deployment of the sample it was difficult for the crewman to align the snaps due to lack of visibility and lack of dexterity caused by the EVA glove. However, he was eventually able to attach the panel by touching the center samples with his finger, possibly contaminating them. The samples were retrieved on the final SL-4 EVA and returned to earth. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The problem the crew experienced with the deployment of the sample panels could have possibly been eliminated with the addition of guide pins and alignment marks on the mounting plates and the sample panels. However, the experiment a s it was originally designed, did not call for the deployment of the sample on orbit as they were launched in place. The retrieval of the D024 samples was quite easy to perform per the checklist. The crewman was able to fold the retrieved specimen and correctly stow it in the appropriate return container slot. The crew reported no problems in retrieving and stowing the D024 samples and stated that the overall design was adequate. The crew voiced their opinion that a heel restraint would have been helpful at the D024 location to assist their stabilization when retrieving samples. 13.22.3.2 M512 (M551, M552, M553, M555) - Materials Processing In Space M479 - Zero Gravity Flammability M518 - Multipurpose Electric Furnace System a. Operations - The M512 experiment facility was designed to utilize a common spacecraft interface for a group of experiments in �in materials science and technology. It was scheduled to be used on SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4. The facility was to permit exploration of space manufacturing applications of molten metal phenomena such as metal flow, freezing patterns, thermal stirring, fusion across gaps, and surface tension. be required to perform the experiments. One crewman was to The basic functions performed were to be installation of the experiment equipment or specimen in the work chamber, systems control operation, observation, photography, and monitoring of the experiment, and removal and stowage of the equipment and specimen after experiment completion. Experiments M551, M552, M553, M555, M518, and M479 were to utilize the M512 facilities. b. Usage/Anomalies - During initial use of the M512 facility it was believed that the electron beam gun had shifted due to loads experienced at launch. Upon later analysis the problem was found to be with a new mirror installed at KSC. The mirror was reversed so only one of two retaining screws could be fastened when mating it inside the facility. During a performance of the M553 experiment, difficulty was experienced with the installation of the shield over the electron beam gun. This problem was caused by a hardware installation sequence error. The shield should have been installed first instead of last a s performed by the crewman. �Due to M512 operational problems the crew was asked to use the main circuit breaker to shut off the M512 facility power when performing experiment M553 spherical forming. During cutting of the M553 speci men stinger, the jaw of the cutting pliers broke. Wheel number one of the experiment was completed and wheel number two had two balls that were not released and three that were released. Wheel two was returned to earth along with the released specimen balls from wheels one and two. A long period of time was required to obtain a sufficient vacuum in the facility on orbit. To obtain the vacuum the crew had to leave the vent valve in the "Vent" rather than the "Open" position during their sleep period. Experiment M479 was performed at the end of SL-4 with the only anomaly reported being with the water quench system. The lower nozzle appeared to be completely plugged and the upper nozzle emitted only a dribble. The crewman completely reserviced the system but it still did not function properly. In order to get any spray at all the crewman had to grab the accumulator knob and pull sharply on it to force water through the system. There was no time for extensive trouble shooting but the problem was believed to be with a water supply valve not being turned on. While burning sample number three the crewman stated there was an operator error in that he left the chamber repress valve in the open �position. The only effect was the sample burned slightly longer. c. Assessment/Recommendations - M512 experiment perfor mance on orbit was similar to on-ground training with exception of the times required to heat or cool the experiment specimen and to obtain a sufficient vacuum in the facility. The crew stated that the training unit was excellent, just like the flight unit, but they never experienced pumping the facility to a vacuum during their training. Consequently, the first time the vacuum gauge was used on orbit the crew thought that the slow bleed down time indicated a faulty gauge. As experienced,a longer time than expected was necessary to obtain an acceptable operational vacuum in the facility. During M553 operations in the M512 facility no problem developed with the facility or the accessory equipment. However, pressure build up in the facility chamber during the firing of the electron beam gun occurred more rapidly on orbit than experienced during training. In some instances the balls on the M553 experiment wheel stings formed a pear shape or did not release. The crew experienced no problems in handling the specimens as long as they observed proper cool down times. The crew enjoyed performing the M518 Multipurpose Electric Furnace experiment because it was new and different. The equipment worked as designed and was easily installed into the M512 facility chamber. The specimen cartridges were numbered (identified) in an excellent manner to permit their insertion and cooidination. The operations �were clearly defined and no problems were experienced performing the M518 series in the M512 facility. The M551 experiment welds looked basically the same as during training with the exception of a non-round dwell pattern on the stainless steel specimen. The welds built up quicker in flight than on the ground. No high external chamber temperatures were experienced during any of the facility operations. All M479 specimen samples were in excellent condition and the burning had no effect on the view ports. The view ports remained clean throughout the experiment performance. Restraints associated with M512 were no problem. The foot restraint grid was used only in the beginning of the experiment and was later discarded. Handholds were adequate. �The M512 chamber hatch did not appear to have proper friction hinges as per the experiment design requirements. No detrimental crew comments were received but during video downlink of M512 facility operations the hatch was observed to be floating free 13.22.3.3 T002 - Manual Navigation Sightings a. Operations - Experiment T002 was scheduled to be performed on SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4 with batteries for the sextant and stadimeter being resupplied on SL-3 and SL-4. Sightings were to be distributed uniformly throughout the mission on a non-interference basis. The crewmember performing the experiment was to remove and stow the wardroom window shield, obtain and install the T002 hood over the wardroom window and obtain the sextant or stadimeter from locker W740. The batteries for the sextant and stadimeter were to be installed by the crewmember during experiment activation. Wardroom lights near the wardroom window were to be dimmed and the reticle light adjusted before the crewman proceeded with the experiment sightings. b. Usage/Anomalies - Experiment T002 was performed on all three Skylab missions and was satisfactorily completed. Due to a residue pattern formed on the wardroom window during SL-3 and SL-4, the operator had to move around during his sightings to avoid viewing through this residue. affected his sightings. He was concerned that his moving may have �The SL.-4 crew emphasized the importance of body position and posture in obtaining accurate sightings with the T002 sextant. During an early operation the crewman developed muscle cramps in his arms and legs. The crewman devised a restraint system to hold him over to the window using a long strap hooked over the S063 bar. improved the accuracy of his sightings. The crewman felt this The crewman also stated that there was a distinct difference in ease, ability and accuracy you get whether the stars were located up and down relative to your body posture or left to right. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The T002 window hood which was used to shield the wardroom window from internal reflection was considered a definite necessity. The crewman found it difficult to hold the sextant steady during sightings and also felt it would be extremely helpful to have the sextant readout inside the reticle so you would not lose sight of the star while taking readings. The stowage configuration and location in locker W740 was excellent and the foot restraint provisions at the wardroom window were considered adequate. The crew stated it was difficult to remove their fingers from the pointing control knobs on the sextant without moving it. ment but They could get a good align when they released their fingers the knob would move slightly. This created some mediocre scatter in the system. The control knobs should have been easy to move but not so sensitive that they could not remove their fingers without moving it. The crew also stated the knobs on the filters were poorly designed in that they could not tell whether they �w e r e in. o r o u t . The crew experienced pointing difficulties due to the shape of the case and the location of the strap. This made it difficult to hold the sextant in the proper position at the window. The crew stated they needed phosflorescent alignment marks to get the line of sight directed between two s t a r s . They also suggested the use of a colored filter s o that they would not lose track of which star they were sighting. sextant at odd angles. This was a problem when holding the The system should have been designed so that all controls could be operated without the crewman removing his eyes from the reticle sight. 13.22.3.4 T003 - In-Flight Aerosol Analysis a. Operations - Experiment T003 was scheduled to be performed on SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4. Multiple measurements were to be taken daily to determine the concentration and size distribution of particles suspended in the OWS atmosphere. A crewman was to transport the portable self-contained aerosol analyzer throughout the OWS observing the readout and recording the data on the T003 data cards. At the completion of each mission the data cards and the filter impactor unit from the aerosol analyzer were to be returned to earth. b. Usage/Anomalies - Operation of experiment T003 went as scheduled with all functional objectives being accomplished. Results �showed that the OWS was cleaner than most hospital operating rooms with a particle count of 3000 per cubic foot. The crew reported that T003 readout time was adequate for recording the data on the data cards. The only anomaly reported was a filter change which was missed due to a tardiness of the detailed pads up-linked from the ground. c. Assessment/Re commendations - Experiment T003 operations were straight forward and no problems were experienced in stabilizing at the various sample stations. The crew did report that the data cards were not large enough to allow sufficient area to record all the information. 13.22.3.5 T025 - Coronagraph Contamination Measurement a. Operations - Experiment T025 was scheduled to be performed on SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4 through the solar Scientific Airlock (SAL) to determine the existence and presence of any changes in particle atmosphere due to transfer firings, waste dumps, vehicle orientation, and time decay of such atmospheric concentrations. The T025 experiment equipment to be used was the coronagraph canister including the occulting discs and extension boom assembly with the photographic equipment. One crewman was to set up the experiment apparatus in the SAL and complete a 27 photographic exposure sequence during five (5) non-consecutive orbits. �b. Usage/Anomalies - T025 was not performed as scheduled because the solar SAL was occupied by the parasol thermal shield. All T025 operations were cancelled for SL-2 as alternate performance methods had to be developed. The SL-3 crew utilized the T025 hard ware to obtain some experiment S073 Gegenschein and Zodiacal light photography. The equipment was installed upside-down in the anti- solar SAL and the occulting disc was moved out of the c a m e r a ' s view. During this operation the crew used their finger to control the Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) shutter release. fatiguing. This was difficult and In readiness for subsequent operations the DAC was prepared for operation with the DAC push button cable. However, the SL-3 crew was not asked to repeat the experiment. As an alternate method of performing T025 and viewing the Kohoutek comet, an EVA bracket was designed and launched on SL-3. The SL-3 crew fit checked the bracket to the T025 experiment and attached operational decals readiness for EVA deployment on SL-4. Problems occurred during the first SL-4 EVA operation of T025 which prohibited the acquiring of all planned data. planned 40 were obtained. Five photographs out of a The view finder on the camera was loose and the shutter speed knob came off during operation. The crewman was able to replace the knob but it did not engage enough to permit use. During �EVA trouble shooting with the T025 equipment, the thermal blanket cover was removed. The T025 hardware was stowed in the AM to permit further trouble shooting at a more opportune time in the OWS. After completion of the EVA, the crew successfully repaired the shutter speed knob and the T025 hardware was utilized during subsequent EVA's to obtain ultraviolet and visible photographs of the Kohoutek comet. All subsequent T025 experiment performances were without incident. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The T025 experiment was performed from the SAL without any problems. The T025 hookup with the extension rod worked very well and the procedures/checklists and hardware used for night photography were adequate. Pad updates for the experiment should remind the crew to inhibit the fire sensors prior to experiment initiation. The fire alarm was initiated on SL-3 when the SAL was opened with T025 installed. T025 was not originally designed for EVA use but with the addition of the specially designed EVA bracket ultraviolet and visible photographs of the Kohoutek comet were obtained. 13.22.3.6 T027 - Sample Array a. O p e r a t i o n s - T h e T 0 2 7 S a m p l e A r r a y (SA) e x p e r i m e n t w a s scheduled to be performed during SL-2 to acquire data for determining the change in optical properties of various transmissive windows, mirrors, and defraction gratings, caused by deposition of contaminants found �about the orbital assembly. The experiment equipment included a canister system with one extension rod, an ejection rod, and a launch stowage container. One crewman was to prepare the T027 SA experiment and then install it through the antisolar Scientific Airlock (SAL) for exposure to the space environment. Upon completion of the exposure the SA was to be retracted, removed from the SAL and re stowed in its launch container for return to earth. b. Usage/Anomalies - The T027 SA experiment was installed in the SAL and deployed as planned. Due to the parasol deployment and resulting requirements for usage of the anti-solar SAL by other e x p e r i ments, the T027 SA exposure time was reduced. It was then removed from the SAL, stowed in its launch container and returned for earth analysis. T h e o n l y p r o b l e m i d e n t i f i e d d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n of t h e T 0 2 7 S A o c c u r r e d during closing of the array valve prior to retraction and removal of the SA system from the SAL. When the crewman closed the array valve, by turning the vane control, the valve did not seat completely. Force in excess of that recommended during training was applied to the vane control, and the valve was closed. The problem was attributed to the low temperature of the system, forming frost, preventing the normal closure of the array valve. �c. Assessments/Recommendations - For some reason the requirement to let the T027 SA system warm up prior to its removal from the SAL had been crossed out of the checklist and omitted from the experiment pad. This procedural information concerning warm up prior to removal was required, and should not have been omitted, as indicated by the minor problem which occurred as a result of its omission. 13.22.4 Operations Experiments 13.22.4.1 M487 - Habitability/Crew Quarters a. Operations - Experiment M487 was scheduled for operation on each of the three Skylab missions and was charged with evaluating and reporting on the OWS habitability provisions. The methods of M487 data collection were to depend primarily on the crewmen. Where possible the experiment task was to augment or coincide with the operational activity to be observed. When the activity was not scheduled or predictable, the elements of the activity were to be grouped into a staged demonstration to optimize time and effort. First the crew man was to obtain, calibrate as required, and position the various monitoring devices throughout the OWS. The crewman was to then obtain, position, and operate the various equipment that was required for photography and data collection. �b. Usage/Anomalies - M487 was performed as planned through out each Skylab mission, accomplishing all pre-mission requirements. One hardware problem occurred during the SL-2 mission. During the initial calibration of the sound level meter/frequency analyzer the crew man could not obtain the correct calibration factor. A second calibration was attempted at a later time and the correct factor was obtained. The cause of the problem encountered during the first calibration attempt was undetermined. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The hardware supplied by this experiment to supplement the crews' observations was considered unnecessary as was shown by its lack of use throughout the Skylab missions. For this reason, few comments concerning the M487 hardware were available. It was reported that both the ambient and digital thermometers required a lengthy time to stabilize when measurements were made where a large change in temperature was involved. Both the digital and ambient thermometers were used over the three Skylab missions in support of other hardware evaluation and the 10' tape was used in several science demonstrations. These items should be included on future missions as operational support hardware. Some crewmembers expressed their dislikings toward the lengthy and time consuming cn-board debriefings. They felt that this orbit time �could be better utilized and that the debriefings could be conducted post-mis sion. It was felt that the data compiled from M487 would form the basis for verifying existing spacecraft habitability criteria and would establish requirements for more advanced spacecraft. 13.22.4.2 M509 - Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment a. Operations - Experiment M509 was scheduled to be performed on SL-2 and SL-3. Each test pilot was to perform four runs with the Automatically Stabilized Maneuvering Unit (ASMU) while an observer assisted. Runs 1, 2, and 4 were designated to be performed unsuited whereas run 3 was to be performed while wearing the Skylab Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). Prior to the experiment performance, the M509 hardware and support hardware was to be unstowed and reconfigured for operation, including Propellant Supply System (PSS) bottle and battery charging. Once the experiment preparation was completed and the OWS forward experiment area was cleared of equipment not required for the experiment, the observer was to assist the test pilot in donning the ASMU. The test pilot was to then undock from the donning station and perform the designated M509 maneuvers. Upon completing these maneuvers, the subject was to return to the donning station and dock the ASMU, thereby concluding the experiment performance. �b. Usage/Anomalies - The M509 experiment performance for SL-2 was limited to operational configuration and checkout. Due to the OWS meteoroid shield problem and resulting high temperatures i t w a s c o n c l u d e d t h a t a h a z a r d o u s c o n d i t i o n m i g h t e x i s t if t h e M 5 0 9 batteries were discharged. If the batteries were used an internal short might have occurred resulting in a possible explosion. The ASMU, PSS bottle rack and AM N£ recharge station were reconfigured to their inflight usage configurations and the PSS bottles were recharged. After reconfiguration/checkout of the M509 ASMU and the PSS bottle installation, the unit was powered up from OWS power while still in the docking station and the backpack and Hand-Held Maneuvering Unit (HHMU) thrusters were fired. Between missions, onground testing determined that the flight M509 batteries were acceptable for use and on SL.-3 and SL-4 the experiment was successfully operated. The unit was flown in all four modes, both suited and unsuited. One modification was made to the planned M509 activities after the first suited performance. During this performance the test pilot noted that the Life Support Umbilical (LSU) imparted undersirable dynamic forces on the ASMU during maneuvering. In hopes of reducing/eliminating these dynamic effects the crew stripped the LSU of all wiring and �insulation, leaving only the 02 line. This modified LSU was then used on all subsequent M509 and T020 suited runs not utilizing the Secondary Oxygen Packs (SOP). During a SL-4 suited run battery problems arose causing the experiment run to be shortened. The batteries were being depleted much faster than anticipated due to time consuming delays during the M509 run. One delay was experienced when the crewman encountered problems attaching the AM recharge station quick disconnect to the PSS bottle connector. An additional delay was experienced when the SOP was depleted and had to be replaced by the LSU. During both these delays the ASMU was on battery power thus draining the battery. batteries to the 26 volt minimum These delays drained both M509 and the M509 run was terminated after completing only 2 / 3 of the run's objectives. M509 was performed through out the remainder of SL-4 and no anomalies were reported. c. Assessment/ Recommendations - well designed and easy to fly. The M509 ASMU was Intuitive skills, common to all astronauts because of their flight training, was all that was required to navigate M509. Ground based training for this experiment using the Denver simulator was not necessary. This was verified during an unscheduled M509 performance by a crewmember who had never trained for M509 nor had ever used the training simulator. His flight was performed with ease and was considered a complete success. �During the M509 maneuvers four potential flying modes were evaluated and, in order of preference, were DIRECT, CMG, RATE GYRO and HHMU. The DIRECT mode was far the easiest and the more intuitive to control. The CMG and RATE GYRO modes were very good but the precesion inherent to these modes was unnecessary for a future EVA maneuvering device. The HHMU was given a poor rating and was recommended by the crew to be deleted from consideration as an EVA maneuvering mode. The difficulty with the HHMU was in locating the center of gravity which turned out to be an important factor in this maneuvering mode. In future testing of a maneuvering unit the HHMU should be eliminated from consideration because it was not an intuitive device to operate, as it required unique and undeveloped skills. In flying M509 actual EVA conditions were simulated to evaluate all phases of maneuvering. the LSU and SOP. Suited operations were conducted using both The SOP configuration was preferred over the LSU configurations because of the dynamic effects present with the LSU. The LSU, due to its mass and elastic characteristics, imparted an inertia on the M509 ASMU which proved to be an annoyance to the test pilot, in that guidance corrections to the unit were constantly required. Safety was a principle concern in pre-mission design and planning of M509. But due to the ease of operations and maneuverbility of the �ASMU the pre-mission concern of inadvertant and possible catastrophic collisions was shown to be invalid. The ASMU, though very large and h e a v y , w a s n o t b o t h e r s o m e o r i n c a p a b l e of b e i n g h a n d l e d b y t h e t e s t pilot. The test pilots were confident that even with the large ASMU m a s s and a maximum maneuvering velocity of 3-4 f t / s e c that they could, in the event of a thruster failure, reposition themselves and absorb the energy of an impact without bodily or hardware damage. The M509 hardware and supporting equipment was well designed both from a functional and integration standpoint with one exception. The ASMU had too many controls located in too many diverse and remote positions. If possible these controls should be relocated on a common panel to facilitate crew operations. The safety goggles and ear plugs were required and were used by all crewmen. The unstowage/stowage of the M509 hardware was straightforward with no problems occurring. PSS bottle charging required the crew to translate to and from the AM recharge, station with the bottles. This entire procedure,including recharge, took less than 10 minutes to perform and it was reported that the bottles during recharging only reached a temperature of approximately 100°F. Translation with the bottle was accomplished by the crewman holding the bottle ahead of him, pushing off and then following along behind the hardwar Prior to reaching his destination, through a mental integrative process, the crewmember could reposition himself between the hardware and contact �point for a safe landing. The ASMU was a good translational device but was found to be severly limited in its use as a workstation/platform for performing work related tasks. In performing relatively easy tasks, the crewman's body torques would over saturate the ASMU gyros and cause a loss of stability. To perform EVA tasks the ASMU, as designed, would have to be docked/ • restrained at the designated work area to achieve the necessary stability required to perform the task. The next generation EVA maneuvering device should be back mounted with the pilot-to-backpack restraint system providing a tight, secure and comfortable (seat padding recommended) fit. should be designed as an one man function. Backpack donning/doffing The backpack must have six degrees of freedom, with the propulsion thrusters located around the center of gravity of the pilot/backpack combination, and should be hand controlled. The hand controllers should have the capability of being relocated/moved during flight to allow multiple working postures for the pilot. The DIRECT mode should be selected as the maneuvering mode with a capability of a 3-4 f t / s e c velocity. Restraints/docking provisions (i. e. manipulative arms) must be provided to adequately stabilize the pilot and permit him to perform the designated task. A backpack spotlight should be incorporated to provide the pilot with an illumination source at his work area. Separate isolation valves/circuit breakers for each �thruster or set of thrusters should be provided to insure against a single point failure. The backpack should contain all systems required for EVA such that no umbilical or LSU is required. The unit should contain a pressure control system, oxygen system and maneuvering system with all system monitoring displays/readouts being illuminated. With such a system the pilot could suit up, don and plug in the maneuvering unit and perform an EVA as a free entity. �13.22.4.3 T013 - Crew/Vehicle Disturbances a. Operations - Experiment T013 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 to measure the effects of crew motions on the dynamics of manned spacecraft. Two crewmen were required for T013 operations; one designated as the subject and the other as the observer. A third crewman was required during performance of the worst case control system input task. Data was to be collected employing the 16mm Data Acquisition Camera (DAC), mounted in the OWS forward compartment. The Limb Motion Sensor (LIMS) suit assembly including the LIMS data cable was to be removed from stowage. The subject was to don the LIMS suit and then connect the experi ment data cable between the LIMS and the Experiment Data System (EDS). Prior to start of the experiment performance, the observer was to don a communications headset and turn on the AM tape recorder and cameras for data collection. The Force Measurement Units (FMU) were to then be uncaged and calibrated. During the experiment performance of body and limb motions and free soaring activities, the observer was to assist in securing the subject to and releasing him from FMU No. 1 at appropriate �times during the experiment. Upon conclusion of the experiment performance, the cameras, AM tape recorder and the EDS were to be turned off and the FMU's caged and pinned. The EDS data cable was to then be disconnected and stowed together with LIMS suit assembly in the T013 stowage container. b. Usage/Anomalies - by the experiment checklist. T013 was performed on SL-3 as designated Upon completion of the experiment performance the crew reported that the experiment had functioned as planned. T013 was performed on SL-3 but during the first pushoff of the soaring activities a malfunction occurred in the load cells of FMU No. 2 causing a partial loss of data. Malfunction procedures were performed on both FMU's and deformation of the load cell flexures was uncovered. As part of the malfunction procedures a FMU calibration was performed and the results indicated that load cells 4 and 5 of FMU No. 2 had failed and were considered lost. To satisfy the experiment mission requirements, a rerun of the T013 soaring activities was performed, but the crew failed to activate the T013 Experiment Data System (EDS) and no experiment data was received. Again, in attempt to satisfy the experiment requirements, a third run of T013 was performed by the SL-3 crew and all ATM and photography data was successfully gathered. requirements. This performance satisfied all T013 �During performance of the T013 worst case input task only two crewmen participated instead of the three required. Since the third man, designated as observer, did not contribute to the data input and was required only for safety reasons, the omission of his participation had no effect on the experiment results. c. Assessments/Recommendations - Other than the FMU anomaly, experiment T013 operations were straightforward and easy to perform. Stowage/unstowage was simple, the LIMS suit fit well and the camera positioning was no problem. Soaring between the FMU's was quite easy, in fact, the FMU's could have been placed much farther apart without effecting the crewman's soaring accuracy. The FMU's placed as they were, were so close that it was difficult for the performing crewman to soar between them and land feet first. During the worst case task, the second performer could not soar between the film vault and the food lockers. He had to soar between the food lockers and the lockers adjacent to the film vault. During the simultaneous soaring both crewmen performed their push-offs together but due to the differences in soaring distances their impacts were not simultaneous. �• , » « 13.22.4.4 T020 - Foot Controlled Maneuvering Unit a. Operations - Experiment T020 was scheduled to be performed in the OWS forward compartment area during SL-3 and SL-4. A total of 5 runs by each test pilot was scheduled with the Foot Controlled Maneuvering Unit (FCMU) while a second crewman acted as observer, OWS cameraman and safety man. Of the 5 performances conducted by each test pilot three were to be operated in shirtsleeves and two while suited. Prior to the experiment performance, the T020 hardware and support hardware were to be unstowed and reconfigured for operation, including M509 PSS bottle and battery charging. Once experiment preparation was completed and the OWS forward experiment area was cleared according to the T020 checklist, the observer was to assist the test pilot in donning the T020 maneuvering equipment. The test pilot would then undock from the T020 docking station and perform the required maneuvers. Upon completion of these maneuvers, the subject, with aid from the observer, would return to the docking station and dock the FCMU, thereby concluding the experiment performance. b. Usage/Anomalies - Experiment T020 was performed as planned on SL-3 with the test pilots operating the FCMU five times. The first three runs were performed in shirtsleeves while the last two runs were flown suited. Life Support The two suited runs were conducted utilizing both the Umbilical (LSU) and Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP) configurations. On SL-4, T020 was performed twice. The first run was performed suited whereas the second was performed in shirtsleeves. �Two modifications were added to T020 during its performance on SL-3. After the first maneuvering operation with T020 it was evident that a better restraint system was needed. A modified system was devised on ground and then information was uplinked to the crew. This restraint system provided the added stability sought by the test pilot and was used through out the remaining SL-3 T020 performances. The second modification was performed by the SL-3 crew on the LSU in hopes of reducing or eliminating the dynamic effects it imparted on the maneuvering units. Using a scapel and sissors, the LSU was stripped of all wiring and insulation, leaving only the 02 line. This LSU was used on all subsequent M509 and T020 suited runs not utilizing the SOP configuration. Because of the lack of rigidity experienced with the T020 restraint system during SL-3 a new rigid restraint system was designed and fabricated between missions. This rigid restraint system was launched on SL-4 and used by the crew in their T020 operations. The first SL-4 T020 run was performed suited and utilized the new rigid restraint system. The crew reported that the system worked extremely well and reduced practically all body/backpack motions. The second T020 performance was conducted in shirtsleeves. The crew operated T020 with both the rigid and original restraint systems. Again, �the rigid system was considered highly effective whereas the non-rigid system was considered extremely poor. This was the last evaluation of experiment T020 a s scheduling considerations prohibited any additional performances. c. Assessment/Recommendations - T020 stowage/unstowage was fairly simple, although between operations it was left stowed in such a manner that would not require much time to reactivate. . . a casual type of stowage. The T020 restraints and harness were not satisfactory. was improvised and is definitely required. Also, seat padding The restraints did not give the operator a secure or tight feeling in the unit. The harness, due to its unusual design, was difficult to don and connect. The backpack assembly was not contoured correctly and was too loose when donned. Incorporation of the required restraint system removed most of the sloppiness between the backpack and FCMU and gave the pilot a more secure fit with the T020 hardware. The shoe plates seemed to work well although it was easy to kick your foot/shoe plate out of the FCMU. thrusters were too high. Also the shoe plate forces for the These seemingly high shoe plate forces could be attributed to a possible deconditioning of the crew's leg muscles due to the zero gravity environment. �T020 must have six (6) degrees of freedom to be fairly evaluated. As designed, it is completely unacceptable as a maneuvering vehicle and the crew sees no advantage in its concept of foot-controlled maneuvering. 13. 22. 5 Student Project Experiments 13.22.5.1 ED 23 - Ultraviolet from Quasars a. Operations - Student experiment ED 23 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 a s an additional data pass of baseline experi ment S019 to obtain spectrographic data of selected quasars. The crew was to use experiment S019 as support equipment for ED 23. With S019 mounted in the Scientific Airlock (SAL), ultraviolet photographs were to be taken of pre-designated galaxies. ED 23 data was to be recorded in the S019 portion of the log book and photographs were to be returned in the S019 film canister. b. Usage/Anomalies - Student experiment ED 23 was performed as scheduled and no anomalies were reported. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The crew felt that experi ment training was good but that a decision needed to be made as to experi ment operational priority so as to better appropriate crew training requirements. �13. 22. 5. 2 ED 25 - X-Rays From Jupiter a. Operations - Student experiment ED 54 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 to detect x-rays from Jupiter. The experiment was to be performed with the use of ATM experiment S054 under Joint Observation Program (JOP) 13. The vehicle was to be maneuvered so that the ATM could observe celestrial bodies away from the sun. b. Usage/Anomalies - Student experiment ED 25 was performed during the ATM performance of JOP 13 a s scheduled and no anomalies were reported. c. Assessment/Recommendations - The crew felt that the procedures were adequate and that the hardware performed satisfactorily. 13.22.5.3 ED 26 - Ultraviolet From Pulsars a. Operations - Student experiment ED 26 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 as an additional data pass of baseline experiment S019 to search for pulsars in ultraviolet wavelengths. The crew was to use experiment S019 as support equipment for ED 26. W i t h SO 1 9 m o u n t e d i n t h e S A L , u l t r a v i o l e t p h o t o g r a p h s w e r e t o b e t a k e n of designated galaxies. ED 26 data were to be recorded in the S019 log b o o k a n d t h e p h o t o g r a p h s w e r e t o b e r e t u r n e d i n t h e SO 1 9 f i l m c a n i s t e r . �b. Usage/Anomalies - Student experiment ED 26 was performed as planned and no anomalies were reported. c. Assessment/Re commendations - Student experiment ED 26 used only film and S019 experiment hardware, therefore all crew inter face assessments are included with the assessment of S019. 13.22.5.4 ED 31 - Bacteria and Spores a. Operations - Student experiment ED 31 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 to determine the effects of weightlessness and space radiation on the survivability, growth rate, and mutation of several vegetative bacterial species. A crewman was to inoculate the 15 petri dishes containing nutrient agar. Nine cultures were to then be incubated in the Inflight Medical Support System (IMSS) incubator and the remaining six at OWS ambient temperatur Observation and photography of these cultures were to take place a t 12 hour intervals until the colony growth was attenuated by cooling in the OWS and chiller. The petri dishes were to be returned a t the end of the mission for laboratory study. b. Usage/Anomalies - Due to the degradation caused by the SL-2 launch delay and the elevated OWS temperatures, ED 31 was investigated and a decision was made to perform the experiment on SL-2, assess the data, and consider performance on SL-4, if necessary. The 15 ED 31 petri dishes were inoculated, incubated and photographed on �SL-2. Petri dishes one through four had water drops but no visible growth. Photographs were not taken of dishes one through four but were taken of dishes five through fifteen. Only dishes number 7 and number 9 showed any growth and they had three and one colonies respectively. The experiment was completed using reduced mission protocol and the 15 dishes were returned on SL-2. The 15 plates were not chilled and they were returned in a food overcan because the IMSS resupply container was not on board SL-2. Ground studies indicated that the high temperatures experienced on SL-2 had possibly affected the experiment results and it was decided to repeat the experiment on SL-4. ED 31 was repeated on SL-4 as planned and successfully completed. c. Assessment/Re commendations - The crew was satisfied with the experiment hardware performance and reported no difficulty in inoculating the petri dishes in a zero-gravity environment. 13.22.5.5 ED 32 - Invitro Immunology a. Operations - ED 32 was scheduled to be performed on the SL-3 mission to determine the effects of zero gravity on the antigenicity. To perform ED 32, a crewman was to inject each of the three (3) immuno diffusion plates with antigen and was to then periodically photograph the plates throughout the incubation period. To photograph the plates, the crew was to attach them to OWS light number 1 using the photo clip �supplied in the ED 32 hardware. b. Usage/Anomalies - Antigen injection of the three diffusion plates was accomplished early in the SL-3 mission. Ten days later, the plates were attached to the OWS light and photographed with the 35mm Nikon camera. This constituted completion of the ED 32 experi ment requirements. c. Assessment/Recommendations - No assessments or recommendations were received from the crew concerning ED 32. Therefore it was assumed that the experiment hardware, procedures and interfaces were well designed and all functioned as planned. 13.22.5.6 ED 41 - Motor Sensory Performance a. Operations - ED 41, Motor Sensory Performance, was scheduled to be performed on SL-4 to obtain motor sensor performance data which could be used in planning, training, and equipment development for future manned space missions. The method of measuring motor sensory performance used in ED 41 was a standardized eye-hand coordination test using a maze with a 119-hole aiming pattern, stylus, and cable assembly. During operation the unit was attached to the wardroom window shelf by velcro strips and the cable was connected to the speaker intercom assembly connector. The experiment was performed once early and again late in the mission by the same astronaut and no activities imposing either intense physical exertion or mental/ �emotional strain preceded performance of the experiment. Inflight performance was compared with pre-flight and post-flight tests performed by the same subject. b. Usage/Anomalies - Student experiment ED 41 was performed as scheduled by all three crewmen and no anomalies were reported. c. Assessment/Re commendations - Procedures for ED 41 were straightforward and the hardware performed satisfactorily. 13.22.5.7 ED 52 - Web Formation a. Operations - Student experiment ED 52 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 to observe the web building process of the Araneus diadematus (cross) spider in a zero-gravity environment and compare this process with one performed in a one "g" earth environment. A prime and backup spider were to be launched. The crewman performing the experiment was to deploy the experiment enclosure which permits observations of spider activity. The spider was to be released from her vial into the experiment enclosure and allowed to spin her web. During the experiment performance a crew man was to periodically provide food and water for the spider. Still photographs were to be made with the 35mm Nikon camera and correlated �to Ground Elapsed Time (GET) by voice recorded comments. Movie photographs were to be made with the DAC 16mm camera utilizing the automatic camera actuator which detected spider motion to start/stop the motion picture camera. Upon completion of the experiment the spiders were to be disposed of through the trash airlock. b. Usage/Anomalies - Prior to releasing the prime spider, Arabella, the crew reported a problem with the automatic camera actuator. Malfunction procedures were conducted on the automatic camera actuator with no results. The actuator was considered failed and therefore the web forming photography objective was not met. Photographs were taken periodically by the crew using the hand-held camera. Due to the actuator failure some additional crew time was spent taking hand-held photographs. Both the prime and backup spiders died in orbit and were returned to earth along with web samples. c. Assessment - Other than the actuator failure and resulting increased time requirement for the crewman the experiment was performe as scheduled. 13.22.5.8 ED 61/62 - Plant Growth/Plant Phototropism a. Operations - ED 61/62 was scheduled for performance during SL-2 to observe difference in root and stem growth of rice seeds germinated in the Skylab environment. �Eight seed groups were to be implanted by the crewman with the seed planter into a compartmental container filled with clear agar. This container was to be fitted with neutral density filters to enable a variation in the total light impinging on the eight separate seed groups. Following implantation, the crewman was to photograph the seed groups daily for 14 days using the 35mm Nikon camera. b. Usage /Anomalies - Due to the high OWS temperatures after launch, and subsequent on ground testing, the ED 61/62 performance was cancelled for SL-2. Resupply and performance of ED 61/62 was accomplished during SL-4. Prior to seed implantation the experiment was relocated because existing light levels were felt to be too low for adequate growth. In addition, the portable light was incorporated to provide additional lighting to insure good growth. Finally the seeds were implanted and photographed as scheduled with no anomalies reported. c. Assessment/Recommendations - No assessment or recommendations were received from the crew concerning ED 61/62. Therefore it was assumed that the experiment hardware, procedures and interfaces were well designed and all functioned as planned. 13.22.5.9 ED 63 - Cytoplasmic Streaming a. Operations - Experiment ED 63 was scheduled for operation on the SL-3 mission to observe the effects of zero gravity on cytoplasmic streaming in plants. �Crew activation operations for ED 63 were to consist of restraining the ED 63 transparent container, containing the elodea water plants, near a specific light in the OWS wardroom to maintain photosynthesis during the mission. Then, once early in the mission and again late in the mission, the crew was to detach a leaf from the elodea plant and, with use of the Inflight Medical Support System (IMSS) microscope and associated hardware, examine the leaf for cytoplasmic streaming. The 16mm Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) was to be used to document the data. b. SL-3. Usage/Anomalies - ED 63 was performed as scheduled on During the first performance the crewman reported that all three plant vials had a sulphurous smell and that the leaves from the three plants showed no resistance when detached. Two slides were prepared from one of the plants and no cytoplasmic streaming was observed. In conjunction with this in-flight performance of ED 63, a ground based performance was conducted. A sample slide was prepared on each of the three plants and observed under a microscope. Two of the three elodea plants appeared to be totally dead, the third appeared normal and exhibited good cytoplasmic streaming. The vials containing the two dead plants smelled of hydrogen sulfide and the leaves showed no resistance when detached. Based on this, it was considered probable that one or more of the plants in orbit were dead. �From a later on ground performance of ED 63 it was discovered that a previously considered dead plant had exhibited some cytoplasmic streaming. Therefore, the crew were requested to prepare slides on all three plants and examine for possible streaming. and no streaming was observed. The crew complied This resulted in a termination of the experiment for SL-3 and an eventual resupply for a SL-4 performance. During the SL-4 performance of ED 63, a hardware anomaly was reported concerning the DAC camera/IMSS microscope adapter. The crewman examining for cytoplasmic streaming could not acquire a full field of view. It was his assessment that the adapter was the cause of the problem. The SL-4 performance of this experiment approximated the results obtained from SL-3. During the first cytoplasmic streaming observation one plant provided some evidence of streaming. In subsequent observations the elodea plant leaves showed no resistance when detached, there was a sulphurous smell present and no cytoplasmic streaming was observed. It was decided that the plants were dead and the experiment was terminated. The plants were removed from their vials and placed in the trash airlock. c. Assessment/Recommendations - Other than the DAC camera/IMMS microscope adapter anomaly, the ED 63 performances were conducted as planned. The crew reported that the experiment �procedures and hardware functioned well and felt that everything possible was done on their part to acquire usable data. From the results of this experiment, it was concluded that zero-gravity has an undesirable effect on cytoplasmic streaming in plants. �13.22.5.10 a. ED 72 - Capillary Study Operations - Student experiment ED 72, Capillary Study, was scheduled to be performed on SL-4 to demonstrate capillary action as a liquid pumping mechanism. The experiment hardware consisted of two separate capillary tube modules and an additional capillary wick module. Each capillary tube module • contained a reservoir, lever valve system and three transparent capillary tubes of graduated sizes. oil. One module contained water, the other Krytox The capillary wick module contained three capillaries of twill and mesh screens. The crewman was to activate the lever valve of the capillary tube modules and photograph the capillary action of the fluid. The entire experimental sequence was to be photographed, beginning with the actuation of the capillary valve and ending with the time that the slowest fluid volume reached the end of the capillary tube. b. Usage/Anomalies - The wicking segment of student experiment ED 72 was successfully performed as scheduled with photographic data and crew sketches being obtained for data. The capillary segment of ED 72 was unsuccessful. During preparation of this portion the crewman observed that both the oil and water had leaked from their reservoirs. capillary action was observed. When the lever valves were operated no The failure was attributed to the reservoir �leakage. The ground later suggested attempting to refill the reservoirs but the crew had already disposed of the modules through the trash airlock. The leakage was documented on film. c. Assessment / Recommendations - The wicking portion of ED 72 was successfully completed with the hardware functioning as designed. However, the capillary segment was unsuccessful due to the hardware failure resulting in the leakage of the capillary modules. �13.22.5.11 ED 74 - Mass Measurement a. Operations - Experiment ED 74 was scheduled to be performed on SL-3 to demonstrate the use of harmonic motion to measure the mass of an object. To operate ED 74, a crewman was to first remove ED 74 from launch stowage in the OWS film vault and then bolt it to the film vault. The device was to then be calibrated using the calibration weights included with the ED 74 hardware. Next the mass of four (4) small objects was to be determined through use of the ED 74 hardware. This was to conclude the ED 74 performance. b. Usage/Anomalies - During SL-3, ED 74 was performed twice instead of only once a s scheduled. It was decided that this experi ment was a good candidate to be downlinked by real time TV coverage. c' Assessment/Recommendation - During both pgr fnr manioc the hardware functioned as planned and no anomalies were reported. The crew stated during the final performance that ED 74 worked very well. 13.22.5.12 a. ED 76 - Neutron Analysis Operations - Student project experiment ED 76 was scheduled for operation during all three Skylab missions. Its purpose was to acquire data for measurement of the ambient neutron flux a t Skylab orbital attitudes. �The hardware for ED 76 was comprised of ten (10) neutron detectors and stowage containers. During SL-2 the ten neutron detectors, consisting of chemically coated films, were to be deployed on the inboard surfaces of the OWS. At designated times during SL-2 and SL-4 the crew was to deactivate certain detectors and stow them for ultimate return to earth. b. Usage/Anomalies - During SL-2 the ten (10) neutron flux detectors were deployed as planned. A t t h e e n d of t h i s m i s s i o n f o u r ( 4 ) detectors were deactivated, stowed and returned. The remaining six detectors continued data collection throughout the Skylab missions and were deactivated and stowed in the CM by the SL-4 crew just prior to their return. The SL-4 crew stated that dector Bravo 3 was poorly placed in that as they came through the hatch from the forward compartment to the experi ment compartment it was in a very natural place to grab. If t o u c h i n g degraded it, it was definitely degraded as it was touched numerous times. c. Assessment/Re commendations - No assessments or recommendations were reported by the Skylab crews concerning ED 76. Therefore it was assumed that the experiment hardware, procedures and interfaces were well designed and all functioned as planned. 13.22.5.13 a. ED 78 - Liquid Motion Operations - Experiment ED 78 was scheduled to be �performed on SL-3 to study the dynamic response of a liquid/gas inter face when subjected to an impulse in zero gravity. The crewman was to excite a gas bubble, surrounded by a liquid, by activation of the calibrated force supplied by the ED 78 piston/ spring mechanical system. Photographs were to be supplied to the student investigator to provide ED 78 data interpretation. b. Usage/Anomalies - Experiment ED 78 was set up and initiated during SL-3 but the hardware did not operate properly. piston/spring mechanism did not function when activated. corrective procedures were attempted with no success. The Several It was deter mined that the diaphram in the piston/spring mechanism was ruptured and that no corrective actions were possible. The ED 78 hardware was terminated and stowed. During SL-3 and SL-4, liquid motion scientific demonstrations were performed and data from these demonstrations were provided to the ED 78 student investigator. This data provided sufficient information to satisfy the requirements of ED 78. c. Assessment/Recommendations - Other than information concerning the ED 78 hardware anomaly, the crew made no comments concerning the assessments/recommendaticns for this experiment. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Human Factors Engineering Collection Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Human Factors Engineering Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/12">View the Human Factors Engineering Collection finding aid in ArchivesSpace</a> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000059 Title A name given to the resource "Final Crew System Corollary Experiment Input to the Skylab Final Mission Evaluation Report." Description An account of the resource This report describes the experiments onboard Skylab, what the data the experiments gather indicates, and the equipment that the experiments utilize. This includes the spider experiment. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-02-15 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Skylab Program Experimentation Apollo Telescope Mount Airlock modules Extravehicular mobility units Skylab 1 Skylab 2 Skylab 3 Skylab 4 Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Human Factors Engineering Collection Box 2, Folder 2 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/23/14364/sdsp_skyl_000013-000014.pdf bf2d88b95a5190f4c837c0ab56cc3a39 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Charles A. Lundquist Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/46" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">View the Charles A. Lundquist Collection finding aid in ArchivesSpace</a> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Charles A. Lundquist Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000013-000014 Title A name given to the resource "HOW COMET KOHOUTEK LOOKED TO SKYLAB 4 CREW." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Skylab 4 Kohoutek comet Type The nature or genre of the resource One-Sheet Posters Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Charles A. Lundquist Collection Box 60, Folder Photograph University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/20/14408/001.pdf 921170356ee20a1b14bfbade0ab86710 PDF Text Text ��ST/iTSSaST 07 WORK HAU/MVCBUST ACQJIVrriES - AIM SCOPE TMs^rvtccsMit of \Jovk. cjicoBroaasGs the oan/niaeMne effort reoulretl to optimize tho crew role cod the eysteas deslsn for the Apoilo Telescope Mouat (AT^!) erpcriaeat* OBJECrmS The objectives of the progrsia eret 1. To Id TiciCy the tcoho re®ilred to actuate, coir;i-ol and ncnitor the to rct.rl<Tve data casosttea ty EWl, end to ctov tlia cassettes aboard the AEl carri<ir. 2. To define cud cstabUsh apeclfiCGtlcns for the cquipE jiifc requited to support the crov dJtrlng EKA trcnslatlcai, do^.a retrieval. haadllDg and etovn^e. 3. To cpp3y huran casiaeerins criteria thru design outroort of those systems interfacing the orbital crew mcaibor. forj3lbimy of lr.tv.m p^rforannco on those tashs Identified ly caalj'Gia (inciud'jjs sittulatica) a£ crew variables and ccostralnts, equiprent UitViatloas, and alnsica roquircmsnfcs. 5. , To devadop a tradning program, Inclv.dlr-g coursti outlines, ^-quipmont description, personnel requirfiicnto, end fanllJ.ty utUlEaiion, to lEjiltBEnt indoctrinatlca of the crew to the ATIl, ASSUiPnOilS The follo»7lns esovurotious will be included emong thoca to be used in the performance of this prosrom. 1* The Apollo Elcch II suit shall be ;rtili2ed by the sstrcsmts. 2. Attitude stabilization, pointing and control el"'all be ccadr^rted by the nstrona'jtCc) within the AEi carrier. 3* The carrier configuration end flight profile shall be ccnoistcirb with the curitiatiy dsolgnated /-AP ccafiguratlozxs. �2 IV ERa'.RAIl OUTUES 1« 2. GeDcral a. Ka::irniax utlllT:t;tion vill l)is made of reaultn clrtaijiod from the G&*ainl and Apollo proc^ans. b. l^axlrai:! use shall -S hardware coiEpimeata and syeteans which oro either availnblo cosomQrciaUy or have teen developed uudior other rclr.tod prograias. c. The Ernsn Fac<:ors Ehciuorr.his Section shall fi-volop a de tailed progmu plan catega.'lsinc th? effort into a logical sequence cf outicireted tatla. Enoh task will ocntain obJ-.ctlvos, the Kcpected proiuet, allocated maa-hci;ro, relaticn to crthax' tasks, data rcxjuired from Gv-vamment scwraen; the plan shall also provida for mihistone event rcvicvs. d. CoaveJitlonal equlpiC'^ait, procedures, end tcehniyica \;j.ll be xrfcilizs.d ^dtenovcr possible-.' Crew/System Jtitecration a. The Eumon Feotcrs Enginccivlng Section shall idorttify critical system paramstci-s for both the ASIA and its carrie?.'. Such factors as pointing and Reciu'aciejj, motating character istics, tarcct nocuisition modes, cnvircnmiintal lijaitaticns, aoaitcring rccruirements, data rotrievol roouiremrnts (removal and/or rsTJlaceaoat, frequ:>ncy, inasscs), aoceoslbDity and interfaces will bo evaluntod for ccspatibmty with too htann opci'atcr. b. Those system rcguireincats which constitute a eonstraiat directly or indirectly on na interfacing system and which affect odrc-x'soly ths crew pcxrfommco will be identified, l/hcre possible Eltemato systems or procedures will bs x*econmcnd.cd which will clloviate the constx'aint or improve system cffcctivoncas« c. Identification will bo csdo of the varlcblns and constraints imposed ly crew mcaber plxis caadldiite crew support (IVA end EVA) equipaient, cixd incorporate this data into the task analyses and new equipment design specif1cations. d. All equlisEont with '.dilch tlxe crew will intorfaco ">>•^7) be analyzed and the opdratlixg and stowage rc^xlramsnts determined. This equirnx-at will include. ' �3 1) 2) 3) i;) 5) 6) 7) 0) « fSTA dioplay and ccatrol egjilpBent Gu-lflcnce and aaylgatlcn equipmant AE' data cassottas Datii hinadllng cq^alp22?nt (tools) D:j,ta atov.'aso crraj-prir^nt Li'Zo ciipport equlprant AlalocJca and nccossorlsa (hctch^a ond Ccmtro:^) Crav Bto.'billaeticc and traiislr.tion oquipiBunt (IVA artd eva) e. A dstallcd task aiS'Jyais iacludlng tinellns shall be conducted baosa on the follovins najor actlvitiea: 1) 2) 3) h) 5) 6) T) TciTcefc aeqtilsltion, otabiiization and control, Beta recording, Data rctrio%'al, Data Dtowego, E-q.u.'.pnint assembly, Crs-7 Qovcment to and frcaa the A2M work area* The enalyois shall bo updated basod on simulation results. f« Dwsicn opscifleatians will bs created for spnciol crf;w eqiJ-prc it and tools rcauirlng dovclopm-uat and vhnro rcoircsory modifi&itions will be rcec^snondcd for existing cduiui^at. AppUcablo hiwan englaeariag criteria wlU bo ro^crorced for boca now design and modifications. 3. Design Si^port % The principles of hunian factors cnginoerlng shall be applied to all related AKI eq^iisncnt to ensure the efficient inte^tioi of men into the design of the system. a. The EPS Inpirts shall con^l,y with system ena^sls regvli^ments as well as other appropriate inputs. Standard ^iS?'C-£TD-267 shall bo the basic jvcfereace doctnnsnt for the human €nginegring design features. b. Euirnn factors cri.teria end reccmmendatlons shall be fpplli.a to system and subsystem prelimiliary Ijycuts and related dratrings. The approval of Isyout drawings by the IF3 group shall verify that ths configuration end arrangamant of cqaipffo-'nt satisfy Esn/equipmcat perfomnnce rcguiremcnts, and that the design ccc^ilies with applicable criteria specified in Standcrd JBPC-STD-267. S �c. OsTrJi fnotora prJ.r^.ir--C3 rud proccdu-vcs cboll "be GxroHcxI, dVLTlac detail dc alfpa, -fco cquiinisnt di-avrlns3; sucli a;i pan<;l Inycuts, vorlaipccc I'v'oui^s, eon'trols, crew ciiuipTn-n-t oad •.•thcT dravinso <;japlofcirvs cqiii-prnDH-fc tiaccaBory for operation "by tho ABl caiTicr crow. d. nFB parsccmel sliall pjarfciclpi:to In dcalca rovicvo to enuvxe ccnalderatioa oi' crev oporationa and crew/eqjiiipra&nt intjractlons. SimtlAtioa a. Upon ccoiplotion of tho pxaHnicary task orolcrsls, e. airulatloa plzin vlll te vrittea and iiapl€n:ca:tod coverins the follcvdnc factors: 1) 2) Critical task? to he siaulcted, ?.2c:ar:-adcd a-.'le zf sl=;latlcn - aicohanical, SC-135, Itrt task, etc., 3) Sketches of noakeps required, k) Facilities required, 5) SiEulatloa schedule, h. The E-rrnn Factcrs Fa.-l2-~Sccticn skall write the .ietailed test prccedureo and suhnlt iioakup deslea xecpiirecents for the approved tasks to tie ajjprppriate doslGu s^^cups, c, 1F2 personnel ohrOl monitor the operation of all almlstitai tenting end participate in the dcelga evtOxvitions conducted on ccn^ncnt mockups which interface the Jaaaon ope rator, d. Prccc3ural changes end time iseasurcnients prodv.ccd oy sjarolrtion testing flhc.ll he incorporated into the detailed taok cna'^'sis, RcciBCzumdcd design changca rssidtlng from aiusulatioa rnd/OT lacckup drsloi evaluation shall be submitted by the Hunim Factors Eagineering Section to the appropriate design groups. Training a. The ATM task roqulrcs^rrts shall he evaluated and chose ckiU IsvcOa required to fulfill the oihital functions shall he presented. h. Prcm the detailed task analysis, H?3 porscmei sha^ldmtify those tasks vhsre training is neccssa^ end ^ dc^. of training xequirad to ensure their desired perfonrance, c. The Euman Factors Englnoerins Section shr^ training support personnel b? special-ty, traininc level «nd certiflcaticQ. �d. Training eqjilpncat and fanilitica shall be Iclentifici quantity, configuration, ntate of developEien-fc, location (if cxiatinc), and need date. e* ^ A trnlniDG pr Cfac outlintj shall be developed. This will include: f:ilGli-t crew. ^ w <)• rfJla ••cla3s:-u9a ir.";U:ri^il and equipacnt. 3) TraiDc?^s.> it) f p^racnnol and expcrlacnt c. ntrootcns. '4 "' Cvurse cutllnoa, frcquenc;' and duraticn, as vc.iJL as cquipasnt descriptions, iacludina sJffitchca, will be pro/ided with the traininc plan. ESPECTED rCBtJLiTS The fs-Uc^rlnc docuacntctitn will l>e submitted Saelneerins Section: the ffurnnri Factors 1. A listing f the syr^tems and/or prtcedures rolatad to ATi >4iich ara incoirpatiblo with bunaa p>.arfQraanoe crltej.*ia bti!? ov&r i^ch the contractor has no direct ccntr.1. 2, Related mission ccnstx'aints, A3S-I and corxder design constx'alnts, pers.nal equipment ccnstralats, and crew inrpi,i{ed constraints. ^3* A detailed task zinalysls and tiffiejlne conrncncing with th? pitspamtlon for iZA torcet cc<iuisition and cndinc with tha stLwace of the data cassettes within the AIM carrier ofter the final m. Design specificoticns f^r bcTth newly develvped crow sxQ^io-rt equipment end m. difIcatlon tt. existix^g e^ilxKoent. 5< The simulnticn plan and detal.Icd simulation results, concluslLns and recoBEcendatl ns* 6. Desl{pi cvaluatl n inputs ux related AT:-! subsystems requiring crew/equipment Interactions. 7* A training plan including course descripticn, material end eqpipBient requirements, skill levels and fcciU'ty rcccasnondstions. 8, A training irplementatlon plan containing a sched'alo of overall training events propcssd for .M!-!. 9. An outline and content description of an A33i flight crev training and familiarization manual. ��ATM FnOBI.TO AREAS 1« The general cost of EVA in ezcpendsblcSi crew end crew fotigiio. (See attnchceats 1 2). hours, oafoty, 2* The iJBpact of EVA whore vehicle configurations Involve crew traaafers by EVA. (See attachaent », 3* Other EVA consideratlono. h. The baeic everlond of the crew In reopect to nian hours nvailtible for expcrlrerts vorcus the can hours required by preaent experi-.;:ent dcfinitiona. On 211/2^ this chows 502 aaa hours avnilablo veraua 859 cian hours required. (Seo attachoem; 5). 5» Tho problea of dovolopinj and getting iraplcnentcd into exporinont dcaigno. basic principles of huaan factor cngineaj*ing and nlooioD oporation rcqu\rc-cnte. Thio io an cxtrc^caly tineGcnaitivo function. (Sea attGchoent 6 for a TOJV prolir-inary cot of the types of dntn that cuot get factored into the exporicent and carrior oquipnent designs). (See nttocfaj^ent 4). 6. Stabilization and Control requlrecents for ATM are the ooafc otringont ever attoapted in canned space fli^t. Consldorable study and cinulntion above that already ur.dertakon is probably required. (Soe attachncat 7 for eooe of the basic iteoo re quiring work in this area). 7« The I/EH io en extremely poor vehicle for extended habitation. Much huson factor effort nust be expended to provide reasonablo comfort to the crow. (See attaehnent 8 for oone considerations on this item. Also, refer to the section on crew habitabillty in attauhoent 5)* 8. See attacbxcent 9 for other AiOl Kan/^nchine Considerations. �/o �o 0 EVA CREW TIAU COST . vy CO 32 u CLOSE 12 5 REEVA « U2 u lUTCH O fj CH.^RGE S o w S 2 and o u BPLSS REPRES- O D O CO ^a and SURIZE kJ STOW u u CABIN "a STA®B'ir; b. -O k 3 u ec« 2s ce •••; ...'-v8 & u u H Q 0* 5 § 2 cu O b Q b. I','-"' CO CO ASIRCr^AUT f . CO R EST (2 lir) CO < CO •i.V CO 3VA.' As-rn(>""" HAUr CO CO CO CO h:,' - 9 •i.'i '' A';--' 0 *'. 'I • a™A /Ws}» ^ '"•"-l' '• • " •" .TiMS.. -(mlnutos) 8 .1. so X 60 X 70 X 80 90 K' •l-. Slv "-y-. ^rr ;.: £•'1--•'• •- "'-H • • •' *•• '•• * r- .*» • '> K . •A • J- r ••"•>'-"*':• '• .'•f'- , CO SVA -_yS•.•:-••. »V ' • - i.. •-•:- .?:.v'';-.--.I ..•••• „ •. -t- o : bV.' J. 100 TOTAL aiANHOvHS,® 0* .(3 X Period of Actual EVA) Attnchm^nt I �o O' •.» .2J ' ...• • .• ». :j: o ,:.;1;;-."V•.'-•»-> --'• ..~ > '• -. • OTHER EVA COSTS t fr •• • > • CONSUMABLES per EVA :r • •• ft-n *-» i- '1-^ ^ •< t—;• f^... •;» w:J.'. --jy lb Oxygen Cabin Loss 7.0+ Consumed by Astronauts (PLSS) 3.0+ Umbilical 6 IbAr Water I • • -.• •-. »=,• f-.-'. •' 14.66 LiOH (Contaminant Control Cartridge) Fuel (Stabll^e and Station Keeping) 7.2 ? SAFETY FACTORS Raciiation Exposure Meteoroid Exposure Astromut Fatigue Lo^v Systciii Safety .-V -.rv '- • -•"• ••-• ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS Wt (lb) PLSS Protective Oarments 64 Thermal 50 Meleorok1 15 Safety Tethers 10 EVA Astronaut Maneuvering System 10-140 PLSS Replaceables Battery Contaminant Control Cartridge Rescue Kit (est) TOTAL Vr rVol (ft^) Quantity 3 2 .5 1 2 2 f, .5 2 f- . 2 f" >>«- <1-9 ^' I »-- t_ - V- 5 .05 1 per 4 EVA 'S t 3,6 10 .04 .5 167-297 6.6-15.8 1 per EVA 1 i-r-: . - S'-.T ��'xHE g/A CO?g.TPTTm PPnarr^f Pcyhapo tho aoot olsiificeat diffeiwfo AV tionc lo a >oquirci=ent for rcEr.lsr comaytinn- toVork conflfpiraDr. MnoUcr and tho Altorrjtc /;a ccnfi-ajTc-tion S.^r.5^. i clic-.;a that ••.•hllo EVA caa bo RC'-canlioh"^ ia'iv-H-t' i i^^iperinent ha.9 l".bcrion3 to the crc-^. Ar.v clo^ig^ f-fficalt £«:cl nhould bo cnrofullo- aea3y=c;d and tho con;cqSSca PCrtcdlo EVA tho cafety foctoro and worlclcada Ir.volvod, every offo^ ^ ^ nxniniro tho qi-mtlty of m'o required., o^^^ort ebould bo ca(\o to D.. «to oori in tho l.:li/Ai;.. Ho oo-ola flea no' rtc-ro-rhir^f^^f =0 tfor.trbsp, cater the AL, ccciiro th-t j ^ the S-Iva veuld then AopTczav.^zo the AL and opcts fcha'^A^St°r Eo tfceeo aetlvltlcn tho r.otro"-auJ- ^,0 v,,, Wij.le .10 t-ao doing thocu-h a oiailnr cot of ooUi-ltioVin ^ prepared, tho firet aotrone.ut would then a ' ucro cuter the LEd and hook up ore of tho Dtsr£^va Iv^ ^'^5 Ea would then traacfor hlo Icrg urb^i^oal to K5?oilicalc to hio cuit. hock it up a-d diaooraoofc the .4ord:"j^fiMaeal ^^^roraut who would thou travoroe back to tho AL v.hile tho aatroraAtt would froa tho open hatch of tho Ii:i. Follcsr'-'^ procrecs ecouro tho LEj hatch, rcprcc-er'-e S^rVv S® as'crouaut would by the Chart, nfto? ah.a 5o the bSi: ^oo'sin^^SiSr& for short tora taslaj. Eowovo- the PLSS vould bo loncer. It is alco based ou^o dcvfi«n-.'^^^ ^^5 althoush tho tisa icfJiJuS'coSfbe ^tnntit. Of on,,. oon.«i .^rS; =-.t'rnSSt51S'?::o1^°Snnn. requeued. Due to'^voMclo^coSwrftiS^S^"^'^^'^^ ® sindlar EVA would bo r. desxrablo and the P15S vouid S S ? ®''^ rnbiUcal would be fiE •-ration woald be porhaaa 10-35 ^ probably ccnoiotius o* haadholde and riii Addittcnally, r. t^alkt.'sy, scroGo tho entire lorgth of tho coi^±s^lo^ developed of E/Ariri-iU So P-!>teo ri:;o Oithor tho Dr. MuoH^or « EOtivity is, orflcr to Ito root ohviof.s Kthed of aoins So iT^o j™ ".nfisoraiiono orootloal. nu tho noceocax^ natch rcouii-c^onto"^, ^^ZlZ Attachc;cat ^5 �/ . O • DEN OO6232 (11-62) ZVA 9 FOB SHIFT-CHANGEAUELLER COHFIGCRATION Hlnixnim Time Costs Activity Don and Check Out Suit " •4 filter and Secure long DnbiUcal AL, Connect ^2 Costs 20 10 Depressurize AL 3.5 lbs Open EVA Hatch Traverse to IM filter m. Switch to IM Umbilical Monitor #3 Traverse to AL Secure IM Hatch ID ' 5 12 lbs (DmbiUcal System loss) ID 2. Repressurize IM 15 Doff Suit and Stow 15 91 Dlnutea 6.9 lbs 22A lbs Developfflent Requirements: . • » . 150 foot DmbiUcal "Clothesline" Traverse Rig IM Hatches for Multiple Usage External Lighting CHART #1 ^ �o 0 ^ t66232,t1I-6Z,) CREW SCHSMJLE EXPERIMENTATIOH 1 1 WATCH NAP EVA n SLEEP SLEEP 0 2 ^ SLEEP EVA X 6 8 1 0 1 2 X X X 1d WATCH EXPERIMnfTATION WATCH ± L •4 tVA 1 KAP SLEEP X X X 1 ' » I 6 I 8 2 O 2 2 2 ^ X 2 6 2 8 3 0 J 3 2 3 4 J 6 Mueller Configuration and Alternative 1 (3'* hour cycle) - l8 Hour Exporinental Shift tXPERIMQITATION 2 SI.EEP ATCH E SLEEP ^ATCH EXPERIHENTATIOM SLEEP ATCH L X X X X 0 2 4 6 8 l 0 1 2 X X I I OPEN ATCfl WATCH^^SLEEP OPE» jEXPER. X X X WATCH X 1 i f l 6 l 8 2 0 2 2 2 % Alternative 2 (24 Hour Cycle) - 6-8 Hour Ibcperiaental Shift CHART #2 I �THE EVA COK^UTina PSDBLEH Pogo Z Md eiDlInr activitico. In fnjperiod the iiidivldiu 1 vdU ebtiiln Zh bouro of nlccp altho.n^ It would not be diatributcd 1 ^-hour baoio. ^ala cycle rey vcxy veil rot bo practical from a lloT ^ ®®'® ccaaideratioa cucfc as this ci;ot *? coafigurstiono r-ractical. The cocond of Clwrfc ^<2 soroly indlontos that la th® rblrt-oieoro ^ Altcr^to ilZ ccnfiguratioa, it is -pooaible to wori a ;iorBal o-hour day; 8-hour olcop cyclo. f^wbaj. Chart #3 providoa a r^r-aiy of opsrational differonccs botynoa the throo confasxiraticno for a 7-dry mission^ In ordor to nal-:o tho KncLler c^isuratiou and the Altorretc #1 corpotitivop tboy aro both barod on an Ib-hoi^ cxporincav vork cchcdulo as coapai-od to on B-hour work cchedulo for Altcmsio s^Z. Bf.ocd on tbia prsstce,- there ia no scrioua pa-ralty in t^e available for or-pcnrscnts between vaiilona config-jratioaa. Howctrer. thoro io a rajor difforccco ia tho aurbcr of EVA»3 aiid pr« est^isation cjclco required by the Altercate ij^ and tho othor two coalinuratlono..- If tho work schedule is changed to a 12-hour oicperli^sat duty cycle the iju-lbcr of EVA s Involved in the first t-wo configurations changos frca 18 to 28, and tha aur.oGr of prooourizatioa cyclca chrPees from 10 to 15. At tho onso tino. the amount of cino availrJjlo for experijcsnts crops to about SG hours. Althou^ tno txne available for AIH crpericoato io not greatly different for Altaraato ^Z, I Another feature choaii on tho eurcaaxy chart Is the feet that tho tins required for the crcv to rcatcfsblo into the CSH for ccGrgoncy abort is conoidcrobly loca for tho Alternate ^ corfigyrstioa. llhowieo, tho chart chouo an.orrdcp of ranking due to tho hazard of ETA. Bccavso of the fTcat ni^hor of EM'S required for tho first tuo ccnfigurations, there io a conoxdorablo spread b-t--.:r.a the number ono rating of Alternate j^S and the oocond and third ratings of tho other configurations. Another factor in this rating io the fact that the EVA at the cad of the work shift id.ll bo ficccoplich.-d by an. astronaut who nay already be hi^ly faticuod cud aoro prono to accidents. Ono pln.co on tho chart ropresento tho relative crow vorklcad for Mcccbl^g the basic configuration. Tho configunitica i?2 would be acconplicsc-d by a relative norcal Apollo dockljag maneuver. In both the Dr. Mueller wd Alternate #1 relatively complicated eijace erection techniqueo would bo involved. Horo again there is a wide spread between tho #1 rating and tho comparative evaluation of the second and third ratings. In GuiEmary, from a crow operation point of view, thore ia a caior bailee ia favor of Alternate ^ coafigurutionc Between tho Dr. tfuoUor Alternate j^^l there is little choice. It would appear that the ccmautxug problem is easier for the Dr. Mueller coafisuraticn- but the probloa of tho original structural build-up would be somewhat co«»' difficult. Attachment #3 ��OTHBR 17//. CO?:SI03?JVTXOIiS nVA cyclea and ducatloa To Reduce crcu workload to realistic level Insure conpatiblllcy with support equipment, I.e., life support ayatCD, caneuverins unit, A.L. hatch seal Reduce o.xygen required By Opclmltlng E?A procedures Eliniinatlng tasks not demandlns direct Vii,twiqTi input Siaq>lifylng required EVA tasks for mlnicaun crew e:;erticn Insurins cocpatlble hardware design, i.e., cascecce fartoncrs, iiandJ.es, tethers, controls Insuring optimum equipment Location for crev aecesstbllity Determine 5T7A support hardware requirements Including SLatilisatlon hardware IhuiGuvering oquipiscnt IUvrnlnaticn requireircnCs « Data cnsoette/crnw tethering harduare Data cassette protective equipmnnt Casratte attachment/detanhmcnt Cools Airlock hatch actuation toolc Sy Idoncifylng ajohility, dexterity, and visual acuity requirements for ea<:h task Simulating critical tasks to develop optlmua procedure and establish support requirements Analysing available support hardware far application and coEpatibillty Identifying AIM interfaces for crew tciherlng Dctcrtiinlag ATM data cassette envlrorjiintal lltaitations. �cj-vj-.z/oycCem By •• durlog EVA « E\-nluatln3 AT^l/carrier attitude stability oodoo Analyzing crew cquipcoafc failure wodeo Coternininc eonpliancc of AXH eyptora with applicable hiaaan enalncarinc critcfAa and avallablo Gcmini/Apollo data Siiaulatioa of critical casks to insure reaccnablc notabolic loads EctrbXiehins safety procedures to be undertaken in the event of an ejr.crgeacy Datrcnnlning ACS conotrainto on crewoan Insure crew/nisslon cosapatibility during EVA By Scheduling EVA for maximum operation during orbital light side Schcdiilias EVA during orbital perioda poesecsing mininun hazard, i.e., HKteorold shower activity. South Atlantic anomaly, solar radiation Scheduling EVA during periodu of minimum mieaioa operation ��AHAixsis OP csm camusmTnyss MlSSICai 2U/212 SEP 14 196S �TABTJS OP CCKTEiTrS BTTHOljirCSIOn Mission OETECTIVIS MISSION FUGEP PROFILE & 0PERAa?I(M3 EXPI21B5ZNP OPERATIOnS EVA E^UZE-IK® REQUIBESIEnrS CARRIER RECa-WEimATIOES CGRCLGSIonS 3s RECaM>-IBil!A!riOK3 �Sunxiry The anolysij of missico objectives, flicht profiles, spacecraft operations, cxpci-lmcait considerations end opcratioQS, and, carrier coapai-iscos for Liisoicn 211/212 is presented with ccnclus'lons and reca-asendntlons cs related to crcv c^naldoratioas end optratioas. The C3M/nc:'l/ATM offers crew advcntac«33 not available vrt,tMn the CSM/ LEl/AlIl confic:tu*ation. All ezipcrimeats con bo cccomplislicd with a reduction in the quantity but not the quality of desired infoxniaticci. The mission will bo trying and difficult for even the niO£;t MgMy motivotcd astronauts. Introduction The jiurposG of this study is to 03Cf;rtaln, in preliidnary form, the operational constraints end potential problems associated with crew participation during the mission. Fnctox-s considered aro mission oV jectivo, flight profiles, spacecraft opei*atlcns, experimnnta cparatlona and carrier considoratlcai. Conclusions and rccaumendatians are included for xiso by technical personnel. There ore many factors that can have an Influence on crev ciperaticaia during orbital or lunar missions. Some are very real, and can be evaluated, Willie many are qvdto nebulous and are a function of an individual crev member on a specific flight. Many in tliis category can only bs ovoluated at this time by Intuition and opinion, with little or no firm facts to substantiate the conclusion. Many of the opinionated iti^ms nust await actual Apollo flight experience before real answers are available. Therefore, this study will be revised and upgraded as more and better information becomes available. Basic crcv considerations must be evaluated for two categories, i.e., Intra-Vchiculor Activities including all spacecraft operations, hcusekceping, personal hygiene, and s:q>cTlniant operations; Extra-Vehicular activities. Including all preparations for external spacecraft cad experi ment operations, crew and cargo transfer, c:cternal maintenance and re pairs, and emergency operations including astronaut rescue and retrieval. The crew represents the most fleoible system contained In the space craft. It has a demonstrated capability of rapidly adjusting to the situation without severely effecting adjacent systems. Dual or triple redundancy Is incorporated depending upon the number of astronauts present. Adaptation to limited and restricted operating envircnmcnts has been rei>eatedly accCTplished with selected personnel in test flights for years. Eowcver, flights have been a relatively short duration limited to a few hours, or a fov days, in the cost extreme cases. Since the main objective of AAP Is the extcmsicn of luanned space flight function, eveiy effort must be exerted to increase tba ccanfort end working conditioas of the astronaut. �MISSION 0EJECT3VES crct; consideratiors �4 r Mtjjton O'o.lcc&lx'a The objective of Mission 211/212, as specified by HASA. is ns follows; ' 1. Conduct solnr astranotry observations using es^erlmezrt sensors. ircunted 2. Store cnrrler-AT2I in orbit for subsequent rcndc-avdo and reuse (see tUssion 213 - Lamch CSM into rendezvous orbit, coplnaor 'rfith carrier ATM from Mission 211/212), *3. Conduct rendezvous oxparimc-nts totveca CSM and corricy Vehicle for lunar rendezvous problem analysis early In flight program. Observation and zacnoureoent of extended duration space fUrJrt effects on crew mnmbors, *5. Conduct synoptic weather and mapping photogi^by cjcperlmeat using CSM as espsrliuent carrier. C » Objectives not supplied by HASA. ��A, Mission 211/212 - MISSION PROFILB AKALYSIS o A doecriptlon for 211/212 as deocribed In C-2-2n/212-2 9 «i>"3t 1906, forna the basis for theao ccmmeats as to obe relAtlve dcslmbillty of various possible miaslon profiles for Fllclits 211/212. TABLB I msslcn DeaerlPtloaa - 212 Firaf. launch Method I 212-LIi;i (ATM)-Dlr. inj. 200 n.ol. circular 211-03.1-Dlr» inJ. 120 n.mi, phuslnrt orbit 2L1-.CSM dock •.d.th 212 UM Ccnduot all e.^ei'icont8 In 200 a.mi. circular orbit Ccamonts; All ej:poi1m^ts vou-lcl be conducted at 200 n.ml. Altitude LF/ ^eter tb^ doslrGd. It may be neccssa.'y to separate LKi ^ 0^.1 durirs ATM experiment so that more than one exneria-at can be ccnaucted simultaascaisly. This method is rated #4 for crew ccnsideratlcn. Method II 212-LE-I (ATM)-Dlr. InJ. 200 n.ml. circular 2^-CoM (RQck)-Dlr. inj. 120 n.ml. circular phasing orhit 211-Conduct mapping expcrriments 2L1-Transfcr, rendezvous and doci with 212 lEM at 200 n.ml. Conduct AI2.I experiments Commits; This launch and orhitnl coquence is rated #2 and pcnnlts E^lmum utilisation of ths manned vt?hlclc at both the 120 n.mi, end 200 n.mi. orbits. Furthermore, If the LE-l must be separated frcm the CSM during the ATM cacpariinc.it, separation time fmd distance can be ^^mum (5 miles or less), This is required in the event the LE-I tt^t be abandoned or cn oi-bit short is required. It should bo rcalizea V Ii. ^snnod LE.J, when separated frca the OSM, brs no orbital rendezvous end crow transfer mist be acccmpUshed by ^,he CM prior to aborting the orbit. Therefore, a ciinned f c i r ^ d e s i r a b l e c c n f l g u r a t i o n e n d s h o u l d oc avoided. In the event this eonflguraticn is rcqvirod, the LEI crew is placed in a very hi^ risk situation. �I-tethod III 212-LE:I (A'.v:-L)-Dir.inJ. 200 n.ML. ci.rculQr 2L1-CSM (nr.elO-Dir. inj. 100 x 200 a.mi. 211-CuM i;i-2n3no30 rjid. dock to rack 211-COM (Rr.ck)-P,cadozvou3 witk 222 7JSd la 200 n.ml. clrculer orbit 2n-CSM imdcc]: rack 211-CSM deck to 212 LS-l cad troasfor two (2) crewmca 211-CSM vadock 2:2-LS-l 211-CSM dock to rock 211-CSM (Rcck)-Ti*an3fer to 120 n.ni. circulor CcEduct roappins o:qx»rlEent3 211-CEl (Rr^k)-Tj.'ca3fer ead readozvous with 212 LEM 212-Ln-l crow (IT/A) i*cGovcr rack data 2U-CS-I undcxk rack 211-CSII dock to 212 LEM Cczmcnts; SMa cequcacc Is nnich too con5)licated cad places oa uaac-cessory risk oa the 2-naa crc-w o? the LEI at 200 aoini. cad the CM at 120 aoml. This ssquencs is highly laiticceptable for crew ocfety la the event of a LK-l failure or orbi\>al abort. ^tcthcd IV 212-LE-: (AIM and MarFplns)-Dir.iBj. to 120 a.mi. circular 211-CSM-Dir.iaJ. 120 x 200 n.mi. phising orbit 211-Circularize, rendezvous and dock with 212 LSI At 120 a.mi. Conduct all experimcats CSM/ISI transfer to 200 n.mi. for LSI (AE^) storage « Corx^nts; This, method required lamcccssajy orbital changes by the manned vehicle, Sxiggest 211 CSI-I direct inject into 120 a.mi. phasing orbit with lE-I. Mochod V 212-LE'I (AS!d)-Dir. InJ. to 200 n.mi, circular 211-CSM (Eack)-Dir. Inj. to 100 x 200 n.mi. phrLq^-ng orbit 211-C^ transpose and dock to rack 211-CS!'! (Kack)-Readezvous with 212 LES'l in 200 n.ml. circular csrbit Transfer tvro (2) crewmen ty E7A from 211 CSM to 212 LEd Conduct ATM and mapping eaperimants 211-Cad undock rack dock to LEd Ccmrasnts; This method requires transfer of the craw by E/A and undcoking frca the rack by ths CM prior to dockdng with the LEd, Again, it veold appear that more time than is accessary would be spent ly the two cre^mien in the LEd with soparatlcm from the CSId, Not a desirable cocdition. �Mothcd VI (ATTO-Dlr. inj. 200 n.ffi. circular Sll-cni (Rcclcj-Dlr, InJ, 100 x 200 n.iai, 2ll-CG:i-TrQnspo3e and dccic to r:ick 2.U-CS-I rfadcrA-ouj with 212 LE-i zi 200 n.ol. Trsjiafcr two (2) ercwxa to LE-1 hy EVA an-CS-i (EccJ;)-Tr3n3fcr to 120 n.ai. circular Conduct uapiplnc c-^ipavliccnt "^o.^OO n.El. ond roadezvoua with 212 LEt-l LTL-I crew recover data (Fv'A) frca rack 211-CSM undcck froa rack 211-CS:-I dock to 212 LEM reecnreiy of tho two cwowtoii 4 5 I n.ai., CSM at 120 n.mi. Tb: method is not accejftable for safety reasons. Hlssloa PoaerlT^tlons - 211 First l-Icthod I ^ n.nO., itolns orbit (A!Ei'I)-Dir. laj, 200 n.mi, circular orbit n.mi. and rendezvous with 212 LSI 211-CSII-Dock with 212 LEI Conduct aU ci^crimcnts In 200 n.mi. circular orbit This sequence is acceptable for crew safety. However, tac 200 n.mi. mapplns orbit is not desirable when 120 n.nl. Is preferred. This method is rated #3. Mothcd II ^ ri.Toi. circular phasing orbit )^®*)-Ccnduct mapping and weather crocrimeirts oH**^ n.mi. circular orbit 211-CSIl-Transfor, rendezvous and dock with 212 LBI at 200 n.mi. Conount AIM esporlments Co^cnts: Tills seqv.eace is profcrrod from crew consideration and ^lers better utllizatim of e<^imezit than Method n - Table I. This seijuence Is rated from crew considemticn. �J'f.thccl III (Krj?ls)-Dir, Inj. 100 x SOO n*i!il* pbsslng crbll; ail-CSM-Tmnflpo?3 oad dock to ztick 212-IiEJ (A'iM)-Dlr, inj. 200 n»ai« circular orbit CU-CS!I-Uadcck r3ck 211-CS:!-Dcck to 2J5 LTSI and transfer two (2) crovcsa to LHI and conduct /.Ti'l c:ncriacnt5 m-CSM-Undcck 212 ISI 211-C3t-'-Dock to rack 211-CSM (Rr-clO-Tronsfcr to 120 n.ml. clrcxOor orbit 211-CSM-(Rr.cl:)-Conduct rcairpins experiments 211-CGI-!-(Rack)-Triia3fer and rendezvous 222 LSI 212-LE.I Crcv-Rccovc-r rack data by EVA , 211-CS-I-Undock rack 211-CSM-Dock to 222 LEM Cp^f.nto;_ Tills ssthod Is too cccipllcated end prefventa rapid racoveiy of the u^l crew by the COM, i.e., lEl at 200 n.ml. (SM at 120 n.ml. Totally unacccptablo for crow safety. Mathod IV 211-CSI-Dlr, inj. 120 x 200 n.ml. phasing orbit 212-LEI (AEI and Mapplag)-Dir. InJ. to 120 n.ml. circular orbit 21l-C3:l-ClrculGrlr.e, rendezvous and dock with 212 lE-C at 120 n.ml. Conduct all e^crlments CSM-Lni transfer to 200 n.ml, circular oiblt for lEJ! storage Co^T^onts: This scQjionce requires •unnccessaiy orbit changes the in order to rendezvous with the LDd, I.e., Cai 120 x 200 n.ml. LC-I 120 n.ml. This method Is more ccmpllcated than necessaxy. 2'Icthod V 211-CSM {Rack)-Dlr. InJ. to 100 x 200 n.ml. phasing orbit 212-IiIiM (ATM)-Dlr. InJ. 2C0 n.ml. circular orbit 211-CSI-Tran3po3C and dock to i*ack 211-C3M (Rcck)-F.eadGSVou3 with 212 LE-I in 200 n.ml. orbit Transfer two (2) crewxea by E/A from CSM to LBl Conduct AIM and mapping, and weather experlicents 211-CSK-ltodcck rack and dock to lEi CwEnents; Thin method requires jT/A transfer cf the crew from (^I to LSI, and undocMng from rack prior to docking with LS^. Appears to be unnccesseiy, conc'lic&'tc'd and time ccaisumlng If abort cf the L51 Is required. Sot a desirable sequence. �VI SU-Cfw'I (R?.cl£)-Diy» InJ* 3.00 x 200 phcolng orbll; 211-cr.l-Tro\ij3po3C» JiTKi do::!: to rack 212-U2I (ATi')-B1j*« IdJ. 200 n.iai, circulcs* orl>lt 211-C52! (Pv';rl:)-Rond02Vc-ao with 21S LEI at 200 n.iai. orbit (2) crcv.7.:.n to 212 LF^l by EVA and start A214 c::pcriacirto 211«CS!-I (Raok)-Tran3for to 120 a,ml. circular orbit 211-CS:i fRrok)-CcvnaE.ct mipplns csxpo-rlmcnto 2U.-CSM (Racl:)-Traasi'er to 200 a>mi<i cad readezrvouo with 212 LSI Lri crcv recover data from rack by EVA 23J.-CS'-Unclcck froia rack 211-CS:i-Dock to 212 LSI Cc-rr-ents; Totally unacceptable due to co.':c)l£Xity and orbital rci-m-aticai of manned LE-I cad CSM, i.e., LM at 200 n.mi,, CSM at 120 n.mi* Dot a deolrablo candltlcax. caicLUBicn Table 1 Method I Method n Method III Jlethod 17 Method 7 Method VI i?2 Dot aceeptablo Requires otra corbital cbt-i^es Rcquirco EWI and cornpllcatee emergency Dot acceptable TeCblo II #3 ^1 Dot c.ccaptable Rcauires extra orbiial chc'eges Pequirca EVA nr^d coaplicatos emergency Dcrc acceptable Table I lists tha 212 launch first folloircd "by 211 (manned). Table II lists 211 launch first foUowad by 212 (unmatmed). At this tino, uo cen state tiiat It is preferable to oeccroplish all rendezvous vith immnimsd vehicles having a passive rathc-r than sn active role. TfcGrefoi*a, the unmenncd 232 should be placed in orbit prior to launch of the mannad 211 80 tnat all Dnnojvcring is porfonncd end ccntrolled by the crevr vchi-clo (during its poxfcrcd phase). This is preferable frcm safety and pfcyclological reasons in that the crev is actually initiating and temlnaticg all povnred maneuvers and can tal:o abort action in tha event of a coHicion. Furthermore, the pilot has the plysiologlcal advcntaga of asoui'ing thTt he has ccn^plete control of the powered vehicle and con utilize his Judgment OS rcq\ilred. Therefore, ^AlsrQ the choice c::i3ts. It is always preferable �to plsce tho unEaonGd vehicle In or-bit prior to the Inunrh of the n enned vehicle? or In ths event the arjsiiGd veMclo is la orbit, to pla-- tl s ^ f .-nd P3rmit the tnsnn^d vgMcIo to Inltloto o povr3rca phase to accorTOlish the rcndcsvoia. 3aocd ou theea ^yr^.1^3, the first choice frcni sn operational poii; u Mctaod II of Table II as described belov: ^ circular phealns orbit mapplr^ and weather expcriiaerrfcs 200 n.jnl. circular orbit ? I ' rendezvous and dosk with 212 LBl at 200 n.ml. Conduct Ani ej^ierlaents B, OEERATIOHAI, MJIHEUVER RTIQUIRGIEnS (mssion 211/212) r.f ^ forcGolna elLosIcci profile, tha folloid.33 is an analvsls nancavera rcov_lred to perform the mLsslL ^iSS recard to ®^sriiSwat ccaisldezatlonad FnrOK; 21-1 1. Assinna velocity tilnmins and ffisncmvcrins is performed by S-r/B until separa-.ion. SMa includes orientation for tknspositiS Ld dcS^. 2. Tra^positlon and dwhins (starl; +X axis fcn.'oid and opprcximtely in the trajcotciy plane, +Z axla vp) ~ hO minutes. ^ a. b« c. d. e# f. g. 3« Add 2 FPS forvrard velocity to CSIi, Perform I80® pitch maneuver. Roll - 63°. Subtract 2 FPS forward velocity# For final docking, assume 15 mlnimtm pulse cyolaa of ECS control axes. Eotate mated I'chlcle 180° (place +X axis forward). Jottlsoa S-IVB using 3-IVB ECS. During the rack experiments operational phase of the mission at 120 n.mi., the following manemrcrs are performed m a basis: a, EttJ alignment cnce per day. (X axis unchanged, rotate +Z axis to +30" above horizon, maintain fine mode stability 20 minutes). �b. Uavleationcl clchtlnsa tvico poi» day, (X axis tnichoagccl, rotate +2 axis to local vortical mil por.ntcd toward aarl-h. Maintain fine node stability for 36 ninutco). c. Anoaiae the str-i-t up and stoi>plni» of alx barbecue nsncnvoro x>^r doy. Asauae c 90® yav or pitcli i-oallGav.rnt frcai nonral fll^ oUgnneat to the bai-bocuo at.&lt\\ile which orients the Y-Z plane tei^ard the sun (+20®), EstnbUsh a roU rate of 1 to 2,5 revo lutions per hcur obouc the }: axio. Aseur-.e driiil.iig mode oneo roll rate is obtained. On stoppjns, i-etum vehicle to original attitude. In preparing for the orbit chrnge, Uie *Z axis is fonrr.rd end appradLantcly parallel to the local horizcrrijal. Ihe -Z axis la down and epproxteateiy parrllcl to local vertical. Obtain required ^ V using SM idln CTiglne, luring orbit a. b. c. transfer perform the following; One aligon-.c-at (Ssc 3a). One navlGotlcnal sighting (See 3b). One midcourse corrtjction: Assuaj correction of 10 fps. Cli'cularlze orbit using main ffll engine. Adjust X axis about 10® In pitch. Brcrp RACX. Rendezvous with Plight 212. Use Qi-HCS for following maneuvers: a. Adjust velocity total of 60 ^>8. ,20 fps In fine incremants), b. Lateral translation of 3 miles» c. Vertical translation of 10 miles, (tO fps in coarse Incr^nents, d. Assume 30 mlnlsnna inpulsc Qrcles of each ccotrol axis. On a daily basis, the following maneuvers are reipjircd. (Same as item 3). If the I^/AIii is undecked fcr experiment purposes: a. Plight 211 will be tho target vehicle for subsequent dockings. Assume fine mode stability in normal flight attitude for 20 minutes for each docking. �n b. FHchfc 2U vlU ettttlon k.^op oa Flisht 212, i.e., a poaiticn abowi 1/2 rile below aoS vlthin 1 to 3 itiles aft. (Contiji«.o i*cciiilrer;c'-ts of Item 9 \^iilc 8ta{;ioBl::cplng), Poi» caeb imdocldas, subtract 2 fps oca then eajust tc achieve station position. H. At cccroleticn of fUcbt, rotate corablnad vehicle so +X axis Is forward and slow CSM (Plljj-it 211) h fps rjid translate down 1/2 mile to «-chlovo aeiorotlCBi from ths LH-I (Pll^^t 212). 12. Dui'ins the 8 hours prior to rc-entiy, cool tho fonara heat sliKld by rotating the -X axis tovrard tl«: sun. 13» For C-I/SM oepiration, the +X axis is rotated (50-70® above tho dJ.rEotloa fllj^t end in the trajectory plane. The +2 axis la oriented to upward local vertical. l^^. Entry starts vd,th the -X axis In the trajectory plans and rotatr'd epproxifxrtcly 26® carthvoitl frcm local horizontal cad with the +Z axis polnv-r-d awuy from earth. Bote; Winlmum RCS propellant at start of ro-rartiy will be pounds. Fllrht 212 1, Assume velocity trlDralng ond manf-urerlns is performocl ty S-rs?B vntU separation. This includes oricnrtatlcn for transposition end dorldng, 2, K tho tS'I remains docked there will be no maaeuvarlnj requirements (the.CSl of PUcht 211 will cOso provide maneuvcrinc for CKG unloading), 3» If LSI pperatcs undcclied: a. b. c. d. Assume one dally H-OJ aligcment (See 3a), Assume one dally navlgatlcml sighting (See 3b), There will be no barbecue requirement, For rcdccldag the LS-I will be the active vehicle, 1) Assume lateral translatica of one mile, vertical of cna mile, and longitudinal of three miles, 2) For final docklag, assume 15 minimum pulse ^cles of each control axis. �c. coTcifSKus concE-2ii;G Tins op^iy.iL'ioi'jLt. aspects (f Mirsica 2.u/2i2 Thl-s mioslon provides oovoral opblffial miosica proflloa, A rccomicndcd profile haa' been Given la paa-asraph. A. Bualc mission nnacnvcrs arc all slnilrj to Apollo reaulrcccato end will cnitall no nriW trainitiG cr cqvijsne-at revisions. IMs is on cltcimatc AAP missicn and the inlsoion as descirlbad, will ce-pler.-c-nt the dcvolopmeat of tlie basic Apollo miDGlon. The possible separation of the LS-I for csctendcd ptjrlod'j of c:^srlmont operations Is undesirable and will bo discussed lai^sr in this report. �o GF^9!\SI0k5 CREi-f cc3sm:niv?TfiTia C �t E^cpj'rjlracat Oporotloni sade: c Prior "to Mloslcm 211/212 analysis, tba Tollovin^ naansiptioas vare a. A CSII/Rack (211) in a 320 n«mi. circular orbit for a total of 13 "b. The l^Jth day sprint vlth the C3M trenoferrinG to a 200 ond rendezvouainfl and docldos vlth the carrier (232). c. Tho carrier (212) injected directly into a 200 n.mi. circular orbit after the launching of 211, d. The carrier spends 13 dtya in a 200 a.al. orhit. e. The 28th chiy spent in CoM-caxTier separation and CM re-cntrj' maneuvers. f. Six mcnlxours of <-:q)ci'iinental time avallahle on the first day of the 211/212 mission, orbit g« EiGht hours/day/mau are available for (3q)ei*i3neat3 (24 manhoura per day). h. The one astronaut in the CSM durij^ CSM-ccrrier eeparaticn, viU not be c:^ctcd to perform €:;^er3Jiionts, Tho preceding asaumptlons indicate thnt thcsre arc 294 coxhocra free for experiment time during Flight 211 (low orbit) and 208 ircnhcura arailable for carrier (based on 2 men) exqjcrlmjatatlon. This totals 502 nrnhcu's, A thorough onolyaio of the candidate cxpcric:.nt3 reveals a icivuireacat for 659 manhovcrs, including such expcriaeixt-rolatcd tasha as alicamciifej spocecraf-v attitude holds, un3toirf.ag and setting up cq.uipmi3it, EVA prepara tion, etc. It is obvlcvs that all these cxpcrim-ints cannot bo operated for the desired time because of the deficit of available time (859 desired cj^ierincnt time mirma 502 available eapcriment time = -357 manhours). T>i^ 055 cjgjcrimfnt times can bo brolan doun as follous in Tablx: I. V ' 3^ �TcbXo I All 3 crcwaen ncc(io<l ^Zwo erevmm ncsded One croua^n needed 1^50 maniainutee - 13th day 616 maaairnrtca - daily lot - 13th day 26 inamiiinc^ico - let, 7i;h & 13th dey c:onminutcs - dally, 15th - 27t;i day 600 Kfamlnutes - l^th & l£tb day 232 manmimrtcs - 17th • 25th day 367* - dally, 1st - 13th day 180' - and - 8th day 720 manminutcs - l6th day 900 maninlnutea - 27th day 170' - 3rd - 13th 903' - dally, 15th - 27th d;^ 10» - 17th - 25th cUy 120« - 15fch, 17th, 19th, 21st, aSrcl day 60' - 28th day Inr-'jrnueh do -three are avollahlc for & wpviTmiiT^ ctf 88O moainlaiites oa eny givtrn dry ( of -fiiGht 211 ), there appears to he no nausucl prohli^a in performing "of the oMperlircaifcii retpiirlnc three men. The ;jc?.vy ragjxlremcnto for all three ei-cvnrca on the 13th, l6th and 27th d-iys of the mission sharply cmtoil odditional c:qjer3.ma.itatlon on those drys- Ihc remainins tlir^ allocation oa thc^so three doys for the rcmainlns c-Aiv nzoabera io as follo-.ra, Txra msn available for a rmxlimrfl of 520 Daniuinutos. Eurins carrier operation vhcre only tvo men are c/arllable for c:q)srir.cnto, it Is estimated that there vlU be rrrsainutes available for two men and 200 nianteo available for one man. K can be seen that the 139ft manmlaute, doll-/ (l5th - 271;h day) requircmcato for two moa, cannot be net. Iloroover, the daily refi-iairciasnts of one for 903' per day (15th - 27th day) cannot be satisfied. It should be pointed out that e:q3criiK-nt3 l-Wll, 14022 and KQfjis have no In-flicht requircnonts. 14005 and MOO7 were combined for purposes of ecir tine study. ^-012 uas ccmbincd, in part, with MOI7. I-K>19 is also coribincd with iK)12. The FvA rcqulromcnts of S005 and SOOS were combined. rVA rcqulrcaBoats for S016, SOI7, S018, SOI9, S020, S052, S053, S05f^, end S056 were also combined. A total (rf 16 E7A's, requiring 97«2 uanhours were prescaitly required. Experiment SOI8 takes 5^ the manhcurs for EVA'a related to micrcmcteoroid collections. All these EVA hours Includa tbs pre and pcst-Fv'A eetivities OS well as the actual EVA tine; The longest period of ZJA outside the spacecraft is three hours. �(D rExpcr^nto SOO5 SOO6 vill bo flown on mebfc ru end wlU rcoulrs a I50 inlnufco EVA on oatronrcafc apendlcc 30 r'inu;:c3 ouiside tl^ c>rXt collcctlcs film ccnnlstois frcaa tbo raclc. liuc activity It ntjccaoniY to ccrry ono F13^3 for the EVA irorloir end 01,0 PISS for the Gtcndhy in tba cvoat It is nccosaaiy for him to rcscuo tho LVA wor:ser« There is ccricus donbt if the C/l-l can ctow tvo Pl-SS's, It mDy be aecesofuy vo pi'ovldc tlie stcndty an 'mbllicea., hooked into the C/il ECS lone cn^h to allow reccuc oporationo. Another desirable cpnrc-'a la to do the basic EVA by means of en unfblllcoa, Foi* EVA emcursioas tho carrier, it is ooomred that two PTSS's vrlU bo ovailable and that the carrier will have sufficient rcauprOy cranaoditlcs, Tho f EVA wherein all the iVE-I cJtperimsnt packecos ore to be rcti'iovcd (27th inissloa day) should not bo undertaken until the CSi has docked with the carrier, thus utllialns a full crew of throe aitroC&tluO« The followin£5 ei^crimcnts inrpose the greatest time diaipoT^/^c m tha Apollo crewEon: C M012 ^M020 ^005 esSOOo - 50h 270 180 170 Honnlnv.tca I'uuminutcs Kcnminutcs ilanicinutes per por per per toy cry day doy - drys deya dnys dcys 2-13 2-13 2-8 2-12 ) ) j ) Plight •*3018 - 270 I-iGnainutes per dry - days 15-27 (EVA) ) **3019 - 538 Manmimttes per dry - days 15-27 ) •*3053 - 193 Mauminutco per day - drys 15-27 ) SSA • iyi !f^ 15-27 «S05t> . 5i5 I-ianntnutes per day - days 15-27 ) ) Fllg^rt 212 « An additional factor which has a serious Impact on tho accctnpllohEsat of euoporirairts is the night and daytime experiment pperating requircaGnte. The e:^p^i-3;nt3 above, marked with can be done in deyllf^ only; •those marked ' con bo perfoimed only during the nl^rttime, A glance at the estsbiishad misoion timeline shora 90 manmlnutGS oU-CTtted of exercise time. Inasmuch as M012 requires e:'"ercising m the ergcmater, these allocated 90 manminvtes could be u-cillscd for performance of exportnant M012. Moreover, the set up time required for M012 is 60 ' menralnutes per day. If the ergometor can be left in an asscsiblcd poaition, this would save en additional hour of tixoc. 1! �c Ccn-t'rcJ. Ccnc.Tvnlon3 anfl Rogccxicndatlcma A typical" dry of lUsaioQ 211 ^ras timalined in texina of e:spei*lmontcl oporaticna and frm thlo tlmvline tho foUoulns conclofliona and roc cfor,gndntiona ware evolved; X, Periods of Watch xost be uf-ilizcd to occonrnlich the c:;porijacat8. Tho duration of »,'atch poric^ vhoroin tho crcCT.an can he e.wsy froa bio watch otation nrst ba ercbcndcd fra-a 15 to 20 minutes.# Otherwise, experiments reqtdrics I7 and 18 mimite continuous ciperatlano will have to be re-evoluated. 2. Astronauts miat give up po-tlans of ttelr sleep, nsps, nci-ocaial lygiciic and lunch hours in order to schedule the ej^jerlments. 3. Dally o::poplmcnt participaclOTi by crowmon will bo as follows; Pilot ITavigator Engineer - 319 minutes - 395 minvites - 36I minutes h. Eu^arlmznts requiring 30 continuous minutes of saqjeriment craoj.T'.tlon can be pcrforiKsd only during an astronaut's standly porlof.." Ihis means teat c:y crpcrimant i-cqulrine 30 successive minutes can bo pcrfor.r-^d only once per day per men \-nlcso it is all right to repeat the some eciperircnt within a men's 3 hour ctendTy period, Experimarcters should tiy to arr£mge c:<i!crlJn3nfco so that thmr can be porfonsed in 35-20 minute inororarrts. 5. Eccauso of the great demand on crowmen's tlma, it will be naccscniy to set up appoi-atus for cxpcrimairt "X" end do pert of that expcri* mantj while this apparatus is still set up, it will be ncccsoexy to se-t up apparatus for cuorerlzrent T" and then perform sera of that csq^oriciim.t., A complete caa3ysis of space problans need to be undcrtahca in connection with the csperimant timelines. (In other words, available craw time alone docs not give ics a realletic picture of \diat can be cpkimaUy nccccrolishcd within the C/li,) The value of simulation cannot be over-stressed. 6. Though the mlssion-sssigned experiments can be performod curing Plight 211 within the allocated tirus, the C/H will be a busy end crowdad laboratory. The aaditlon of e PCH to cany soas of the exp^icontal apparcrtus would significantly r3.Ueve this ccngestlon problem while saving a sizeable amount cxf time. The inclvalco of a EC2i on Flight 211 vcu3^ allow the crgjcrimcntnl aK?sratuc to he Initially set up and then left in an assembJad position. If experimsrrt apparatus for Ho. llOOk, WQ^, K012, MOlB and 1220 could remain assembled, the nstrcmauts would face a more realistic time schedule. c # 15 mimite watch period \33 rcccnnsnclod by I'Tcrtin CoBsajay m "Cre^Qperaticas Eequiremonta" dated 10 Aiypist 1965. �7* It l3 Intcrcotins to nots tiuit once tb© typical mission tl^rollne of events \ms ccnplctcd for FUx^lvb 211, there uerc a Diais!rm of 3^ hours for tbn three crcsnren por dcy on aa iiidlvichtal bnais. lOnly one icna free) Tliis cucsenta that O3>orim;ntcr3 should look very closely at the car^Erincnto to detonnino vcys la which e:-7/orlnents could bo cccdac-bcd by ctio person, rather than on a pair (subJcct-ezptriiKater) basis. ^ «, Jf«allx-d etperlmc-nt cpei-aticns data for mssion 211/212 con be found la Table I. The fcUoulns cocxeats ^ply to the Indlviaual espca-lmeate ^dilch present problems: 1. KOOl^ - This e^erimeat req.i^lre3 17 mlnube time Inorcccnts. HeccaECiia 17 minut-e avcy«fr(x>vorlc ollot.'ancc diurlnc astronaut's >ntch periods. 2. M012 - Thouch the annVsts have requested this experiment to be repeated three times a dry, it is reccmmonded tjrvt it bo done only tvice a dsy. Tho oajj' moans of scheduling it three times a Stbla ^0 ^1^ appuxatus scb up permnnontl;' - cn improbabllllgr 3. M020 - Bequlrcacnts for this 30 miaxite caroerimenfc incividr- its ®:c^tica tvrlcc per day on all astrcaau-ts. It io recoscrnded that it bo per*Oi-flcd only once per day. Otherwise, it inroosea serious schcouling proolems. 4. SOI8 - At tliis tine, this c:^parimsut reqj^ircs one 135' IVA per day fw the orientation of nicrccetcorlte detector plates for a total of twlve days. Reccmmand that: ' a. Tho number of FJA's be halved, or b. Means of rcmctcly reorienting the plates be devised, cr c. Detector plates be positioned so that visual inspection con be made from within the LEI, thus possibly cUninatlng the need for 12 EVA's. 5* SOI9 - Ccnpletely imreallstic rcquircnont for cons-taat sur/oillsnce ly on astrcaisut during all dark-sldo orbits. Reccanncnd tbjtthls tine demand bo reduced by 75^, Or develop an automatic device capable of meeting <u^>erlnieDt objectives. 6. SO55 - Requires two cstroaD.trts for a tottil of ^h6 minutes a d^. Reeenmead ttot this rsojiirciaent bo halved. 1, SO56 - Ells ei^^orlmcnt requires 320 hours of Plight 212 time, Incliiding spacecraft orientation. On a 12 day flight, this means ten hoars a dcy are to bo devoted to this one e:q>cilmsnt. Reccsmsead that the exporlmaafc be seriously analyzed to determine if it is worth this Each time. Reduce caqoerimeat time by at least 75^, �. / n c I>AP MrSStON- tim«um£ MJSSIOM- CVKV OF MISSION _ Day of . y of T events : JC 7A . .. • day mission DAY NIQHT 0<70UN0 -STATION-COS^fiASE ORfilT HOURS FROM K.Z /!?• V2 -V-»^ u < ?BC m w/^c EXPERIKIEWTS OPN ^ NS I EMM I M K M QMT 16 SO rroo laoo ^ifpi 11 [w^BC ^ I900 ./ t:aa-rc|%< ^)?N B B Iga!--""^TVYX g:!&gS^lfem»s fejv/g^cH •- 2000 a ^ ^ F-HI- EioQ eaoo : zaoo atoQ moo CBoo < 0300 oq oo isoo la oo DAY OF MISSION bAY NIQHT --^ROU NO•~a' STATION I -CO^AAOC- .' OR SIT HOORBFRONljC 10w ^ E IS < tu o <. . ^ 3 SLEEP WATCH- sleerN •WW V\\-\ \\ WATCH- - W V\A \ V\ \ \ \AA \ \ \ \ \ V\ CXPERlMBMTS r'XfipL^ H ^SW^i5^cs::^T -oyigg/rgtON QMT OSOO 0600 0700 <>soo 4- I *QOQ »">o 12CO isoo I Koo ^ �' MISSION 211/212 O A 4* B Q O o -H e .4-1 h rH I0 D U SXPERIHEICT ln»rilght HionocardlogrsD Blo-Aeeaye Body Flulda Calcium Balance Study In-Flight Sleep Analysis Human Otolith l^inction Cytogenie Study Bcercise Ergometer nioraclc Blood Flow Vector Cardiogram Hetabolic Bate Keasurement Pulmonary Function Red Blood Cell Survival Microbiological Assay Antl-Q riastic Qarment In-Flight Nephelometer Space Suits + Lunar Exp. Hardware Synoptic Terrain Photography Synoptic Weather Photography Trapped Particles Assyatetry X-Eay Astronocgr Hicrometeorite Collection OV Stellar Astronocy 0"/ X-tey Solar Photography Apollo Telescope Mount White Light Coronagrapb High Resnlutlon Photography of Solar Ataoaphere X-Ray Teleacope {21V215/216) Ultraviolet Spectrometer Intensity of Solar Flares gpectroheliogrephy in the EDV G O <> O ^O h ~ to M X X X X X X z X X z X X 'z T z X X X X X s- Xz X ZX X X X X z z X z z xz ZX Xz ZZ X Z Z X x.xx x x x x z XX z zz z zz X X X zzz X } z z .z z x.z X'X z_ xi X X X X z ZX X X zz X X X X X X z �•Mr -: ^-r--- - - • I. ' HffA/«pyiCj : . ff // "rv-Firw77—• , /•^PN-kakv/^^HTVI i ' '•// ff i/'il w_ I- ff'*'1/ /fYYi s • I" ^ I- v' ^ x'—.- Jtk^ 'i- •"' • /" -X V " ^ I m J/m . Ch^C^/^s.; J ; ff •: ay JA i ' c/4.L_ ' 1 .—i-_ *2iv..»6's v7; V -• MPP-f ,. , I S70AS3AYr apuy Ftujos.: I ... NOME /o^f NONC ANAiYSir i'.S_t„7 i Pfi RjpVAL'i-J V(> » .•A/f Ar'jtfC U«) £. yM. M£» AD Ci iTfuivr-^ s tuyy •S»M£ i • —M r--f ••-'t-r— — 5 tj £/ir^< r • c 'J * 3 5.<i:<.w|v G H'*' ij ^V" -4-4-^-4-p 5j.reiP..AM^ \JO.N£ Ij g^V I NoA^i M/N TT— ; SitJ- ii. /At? »- -: -t r'm3"MA-KMOOS (5X0.nr« FW^CT»^/4 f— «i1» rj<Ai - I.' MOIf NO fj-r-MT p^h\ni I y MOiZ. -. "7"" aZC^£ ecss/fC •MNT e ^ «•«»• ^ Ac^sff. r rI. HPIT .1 . • : i 1 • MC :I • • • ^ S<pC£i £0M. C- I - ; A.'©-/'} IT* A TT ^ • V - • v Shet-t OV ��• h - X C/i -m ^ _ i J u ^ d i ^ 1 ; 5" " yi • i . 1 : ' • I J . [ . . . ' I ',— I i t . I • •• ' c x r ~ " T A/r ' • • • • J . . . . ^ ' f ] '•"^ur'.OASM I . . . . I i n / a / i i • " " l /•• I n ^ . ^ J I i ~ , : J I'J. Id /If r . y - / y y e i X : . : ^ — — I '* /kL^/f £' »"/ t »ia . ' , li* 1 -O ifA 4- \ •iff /^ ^ - . I . . . r.r^f S O i l ^ i ; . i A S I S Y i M ^ T R y . • A I •V B n | . ' . T " • ' 1,«7 a s*'-*'• • f O Y 3 4 i . inm f^l.V II a i ' A •'! /'Ce 1"^ C S n ' . f i ' p i T*e iX ' n r A & u - ? ( E ; r £ / | T 5 i S 0 ; i 7 | . A 5 T f ^ y p V R £ T A T -T ' ? A * C T | " ' P « f V ^ A i s T ^ r - •:./^- - • " • s h r p r e 9 ^ f / T J ••IV - f : - I f J f ? t i e L 1 — . . I . . , . C.Wai I o t. c « ; i i c . 7 : A A y iLP • f - . t i A . ) k . . : : ? , 7 M / Y • t Q.^jLy.:£.-,- f. arc .P'M/} ycrj.. f2e.£Lri]j fA<£c M i M . . I 'I w i ; S v ' - - - : f - Ii . I : e i L : t b p . i Y l r iPPCl r C'yA r p M I 3 . J | f £ . D _ ^ . ; : i ^ ! . S >ik~. . I.,;. M I W ! ; • » • • , • i w ' h ; Wsp, J £>••? 0 1 h/tlW t • t - . 1 — E V ' ; v C T ' / ' ^ s t w r i j •. ..I.. 1- •. . . " V T H r A T f ' f r^:-p P R h V J 'K 1 i w j 7 = :i;;• H^.p '*)FEpr r/r- ts'-tia.vnS'n r^o- V^.rr j W ** f l ' i / i ) » H : ' i . E.-Y*x I V '. i l •i . • : I . . . — r - r i » f v ; • • : ) l£/}"Ct.j«isl B - - - • 1 — H - S h < H e C '3 n T 4 �i f C / X ' - • jr ;. juiy.Jvtr \Cr •. ' • —•— A * dtJirtkt^ J . 1. I .. r > ^ T o T /^ ! Sheet - ^ t>'P ��For o;-:p2rlnu-nt3 S005 Is ncodcd (In C/JI-Fllchfc 211); MOO6, tho following !27A e<iuipacrrt lunar SpiaCQ Suit Aaseabl^ (3) C'A (2) LCA (2) era (1*2) •PISS ( 2 ) and spores Al-dJ (i) and spares Aim P^iol Sijpport 20' Tcthor (2) EVA Visor (2) ) Boaed on ) iVDay Mission "^If only ono PLSS can "be sto"/ad in the C/M, the standby crowaon will need a twenty foot nmbillcal (hoohed into tho spacocraft ECS) to perform roooue nisoions if necescesy. It may also bo possible to substitute 75 foot itabilicolc for the PLSS'o. For experlcants SOI6 and SOI8, all the following EVA equlpoent vcwld bo transferred Into tho carrier (Fliglat 212): TI-IA (2) LCA (2) *C\'!Q (11*) FLS3 ( 2 ) and spares A^^J (1) and spai*cs Al'U j\xGl Sunport 20' Tethers (2) EVA Visors (2) *31och U Pressure Suits (2) •Portable Light )• ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Based ^ ll*-Day Missieu *19 additional C^vG's will be needed to "bo carried into orbit by the carrier. (2) Block II suits also to be carried by carrier. It should be noted that a handJiold system must be developed for crcwrnn stability at tho work locations. Morec/cr, if an AJS3 is not used, a handhold ^stcm will have to be developed for crewman transfer. �o CRsw con3r:rPMV.eio:3 CARRIER Ri:CO:.::-u-ro\TICTiS �Crev Ccnslflgratlcais - Mlsaica gl?./glS Tho cdcctlon of Q carric:.' tajod aololy c© crow con$idcra'lilons lo on cs^ircaaly dlfflcwll; •took. For c.-ftng>la, -fcha aMUly to iBa5.ntaln on otation for a pariod of two vcate ii tha Gcelnl has bean dcaonotratcd In a ain^jle flight by highly motivated astronavrts. this particular ease, tba accccmliohmant was a chaUcngo of e slncolar feat rathor than a routine occurrence. Tho tread today is to incrccae the vorKLoad ccd tho nisslca duration scvei*al fold in a spacecraft that is so/crly restricted end limited for a I'f-doy mission. Wo mart accept the rojulto of tto Gcsninl end tho initial threo nnn Apollo mlsslona as islnliim E;trada"da for crcv/ habltabillty and ccaaforb and attcagJt to iarprove thcsa standards for tho AAP missions. Habitability Environmental paramcrSors are not a consldsration for carrier tradeoff studios in tbat the cabin atniospherci idH be maintained at 5 + .2 p^i normal, 3^ cmnrgcney end prior to BVA egi^ss, 100^ orygonV relative humidity from hO to cabin toapc;rature 75 + 5*^ aad <5ebln dicoldc not to excc^ 5 millimeters of morcuzy for nOTngil operation end 7*6 mn. Eg maximum* Crew Comfort The LEi and AIEl rcpri>3cat3 a total iMressurizcd volnr:c of 8o0 with a vorldng space of 122 ft-^ for two ni'ai* Weiste disposal end storage, food and sleeping facilities are ninlmiaa end sized for o 2J<-~hcur mission with a reserve tlmj of 2k hours. Eor-iaii crew operation requires suited astronauts that may'or may not be prossurisod. Fccal collection with two cuit-id cramcn in tho LE'i would be very difficult. The ECM on the other bond, vlth 356 ft3 of pressurized volume with sepasrate waste focilisies, offers more privacy for waste collection. The cppoz'tunity to brcalc the routine ccn be tc3;en advantage of by utllizins the movements and tasks esscclated %7lth the food storage end preparation areas. In addition, the necessity for the astronauts to move around within the U".! is vciy liralting* TIis actual operation of the vehicle is acccngjlishcd from tho craw statlcais, Tho RCM could be designed to parciit mora moVGmmit of tho crow which is certalniy dcsixablG on missions of 2U hours or longer. The ability to r-aaovc the pressure suit for shirtsleeve cperatlon oiid for personal lyglene, is highly desirable for all Apollo Applications flights. Equipment and space for shaving and cleansing chcuid bo provided for dally use. The IE>I can be modified to provide this capcbillty for a two-man crow. Pressxxre suit opieratlcao, including EVA, will require suit storage, and ability for crew to inspect, clean, and diy each suit 53 �prior to storcoo end use. iluy siilt<:d opf^rafcion vill require both oxiw moT-jbcra to be la prereviro otdta so tho dressing ond denning of the salt, rcaovol and drj'ins, will probnbiy ;-ciiuirQ the utlli-Eatioa of all avallablo free prcssurited apace. I;o other taalts, ecporimcats, or pro cedures nofually will ba ecconqjllohcid imivll the suits nr« stored. Internal arrnngoiLcnto, Includirg proturberancos or £:harp edges, must be ccOTr.tlblo with tl-jy ncveatsnts oact aotlcoa rcqplrcd for two astroaeirts to adequately accomplish all cperatioas regplred with th.'> auits, ModlfIcatlcma ore required for alsoJ.ons that require separation a£ the U::-! from the Ccrmend Modulo for periods in excess of Sh hou.i-s, A seven day rcnnned Lul separated from the Ccancmd Module wz^.th a t\ro-ir2n crow, requires fccal collection and ston^go# vxine collection and storage/ dump. It is rcccavrcnded that (sclnting food storcge end juaparatica bo cnlnrced to include a preparation a:v^. Perocjial hygiene f^ilitics should be modified to Include provisicms for body and dojital clcannlng and shr.vlcg. Shirtsleeve should be normal operating modt;. Chnnge of clothing cvoiy other day, or threo changos for the seven day mlooioa are minimal roquircncnto. The LEI has ao^ provision for sleeplTig other than napping on stations during the normal 2h hcnu' mission, hhca awry from the OoTsend Module during a basic Apollo mission, tbo nrsw is crrpcctcd to falrlv BCtlve for the 2ij. hcji.u' period. no-«T.vor, on a ssven dry nlGcion with the existing ci-ew station restraints, napping on statlcn-c cannot be ex pected to suffice for sleeping faci:'J,tle9. Provlslcas for uninterrupted sleep for a miainrun of seven hours for each crew member la^at bs provided. Similarly, this feature mast bn retained in its existing form In the EC31, or suitable facilities provided. The Conmnnd Module aoncally provides the crow caaforfc reqoiremonts including a "gallsy" for food pi'sparation, and separated waste col lection and storage facilities. It would appear ot this time that the IttM cculd have at least the same capabilily as tho CM. In fact, depending upon the •Ission, the available facilltlGs could be euqpondcd to provide additional crew comfort. Craw Safety The separation of the experiment carrier. I.e., either the lEI and AIM or the ECIl and ZiE-I from the Command Module, represents an extremely high risk sitv.atlcsa In that the ability to abort from orbit is delayed until the crcv is aboard the Ccmmssd Module. �6) Ths ability to ecrcso froa the Lr:i tlira;3h tho batchss In tho eiroat two mm ore conaif.tia^ eiqiorliucats, la (UiTicult end tiying ^indnr noriLtJl coadltlocs. Es-jreoncy cgi-cos of two {Vitroniuto Siid trcnsfc:.' to" to the ^ preferred to roadozToaoing end docldLng, providing the Cli is ^-oondicg iry, Sio ECJI eoiUpped VTlth the airloc"':, cpprrers to offer M crislcr egress than thrcn-ii the tmmol aystoB on the Ul-l, Tm airlcc.: can ccccr--aodato only one astroaa-rt at a time; ho-^evcr, the opening dimensions aro considerably Inrger end more accocioodatln'j to the evltod ootroaaut. Escrgcacy egrcoe should bo quicker and less to tho astronaut. ability to provide assistance to a dlstreasad astronaut dm-ins or crcv transfer appeni-a to bo easier and milcker fToa the RC4 airlock in preference to tho LEi hatches. Retrieval of tho disabled astrcnaut through the airlock probably can bo ccc^Uoh^d with less difficulty and capenditure of energy than through the hatch on tho IS.I derivatives. " Conclusions n».ri I-S . conilr:^n.-Qtion for tho noraiaL 2h hour mloslon, and tho abinty wO incorporate addicloc-al crov hnbitabillty, confoit, and s^c.y rccalrod ^or a seven dry misolon, a revised LG-I cnn be dcsifncd to ^ccmplish the i^sslon. On the cthrr hand, the fcatur-es alrerdy available w Module, nodlficd end cxpsndcd in the ECM, ccabined vith the 3 an ^rlock, certainly pi-ovldes a safer, more hnbltabillty and coaiforfceblo configuration for a two-man crew on a seven day mission. « Carrier Chice - Ist, ECU; 2nd, LEI �c^cmrasj™ E^>?.fimy?ron3 CRBtf CCE3IPKRATI033 �V 4 Connliislono cind Reenwwi/;^^3^.^^ons mont ccjnaidoStioaa^ Sa°cSrl2'coS^°^ spscccrcft operations, cxpcri~ Prccnt^ OS relate to ^ LE!/Aa:i configuration.'^ CS^VJ^CM/Aril or with the CSt-1/ cecoii^lisbed i,^tlUn the mlosiok Pi^oscntly defined ccnaot be times and rcpoatabiHt^ ^ opezatlng the niosloa could preuce voluaWo oxporlmcnts, me^s,^^Quantlty of o::perlmental-dntf^f- ^.^^-1- inrtopoildait f ^riSSS™- ssi? LT? —-s ssSi~'/•~ \. presents a vc^ siSiS^'^rthQ^ caiTlc-r for seven d^ys event of nn emei^eS^ Invoi^rn^^^i^S^ abL^ ^ ^•psnmcnt comer roust soai-hw tiansSr ^ crewa=fl,.ln the Cororond Modulo before ro-entuy Prcccd^Ss^aJ'SliSrS''''^ ^ alccpiyat'S^^vS^^' iJito tho LHM and are asaiKscd part of the ROI. «incorporated •££'?^.iSSSS-.s?S~=-^i~ O s-? ��CRE'.v C:":V.T*Oi^S IJD l'-3b"IE^TS 'KE^lMJNAir •1 A-VjTJiiT if-6 Approwed (i. A» fiotUji,' / f^r9M Operas .ons, AAP �CKD/ (iPBoATJO^;? R£.;"^^;7^S^-TS YAHLE Oi CON" :nTS Human Factor SoqulrciBcrta Cperational Scqutreraeffis Astronaut Training Crow Equijauent Data �a. Miacion AS-2C'jA, fjC-012 Cpacf?raft Oijorauioa Ri es b» Aosusip fc '*.oin,3« c. Espcriaent Tallot Opp'-a^Aonal Conat.-.ilnt, fi5-3/?!AA; d. NASA Jftttort P0H/0]3VL~l3« datfd j5 L -Tairjajry .19£;6» e. NAA tntercal latter, 692-80't ^50-66-')17, dated 2 Fob;.'uai7 L^6, t. NAA internal Jitter, 692-3cA-050-66-020. dated g. Design Reference Kxetnotic LE7)~M0-l2., QAEC, dated 50 C.tober 196'». h. Apollo E.;i.a.ncioa Syeteaa - LC-5 Phass- D Fxae.1 Se,,or:-.. Vol. 3V, dated S 1965« i. Apollo S-;t£-ns3on Systems - LSI Hiasfj B Final Remrt. Vol, TTI, dated 8 Deccrrber 1965« J. Desj-gn CritorJa and Reference Data Jfcindbook for Uv>ar- Stpleration Systeasf Vol- II, NASA, li'ir.tsvllle. k, Systea A'^alysis Sxtnmary, Part II, Na\ SID-65-15;1>-.2, dated 29 Dcoeaber 1955, KOTS: HAA« !C101 Febi-Uery 1966. bliore appropriate, the l«iutf'- de »igcatiwi of tb© souree reference is placed by the psi'agraph nuBflsev", �r X.O HUMAN FACTOR PS^UIR>^-?}TS 1.1 Scop** Theco requ-trnraents applj to cqui.pfj»cit and warl: p.i.n^o which dlrcctlj affect the flight cre< durtn^ Intr?veh1ruJ-ar Ar tivUJos (IVA) and Extravehicular A:5tlvit5ea (BIX), 1-.2 Purpopo The primary purpose is to eptabldoo spcclficacionc for the equlpsenv ouppLiftr and AAP design and tticsios plaanlng g"o"o.t, Tu is an ohjoc bivB to tnaintai-T. st.nndordizer-i.on with the cr.le .ir.g Apoiio svotem hardware, 1-3 General Reqti^"roT.anta 1,3Ipplementatlon iBplcaeu^at-ioA will be ucrorplichod through decdgn roviowcioterfac© docuocrtation, oni -confiyirtttion copvrol. l,3-»2 f- _Equ'prerit. Slandqrdtz^At'on EquipRonl coaf'.guraticn ehojld be sini:ar to certstieg Apollo flight eqalpmcnt BO thti ere.- will require minlinal special trainingc 1«3®3 Equtp«>ent. Deslgrstioa / ' Bquipe-ent will be named for case of Idnitif-iration by the .crow rather than no confom with sciectt.o.r custom or academic precision. 1,3>^ Exceptiop-s to Specific Regvirrpcnta Exception to specific requlcements will be made by reference to the general requJrci'.ente, la3»3 Supplenonte to Sreclflc Beg ji rcmentg Vhen a des5gn requirement is not spccif.cdc typical Upoan 2hglneeriag practicfs will no followed, Tho following docunentB are recogrlzed as authoritative in coating good Euman Eogineering dfoigas a, KtL-ifn>-13036 Zk April 1962» (rriL-STD identification Marking of U.n,- FP.'.tn , P.roperly. G b. KT]>STD»^3A 1. c, HII-SIi>-803A-2 (US/if)j 1 Dcrcenhcr .I96'i; Rirt 2. d. HIL-£1».12B, 18 Kay 1959^ (AhbrcvJal ionc for use oi. drawings and technical type j.yb Ucnfcion.n). (£>•?- �NPC-^CO~lj 18 RTid ^{SC S-ofp" wont i^l, :?ev . B, 26 April 196i», (Ap')Llo Con^Jsun-Jlo" iiir-imi). MC-999-00'J7. 15 Septcraijer 1952. KAA, (Grrcr.il CpcclfiCQUoHtiaan ahcincering Seelgo nrltexlo fo;* Sfooecraft Syst©a3),. �'• • •* Ami PtfYSlU/iL PJKTGii HPXfJ^ !.-^?4r:r."".'^ - ''•1 P^ro-il Cr-.'-ti-.a 3jyi» Crr^ir'a Cj) Tfie 6£bo cf -be cr^wrar ahalJ. be wdfhii: the tpj'jjc froi 5» to pc?)i-.'aMon ac ^iven bei.ov.- y^GTRONAin' STZE Clfr'fI::n'A Mcnonreracnte* IIS.TGUT Fn02l FLCOR Stn,ure LVo Holghtj Standing t.cr.-it-ale Crcrch Foot Length Foot Braodth bpper Anu Langth Forparo-IIand Icagrh Hand Lnngih Cheat Braadth Wa.'-St Bri adth Hip Breadth Wrlot Brcodt-h Forc-nro to Grip Lcngih FuQciional Reach Eibow VJrioc teagth B"ihev;-Raot Height 66,30—70.9'3 62,1/V.6?.O5 56,'? —6'4.„25 30.31--33.79 lO.C:-11.25 5,70- i?..52 11.85—15-59 17.i?—20.39 7.2:— 7..83 n.3-'—12 80 10.53--12.'?8 12.7':--:'A.33 2,2?-. 2.'I8 13.1 >-1'? .56 29a:-.5J^,.hi? 10.8 j—11,96 7.51—iiooa 69.25 59.19 32,92 10.-56 h.07 •5.57 .'8.'t9 7-'?7 12-33 12.36 13.88 2 <35 -?3-67 31 ;i2 8,99 DEFras Ccc-ot Depth Waiet Depth Bj-^cok Depth 8.3?—• 7.M«— 9,92 8,«»2-^aD,55 8,95 9-2? SEATTD nEASBREHENTS ^ Sitting Height £?© Height^ Sitting Head Height Kr'ee Height E2bow«EUbow K'^ce-K&co Shoulder Breadth Rip Breadth Buttock-Knee Length 35,00—37,67 29,21—33.5'» 83—5.6? 20,r .—22-83 16,97-~20;20 13,31^-15^51 17 51 ••-I9.IK) 15^30 22.03—25.63 ?6.il Jl. 36 5,29 21,8.5 13,90 lV,8S 18-91 ;iij-58 23.9-9 �'"A •• ' c?r"r • i-) Kccijiureae'i le* HEAP lOEgth Bro-vcii-.h Cli^unforcnce 8.35 5.71— 6.1'f aa.Ofi—25.70 7.^3 r>.26 22.7A 55.3f»—'!l-53 28,8f.—3i?.''0 36.2(>'~38..'f6 21,0^^—2^ 15..2>-18.07 13-.9'' -.16.77 .Qif l2.0'/.-.i5„27 30.7f^-ll.8l 6,5"-.- 7.52 9.13 12.00-13.5<» -I'f,5'.'--16„06 J3.5^ 5U93 CIKGUMFiSEHCE Choal: Wnis" H^.p Opppr Th '.gh ij>wor Thjgh Calf Arvkic Bictpa (Flexed) Foitaro Wl-l3t KatJd WaisI; Front Haf.et Back =,0 vilie 1'>,1j6 .).o8 15,10 IL,39 7,03 8.7/ y,i.S3 isj<5 LlfIiV3 % Vertex to Seat *A1X ficasureacnta >.8a-59,oi 37„7i» ia Inches Dloplr»y and Coatrol IcnM'.lon (J) Control pot^ets and £i.iop".ays shall be so located An respect to tho cre*<?can''o restrained oponttiag oto'-Jon that they are wltWn the noriial reach dint-ance of a 5tt to 95'^ percentile Pnn, This fucctioral ans rca'-b dietaacp \a defined 5p tho foliowlcs tahle, PfiOoX Xnyorte should be constrained betveea tiere Units but noiT'.illy clo.^er to •:iat defined by the 5a percrntile cret7r:.->:^. All controls will bo adapteblo to efricicoi. opora^'ofl Jjj eifjor c)i»r»s of preecr.tro of esilt, PraleiKlnary Ita-tJi-- Cfper^aertol tiata indicntos n tKsxinuro forvard rea-?fc of a 5>2 pereentiJo cian in a epnce cruit Is lens than 17,0 inrhfis. (of �nsiGHT A30VE SF^T IW -_jNCHEs_ mmi 0 15 30 'if. et) V5 90 105 u>c 17.^! 23.9 2?..6 29-3 23.9 2S.3 25-1 20.3 IC.5 23.5 23.0 30.0 30.0 29.3 2S.9 21, :t 19^2 25.8 28,S 30.8 3U1 30,0 2G,9 22.2 19.2 25.3 29,1 30.7 31.2 29„i 25.7 ZO.k 21.0 26.5 29.5 31a 31.5 30.5 29.0 24,5 16,8 21.0 27.0 ro .0 32.0 32,5 31.5 29.0 25.>5 18,0 22 „0 28,0 53-0 " • T 22.0 27,5 50.5 2if.5 29.6 >a,i Zk,S Sib I-'arrr>zt.! !•» (Tr,) «6 0 6 12 18 24 30 56 42 48 • . 17,0 19-4 21.3 21,6 20a 17.4 12,7 * 21.5 22.9 23.4 22,0 18,7 13.2 25-5 25.4 24.9 25,7 20.2 13»6 16-0 22.4 24. 9 26.0 26,4 26 >4 22.4 36.0 17.9 25»3 27,0 28a 28.0 27,4 23c9 19a SOjbPorcflnfclle fin.) . % 23,5 25.8 26,0 25.2 25o0 .19,0 iao3 3.7.5 23.0 26,0 27.0 27,5 26,9 24.5 19.5 13.5 •19,0 24.5 27,5 29..0 29,5 28.4 25.5 22,0 15,0 20.0 26-0 28,5 30.1 30.5 29-5 27,0 23>0 16,0 33,0 32.2 30-.0 26.5 19o5 • r 19,5 22.5 24,0 24.5 25,6 21,0 17.0 11,0 0 ^6 0 6 12 18 24 50 56 42 48 32.4 30=0 26.0 19,0 PnrccntlTe (In.) S 0 6 12 18 24 30 >5 ^•2 48 22.7 25.1 26.6 26.3 25.9 24.5 20.8 .35,4 21.6 27.2 28.7 28,7 28-1 25.7 25.5 3i;..3 ?.l„2 Z2A 25.5 28,7 29..8 .30.1 29.4 28.1 24,6 18.3 27-3 29.7 31.2 31..L 50,6 28.1 24,5 ..8.2 2? 5 2B,6 3\a 32 5 53.0 31-9 29.5 26,5 20.> 34.0. 33.3 31a 27,5 " 30,3 33,.2 5'»<6 35.0 3U,-'i 32.0 29-0 21-9 25.5 30.5 33,5. 35.0 5s,:i 54.6 52.7 29,7 24.^<f. 35.1 25.2 >0.5 33,5 5sa y,,e >5,2 55.1 >0,0 �PrcL'r-.ry i j 1 tv Th- eq.j*i)0.;nt «. f I !)» il'- j)gnycJ pr^•8a•i^^ ctfit The fflt-Ml-i.iy e-^V.ecvjvliof jjiy ea-'Apollo do-a not pi-OJid;? fM'fldof The raflge of raovonnnt ar.d fr gure 2-1., v.-^ i-ju.a'v. *i;,;, ,b- pr«s«ntnd of -i : Fiiiinri- H-l. nir,r.k.'l', pjoTomeji in «nic!<iar'.scd a6i.) In all asco. In Table RRiDTREMENTS ^'OR THE mrE^™Y flODT >.OVmE?iTo IfiTRAVERICUIjlK AW) £.XTRA\ vfllCULAR VDH. AT 3,7 PSIQ A« NSIK M0311.TTY Flex-:on 'forward-! ackwsrd ) ' <^0 Flexlca (loft-r.Vgh-) ^ Rotation (AbdU'-tion) B, SHOHLDER 1KBT1.TTT Adduntlen ^3 Adbuctlon 225 Lateral - Medial jjO FlpjdorEKlencion Dcwn-up lateral Rotation 55 Medial Ro'-ation C, 1 ELBOW KC«rLTTT Fjexion - Ettenoion D. J55 FOREARM K0BTLTT7 Supination (pairs up) 150 Prooation (pains down) E. 75 WRIST KOBILiry Flexion (Adduction) Sxtoaaion Flexion (Ai)d'ict:ion) (Barkward) Extenoio.n (Forward) 55 • . 35 50 (x>1 �scvf mohilit: OF J50VEMEHTS ( fN Dro«EES) HOV&iEJ'TrS 'J?RUKK •• TORSO KOSfiLTTV Trunk Torso Torso Torso a» Rota^'Jon CAdbuci: lon^Ad^luction ' Flexion (Ini-.oral " Modlai) Flexion (For^'iard'^ Flexion (Bs'^kward) HIP MCETITTY Adbuftlon ;leg s^' cai.^l) Addnction (knea beat) AbducMon (knos beat) Rotation ^SitUjig) lateral Rotation (Sitting) Hadial F.loxioti Extonoion H, 'O 30 35 30 30 V3 35 KHEE kOBTLITY Flexion (striadlng) Rotov/'on (oedial) Ro^,?.-..lra (lateral) Flexion (kneeling) J. . 70 50 80 25 120 55 35 160 AFKL'-; riOSTLTTY Etctenelon F'jexioD Abduction Adduction kO 50 y) �• SPACE SUIT ASSEMBLY MOBJUTV PRESSUSlzeO. TO , ^ FOlO ' �Any f.rca rrjqulrius any iBinlrul.-.ttion ?rd/or r<>adou^. of an InatruTcnt by a crew racbor vrl l.,i bo provided with poi«l' vrt n-aos of crew restraint that will cctirol both trojie-(atlonal nnd r;>ratl9nal Biovrmenrla^o2.2 R* t,rr :tr.in<^ Drvji-oo Rt.r.tminloj; devleeo will be provided at 2WA work areao aod Jn Qro.vo ro.-juJring -.-row troasDntioBal no/enwii. Acceptab\ dcvie cf 1nr bide• "" developed EVCT haoclholdbe added).. (Ujegraa to b. Velcro Pads - Conditions to be oidcd. c« P/indHolda •• Gritert i to be added. d. P;l.j,3n " Pr<»l 1 CI 1 naiy ••?artin data indl-rato that rigid ral)T ut.lH;'.»d for longitudinal tracslatlooal should have .i re^rtaiigulvr crossosection 7/8" wide X l-l/'J * deep and be olovated 3" above tao .•Jd^accut yvrfare. e. Tc-'hors •• Conditioa.i to be added. S 1«4«3 AeseroibiV ty fi-ncl Openings - (P-reU'iinary Ke.r'.in Data) Ihe else of any op'jnlPg reiuli-lng the mut'»d sntronaut to rrnoh in wi.th oo^ bnnd ipint be nt le-^rt >>'/-•' «; v<t>' ivi handa« at Iflinl BY/^ high x 25" v>Mo, art! if visual viewing is neces isry, t'li opooing w.sv b t 8" wide x 11" big' for one am and 23" wldo x tl" high for -mo atns. SJoce the suited aoti-onsut h.-s li ;;le feel rapsbil'.ty, vis»iBl capobll.ti;, will gansraHy be required at any accoGO panel- All edgoa f h projoctlona near the op-riing must be rc-'-ided eo ao not to puncture the ^a'te cuit l.-4»3»2 Typo of Dcorn or Ponela A door OP ]«asel optnirg outwnrd should hive a a. ilhcd for 8eeur.ing ir the open po'iltlon. Lnvmrd opecing coors oust not trap the 3m 03 sfvii ....ocft during rr-at-ival.. Freo v.ypo panels rauet be provided rfith a positive 'Jraao of s^-owase adjacent to the area and located so ec not to intefere wlVii srboequent work activity. lclf.3,3 E/A Pntch Sizes (To be added)* �Is'j.-'to1 G .•';•• t", 1 1 w linttc which nun! hf tfio% «t1 rJjcll he 'rrovlded wUh lift poAnxe In T.ine v/itli thf crntci of rarr,, Tiie wricht of the ujj.lt " chslL be ffarkfd on the •'Jiit and tho ccntor of nana shall tr Ador,;.-;fied if it it. noi coinddent uith tho goffietrlcel cpn-T. lioto ,-ba7.l bf hnajoned to poinit Ttr,joval and r-- • ri:->i; wi'lh one hoi''d ur-df i- .TJmJ.tod vl;jibiUty coodiUons. i aboli aJJdo into pooifci C'U and be concfcrwotod no that nliyr. • mem is icpoasib le, Ur ;to chall slide ovt of position to • • Um tc and rhall be ret rved froffl til'.* sujijoriiafj panel or b.y .1 ranof- in tho dirt ftioa of reanval at the ritop. Dnl. fhil., be prca'ided vdth ritanda or rR.-.ls J'or moc »/hrai out opond or aclc. The uui i will have no piojoctioBOc coble/; r other tr.onrfcprap-ces whj th Ts--3\ b© v.'afivcd whl.l& the unit x-j. belli Thr. syeten "ufil; Tot present j:!jorp <«!ss.o or protrud.? boyord lh<? surface of t ho panel or rack whoa tho unit is ro'. in xhe operating positi c r . l.kA^2 U n i f G<iyv>r6 ly •?"""*?" "• «> 'owe ':hcy «. b, or r^oveo Kithout iootrurUon or tool.-, out oSall be p-ovlded With a method of Btor&yt . C f'iont! f 'rrj*ipt> To p-evont confkcten, f c-nponenta to be removed rhould be rd.or rcdod or othrruder oLiirly IdatiHfied d.tff>reatly f en the c«!|icnent:? usee as repliice;.:cnft".. Sau pmpnt S:-ae /-nd W e ' y h t Hsximum s.\se for novoable cqu'i'saent is »fci.! t--.jr.i Bf.sjn O r b i t a l TVA Oibiiral EVA Lutar TVA I?jnar SVA Voif^ht (TO BE ADDS3) Fasteners Grnc--ai Mount .ing faateTfTft ahal ? rrquirr r.o too)o and shall be op^^n-V tb either batid. When a fastener io net see^ircd, th-io Bacu.l.d be obviars on JrspcTEion^ Fasteners to be latchcJ •ualatobod ditrior S!k sb<'.fld not require an opcn.-i.ooo rpac-- v xorcce De/fl ^yr.cv faolv ccs art uufatiefar.rory siace ihey cquirc rluward and rotaiJcnol Tir®'S/-TTtj srrh'''oh cioo'; b<> r^nct,.? i ccthcrao ' O l-^o5®2 Fr.e-c.nor Pfrriorj T- 1 �O 1-5 TI.U'filtlATTO'.The estcnwl r-blonr Ught co^di. Ic-ns f >r the AAP ttlaaicA «vll vorr frota apnroxi«atoly rcro ro 12.2^0 foot t.vndi ,5, Secauao of the colllmted'notrrof thd Tishtv excfine contxa^n between Urec.f.ty ngl-.tort -traae end iboea 1ciLauov 07<]Rt be exfjcotcdo 1.5 =1 - Cn^lndlns aroaa .jc^aaslble oy EfA la u> whuh data recovery. «qulp,w;H c'lmgea, adjiiccrawCc, etc.. are com cnplatod) a. AabionJ lllumtna>.ion 'ox-els .i al.l arsao requlrins ary visual re.oronce by the aatronaut sHtll be adjucmb?./! wlthta the ran:r< of 25 to 50 focn -.tQad Leo, b. '.•.'here cabin windous are prov ..ted the jnrontRl bt-ightaess ratio eball be nontrollnble to ra* vos ?paB than lOrl. c. Light sources shall be of a 'li.ffuso type. d. All inrifcotora and panel are,..e ehnll have nn form nmbieat 1j gbt coveragu. ©.. L'ghc Gonrces ehaU bs e^ran,;-.d so thoc che vieidjig acglo of the vicaial worlc ar^ja is n-.t equal to the onglo of indidence f.roa the oouroft» C la5"2 <j) •> Work StcT-lcn tHuaufTvitlon Tho general requirements for the mumlnation of wrk stations ai-e; a. ' le5»3 (j) O No light aoureoB visible to 'he operator ( i v noraal worlting pooltioas)o b. Anti.-gl^re coatod iae'^nnjent <-over8.. c. Bulb rcplacoiBoni. froo the fr-jit of diisp1.!iy ptjielf no apocJai tools r.5quired» dn Sharply defined irmatllnolD :ed narkings ret'U-ible vhen vlevcd at any angle up to 60^? froo noraal of the display panel, Brirhtncse L9re.ls ard Ad1 <str!enf.<i Bo For map and obnrt reading: n diffuse scitrce. oontinnouoly adjustable to produce a hrig'-.tness level of 15 to 50 foot latrborlSo bo For inetrunent. jiantls; foofc'-levber^.B, whether Co Controls: allowance of nd.Ji>*_-;-caat "for saparene ponel light eoM.T-a to achieve apparent squa.i b.r-.ghtnesc. do £VA work areas: brig . .peso level adji-jtable froi*. 0 to 200 .J.rated from external or iotcmal oo?irce/: (To bo added) 7^ �!• I'lk'h(r.ep» ?.ii vcH f frrr tc< within: a., 5sl b/'lVA.'n ti,- h. 7^1 belwcf" the '• ' • >«< ,n.'« r, io» Jhould h, control j ;..ri3o«lat(^ :r..r>-»vr,.-;^hss. .i/id i - jfliti'sr ini-tr-Jiiola.. c. 20;1 befw?ei5 Ihe '.it-jk jrct stj.. reraotei our:';jceit, do '»0:1 befwseu a o-ui-® .i, :! the oui'Viife adjaceat "io Ifc. �c 1-.6 (J) C07.0R CODTKCJ '• .-houlj bo c.oiiip{it5*>;i.c ^llh U^/AdoIIo The appUcuble Tablon i-l acd 2-2 docuj.iin:-.ed in LlN " 5'iO-OOU of Z/WA, .»s changed c.t 6/3/64. are ohown in the foUowing tables: Ml..cd/,rds. COLOR CODCNO (C0> PONIJWl'S) Ttf|TC Tau 30227 Internal Kovoblo Stnicturr (balch.s, access panela) Ito Brown 5o:-.'to Brown 20099 •live Gray 35189 31'Je Gray 351S9 Gray 35189 Restraint Straps Restraint Structure Kcstraint Upholstry PLSS (Pa^lqvock) Harness Straps PLSS o Fed. Std Wal3a. Coiling^ Internal Stnict'ire Floor. Steps, Wori S'^rlac* c Color «bi te 37875 *bi te 37875 Cabling, Dixts, Internal oajse as Background Controlss Emergency OpEi!g*~yellov» <• Black Striped 25553 27058 Docking Ring I^nnel naite 27673 Glare Shield 'J iack 37058 Hand Grips Tellow 25793 Hand end Foot LoTcrs, Knobs» Control H-^jidlea- Son Illiua. Push But fcono Lt- Gray Handles* Assist latch Jatin Chrome HCPR Hardware* Instrunent Penel -ray 36a31 Inotru'ioct, Indicator Hezole Old Casct; Gray 56231 Instrument and Indicator Faces btitft or Black 37375-57058 �1.-6 "c-'Jrri.'irED Color Panola y^l- S?d, 50^ 'J .-ay ^231 tottering; Wsite 37375 Sw.-.tch, Icvera, Toggle Hatln Chroao Koae TeloB'opc and IMU It-- Grcea Z'iklO COLOS COHiXSNlIfTS (SYSTE3I?) xtrm Color Crow PJCTleions -t,.. Bll'rt Fed- Sl.d, CosiRu n ir a t i ona 1J;«. Gray 26132 EPS (Elocti*lcnl Pousr Syaton) Orange ZZZk6 N & 0 (Navigation 8t Guldarce) Lc„ Gracn Operat to.'ial TflGtniiDontatio'i iJlne Green 25195 S & C (£ ch?.lization & Control) 'ellow 23793 Ecpert::c".t Hardware -?<' �CptiBua panel ev.rfaco srenn r.houid be unj displays., ur.-H\ for prloiity 3vbtj*s!.ea contrelj With that enctpt^on, roD-.-N)lR ehculd bo 1) £aoo of Operation 2) Gequenee of Opera'ior. 3) Fr'rqueacy of Operntion k) CoatroVOlsplay Rclatirn^'jin.-^ 3) Minimal Hnnd/lJiro Excuri'io-: AecaLed for: Autonotie flyatoms with functlooa critical to crev safety shall have audibl and vicaal warning sigcals ajid n-mwil o 'lrridea.. Controls shall bo decigued to prevent; 1) Ircdverfcont Opera'-lon 2) CrewTnaa Tojuz^ 3) Dofrage to Syaieci All controls other than r.u..nd<rd Apollo tcu.ipmen« strata freedom from control --eve-ssl er<-sre and nl'all be tested to d&TO alia I t neot the system precisioa requlr.-mer.ts with no more tha i one overahcot error and rwo unde^ shoot errorsg l'7-l Gor'-rnl IbOcr. "or Controls (k) The direciio" of norextat of the -control will ho corsJstert with tb aovemcnt of rho conirjlied objec: or moving rortion of di^play^ Controls Bust be easily idc-ntifi.Viie by both^visinl scC 'actile ten Because vleual cues are pr^inary^ iowovort the control arr.rklngc are* ni?ot important coding method for ooaf:;^ol id^rtifioahioa.. % All eoDi.rGi.s will iiave two types of Inforoation Xaeatod px-oxinate r the control —• idsntiflcaf-loa of the control funrl ion and raethod control operat'on, vh-re r-«quirpl> Crebioed hmd two controls on concentric shaft i for g'-ocs >.nd flco 'nlj'.i be naod only when cjiace limMati )>s prohibit controls and accidental oovcmant hazardous cor/i.iUon. of coTf-^iV, s'^ the use of ludlvidoal >r the controls will xot create a When manual ixrfoxmanco rcqalrem:3ts are ouch t'm.t the rcni!;rollod object can be adjusted in a lioi ted number of dis-rrete stops, dncea controls will be uood.. When hlg'i-precirjlon iikTiu'pl ectflngc arc- rc quired over a wide 'range, assitirc-tationel cor.fc'-ols should he ueade All controls will be distributed so that no ^n© burdened. ll»Bb will be over All controls will be ieBigned, ori.cntcd. and located so that they ore in acoottlsE:? .-iti. lonrol vrork habit patLoruo, cusiomaiy reactions and hvnuo reflexes. It is des-.rable to recog nise the goneralised oovrcss of human error in t-he orer-vtioo of controls in order thi rh* .-say prKciurlo then.. for human error exlats in the foJ.lowiag ercamplrs: The potential �a Sim.l larity of control csvlcfiii, cauclng tl.R wi^ong coatrol to bt octiintrd borauflf. of ro\ftiMiijj; Lt vritli oi>t,}.hor, b. locatio*^ of controls t„o eaoc.ly rojsthcr 'r.nsln? ».nad»arteat operation of adjno^ot '-ontro:.. and iatoxf'x'ii.p; with eaco of . operation^ c. Improper aequonrj.i.ij, :n«o ofj.Jiatment, one orerly complicated adjuatmenta mutiny a',oUtkes .a coatro.1 cperotlon- d. l«ng oBd involved prorodupes dlffieuit tc oomnit ko oonoiy, Xa7t2 o. Operation of cont^^3la in a d;v'cctlon conlp.ix^ to normal novcme of the operator (}wrt.\cu\apl> tnibject to human error during tJof otresR or enerr;.3icy), f. location of coatrolfl .u mich positions that t]ie oporator can bruch or kcock againol theu, i;au3ing inrirJvcrleat opemtionp g« Arrangf r.ient of I ho ln:;t >'ii'3oa* panel 1n is'ch s. v/ay that It is .Impoosible or very dirficult c reach for one control vihilo operating another^ Gcnc'a'l S-sfsini.';!'^ rri- .»p^r» <k) Bcoanoo of the confjnc^l q- n.-^ ern .tad tho djf Crl v.-l, v of controlled Bovcmenr by the astronauts, in 2eix> g>'aviJ;y -•a-.'lrcjw»ni., safeguards iTiot be adhered to in tho d^nign -tf control? ixnd In/out of tho console bo prc-lude toadvcr net. (..ctuaiion .of coniroiso Recooaee Will be used for toggle ewitchos ^f it aprraro thau the rontrol olght bo acTn^aiod ir-advertcntly, Guarde-l'p«oljhnt';oas. toggle ewitrh ... ^or levcT-lock-t.ypa tv,Uoh.-3 are •.•.^:^ulred for'iVncticns that are ^irreversible.. They wl 11 nnv.; re' ->n3 installation depending the po tion, or> tho .main disp^uiy coraoXe ,)rovlously etlpulakedl,..7-3 (k) Toggle r.s-Jtr.hf^a Toggle or lever^typr j.-it hc.u ma.- be two^ or «-hr{-«-peollicn, tab handle,, or lei[er-lork "-.anile an 1 isotrentary cr Da;.rt3inirg in thai, switching action- Total ..hrow d .itaneoc of iogglo .aad J.;ve--lo'ri£ switchc.9 should be f 8 dcgree.'i. The force r.'cit'red to change poGitien should be ^jO-IOO ouiiccg Ad axial pill of 'fO • 30 oJUJces is rccoamended to release the lev.jr-lork switch f.-om a iorked pos-ltior:. Tho m.iaicaiin allov/eb.le spscing be^'^een log'jle switches grouped in hori.noDtai rows sliouid be oc« in i on centers- Vlien xi.vtd in locaticaa whore the baodle could po-'e n -ta /icd to «:r«v r'crb ^rs or be subje-icfd to inadvertent actuavicn, tho sw..t;ch should be sc-aireccssod and pro vided i.lth barrier guacdl -u rbo 'i in Figur? l-J.. distanctbocyocn barrier guards .?h-'uid ro- be Rorc than or,.. Jjvch. t>ierg:-a:-y s'/itchea or switches whose iiuidv<srteDt actuation would create a hazardoua condition rn.ist iiave a '.evor-lcrk handle or be pro»;ectcd by a guardc nl �RECESSED liVERLOCK TOGGLE Figure 1-5 Toggle SwitchcB - 112 STD 65-1534-2 �-ogg-/^-sw.Mch 0]ie.-atioii is varS-icol iv foBltloa jalrB sS=oa<i b. ,„ ac=< 7^ * -DOrfh _ . rgi»ARY BACKUP gj, Oif eit?':. Ctoi;; tl.b xc L'bv,ins brtbari , TMOK'•A^^s DJSAcm'm _ D.-.i'ipy dwoi.auinr Brc£s;»3B /ijjo JiT'LvrC Where a thlni position Jr added for OPi;, v;-e-oiild h« in «•»,« center position orrept. .tore thjr «ouW perforonnco.. In „h:r,. mrr OFF .tonM be In the litSr!'^Sunn. l.-7oA (k) Rotary Switrhc/ notary swi^ohoe (with not oore \hon - 12 floior-rohi. ^ * •. • \ ^oJeM'" ''"If "• "«»« l-*~ *li roia^^LThen I - ..ctpblc pocLtlonc Pbou.Xd be detnited. Eioh swJ tch ohould oy a detent cao, to hc»d the .rliva.ins nhaft ia ZToAZ nd.vldual ^Jtch positicne., A itop will be i>rovXC.TTl "he ^cnee of the actuatir,5 rkaft's cotation exooot. in oases reouirinr Joa-degree rotation, , . -""juA-riniT . ^csTj switch throw distc-ir.:a bttwaca poait.loaR chould be 30 dee'with a torquo required to change positions of .12 - 100 inch-ouacee of ^sitiona will be sjch that rleclcwJao ooveoent ie on , ascecdijig order", "incroaasd perforuiance", etc. I«7n5 (k) Rheostots l^ea the th^gtat 3.^ ncw.d rro^r. U« knob side, the maxi'M resir;. tnnce should be in the OFP diroc Uoo ^c^t-h d4--r<-a«Jr,. jvr.tw.n-- ™ dire.-t!.oa„ The ront-ol should .royatr, throui:a so a:^„. of 300 oegrers plus or mj.nun 5 d j^raes, A B:«p..n-}tion OFF positio . .B recommended to opaf the rhoos:ar. rircuit and should occur j stas the contact passes beyond the i<a5;in!nm ropj.Btanse polntb Depending on the ^st;allation rejuired. al;. -heoststa should to the rotary Knob nesign as shc#o in Fxgure V4. 1j7o6 ^nmhwheels .• PotentioKaterH (k.) contact nm should rotate throy.-h an arof 300 degrees plus or ai.-us ID degro^rs. Tf the poteatiora^ter is to be mo-Mtsd riush on th-s control ranel bf the tl„,nb»bb,l bh,uld �RANGSS A 8 C 0 E F G H MINIMUM -MAXIMUM 2. i2r. I.W a687 - a 812 asoo -0.678 0.31? - a 437 a 43? - 0.56? ao»3 - a 156 a093 - a 156 1.08 - 1.20 ROTARY KNOBS AND RHEOSTATS ri^ur-i 1-5 Thumbwheel and Rotar/-Knob Switches - 113 Sir �c Tho r'.arTclfjrd r trhb" ..i-:n 0. '/;0 jrch-?« nad •'onill iijiiaatud, < •'; J>r i 75 owucfte thnsusToul tl.? dw>r«sejoi5 v-n-.^pf. i'AS/iMv. toTi Si'-u-hry Sjy hM (i(.-jr:Kji rti or iiorl/.onhelly oa ons-inc'j ccr,tcT.-„ ^^c.-js i>-e to bs n'ourvcd fJus^h wj in the r^-Dcl nnd bavr- a mljtlr-in sf C, 125 '"nrh. S-;•^-~lte(l p»sh. b'iilontt Rhould iooorpcrotrr gvard » (P'y.fa j :.o p-.n-^nt Inadvart' ijctuatson . h o rolor of tho ilJuTin-i «cJ pufiiiattro sirf^cc. I'-pc^v.^of; on opplieatlon. wJLbo ^viaw .a yolLow. ni, or jn nccordar.cs wlh eho-11 ;v on H::.C-2505A. Vhen sot OluMira^^ed, ».he 'on facti or ca.-> ::ovf!T bA o ilcrcp^ruUr white with n 1:7 r-r gr^a^ ar '-an'-fasl r.nf jo !face to i««gcnd> and ir^e of tint, '.pon viaua-L 3r3pectloOB C 1,7.8 (k) ^i';y'jlt Breeker CJi'^uit breaker dori.gi should coifonn to dst.-.ilc of Fir;aro i~6. Circuit broekerH! gMieralJ;' iii-s o.f the pop-on: rolco.oa. puah-co^ rc5et-.type. Circuit V.ros ,r-n uiW be nordnf-nUns ho.-jilng thf? krob in the r -s«t jsoiiMon wjli rot oferi-tdt? (>.& r rcui ^-^brcak-tng fur-t ion . The -rri.ppod r.ooditioa of h- p'oi • .jer-t.yp- .--iicu-.? breaker la i.r.d.vc3''•d. by a white bcrJ whicr. is . nltiLina of f, ••.5/-..inc:h w.'de. The b.renk'jr body aid head vili b*' h? -Ir, r',-t.d«r.- |r ,^...,,.,-,.1 .,i,r.v *• Ii.T.itod to tbf to? .-vJcfaca of »;/ • virru'^t e-- ake,^ s roqn'r«d to re?i?1 a ph'vg.T- t.Tpe Aircjit bre..ker •rill i«>t exceed '2 pounds, and the forc-e rcqj-.rr» ic '-rip a c i nniLt brenker Battiei i u'ii.1 tiofc excefl 3 p->'.;cdBThe mioiaoiB a7.i'-vatle spare between rirrujt. trealjers g"cjuped tc. horizontal rows wl.li. bo 0- 8 ?.B!}x on center s.nd hhe dio*'oj>f-p.a bo'wfon rows a miri-j.; of o;:p o 31 �o rr* ;a ^•nG» < A XLUV. O'-v 'j:iO UG/ii : • 9.tir, P ttov • • • -A. 875 r.Oi; •K •*A<T'- . -KANOr. Ml>l A 0 " ON'.'*' A - i'<..\.'iv., .'J'0.«7 • 17$ - 0.8A3 r». •• - 0.156 c 0 E PUS E'JTTON SWITCH G RANOCS A B c 0 MINIMUM • M/ 0.W - 1.967 1.975 - 1. OCO 0.943 • 0.4t« 0.3IB - a 711 va•. - >-v. O' 3 ISHBUTTON :OVE! GUARD (TY»:C4 FigjUrs 1-5 1." • - /-?>>•*•» '• Pu^button Sv'itches �KANGCS MINIMUM-MAXIMUM A t a37S 0.«J7 a093 0. 156 0.167 0.250 0.37S a AS? a 281. asAS a 375 u. ISA lo® — a J/3 a «s »i - a 0 . 5593 93 « ».A I «t a 730 _ I.OOt c 0 t ff O o H o — — RESn CONDITION -> — — fJ Nw* — TRIPPED CONDITION r Figure 1-6 Circuit Breaker - 116 - SIC �In tt? dosign of a n y Uco thr.i ,!..-olv=£ op^mvor.-^ o- K,r ccn3-6' y r ^ i i o a t i i s th^r a ^ t h c d b y i-H.vch . t - r M n e n i \ u r r > " ^ 5 v i o n w i l l а. Display irfomif:i,.a wiU be limited to the desree of accuracy actoall^ -dovstandablo. Identified eo aa U, ot.-/i«te undue 5 •"• E.-=.p=d.»,, to . б. lDfomat...on will be prceenttcd in ouih a manner tbot any frilnre or apparent 7- All displays will be prorerly illuair^tel-• c-'V- --•> fureti-^r.. "' .. . •• lobol ^Keters <k) Tho opooir.tc,viion of aet.ro, InolodJog polutor loMtlon. oovomoot display scale,, and penersl frrm factor character-,ties, v-iii nrn^-. to tse fcl.is-/ir.2 'y.-*23 (r-^-rec '.•? a-;! !•£)• " ' 1 8-2 (k) O lo Single boriaontal moytng pol;ttar displayed 2o Single vertical moving iKJint.jx- displays. 3e Dual vertical ffioviag *»« Fc-u* vertical ajoving pointer diepiays. 5® Single circular diGplays. 6« Dual circular dleplayT- pointer displays. Meter Scale. linear ocaTes ara gene.rally prei-r^d., Idien accuracy r^-ouiranentn exceed there that can be at^alnM usi^tg a Uncnr .cSc SSS! "f e-pa=clcd to acquire the -Drdcd accuracv, rc;pi;'rc(', to b? f>r.'-ri;v,7,j trc.'i -i .-.(ij-j . -^ , --• �i. EL. n JL DUAL VERTICAL MOVING POINTERS SINGLE VERTICAL MOVING POINTER FOUR VERTICAL MOVING POINTERS Figure 1-7 Vertical Meters - I2r. - sr: �% DUAL CIRCULAR MOVING POINTER i figure 1-8 Circular Meters - 12" - € ( • '••o �rRANOrS MINIMUM - MAXIMUM .300 . .500 .187 .391 .093 A » c 0 ..362 .562 .250 .343 .156 - :C7 DRUM INDICATORS RANOCS A t C MINIMUM - MAXIMUM .718 .425 .093 . - .?«' .856 .156 DISC INDICATOR Figure Electromechanical Event Indicators 'O- 1?.7 SID A'>-lS34-2 �1>8 3 (k) D'np'i/'-- rcrr' 1 J A.Tnf>j?frt.'!n ' — >.ncr'.c <.t:aM.3 y rv»sdwto. d.gi'j l or Oa.nlos. nhonlC b« Doni^Uy-ea to read i n vr of »a* Mi-a !t«ihlo f.Uild t, 'olupw or walgh): as rer>prJ. V'r.;?'-Q.l eoalc indlcnt.or (Tiaup" for r-'bsyatea condltiou raeti.l toring ::ho. *<1 bw orrorged by aycteni fyj Jtloii ihon by displ-'jyod iv-.rn'i-jterv Chen by alpl.iibftt.Vc or Dusiftflc scc^itisnces 5c deoccaJJng o-dftr of fT>bgro«i.M. i'.n- typlr-oi ri„td syctctns, chc profcrrccl ord.-^r of dtspl/iy sf rongoutjitf rtadicg froci left to right O'r ffoo top to boiioo la pi.lol. Hxes Is cs follnvcJ In Gyafon fua- lion: Preo.Ttr 1 fOel., oxjilizor "a 2a ^ D.6p,.ay;d r^rAmetors: Plov., toiip'ratovo# prresnre, >ii.'antlty» TQlcot aaperes# 3® Alphabetic or ounoric rfquenco; S.Tst.e-3 A • Syvjten B or TcnU 1. 1<>8.4 (k) T&jik 2 DJcpVv pointsr Location nod NoT/nrnt Jbo pnlJitcr In vertica I single-'p< tnter diepL-iye fclll bo located to the right of t.he scale. Jointer 'loveinent- io na up direction indicaVea inrreasfch values® Tho pointer i a horizontal oinglc- oipter dl.nl'iyf c- <; ?. I above the ijcale (there isay be .lo/:U.taate exccptloJisJa f^'inter neve went to the right indl'-at?y itirri't.eed valueu.. lbs {rd..lvidvial peictcre on dunl-pclater •.ndl'-etors .'ihonld he lor.ifed oi'thoard of thalr rosp^•cttve scales (Ue., b--:el, po.'nler 1; icftle J., scale 2, pointer 2, berol). Pointer (aover-ient upward Indicates Iniroased values.. The individual pointers on four»i)ointer lndicctor.3 will be ao ohow'^ in Flg'jrc 1-7 flrC,, bezel- poin^^er 1, scale I, piintor 2, pointer _• pointer k, bezel)® The pointers In dual elrc-jlar io' lcetors shovild pVvot about the extrsaiitics of the horizoat?. I ex s- The lef- cfvxle cocuicrcea at nl.i i33=degr«''c point from the -.op cc-n er point end oonclMdee countercloclcvise o t t h e ^5* degree p»iiit The right scale co-itrcncea a t the 225''dGgroo poln' froa the top cc:\i.ftr point aad ronclude? clockwln at the 315'dflgree point.. Pointers for both circular arc vori'lcei dial fares should be close to the dial fr.ue and c^ale to reduce �parai-Vix to a o»Piou4. for c.cpro7«d tieisee, tha pointer h^^ad wi.ll be triar.|i«Ur m d the a i d s t of the pointer shaft, where required, vdU ha parallel (n.g'.reo 1-7 actl 1-8), 1.8-.5 (k) DlnclS"? Mni-kinera . , When oporationnlly useful., eolorel renije tear!' in.'is wet be used on vortical, borlaontal, and circular diopla:,-3 to Indieat.o operating ranges, "Kiree oporatiog rooge marl-rtngo arc recommendod to indicate the following oouditionsj 1, Nora.al 2, Marginal 1 Prohibited or limit mark 3- "" I Rargo Pirkireo ehould be 0. 05-loch mde and extend to the Umite of tlK; uiuile factor reprcscrted, Range mrkings vail bo imposed over Lbe scale index tnirklnga to enhance reRdnbllity and visual cue rcGTion.ce, Idmit ra-ixkaar: should be 0, 07'ln«ii wide end equal la Icngih to the loag graduation of the scale in qvestioa, Diraplaj* cover face© will ba coated wj.th an artiroflectlvs trans parent materials l.-8a6 (k) Alpiinr.'-V'erlc Roadouls " A.lphanuncric readouts should be ocmposod of dcctroluMaescent eoven-line characters that have :>ie following deaign details: Slant- - 14-2/2 degrees + 1/2 degree tc the right frw» the vcr. Height - 0. 500 Jnoh + 0, t>05 inch Width • - 0. 375 Inch i; 0, <>>5 inch Stroke Width - 0, 625 inch • 0, «>15 inch Spacing boiwecn nxwEorala - 0, IXy) inch ^ 0, C05 Inch DimlBsuiB Iraeasyrcd at the bace of the num-jml 1.8.7 (k) Elc t'-oirechanical Eo-eat. Trdlcaioca Blectronschanlcal event indicators are rocomtiandod for use when highly reliable go^no-go '!or two•oogition) iiTdicaoion^ o.r® r e q u i r e d a n d when e l e c t r i c a l p o w e r n v a l l j i b i l i t y i s o e v c r l y v e strtcted. These Indicators are recommended for use as go-no-go (opcrational/nonoperatloa.il! s{e .2s iad:'cator6 oni for vwo-positio'* positioning Indlcatorn, e.g. , no'^'mal-naxia-.ia and norrr.al-rtfiii.lawa poGitious, 1.8.8 (k) Two-Pos'ltion Dmia Xrd.lcators " ™ "• Two-position, electroncchanlcal dnia indicators will be need for status "indicators 1-8), The Mark (gray) poaitien of th? �drtia vrtll i-jTor tr« ^•^ane^^Te-J l e in or oi>Rrt«tJo'ial node or o r o t inhibited i i o n oneratic*?. rho baohcr poiw (n'U rmnie b 1 : . . / . n i v.1alr) position o," tio rirvrii iadlcntocs Kill Infer tint .!;c 'r.. •no-led pyatesc «>aiint lo i.ihibilsdl frto operation or 'in l:olflrnc05 -03<iLtirr., • A pair of »•:. ^etr^e-hvclcci.l dru.t iai'.cators t.'ill be uoed ao por.i >. . •>> i- icdieatore for eomo jsycteit <iericea« Ono will Indicate th .if:; ir.d c-3;d.itur. yt-sitjonB of the dt9vlce. second will i i i -ifi: : he r.omal std eiimtmiBi vasitlon of the dcvicoTbo pair of dr n ii.d -cotorB will t e referenced to a switoh pooitiori The dleplay face of th.* two-poottlon event Inilcoloro ohould ba Pcrtongular vi.-h a dleplay sine 3o Joss-?han D, 187 by Go 2Cl Inob ard iho lon^ nxla nourted horlzot1,nll,y„ Z'i<-< I-c^icch-nioal f:fatiJo t-d^cntorc tj/rinlly t i l l be localod above the nfjnooiatcd r o r t r o l cwAtohoa^ Rleetrooechsnlcal position in.'l.;eatr.rn vfii: be located with r.-'ference to aw.tcb positions1<&«9 (k) D.-f.r Irvl.''".TO"*. Eiectrononhana'al dJaf event i a d l ' a t o r s eay be uoed t o diaply cbacges onalofrora to a speceiu device poni^on, "nieec indicators are used In ttucoaatic syct/ns and.are rot dii'ic-tly asaociated vdth a ev;xt.oh opcrationa Th'y iT'xy t o Ufied for riystcm devlrr operational position BxatU3'. ir-d'. ;otor will tlispljiy the poaJ' J a of the i^sterj devic.from ore exlrc-iTie la the other wains a rotatablo biack pointer. Thorc should be two black indices on a white baclfgrovnd to indicate the extreraecs (?'ig-jre .1-8)'The display face of the electronfohanlcal di'.c e»cat ir.dl-:afcoro val be c.lrcular bavin,;.- a dtsp'sy dioircter no lees than O. 625 Inches. Tha Indices ffiy-ct be f j ted lisving a leegth of 0.. CIO and wldrh of O- 093 inches. Tho winter Aengvh ahould be 0- M ',m ':,c 0 . 093 inch. 'Tlie pointer opncinc from an index uhould be no sreatf than 0 . 016 inch 'Fisiire .1—S)» 1-8.10 Alarn S y s t n Any e>:porJ.rcent that has any oper.-jr.ins characteristic which can pro duce a ti'se-critical liasardous c<«iditioa requirin.g laasdiate corrective action will ba desagned with an i.ntcrfaoe Ine-trunantataor output ccapatible vd-th the CH Master Aiazwi Systca. (Additional crlteriii to be addnd) 1,8.11 VaJldation Tas^irq Kooslandard or intoerated displays which coobine related Inforaatlcn in a single display uni t , s h a l l be subjected t o huiraQ cngiv.eezliig t e s t s to dcterraine the effect of the lategrEcion on pyst era perfojTBaDce. Units which produce pcrfo:-nani'r equal to or batter thsn single purpose indicators are flccsptable. �_FHY.-JIOlonTCAl i T,T|i^mCW3 i-O'L Cr«>w Ont-Ta' Icn.-il ry.-:; . -.jij |,» Rygu^romcit./i (See Table i; (1) tor H.i'Vnrj) Food Pood quar.lity vill bp based <>a on Hndivjcual calorie intake of 3000K caloi -OB par tnon p«r d-if^ Cnc-ron dayo' food rrqoirca 179 cu. Irpbos nforcd volumo at 3.3 ponacs vfelslit. 2. (i> Wnter Water con)?-.itipc-or. .3 .10 folL-Jwai" 2,.6 ili-iiikf.Qjj aod food proparation 5.0 Ai/c:-.c dry,, ^aolcatioa and hygiene 3» ConotnTil" '-.'par C'ln^ente Each crew r.crbcr .-sr^ulrca a jjsw co-irtan'; i.ear garsent, (C^Q) r.'cry two dnyn., .Nuober of milte >-'iTU>r^d fnvr^cr of crow) X ' o | 2 ) where r -n m i z s t o n deration i n days. Wliare p. . 3 an odd nvcibp" 'ice the ne:ct afBal.ler p«»iri>er,^ •13 cu. ft- and pounda par auife, Stored volua® ie Pc^sopol HvffioPo (To be added) *5' EVA Opcrat-orval ror^nnptiofi a. (h) One PiSS UOH ar.-^dgo )»Qr wofgs; dlisena-lon * IV*, weight ^i->3 ^h}. Store 5 Lntera:illy, rf3.T,?»ii-r «.•- i« s t o r e d exte ?*nn l l y . b» (h) The PUiS lie: 3 'K rechnrgerililo battery that nrist be recbarccci for 10 hours per uaago. Allow '1 ysagen per battery- Dimcnrdon 3^* x VyA" x 6H", weight 3 ibs., store Jnternaliy, c. A full PISS oxygea c»iarge J.a pounds. tion Will average pounds per hour, Csyg-'O rtononpu- d. (1) During iWA the standby D'A acfronaut wil?. cperete frcw th-^ sMlt loop of the tCS, requiring operation of the suit loop fan at '52 watts ?ri* hoc • powar romrjoption! e. An additioDfll Constant Wnar Gament. (CV.^) iflll be included for each €re\-.3-n on ^iVA :»r EVA afsndby duty. (ThJa is in addition to the callout of pai^agraph 1-,2.5,1 (5^. �C?.Zv! OL'IvRATTON.H C0tvSiJM.*i3I.E Kf-vUIIiSHENTS Wir, C-^wi'ioclv f'j f 1 ECKMARi) V<» l'>mo Pcyer Ci'.. Xn. Watts . . . . Ar i I'er Msn Per Dcy Is Food 2a Water 3o Oaggen 2 Va CoQstanl' V/^ar Garrao,;iL ( 2-3 r.'9 7.6 2-a . \ 1 > (based on i ovoij? other day*) 4 (" ) Perooruel Iiyj^lene -• chowiji,3 5' gu.t tooth ijieanera M C - ) deodorant t OtCa 6~ < •^ Bo Per Kan Per IT/A • 1» PLSS LIOH cartridge 2a Battery a, after Uut ueage < - ) • ». 0 Constant Wear GnnaQnt Oxygen "'per hour) 5e fio Ecohargfl a.fter Jisaga bo fioplnce 3o * Coolicg Water 1.9"2 1J9 225 0..25 .1.83 Crnw Wor?fcc' Ppcf^nrnioB 1# i tJjitrented bloi.ogiral waatij eh.,11 not be allc-wed to bccoaa free residue in spnco. .J �2, (i) yao'c Vaslo Production Vol, .1, 3 Orino 3^2 Feces 0-3 Water Vnpo.r 5-3 Carbon Dioxide 2.3 There are additioDsl oinor-itcos of hyM-^a -.fci-.l;® that can be ignored frois a weight staadpoitit att total jn'odeetion for a i-isan crew for 30 doye is cbovt 1,25 pouod:?- Iheoe ilffluo i-ic.\ydo flavusr hairv naiJs,. n-j rrocrcani&'Jn, aliiia cells, a'"id mucins, 1,9-3 Radinti qp LIti;', rntlooo (To bo added) r": �FiTJiT or-:-:\'AT:rGi:AL 2.-01 Thopo requirerannwj cl«?faaa i-);o.';e «>ud oanotrBlats that •ffpcl the m ..ri.oic'i op'^ratloiia of A/a', 2«02 gnrpog-i T}ie priiicry r .vpoa" -f. i.o d. fice tlnr.^ rrqulr«:r>flata r-ncl rr\t-7rla 6.lth«»r pocuJp.-ii- to A/J" ->1' def?)icd by tho Anollo wlosion cor/ljuratlon tha.t five nc-'.-onary for nlaslon pli=,r.aiQg or l^ffect cquxpneat doaign, Tt 13 nn obrif.tivs to e>aint«:«ji the saria functioeai in-flighffilsalon p'-occiwresv t c-hnlquoa, and planning ti ar. oharactari ae the atacdsrd Apollo i-i}.6a5c:> �2 - 1 cr;^rf ArsiGT>7;:-:.vT.: •• nun stati<m>T7 j Crew Arr.'i. It ic findelpo^ .jQ that aXl <• ri^y wt-niboi-a \.lll recelvo a d'^grce of trA.';nlni; porro^ ts total later^hangcabi llty of crow dutJos on en oa<>r;tnry hcoiis, 'fhs onlsr of priori iy of crow ntiliaotiott in: a* ^kliatonarJCc of flight eafo^y h* Condvict of hasio c. Exploi-arion of natural phonoaeoa d« S;;hedulod pi?c:sureaents oBd eboervatioBe of natural pehnoneaa e. Repair. •^ali.braUoo and codifloation of olssJon-epcclflo cqu-lpcient.. oporations For the p-.r^cacn of rrov s'e.U^T. salei':tlou„ tvaicing plans, arid nora?al oloB*.en planning, the following ground rul9.-5 ehall apply: a» • "^c eoomnd asiron^ut viil nflrrFo'ti all major spacacraft taar.'iuvars froa the left haad poaiiloa of cither the CM or LS-lj He will also be the bacioip navigalor on the CM. responsible for Q}\ naYlgatler. a-^d cperailcTi of the CH Iccluding docking khea the XifJl io sinarated. E-n'recr -• Is pr5.raarily re.'iponslhl? for all experloent act-irltieo pins backnp operation and rarigatioa of the LEH, Aaoi (Tr"fnt l^'-iorlttes - The follo'dnc tab i o lioi B acslgnaeat priorities for the rorlo-.in crew meai'ei's. For purpoees of mission plaanlng no noroul oasLgacfflento will bo oatie where the crew n^tnher .Is listed as type 'in In t-hr va<" of CK 'v^,. ,»>;•» pcrlceni-s the ccr-snnder I3 lifted as bdh typo j5 and - *ypo > for repel (.••.!ve axpariB cnfcs or 'hoso otnou^ly requiring all or«u cecibsr.s such as most bio-oed» r.od type ^ for highly speoisl' typo of experluieata ewh as a 'clescciw prigrara, , Crrw Hersber CoaaiaTider lani-'ch 1 CM or OK Dochcd to VO'. or J iXri & I Experintn*- Carrier Operatioi'B J Orerniic^e Recovery i^larc 'ivers "^Javi'^Vica' h;^erire^t6»"^'.accu» erb liavT' t J i t 1 i 1 1 j 1 •i Navigator 2 1 2 1 2 Syecen Efegr. 3 1 ^ h 1 ' 2 c ' 1 2 Q - �priisc fi-r'.poti8; bJ li ty a-ileP i=>iU tmjjiina and capabiUty a- SocoQdery F.ecpoPclblll»-y - fjill tralulns 5> Operating CepaoiLlty -• S'jftl.c-venc. vr-aiuta^ to dfCQnabratf; capability o£ Bor.iial oporation Boorgency Capobil!.^ - Tj»do'2';riaQVioi> aad Xlaitcd praetice- Duty StnnlonB (To ba added) C « r-apabiUty �6, AL\ri>f zh bo*.' 'r between hVA'a fo;' <Tur-h crevmaii, 7« Maxur.,i!a hours c. o'Jtslds Hno for owo .^A operation Is thr^e 8-. Provlslosa w 31 be sisde to penult Ev'A d»4ring darkBeHa,, 2.2<.5 t»nd 'a'e^Con.ytrainfcs Jiard s'j-'.; 3!A oo ."urcr ourfe-ce vl H be 'Limltec to aix contlsuous hours per daj., (This reiju-.r-;r a .^'ISS char^ge) ;.:>r �n i l t h r ' f c .'ir-t r.-tri.;i ; • l i f y r.: An y'or • ; iVA ?'!- • i • r i v.->(111 j : j ; ;-r' v.-th ti* .i-f t h e atar'jb.^- ••• ';, kjjuo**" >N' cosimunitfatiena .».J .linllons of . r virau iticinr* j,"3ivT« rhe nur > f;ht L\A £.11 fliK?:*. ci« '-rev tjtlitl :5stl«:«3UL i y efaal". ..ivifr or « ' c h l c l i » . iOi bcv '-a •.in>l,o.or/ ;>• r ; . . e . - r , • ; ^' -ndby T/J: nnd rrv • • . . n - . - n v v o i , ' ? • t . . .i o r i fi'.u blinij epotp are the > " ii't be oroHab'' ^•inH .11' i - f l , , mo lo be'WttaR w1 'J. hnvs TnlroaanJ entetua vthiclea tvo-wey h-y v o i r e r o v e - - , •' '• .-rc-" ^j-atrcysnr' jon: '.n roqutrcd e c lollowst 3- AIJ C i f! b u r n ; ; bo Once p,>- oj'h'.' ni' v.,I lavr " ban .J-hou.v inioi ' a'l6> Deorblfc T/Mt voice, radar; i e required aa a* Xaoucii,. t>« Major Si'S burr^^ t o •iRci Cf Aoy cn : • • . .rin;j c - ' v a r - t j e f o l ':•••• i"oLT.ir»wi oijj3if:tri,nt n it-nft ctnl mJK ' atH'u'orial • cos.plf'tloit Jtars'j'jvor' i»airo two ;»f b j m (i5X«'ej;».if.a roOwOi:'- p r i o r Jg doorb?.t sijneitwc-r) �G:--'-: r-i. ON Er.'snr-jii' Ort:..ArMi<s } 1, llvtl-r.- 'n I.! j U.r.itlon of the cr<-"v lor n-dumjancy TPtiootcrlng tiod r?i.il»irp. stotJo coi-rro'.ion.T/otor-tiono ol «>;perJrt:a*«G viil tc sjp««d» ?. Gxpcrijn.^n'; (*atn oet-up, pr«- or i*03t«« nJjbrarion asi ooRratlon Mill bp 0'n-bo!*i\i rcjitrollcd sad will &ot roqu-xe ory groind upllnit euoporh sapabl\j. Ci-spo 3- Tao rcrrd , dunp or ."oGufi p reqii wiV. be h crsM roBponeibili'y aod will not requiro c.ny ground upliiJ: controls 4c It ie clsr lr-;blc not to hare "• PoUviiien oi'rtng major Jliglit ffipneu 'ero — iaunch- tra'isiLatinn and iloi , 'sa^oi* Sj^^S burns, deotbit, lun*r '-.adinij md aooenc^ .md rc--onti:' If roqu- rc.d., il will not. utili:;.' moro tlian or>e cx-nw m/t.bcr pef'ornliig Troi^i lis rtf^xhr duty otat jo.i. 5, Ibcpor-;:,! >;it .int.lri»lc8 xfil'. be co'rplo--i at Jr-ast togUt hours prior to dso.'bit ond ao notrd in a'jotion ?.. • �2,5 riTOfis T-T-'B T.if?2-,5-i Gefe'-al "»ro-;ad Puiilfrg Tho question of u prcpe.r worc/re^t dniy r y d e in b cpinloitat.rd variable., A fjj>aL ocovox- will not maalt x.\ a.L'. probablbty until after ccvaral .long period Arollo UlgSits have bees r.osipleUd. In th oioartlr.fi, a re.-jsonable rye l.e rrast be nelf.-ctad to p.^nnit inUi^ion analysis of celfvrtcd erperlR^nt granp.ngs- TIds ejr J.r will be used to anuljzo the bnslr arceptai'"! vt ty .of vrrious ex-jerimer.t groupings with tho ucderstijiidius tlmt whore i t beoocxja a .litn ! lug factor, a specif --r aoalysir. of altoraaSo GOlutlo«i3 will be madd- The cyclo eelected t based on the foilowing geDcral pre^'soss 4 1« One rreura.-iii -.iill always be awake rjid in rtiBrge of roiGoion lai:r/.;rity, i„e.M v.'stch duty. 2« The woi-iyrest cyc.le will be orUnted to itnlutain a nornal Uving i-coitine phased to coSn;idc with thu eastern U.S. t.imc zone, 3» i:,arh astronaut ul.ll have one sl?ep period of approximatej,y serec houro augjneated, wlien p;soltlft( by >• rap of not moro than one hour.. h.. Persem?l Triaha - cr.tirg hygLsne, exei-t-iae v/iil not be rigidly sch-duL'^dt and fo.r olsc.U'r p.>j-»nl;.'g p»'rpo.«.es ii^e allocatiODS for 'Ae.fe tasks will be ts^de by duty poriol. 5. Koutice micG'oa and for will be 1 ^ . 6. ml.':.3ica houflelc^ejiing :?.sks - stot .a checkc, LiOH changcsc log raa:lr.t.enaj)or, will ?!ot b€ rigidly rchodulsd, mis«non plrfoning f'urpor.os lima al'.c<atlonB for these ta. . • rsiy-c i by duty perJ.id- For prellBlaaiy AAP misft'on aiulysis i t wall ba asnu'^cd tSxat elgbl C8) hours p*>r day per or o tot-.-l of ?i» a-r.bourj» per day in aeailable for experitpeu actfvity. 2 * 5 S t a n d a r d ".U'rnjeft Cr-uw Duty Cycle -ind Ttnig Avtr-ilaliLe la Three^iwn operation with C.S o - GH docked <6 other vehicle. •20 24 D8 'v/T«--h Glean katch Ocea 1 1 V.'ei r.h 1 Oncn 1 ;,'al:<h Sleip i Si e .12 1,6- 1 ; Wa!;ch 1 Or .Iv'atvh •All tinea ere Eastern Standard Tines and the s t a r t of f i r s t d e e p period may be established for any given niseion f?*on i600 t o 20C0. . �^' Crev Tlac for gHtKiriT-ont Cirjoi-attooo (See sections and 1»3»5 iof derivation of tioec) ;jiii;;i>cr of Crev Avpi.loble jSpcn Tin ? 3 a UikO « ikskO 2 8 ?:X0 - 8:'fO 1 8 2:^-0 f nuiiours Avali&ble .for Z^poclmfoto 2>.:30 - 2S:00 (hrs.) 2* Thrc-'ngn Operation • one In (2M« TKO in uraocl-.gd II5H a> Pvtj Cycle 8 T^na: Doy/Niglit (x) XXX XXX XXX LE« n XXX Tx\ :oa i U3i HZ '••/atrh CM Ik rxx 18 16 xxx xxx 20 XXX XXX > i 1 V/p.tch na?' »>p#vn DUvv Watc'i end On'-r, l'u«y This duty cyolc ia based «a the folioving araolsoa: • 1) Kln-itaizlDj the tiipo aH.! three creii' 'fiC-'jero are asleep, simiiltaiseously. Ta tJ-.ls crisc- It le only for about 2 boura since ibc lac: ho»r of tbif sloop period la actually invdlvcc In personnel hy&iene and eating. 2) Kininieirg the niTJibcr of day u<-rlcdc »'jdc un.-ivnlLih)*for opers>::ions dc? to the LB4 rrsy bei-ug asleop. In this cas" only ore even day psrio'^ is lost. 3) This cycle Is based ai a 2-hour oibib- period for gro;utd scheduling purposes. Rjc actual cycle should be adjMsved to the tru-» orbit period tha*. vi.!! be closer to 1,9 hours for 'lO-tsile and 2.1 hi»urs for S-nile l»nor orbitn. 'PhiH will result Ir. ;u.-nor variations to the tine allotraeats available. 2.5.5 Zk Vatfh end Cofai D'*l v Cleeo Sloen 12 3U Watch Duty Period 2.5.3'1 Three lLm Operation vith 0" or CM JJoc"ifcd^co_0^ior V shlc le One crowr:aa vlU. be awake and oa vatch duty osslgcment at al': times. Durin-j these porlcda he v,lll be rsspensibir for the EMintentince of spacf'Crafo syGccr.S; roxauuicatioue. position and flight records or logs, and geaci-al operational actli'iti- —1 f I �Ta CHPo of rnei-fjcncy ?•© -illL f fcrt -wpilrle CowmadariEach cjcw (r'.'ti'.»er wt II v-'or^i two four-hour wa^ch duty aasSgnaicPta per d.ty, •>• cdt3tpl,y i'oliov.ng tbn sl«ep cycl# cod tiiQ ,'n':;';d.UteTy n.-ccosin,'^ t?i3 olifop cycla^ During each four-hoor vfTfi'b the roliotjojj aclirit.'.f.p 'jill ba perforseds 1. SJxteca (i6) n'cut.oq cut of every hour will he upcd for vehicle :sor ;.torJ loi: •V2"*ntoaanc.». Q. Stfl-up cbe-^k of ZfG hovvly (6 win.) recharge batter.' ae required. b. Statue ch-^rk of ECS hourly (1 mln.). e. Vo«ce oontnct vitt MSfS every 2 houru or once per orbit (5 atn.). d. Pi)r,^e fuel ct lle - al.i.ernate 3^ ard ©2 purgea every 5o5 hor.re (j.2 nie.), $ e. Si^-SCS eteluc check prsfcrftbi/ ulthln T/h range of HSFh every b houti' (3 mio.). f. Status check-of SES evsiy ^ haws (2 tnlo.). g. nritery check evsiy 7 hcurs (1 Bin.). h. S ii'^s check of CK-BCS in unpreseurLzed state every '2 Isoiu's (I ntn.) I, Alternate replacing the CK Id5H filter eloasata ever 12 hoMrs (5 ain,). J, Staiun chock of ryro batteri.es every k* Data aoBip to 11577 oa eocft (2 nxii- rj-aw tloci. Zh hours (1 oia na 2. Twcrty-i'l.t i .otn' teo fo,i. i-anco of poaiticm logs and bneir is'sc-icJ. rccrric, ; i-iboh crevoan wii. be expected to Raintsin cifficlert eppcecrair. pasdtioo ortenraf.-'on to be able to in\t.l«t! «d>o'-t pj-o-rlures at aoy tlae., 3" Twenty (20) aisiites for eating (gancrally enacka) during each wstob^ llils is ao arerage valiio that will be wprki'd on nn "as «*^'ai-Lable" baaio ly the crsu. Fifteen (15) MJ JI - tec .or exei'clse. This provides oni>half hour of cxerrlce during watch doty wliich will be added to one-half hour additional duriitg the open d»ity period. Tills • I cc- ^-orlced on e.n "ae available" basi-e by the crew,flo exert iso will be perfomed oa the da;, that a crevsan EKhea an £t;tra Vehicalsr operaiioa. « �5. 6. Tv/s»Dtj < 2 0 ) ffllPi:'.-op J*">r a i ' o i a p i ? v n l u e t o frs t h e ttSt.roiuiuJ , in^d c;i nu "hu ^bchty jKir \ M l c h ^ 8 o i o 1 n a t n.7 »*xp:!rioi''ni.nl the rptPro?-y hysrt«nt>. TbAs i n an rfquiiod" baale by : o u v a l l o b l o foT- 3 e r o n d o . r y 'ilicnc fliouifl prsmarlly f a l l into of nanlfujuf; ii; b<o-iied experiments or i f l l t - i a t j i i j ; an<J/o)* a e j . >;or:n.'* ' • o c k j . U c o n t r o i l o c l e x p o r t . ciPAte,. Gcnpp.all;- it-e :n'j -o t h a n ; 5 m.l.nntec e o n t l r i i c ^ ' M con-^ r-i r a . o'-« .'.i mental du-,..«o should l e c^a^•c!-•a. DurJivt frc.r: the eonKr-odi-r's f. or.'.- ported on oxperl** A' : c d i t i e d f o r the vatr^h d u ^ : h e i f a t c h d>i : y e r e w / ; s B w i l l o p e r a t e 'IJa) ' • 7» Thin c n v r ; j e'v^r<>D ( •>.> tjr'- t o a o n a e p i ^ n e d p e r w i t c h \rx i ; geeevolly ) o o r additional e::jjei-ltioPt 2.50»2 :-or rovljiatAonnl fjjcea T h r c - l i a e O p « i r a t ^ o •• o n r cian I4 i a Cll, iwo DCD In Lat '4'alrh Dfof Op3 l/ot in CM a» The ciagl? iituj i i Add'.n: onally, of b, t h e CI-! v i i l p a r f o T i n n l . l t h e f u c c t - i < in ntti ionc cal.icd ou'. 2..50-!. CD and 2,5.3.1 (2), h e w i l l c h e c k i i w i t h t h o I S i o n a niJji: r v ? ouce per hour ( 1 ci5.n.)» Tbr ouo-h^l.f O J ) >ioi:r •• i r i n s i i R t p l y p r i o r t o a n d lencirdi.? "c't foUovrtr.g tbo olr'-p poi-iod wiJl t o utfliaed to aco'icrilated s. • d. ooctionn .?»5.3ol < .\) and 2.5»3'>l (2) accoapLiRhod due 'O '?e,.nl«flp period. that ware not T h o s e prJ.iT'Erj- vo'Sch f u a c t i o n e w i l l a r e r a g e a b o u t Th.c r<'.v<iAain[; c o t . t r i t j o a eectioii notel In sactljuo 2-5-3.1 v m I I h-i l i s t e d u n d e r O p o n D u t y 2x3'^* ^ a t c h ^ Pti'-.; 0 3 o f ':Vo n-;n 1/ '.ig^ *• '-very C ) n i n u t e o on* of hour Hill, be iiard for vehlolo aonltoriri^ and salntorancei ^ chec): r,f ppg hourly (6 sin ), batteTdco, an roqutrsd, if capcbllity t. I. . ^fO cinutoo per hour. Ihrc'-ij;!! 2 . 5 "> 1 ..." pe.rfoi-3 t ' and Bainter-fineo functions of recharge e*ists, » O 2) 5) S t i t u i c>*eck 'f 0:^5 h o u r l y ( I t a i o . ) , V o i c e c o n t a c t w i t l i CK a o i a - l n u a o f c n c c h c u r l ? O fflin.) Voice centaol with y.STii per oriTit (5 niji,). every two hours o r onct �5^ i' j Og 6) 2-.5.'* '-f.abl'i - ait.fr-nnlB Hg . (12 n^C,), rep.\fl-'n ..f'M I. 01: niter elflttonto evory '5 »jn^). ho'irs Open t>L;ty Pt rir^r 2 . 5 . 4 T h r e r > ! : » a O r - - i v r ^ j a n W t U i T M r.•• C M Poe'tcd no tm Durlnr ari.y S'uUoiir perlcS K V H will bAve O'A© contlruoar oaf'T duly Il^rlod. D;:;-jrr.* thio period cortjjin houe'?ke3pir,7 r.:'^ nuai te p.;f i\-.r-scd hut the ren-eind^r of t';tl5c" ie tan> lible for cr.'r-. r.t acti'/ltj «»rd rc-quJrcd Pav^fjatlon.'il fAxca or .9pTf;aor.v.ft. jaiineivaro. Tho foliowing act:'.Ham ore iurludti jurieg thi.i psrlod: 1. "fciko ^.'ip (i hour), rhic ot-a bo eoho-Julyd by tho crew o "as cvoUabic" baoio r.nji be eUsipatod oi.crxionally 2. 3» OOP hot Baol (I 5our;. 'fbio le aohedu.lcd for one }>• v pli^'W cotae tvae fir rolavation or recreation. oxorriS'"; fox* I/? hosW' I'.xie vfou.ld riortnftlly bo broken Into tbra" 'n- C'-O) Hiaout-e parl.cic nnd cr.a be niuiJp.-xcoi cep jiona lly. J'O exercise in i t-nuirfd on vba day a ore-.msin piirforu? rn cxtrn rehicular operation# Perform waste e.llmlrntioa and body oloooins (1 hour)# 5c ' k 2c5»^t.2 'ITjo rcBiining tlfle i s avaUrsble for other activities to. o hours) . a. Flight optmtloa; - r-oe section.3.0 for required fit;!.' openitloa f»inctl>33- b. Bcfpriaent Three-Man 0:><-ratlon - on r In - to be dete/KinfJ» two in tBI. (To be added)# 2»5e5 Sleop Period 2«5->5«-l Three-»Man Oppratloa V.i1h TH or CH Docked •*<> L3i The sleep p«rl-od for escn nen will be eif;ht (8) hours. It anticipated that about eu^cn (?) bouro of this lice will be o f f e c t l v c e.'.n";-. Tt • r» -.-fria^ t l c e w i l l b-? ntlV;.'':.! t c p r a pait tin £.l^>p ca risixj, cl-v-ninr cp clxe ar.al1on, parf.vrraing pcrsuciicl irrglone, and earing b.ranktasl , T5ic iQ'Uviduals eigh.rh hour of deep will bo in the fora of a nap during the opea «!uty period, (Sao 1,5.5.1.1), / O 2, �J - One in CH. T^ Q Th- flc-p IVnr.i fry.' eacfc ooc uiU be 6c-7fn (7) hour3, n • a n t i c l r . » t ' : d tf., -. M?oct si:- ("S) heuro of t h i s t l a e i f i l l b e efro-rtiv.? Tljp roirinijis tiino rfili he uttliiod to pr.-. paro t h e alu'p otj^tuo aoc. o n riftios, cloanlng up the oloep BtatioQ. pevic-mJn^ F-eroci-nel K yfj I ousc. nncl sating brcakfosr. Depe..<jlng oil tl;s iength OJ' chis type vC operatiun a tuip of ono to two h;. -rs dwratlot ehOKld bo o^;hc€tulod durJac tho opc^ poricd- \v. 10^ �o^f:i?ATicNAL coNoTRAiNT.; 2<6^1 Kii;src;« c Tjiipch O.-'c"n". Io;:« to Liftoff 1, Inunrh cuUoff time io IfjCO hours Iccal t^me b^<-.PUoe of recovery (a) rcqulrcQcntg.. 2« Ho cxpcrjnent activity w^Xt r-s-iuire crcv tariicipatlon itore tfacJi (b) 90 minutes, or loss than I nluite prior, tc .dftoff. 3» lixpnrlijient uotivit-lea during "fie coi'Dtdowj* are iimitRd to those (b) that can bo perforned by the ayoteme ensinacr from his counh pooltlon. 266'.2 Pone Vi'iT'ch and Sa-rth Crbit 1« J'roa Liftoff to confirmation of orbit experlraeat activity is (b) u-ndruirablo.. It required, it should bo Itinitud to lha capabllliy of the .vycitoaa on^lnocr from hLs couch poeition. 2B A ctntun check of all systems wil-l bo pei*foni'.ei after insertion, (g) Aosume ^5 minutea with all BoiabArs occupied except as oote<'. above, 3' Eftttcrj-ca will bo recharged after .tj-'oertiru, Hcniml span is (a) 100 oln-'tes but crew loading :,a 2 nlautcs for jyeteca engineer, 4, There shall be a mloim'jra of o!ij orbit piicr to S--IVB/CSM (a) tioparatlon. 5, The S-IVB G&C and PCS shall b*? uaed for all aaJieuvers prior to (c) S^r/B/CSM Eoparation. I?iU fine alignment vill be required once per day for normal <c) epaccrraft raquirenents f20 ns.-mte), 7o IJTO alipanent requ'res hiving the '•X axis cj-.; i-•*'i- r?, '.1 (c) local horizontal^ pointed in -Ho direction of flight and aalntnliuvH within + JO' of the plane of • le orbit. The axis nict re-ajr. r least yj'* above the local hor ioo, 8, During near earth orbit cperav.ioas navigational sl^tiago will i>' (b) token 00 loss than twice per day (3^ urinates per set of three sightings). 9B Oribral navigational eightlnga require having the •••X axis in thn (c) dlrectioa of flight anl the +;• axis n-var iocal vertical and pointed toward earthB 2.6,3 Transluugr Tn.jectloa 1, The S-TV3 provides G?;C and thi^ust for the vraaslurar Icjsction. (c) The -j-X cxls is for-i.-arc rnJ approxiPiatcly parallel to local horisoatalft The *-3 axis la down aad appro^J-o-etcly pajvillcl to Jocol vortical. �& 2 <b) 5. (g) battcrjca 20 niratea Prejvrtmlioii crev tlrae l l o down, arlor to d « r b i t bum (20 siautoe) for tranalumir icjcctic® incbidee eyotsas IHU c o n r o e a n d f i n e a L i g a a ' . n t chcc'rr. — ^2 mljiut-es iOTOiv . - a l l crew acKboro» 2,oJt Trpr-.npoc-lllon npd Docjfln^ 1, (c) 2. <c) The i a tho active vohicle diirinj tmniposition and docking* Tl}r S—IVB l a l a The f.-l'VB o c p n P s M o n tranrpeoition noaeuver ol«rla with within + JO" of tho trajectory pleucs the 3* (g) r o l l i a order to s-.llgn +X a x i s f o r w a r d a n d *2. ^xla frofT t h e S - J V B t h o CSM p o r f o m j a + 1 8 0 " a --63° ' tfaa a t t i t u d e IiaLd n o d e - -Jp. After eeparation p'tch maneuver follovicd by for docking, Tioo for tranepoottlon anif decking including preparation, jettison o f SIA<. a n d p e r f o n v a n c e o f b a r v l d o c k i n g p r o c e d u r e o i s 4 0 m i n u t e s Inrolving a l l crcwucn. 4. (g) 2-6«5 Time f o r S-IVB ceparation including preparatoiy procedures i s 5 minutes. T r n n s l H c y . r Co.-5j^ 1(c) 2» (d) Tno coast period iacluiofi o mariruQ of nine nrdcourse Rovigaticr . c i g h t i n g a , f o u r THU a i i g n m o n t n a n d t h r o o d c i t n V c o r r e c t i o n s . Passjye Hiermnl Control (ITC) io required during cooct except a s Jnternipted by i'TC t h e Cf-H mte of ' \ axis. the j'equircmonts of y-Z phase l e pointed toward This Periods of nor ratio ITC o j u r a t i o n e r e I t i l ^ - - ? contlnucie f o r a long a t t l t i - d e hold t i n e , t.hs PTl*. the 7 aud ••cf The "nile-oi'''thUaE." iratlo of For ehort attitude hold tlnco (l';6e roll to hold ic than 15 minutes), tkf i s 7 to 1« Attttndff Eold 5 oin* Hequlrcd Roll Tine 55 15 laln. X'.75 h o u r n 30 min. 2.5 3 hrs (esx.) 3. i t s initial oi*lontation, if s,pp:-oviBatoly ^20" about must bo follovcd by 15 hc-sre of i s that the rollLog cictioa ^-onbines with vehicle residual d r i f t ra'-fto causing the X a r i a ro pi'^cees about 5 to lo Duri.-. tho tnm (•20") end a r o l I t o 2*5 rovolvi Jons ]v?r hour I s coteMlshcd about precession creating rocotiooe Z cscs. periods itrfo 1 abo-^e. hoars 15 hrs. Tine period for navigBtiocal ei^^tiugs i s 36 Bin. InyolTss one c m . (g) 10^ �P®rio^> Tor oid-courc? rcrr^^tion involvt>« oil thx-fy crewmea, includeo ri^noutfcr C/K to dooirM atUhide^ syatea en-up acd (g) checkout, firixij; of aj-uv.'> for tillnpc, SPS firing, rci-ifl'-etiou of doUa V cl'tnlapd (requ'rce contact vUh Wr-FtO^ poot ilrina eyoteia checkn, 25 oUa. j" 5 vg) 2.6 6 TXtno poriod for an TKU ocanfle oUgnriCit. £c:ji)onco is IL nlnutos, 6 min'itcs additiorjil for fine .lUEftmrnt, oad ? wlnutos for a finn allgninont cneck. lAxnur Or'olf Tn>;"vtJ on 1. (c) 2o (g) The X axis is appro^rlnvjtoljr pn-allcl to with -X forrfnrd. Y cr Z axes. th? limar local borizorr ' Ho reotriction ia placed on the direction of • TiiBO for lunar orbit inj&cticn Jjiclndcc sy-^teoi chorlca. lOT eoar, ollgnaeatp IMU fine alignnant. manouver C/H to decirjA alignfflent^ eet-«p lOI navigation pamneters, ullage firing, SFC firing, poo-: fire syetea checka - 1 hr. 5 oin. 2. 6^7 I.uner Orh: t 1. Co) Orbital aav5gr.~iorj.al. iiighcliign wil.l bo requ.ii^d durJ.og rbo first, two orbits for orbit coaC: nnatlon.. CSM aititudc will fc? with the During thin period the general cad +Z -X cxsa jwlateci below the local horJronfcal plane and the X ax-ls will .'io wlth.iu 6'J® of tha orbit p.i-.no;. C 2, (c) A Blnlojum of thros cib'tal car gotio-al s'.ghtlnge (iitiliaiiig IHO alignment of 'lO a.-lni-tea) will he x*ca«.tred daily. See itea ebove for atl.ttUfic3% 3. Proper ECS oporatioa in Invar >>rbtt la dejj.rndent upon the orien* (d) tioo of a plane which b.is'jcts (c) and which p^.rnlloi the X ttxia. .he CSK withjn 25" of th:i swbpoir-r po^it dxrertloa of i.-.a- rr . Devl.a'-.ior froa thia require- ortilts every two days. IKIJ aligaiaoiit ."cccasita«ea pli-.eliig the (c) i.h.f.e plr.r.? a-;iet; rtmi- < the r.str.t at vMc!i t-.c iise intersects the .lun.ar (rjrj".»<-e). Bent Is aIloj:;ed a n-uciM'.'ni of +Z/'"f and -Z/+T quadranta The edge of vX ax.ia in the general and wiiatcinirg it witnln 6o* of the oihit planelihe -fX axis susfc ^etEa^n at least 35® BJ»cve the IcK^al hori-zontal. 5, (g) Tlae fox in;-tl-al rotry ici o LfJi-fiq'iaLiac CSM c:\d .lor?: prcpsure.; roQove and etow CH preaeure aid thonsal fcatchear puTforvi CM eyotpm checks? diecoaaar t and blow probe and c-4*o.^e, cheek for Lffl pressure equal!tat loo. op-ri LBl hatch, tranafer unbiU.cnl O 6. <s) Time for initial ro trsnsfer tc 155'. - It. tiiin. rh-rkc.it activate and chocjcout •jo-oiunica-' tlona, control aed v.-^tning sysven, power ayatca, SXiSj ARS, fanB.^ transfer of PISS and other eei:..'.i:nca! to LEr!? suit transfer serond oan, d-:^ploy landing g?ar, checkout propuliUon r^ystcae? coarss and fine allgmjcnt of liEM TIPJ. set wp rarisation ia L£K, close up I~; -- 2 hro, -17 .?5n. jOfe �2n6.8 lii'/nv Trrnnfor and Uindtug lo Tho 1 hour pr.'.or to I£K e^^pnration frao tlin CM, all three CTv^ («) cc-j;hor3 will be totally' occupied w.Ub Ration nnd other ispaceoraft xreparatory aetivitias, Z . -Kroa lEM cop^ratron to ton-hdo-n, ao o.rperi.montQ will bo porforC' ' Ch) oithoT on-bcard LEM or CM, • 3# "^he two LEN trrt'vnflQ will have "•erapi.ritfd a ulcep cycle no store thcc <b) 6 hours prior to start of litoar trr.anfpr. 2..6,9 Lio.ar Surface 1. After landlns,. prallol.nary LSM cecxirtng and checlrout tiote Is 15 eiu. (g) 2.. Preparation tim? for initial Ivr-ar egress •• -^x^^llne .r>rface, (g) photograffti, review exploration plans ia light of actual conditions, check out ond don suits and PLT-S equ^poent., check out cconunlos* tions, get ocicntlflc oqulpmenl ready - 1 )jr,. 8 oin<c) Duoo lEH preosuro - 5 oin, U, Erf.t Lai, get scientific equipaent and 3ow.»r to gro'ind, oliBb dc.'o (g) loddcT to lunar surface, chock nobility cum iru"fnce coaditions 12 Din. 5. Conduct external inspection of LEW - 5 dn. (r) 6. Erect and align lunar surface S-band dish aotonna - 20 Bin. ^b-) 7. Climb ladder, transfer equlpfflcit into LW, enter Lra • 2 sin, (g) 50 sec, S 8. Repressuzdso LE31 - l8 nin. 50 <ee. (eirgie oysten) (g) 1 Bin. 20 £«, (both'eyctcr.6) 9. No biological waste shall be disposed on the lunar sarfsce withou (g) sterilization, • 10, The LBi is designed so that it con bo left unoccupied with the (g) cabin unpreaeurlzed on the lurar aorfnce. Etqic-rlment design should conform, or posnlble eil'ects be properly defined* # 11, Figure shows tkf- c-xim* disteaeo for E/A froa the I£K as a function of the duration cf the EI ertiwily, TlJo ig based on the amount of oxyger. available to provida purging of ^he SI ffJit in case of pressure stiit rcvitalizatlon syeteBi failure. 10-1 �2.6,10 T.i;inr 1 r:-.-? ZVOU8 f-rc.-^jror:.-'. fo-^ J.^-^ach - L t r - I = xE. 2. (b) Tl-.ore uj.li be r.o exi>9rici.iat activity dvwin? L5J1 iunor return, doekir-s, ="d period throu..^ trausearth a.iiJftCfc:;.on.. JJ. (g) Tft't I.TI vfl be "enof.derni the neiive dni^kJn^ "ncaber on th® roMiru fcr.irtzroua. .9 2f6«l.l Trencrifi'-tb T^jrcttoa 1. (c) 2- (c) (c) k, (b) C 5, (g) >2i.6vl2 1- FolloHiPg TI'U alignTBept the +:i lucla in dJ.r<ictod approx^natoly pnr.illel to rhe local bor-',zont;al prior to jr-Untiog transearth in.ief.ticr . Hocharge b:i>-tQrir-3 20 oiontea prior to dooiblt burn • 20 ain. Prcperat ion iinte for traeooanJi injectioa 3 hrso pr'or to engine ignltlo. xrill take approrltcatoJj -gnd TH/SM $*n^3rn_t loa 98 Trnr'.oluner Coaut '2,6r5'*l) 2e <c) Saoe as Tv;jnaluri.nr Coaat ''2.6.''-2) 5.. (c) Tn addition to tho .-TC ratiulrc.sants of Iterei 2 aboTe, It ia necoasary to provide pre- re'er.-;ry coolirg j!or the for,<ard heat 3l!i9ld> Tliio is acccaplifihcd by keeping the -X axis cumM sun-.T-aT^J i/itn,ln ^o lioitg specified for PTf*. 4. (a, b 8f c) * IflU allgr.r.er'j; io tJie aftnc as Innar orbit (2.6-7), Trrrn'-trth Co<^n (b & c) (a LSTH Jattlrcn orruro prior to oll^^ncDt ejkI la acooupllahod With tbf -X axis in the dircctLon of riJgbl. msd Uie *Z arts pointed tovmrdo the liiv'nr f.urfvjc. tt No e.-nJoriccntnl or .•3peri,n.l ope-.-atlooil activity rcoulring crrw attenticn e.-mll be echcJulcd during the final hours of the Ti'arcear'h Coast period dug to the cr.ltioality of «ct«blJ.shlng a cafe on'-ry corridor, liiui-pueat etownge bo rooplotGd during this period. 5. c) For CM/EM e rnr^^-e.tioe tho »X s.tis is rotated 60-70® nbovo the dlrectloo of flight and ti the trs.Jectory plane. The +Z axis baa s 'zcii.-.iTs prnjcctlcr. ra np-wr.rd l?c-^l Tartl'r.l. 6. (a) The zy^'"-- s-:-arE':i,:: a-i ;;re-sf:7y s.aiavTer r-j>t ce r: ::a-ci Its less thxn 5 clautas prior to reaeliiSr; ^O.CCO fee' entry altitude. i ICS. �7. ferforr iPS statu© clieck prior fo CH/SM c^pcratioo (6 mln.) and .n) © Bain bus status checlt eftar separation nr.d prior to ro-eatrr (5 nlQ,). • 8. Check pyro br.ttcriss prior to C.V5M esparstlon (1 ailoO, (a) 9« Disconnect fuot colla froo CM bnoses orlor to CH/5H aaparatioa (o) (Icda.), • 10. Porforra oTatuo check of ClVSCS tvo houro prior to CM/CM aeaaratlo . (a) (1 Din.), ' U, Preheat C^/RCS wigine vaivns 10-15 atnutes, to be corjplcte 10 ola'.tca (n) prior to ri-I/JSi saparaticn-. 2.6 15 Rg'-ertry nrri Piecoy.^ry 1- CM landing shall be planc^-d no earlier thsn one hour prior to (A) Eunriae, or later than three bo'.'ra prior to ouacet* 2. The longitude of entry for both the CH and .Ti ojuat bo such that (a) the GM doon not endanaer any lend raaaes., 5* Sitry stares vlth the —X axis In the trajectory p32me aod rotatr-' (c) appro::lnvite3y 26* earTh>fard from local horizontal and vd-th the *Z nsia pointed avay from earth. A, (fi) E^orin'-dta or data roturned In the CH. mu^t eorvivo a aaxiBua of two dayo aftor landing. % ((A �2.7 op.•^ATTO^?/.L 2 ^ 7 1 gns 1. (a) i n vattcr.,; •'^.^.-•,?(».- J-.o ;<.on." '. C?yr. - ra l"v« Tne ndiator inifti; toapL>^i-ntnrc r-ua^; ba i*A*3tr.ia:i r.bov® 75®F fo prevont frcftriiia and b-jl^v "F to prevoni bnlHua- 1'h« - folL- ving .nr® operational ••ni?.^of-thuB'a" ron-itrolata. Where expor. riai raquiremcata roquir-a rioUition .>r these rules, & d^tai.V-i vhffirmal balnnoe onaljats ohoald ba ci-.ie. •* 2.7,2 2®7»3 b(a) The apa-'.-ecraft attltvde ahould not be .-'cr.Btralned In an ir-crtlai or earth relftive orientation fc-r longer than 3 h-'-G .. C, (a) Eleetrieal loads of loss tlias l68o»l65K3'vatto require periodic oxpoctira of the radietor to tho sun to picvent freezing, Routiaa Ovi-Tn tlon.?! Coaatrglnts SPG prc.p ;llant O'lsi be rsintniiied clove 'tO®F, Alihongh no fixed rule if poGjiiblo, attitude bo:d? grc^t-er t-uir 3 hours in curatior without uoLrc incidence on the £»•! aft end should be avoided, bhoro cxpcrlrtent cctlvitJes exrresd this tiue, ti theroal aaaljalr should be conducted to check propellant tc«porr.tari?6, PCS fSM) routine Opcrattooal roGgt;-g.intq 1,. (a) 2»7«'f' Tha radiator ourfoc'j'nliould not be ercporad to ao^ar radlatlc. Incidenrro angles of for mora thar 20 clautss por orbit cn vhe n-emge to p.i-event boiling, Jln-:inuB expocurc of theo<' rnslao tor any one tine ifj one orbit, Service Pre'M! J'l i c.:t Syin c-n 1. (a) C a, (a) /'ny f pe quad of the ECS (SM) ihall not b® pclnted towards deep cpace for prrlode exceeding 6* "jO hours. S—IVB Po^itj.re ^'eratipoul^CquKV-raiuj-g i, (a) 'Hie S^TVB propellmt tar.k« oatv be veutod parittdlcally, probably about evnry 'i boors on aa avenig®. 2(a) The S-1V3 ofabie pJatfora in tha lb has a ::».dd!.e gimbnl restrlfttion of +45® about the X^dxis vehicle yaw at luunch, roll la. flight. 2.7.5 Ouidence end Jfevigatioo Syntem RovHoe Opftiational Con^t.'rslnta 1. (a) O The S-lb'S stable platform in ii.e 10 has a slddie glsfiai rectrlctiVon of ^5® about the X-ex<a vehicle ji-w at lauochs roll in flight,*' �2 8 Rr,^UIRg!ir.'iTg 2.8.1 1. SPS propolLs^t chctll b* kiiatainod above lift c^rnbutloa (a) Inatabl'Llt/ iovoi during any d<orbit ironeu^rr, (OX Yoot Iba.). 2 . Contiuuo':a iii'G abort capability will be ea'At-ntalacd. (o) 3. Tbo nicaloa rhall be aborted a® eoon aa i>038lblc after (a)- wnoontroliacl lo^3 of cabin prec^urizaltca. U- SK-KCS dcorbit capability chnll be provided during ary? portica (a) of near-earth orbital flight. 5« In-fl.''-ght contingency octious eb&ll b© initiated prircarily by Cg) oanual Rcr-an utilesn cfflorgsncy corditlon rc-iuirestcata ars cuch that c!.anual opo ation Is incoaelsteat with crew oafety. C - ��r- ATH Sfcr.MHzr.tior ai>:I Ccjcvn1 T ..— . •» t>i.«»-or-«v ^*^..4—-,—^-^- ui:;hia Coicr>'nc<&8 of huspa cr.pablllty By Anolyzina crow cfipability to acquire target within 10 oinutea \j Dotcrainios crew inputo for autcaiatic operation of the ATM ^ Evaluating ooquencc for cxperlnent cctamanda (tsaxiraum 100 ccxsands) Selecting control toodeo coopatible with operator capabilitioa Analysing available ATM target and status presentetioa har(h7are Selecting diaplsQ' and control coabinotlon which places least demand on operator skill and endurance Insuric^ that AiM to opGrstcr input 2. c end LE2I ASS prc'ide near synchronous respcnse D-Jtucwitie training requlreL^nts to ensuire ma-y<tmrm crew proflciencv t^ith selected /AM display ajid ccntrol hardware By Specifying critical tacke required for perfomeace of A'-AI alsoion Providing course and briefing outlines for crew fcsdUerizatioa and training InawiiiS direct ccrrolction between trainer and opcracionoi equipircnt •T h �ATM 1. r'Mtabll.'.(:y_rnd "roCj.\e Evaiuat* haoiualtiiity By Analysing ovorall usabla volutn.; Avnllabillty Insuring ATI! peeullcr and crev fiupport equipasnt ecaplles vltb buisaa enginacring and fllghc snfcty criCaria Inruring adequacy of Illumination for A1^! display and cnntrol eystems Entabliahing vrorb cycle conipecible with overall mission requlrcnonts and Gcailni/Apollo data 2. Evaluate carrier profile for coirpatibllity vitb ATM oysteas By Chacking ATM retrievable (EVA) cassette alze against hatch sizec Evaluating data ensootte maaseo to eisure crew translation capability Confirroing compatibility between cascettes and carrier otowago provisions C Evaluating ATM DJC for cdB^liance with human engineering work station criteria Confirming volume allocation and stot-age configuration for special EVA gear, i.e., maneuvering system, tools, lights, life support f O �Am u:^7^^Ac^^y::a co??57p};p,^Txo^ls n.^onj'.vof^jr.tfl Fvow ATd 1V\ Ground chsckout of ATH OrbJ.tnl checkout of All-I Sonceeraft poAntlnE end trncking prior and durlns experiment Crev notion reotri.ctlons during tracking Ara poiutlag end trucking design and techniques ATH enperlircnft Goqucnclng and control Tarseto of opportunity (in-flight noprosrninalng) ATH ocbltcl reactivation (potential rainfccnancc) Control/dicpley coinpatibllity with LEH/AXM C£-.D Orbital/baSC-H cosaounicationn and flig^C planning C ^ f, E7A ti'."/, film data retrieval (esasette management) r^'A crew equipment fcr frequent Bv'A'b (mod^s) Cr.--.- locc.-nction and tcthsring (hardware) Cv£!.* rr:tabolAc load (vork cchedulc) IllualnaCion duriaag EVA Crew corpartceut pre- during and post- KVA procedures Crcv; corrpartiMnt EVA coinpacibillty (b&tchcs, O2 supply) A'.il rc^tctiration and rafurhishmcnt (fcatterlea, Ci-';G'8, etc.) Crev force aiui morsant impacts on iVlM Instsllation design Special tools and test equipment. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Saturn V Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/60" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">View the Saturn V Collection finding aid in ArchivesSpace</a> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Saturn V Collection Description An account of the resource The Saturn V was a three-stage launch vehicle and the rocket that put man on the moon. (Detailed information about the Saturn V's three stages may be found <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/rocketpark/saturn_v_first_stage.html">here, </a><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/rocketpark/saturn_v_second_stage.html">here, </a>and <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/rocketpark/saturn_v_third_stage.html">here.</a>) Wernher von Braun led the Saturn V team, serving as chief architect for the rocket. Perhaps the Saturn V’s greatest claim to fame is the Apollo Program, specifically Apollo 11. Several manned and unmanned missions that tested the rocket preceded the Apollo 11 launch. Apollo 11 was the United States’ ultimate victory in the space race with the Soviet Union; the spacecraft successfully landed on the moon, and its crew members were the first men in history to set foot on Earth’s rocky satellite. A Saturn V rocket also put Skylab into orbit in 1973. A total of 15 Saturn Vs were built, but only 13 of those were used. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000073 Title A name given to the resource "Human Factor: ATM/Skylab." Description An account of the resource The "Skylab" in the title was a later addition. This is a summary of the human factor aspects of the Apollo Applications space habitat. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Martin Marietta Corporation Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966-09-21 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1965-1970 Subject The topic of the resource Martin Marietta Corporation Skylab Program Apollo applications program Human factors in engineering design Apollo Telescope Mount Onboard equipment Extravehicular mobility units Life support systems Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Saturn V Collection Box 19, Folder 9 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/21/14409/001.pdf 57c118af0b27289322b6f8f251bd3c0e PDF Text Text NASA Contractor Report 3942 Human Performance Issues Arising From Manned Space Station Missions William K. Douglas CONTRACT NAS2-11725 OCTOBER 1986 fVJASA ��SK (.58 NASA Contractor Report 3942 Human Performance Issues Arising From Manned Space Station Missions William K. Douglas McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company Huntington Beach, California Prepared for Ames Research Center under Contract NAS2-11723 fUASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration Scientific and Technical Information Branch 1986 ��CONTENTS SUMMARY INTRODUCTION METHOD MECHANICS SAFEGUARDING CONFIDENTIALITY GENERAL FINDINGS ANSWERS TO PREPARED QUESTIONS SPONTANEOUS COMMENTS APPENDIX A APPENDIX B ��SUMMARY Ten former NASA astronauts were Interviewed t o provide Information f o r use In planning f u t u r e space f l i g h t missions. Although no s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of t h e material was performed, t h e responses do provide Insight Into numerous aspects of space f l i g h t . Including psychological aspects, t r a i n i n g , command s t r u c t u r e , health and comfort, physical aspects, and many o t h e r s . The responses by t h e Astronauts t o t h e questions a r e presented together with coRTients by t h e researcher, himself a physician with long experience with the space program. Additionally, spontaneous matters t h a t came up 1n t h e questioning periods a r e reported upon together with t h e r e s e a r c h e r ' s comments on t h e s e a s w e l l . The r e s u l t s , which maintain the s t r i c t c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of the Individual respondents, contribute t o t h e basic Information required by those planning f u t u r e missions In space. INTRODUCTION This I s a report of information obtained during t h e course of separate Interviews with ten former NASA astronauts t h a t took place during t h e f i r s t half of 1984. The purpose of t h e Interviews was t o e l i c i t Information t h a t had not been previously reported and t h a t might open leads f o r f r u i t f u l research endeavors applicable t o the United S t a t e s Space Station program. There a r e many reasons why t h i s Information might not have been reported. I t might have been forgotten during the Astronaut's p o s t - f l i g h t debriefing, o r he might not have f e l t t h a t i t was Important a t t h a t time. There may have been personal reasons why he did not care t o mention some Items. Some material may have developed in h i s mind as a r e s u l t of r e f l e c t i o n s since h i s f l i g h t and of h i s observations of f l i g h t a c t i v i t y t h a t have occurred since h i s own mission. Every e f f o r t has been made t o safeguard t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of t h e inquiry, a s described in t h e section on c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . 1 �METHOD A 11st of fifty-one questions (Appendix A) was formulated by the Investigator. Published documents, discussions with NASA personnel, and the Investigator's own personal knowledge of space f l i g h t human factors entered Into the formulation of the questions. Some changes were made In the l i s t of questions as Insights were gained during the course of the Interviews. The original thought was that each subject would be asked each question on the l i s t , but I t soon became apparent that t h i s approach would not be the best way t o proceed. Some of the questions clearly referred t o specific programs. Project ApoUo for example, and would be of l i t t l e use in Interviewing a person whose experience was restricted t o an e a r l i e r program. Further, I t was seen that s t r i c t adherence t o the l i s t of questions would result In s t i l t e d , stereotyped replies - the questions became boring rather than stimulating. After the f i r s t two o r three Interviews, I t was decided t o use the questions only t o stimulate discussion. Although some questions were given t o a l l ten contacts, some were only given t o one or two. with each question being presented t o an average of 6.2 contacts. This I s somewhat misleading because In certain Instances questions would stimulate answers t o l a t e r questions, and the responses were combined. (See Question 4) Ames Research Center provided the Investigator with a l e t t e r of Introduction (Appendix B), which described the program and I t s goals, and which reviewed the background of the Investigator. The l e t t e r gave absolute assurance that the Information given would be safeguarded In such a manner that no statement could be attributed e i t h e r t o an Individual o r t o his specific f l i g h t . The contacts were each paid a consultant's fee of $50.00 per hour. I t was originally Intended for Mr. Donald K. Slayton t o be present a t each Interview so as t o take advantage of his background, training, and knowledge of manned space f l i g h t operations. I t proved nearly Impossible t o coordinate the schedules of the Investigator, of Mr. Slayton, and of the contacts. 2 �without delaying the progress of the project to an unacceptable degree; Hr. Slayton, therefore, was present during only two of the interviews. The first interviews were with people known personally to the investigator or to Hr. Slayton (or both). These individuals made suggestions for subsequent interviews. MECHANICS The contacts were first called by telephone and the purpose of the study was explained to them. If they consented to being interviewed (and some declined because of their busy schedules), an appointment was made, and a copy of the letter of introduction was mailed to them in sufficient time to allow them to review it before the interview. Because of the preconceived opinion of the investigator that the presence of a tape recorder would be inhibitory to the free flow of information, the original plan specifically excluded the taping of the interviews. When the first individual was contacted, and when it was explained to him that a tape recorder would not be used, he said he felt the taking of handwritten notes would be distracting to him. interview. He then asked that a recorder be used in his When subsequent contacts were made, each person was given his option of using a tape recorder or not. reluctance to being taped. None expressed even the slightest One even asked for a copy of the tape for his children. In all cases the investigator traveled to the community where the contact lived. The interviews took place in the contact's office on three occasions, in his home on three occasions, and in the investigator's hotel room on four occasions. The environment was very informal. used only to stimulate discussion. question was selected and asked. As stated earlier, the questions were When the conversation lagged, another This usually resulted in a great deal more spontaneous conversation. 3 �SAFEGUARDING CONFIDENTIALITY Each contact was assured at the time of the initial telephone conversation that anything he said would not be traceable to him or to his flight. The letter of Introduction contained these same assurances, and they were repeated in the investigator's letter that forwarded the NASA letter of Introduction. Finally, the subject was given the same assurances orally at the time of the Interview. It was apparent that most of them appreciated the assurances of confidentiality and were probably more open In their discussions as a result of those assurances. After each Interview the tapes (12 In all) were brought back to the Investigator's residence, where they have remained stored In a safe location. They are identified only with a numerical code number. does not appear on the cassette label. material verbatim In most Instances. The contact's name The Investigator transcribed the Paraphrasing was rarely used and then only when It became necessary to clarify syntax that was peculiar to the oral Interview situation. There are a few portions of the tape that have not been transcribed because they referred to the personal social relationships of the contact and the Investigator. The Investigator transcribed a11 the recorded material on an Apple He personal computer In his home, using the Apple Writer II word processing program. No secretarial assistance was used In either transcribing the taped material or In the preparation of this report. tapes of these Interviews. No other person has heard the To facilitate preparation of this report, the transcribed Interviews were printed on 104 single-spaced sheets. than the Investigator has seen these typed pages. No one other When not In use. they are kept In a combination-locked safe In the Investigator's office. Each transcription Is saved on a magnetic disc, and duplicate discs have been made and stored separately. 4 �GENERAL FINDINGS The subjects were, without exception, extremely cooperative. towards the investigator or the project was expressed. No animosity The investigator could detect no evidence of conscious withholding of information. A broad range of experienced people were interviewed, including persons who had flown on all NASA programs, with the exception of the Space Shuttle. Interviews were conducted with crew members from Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Stcylab. The Apollo contacts included men who had participated in the Earth-orbiting phase of the project, and in the lunar landing phase. One of these latter contacts landed on the moon and another was a Command Module Pilot who remained in lunar orbit alone during a lunar landing mission. No meaningful statistical evaluation can be made for several reasons: 1. The list of questions was not rigidly adhered to. All subjects were not asked all questions. 2. Answers to questions were subjective in nature. 3. Many spontaneous questions generated by the subject's comments evolved on the spot. interviews. Some of these were not really applicable to subsequent On the other hand, some of these spontaneously generated questions were asked at subsequent interviews, but no effort was made to contact earlier subjects to ask them to answer the newly generated questions. 4. Only ten people were interviewed. In this report the questions will be stated, and in cases where the question was presented to several individuals, an evaluation of the replies will be attempted. Spontaneous statements of importance and answers to spontaneously generated questions are included at the end of the answers to the list of fifty-one questions. NOTE: After the answers to each question, there is a section labeled "COMMENTS'. This section contains the investigator's own subjective remarks 5 �and evaluation of the statements made by the contacts. A COMMENTS section w111 be found after each spontaneous comnent as well as after the answers to the prepared questions. ANSWERS TO PREPARED QUESTIONS 1. Opinion of the Crew Health Stabilization Program. Surprisingly, only 2 of 9 who were asked this question were opposed to the program. All stated either spontaneously (5) or upon questioning (2) that they thought It was helpful In keeping the crews Insulated from annoying contacts. •1 thought 1t was kind of fun. It kept the world away from us." •It allows the crews to concentrate on what It Is they have to think about. flight. They are not being pulled In a number of directions just before the It allows them to focus on the task and the training ahead." CoiMents; Inasmuch as the Crew Health Stabilization Program is no longer practiced with as much rigidity as It was In the early Apollo flights, 1t might be wise to develop some policy for providing a similar degree of privacy and seclusion for future missions. 2. Thoughts on Space Station maintenance activities. NOTE: Because of the similarity of responses to this question and Question 4 regarding tools, the responses to both questions have been cond>1ned here. This question was presented to all the contacts. Two had no comments on the subject. One man said that multipurpose tools were Important. Inclusion of files, wrenches, and other common tools. Swiss Army knife was especially valuable. tape with the adhesive on both sides. He urged the He stated that his He also suggested providing sticky This would be useful In restraining small parts to the workbench surface when making repairs. 6 �One man commented that the Apo11o tool kit was very good. Another urged that maintenance should be kept simple - at the 'black box' level. One respondent thought that neutral buoyancy training was good practice for maintenance, but another stated that it was misleading at best. He urged that any procedures developed in a neutral buoyancy tank be checked out in the zero-g aircraft before being adopted for use in space flight. Only one person mentioned the importance of foot restraints. One recommendation was to project maintenance instructions, and even diagrams, on the inside of the helmet visor in the manner of a Head-Up Display (HUD). A quotation from one of the contacts might prove interesting: •You design things for routine maintenance done there by people with tools in order to keep the system simple, and with simplicity you gain reliability. You get the reliability through that route rather than through redundancy and automation." Comments: The most significant response to this question is contained in the' last quotation. The recent remarkable successes in satellite recovery operations add emphasis to the quotation. Future satellites and future Space Station equipment should be developed with the plan in mind that crew members are capable of performing routine bench-level maintenance. 3. Alarm Systems. This question was presented to seven contacts. Two of them mentioned that they noticed a decrease in the loudness of sounds somewhat proportional to the reduction of pressure in the helmet. experience. Another denied that he had had that Other comnents included the reconmendation that the volume of the alarm be proportional to the severity of the situation; that for critical 7 �energencles t h e r e should be simultaneous visual and a u d i b l e alarms; and t h a t audible alarms should be a "warble t o n e ' a s i s used by some European police cars. Two individuals mentioned t h e g r e a t importance of e l i m i n a t i n g f a l s e alarms. One suggested t h a t a study of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of f a l s e alarms might reveal a "signature" f o r f a l s e alarms. This s i g n a t u r e could be Incorporated i n t o a computer, and alarms could be evaluated a g a i n s t t h e s e signatures before being sounded. Comments: The suggestion t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e " s i g n a t u r e s ' of f a l s e alarms might be worthy of f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 4. Tools f o r o n - o r b i t r e p a i r and maintenance. Inasmuch a s t h i s was covered adequately in Question 2 , r e l a t i n g t o maintenance a c t i v i t i e s , t h e answers t o t h i s question have been combined with those obtained i n response t o Question 2 . Comments; 5. None. Food and meals. Of t h e ten persons Interviewed, one had no cormnent; t h r e e suggested t h a t meals be s elected from a menu i n - f l i g h t ; and f i v e advised t h a t a l l individuals e a t t h e same thing a t each meal with no s e l e c t i o n . Hention was made by these individuals t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y chow l i n e had much t o reconmend i t . One of the f i v e suggested t h a t snack Items be provided f o r f r e e s e l e c t i o n from a pantry, but he s t i l l did not recommend t h a t t h e r e be Item s e l e c t i o n f o r t h e main meals. One person said he f e l t a menu determined ahead of time by crew interviews was of l i t t l e value because people lose some of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o t a s t e when in zero-g. He a t t r i b u t e d t h i s t o loss of convection c u r r e n t s carrying aromatics i n t o t h e nose. He s a i d t h i s could be helped by providing strong condiments - pepper i n o i l s o l u t i o n , hot mustard, and s o f o r t h . 6 �One contact suggested the Investigation of foil-packaged foods that are marketed under the brand name of RETORT FOODS. These are not freeze dried, and may be eaten hot or cold. One contact urged that more attention be paid to the nutritional aspects of the diet. He distinguished between those aspects of food preparation that are conventionally performed by a dietician and those performed by a nutritionist. He suggested NASA pay more attention to the latter aspects of menu and diet selection. Comments; Those who advocated the military chow-line approach have probably not seen today's chow line. In present-day military dining halls, there is a remarkably broad selection of items available. One of the contacts suggested that each crew member be asked about his dislikes rather than his likes. disliked foods would not be provided in his menu. The This seems like a reasonable approach. 6. Trash disposal. This question did not stimulate much discussion in the early interviews so was eliminated later on. Two subjects suggested that trash be pyrolized - convert trash to energy. Two others who were asked had no comment. Five were not asked. Comments; 7. None. Clothing design. The overwhelming opinion was for a two-piece garment with lots of pockets (seven out of nine, with two "No Comments"). The advantage of being able to shed the upper garment for comfort in warm areas was comnented on twice. All agreed that many pockets were a necessity, but pocket closure should be with Velcro rather than with buttons, which could catch on things. Two unusual comments included the suggestion that a "dress" uniform be provided for special occasions- this for morale purposes. colors and styles was important for morale. 9 Another was that a variety of One individual stated the need �for strict dress-code enforcenient as an aid to maintaining discipline. One subject stated he had had some experience with polypropylene outdoor clothing and thought it might be worthwhile investigating. He said it was quite comfortable, but brought up the question of its fire resistance. One suggested a different garment for wear during exercise periods. One man suggested that two-piece uniforms have some means of fastening the shirt/jacket to the waist of the trousers to prevent uncomfortable gapping at that point. He suggested Velcro. There was a need expressed for a place to carry an emergency checklist at all times. Free choice of underwear was suggested. One man suggested that slippers be provided for off-duty wear. Coweents: As might be expected, there was a wide range of suggestions regarding clothing. When some of the more extreme suggestions are eliminated one reaches the conclusion that the basic in-flight uniform should be a two-piece garment with many pockets. The suggestion for the provision of a place to keep an emergency checklist available at all times is a good one. B. Personal hygiene equipment. Three contacts had no comments, and three were not asked. The remainder had comments that did not fit any pattern: One wanted to use an electric toothbrush and an electric razor. Another preferred manual toothbrushes and a blade razor. One man said that all on board should use whatever turned out to be 'issue' equipment. He also mentioned that he would insist on daily shaving as he felt it to be good for mental discipline. mental set. 10 He felt it establishes a good �Although not r e a l l y classed a s personal hygiene equipment, one man commented t h a t showers were important but he f e l t a sponge bath might do a s well. Comments; One might question t h e a d v i s a b i l i t y of providing e l e c t r i c razors, what with t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of producing "whisker dust" In t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e face of t h e u s e r . Since e l e c t r i c razors seem t o be more p r a c t i c a l i n the Space S t a t i o n environment, i t might be worthwhile t o conduct s t u d i e s on t h e Shuttle t o determine whether o r not whisker dust r e a l l y i s formed in the v i c i n i t y of t h e external nares in a zero-g environment. One might a l s o perform animal s t u d i e s t o determine whether o r not dust produced from t h a t animal's own guard h a i r s produced any lung pathology when inhaled on a d a i l y basis f o r extended periods of time. 9. Aids t o t r a n s f e r of massive o b j e c t s . The question was asked of only four people, and two of them had no comments. One person s a i d , "Put a loop of rope around i t and snub i t down." Another suggested t h e use of a "Brooklyn c l o t h e s l i n e " . loop of rope strung between two p u l l e y s . l i n e with c l i p s . This i s a continuous Objects could be attached t o the On t h e other hand, another contact mentioned, in response t o a d i f f e r e n t question, t h a t he had t r i e d such a device in t h e Weightless Environment Training F a c i l i t y (WETF) and found i t worked very well, but when he t r i e d i t in t h e zero-g a i r c r a f t i t became tangled t o such an extent as t o prove u s e l e s s . Comments: 10. None. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of "Up" and "Down". Because of t h e s pecial i n t e r e s t of t h i s question, a g r e a t deal of time was spent on i t . Of t h e t e n subjects questioned, nine were very d e f i n i t e in s t a t i n g t h a t t h e r e was no need t o t a k e any p a r t i c u l a r pains t o i d e n t i f y up and down. Several commented t h a t down was always where t h e i r f e e t were. There appeared t o be no d i f f e r e n c e between t h e answers from individuals who had flown in confined spacecraft and answers from those who had flown in spacious 11 �vehicles. One Individual said he himself was not bothered by the lack of up and down, but stated he f e l t I t would be wise t o ensure t h a t everything In a given volume have the same orientation. One contact related that one of his colleagues had spent "hours and hours' In the simulator, then went Into f l i g h t and became 111 even before he had gotten out of the s eat . The point of t h i s observation I s t h a t t h i s person had excellent up and down references but became 111 anyway. In response t o a direct question, one man said t h a t even seeing his colleagues In an orientation different from his own did not disturb him. Two men conmented that the use of a simulator may drive the configuration of the Space Station, a t least In areas where simulator training 1s extensive. The simulator will have t o be constructed with an up and down orientation because I t I s used In a one-g f i e l d . The Space Station area must match the simulator for training If I t I s t o serve any purpose. The following quotations are presented: (1) 'Before I came Into the space program I tended t o have a great amount of familiarity with mathematical techniques of rotation and translation of axes systems...! tended t o look a t something and j u s t figure t h a t I had a rotated coordinate system. (In space) I ' d look out a t the Earth, and I ' d recognize the Earth had I t s own set of Earth-centered coordinates. The spacecraft had I t s space-centered coordinates. Whenever I saw the two In the same field of view 1 just automatically thought of the spacecraft as being oriented t o the Earth, but more Importantly, I had my own body-centered coordinates, and the Input, If somebody allows them t o , can be of those things. . . . I f you operate 1n egocentric coordinates "down" will be towards your f e e t . I t makes no difference whether you're going over the Earth upside down o r diving under I t , or any of those things, If you really look a t I t as your world Is where you are, and everything else I s oriented around you." (2) One contact said he thought I t fun t o look a t the world upside down. "Trying t o force a one-gravity mode of operation Into zero-gravity I s a mistake. I t defeats a l l of the freedom which you a r e given." 12 �(3) When he would go from one compartment t o another, one person s a i d , •There would be moments of d i s o r i e n t a t i o n and you would kind of f l i p your body around and you'd pick t h e work s t a t i o n you were going t o work a t , and then a s soon as you got your body flipped around t o where you were within about 45 degrees of t h a t work s t a t i o n ' s local v e r t i c a l then everything clicked in and you were comfortable." (4) " I think t h a t maybe i f you s t a r t i d e n t i f y i n g up and down you may be reminding people of t h i n g s they should be f o r g e t t i n g . " " I think we adapt e a s i l y t o most any environment, but I j u s t d o n ' t think there i s a g r e a t deal t o be gained by t r y i n g t o force people t o think as they do here on Earth when they a r e , i n f a c t , in space." Comments: If t h e opinions of t h i s small sample of people a r e f e l t t o be s i g n i f i c a n t one must conclude t h a t special e f f o r t s t o i d e n t i f y "up" and "down" in Space Station will not pay l a r g e dividends. The comment t o maintain a constant local v e r t i c a l i n each module seems worthwhile following, i f i t i s a r c h i t e c t u r a l l y f e a s i b l e and charges no penalty from a design standpoint. On t h e other hand, none of t h e ten subjects interviewed admitted t o having experienced any degree of nausea. If none of t h e ten contacts became i l l , and i f approximately 40X of S h u t t l e crew members become i l l , we a r e drawn t o four possibilities: (1) The sample i s s o small t h a t chance alone resulted in my interviewing only those individuals who did not become i l l . (2) There really i s some difference between those interviewed and Shuttle crew members. (3) flight. The persons interviewed did not admit t h a t they become i l l i n From t h e obvious s i n c e r i t y and d i r e c t n e s s of t h e s e ten contacts, I am convinced t h a t none of them became i l l . This, I must admit, i s a very subjective assessment, but i t i s my conviction t h a t they were a l l t r u t h f u l and f o r t h r i g h t in t h e i r answers t o my questions. This opinion i s substantiated by t h e f a c t t h a t one individual did admit t h a t he would have become i l l had he not paced h i s o n - o r b i t a c t i v i t y f o r t h e f i r s t t h r e e o r four days. This person's conments a r e found in t h e SPONTANEOUS COMHENTS s e c t i o n , which follows. 13 �(4) The flight environment of these ten contacts was different from the Shuttle environment. I suspect that the reason for the observed difference 1n distribution of nausea In this group Is a combination of (1) and (4). 11. Use of vented gases for attitude control. This was only asked of four contacts. One remarked that vented gases had been used as an expediency to control tumbling In Gemini V. Another had no coment regarding the use of gases for attitude control, but he did suggest that they be used to run turbines for power. One said he did not think It such a good Idea - use control moment gyros Instead. Comments: 12. None. Importance of private cwnnunlcatlons. This question was asked of all ten Individuals. Responses varied from, 'Hot all that Important' to 'Absolutelyl' Host of the respondents thought a private line was Important for personal connunlcatlon with families, but of equal Importance was Its use In operational control of the flight. One subject gave an example of a situation In which Instructions had to be paraphrased to keep them from being heard by the press. The paraphrased Instruction was misinterpreted to be a Joke and was not followed. The example cannot be further Identified or described here as it would reveal the source, but suffice It to say that the well-being of a crew member was Jeopardized by this misunderstanding. One contact said, 'The Administrator [NASA] doesn't have a microphone In his office with the world listening Into everything he says. astronauts have the same privilege?' 14 Why can't �Another s a i d , 'They ( t h e press) have no more r i g h t in your bedroom on o r b i t than they have in your bedroom on Earth. They a r e not allowed t o go t o your doctor and find out how you a r e and what you a r e doing (on Earth so they d o n ' t have t h a t r i g h t i n s p a c e ) . Coffinents: I d o n ' t c a r e who's paying t h e b i l l . " The respondents' r e p l i e s t o t h i s question were based more on t h e i r feelings of p r i v i l e g e r a t h e r than on t h e a c t u a l need f o r and u t i l i t y of a private communications l i n k . They admitted t h e importance of the r i g h t t o speak p r i v a t e l y t o t h e i r f a m i l i e s , but they did not seem too concerned with the beneficial e f f e c t such communications would have on mission accomplishment. The comment regarding the u t i l i t y of a p r i v a t e link t o discuss purely operational matters was s i g n i f i c a n t . I would l i k e t o point out t h a t during s t r e s s f u l t r a i n i n g exercises during the Mercury program I had many opportunities t o use t h e private l i n e and found i t t o be of g r e a t b e n e f i t in assessing the s t a t u s of t h e t r a i n e e . The t r a i n e e s more than once made statements a s t o t h e i r physical s t a t u s t o me on t h e p r i v a t e l i n e t h a t they would not make on t h e open loop. As an individual, and not a s t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r i n t h i s study. I would strongly recommend t h a t an absolutely p r i v a t e communications l i n k be provided. The "Earth end" of t h e link would be under t h e control of t h e crew member. That i s , t h e crew member would decide who he would t a l k p r i v a t e l y t o , h i s family, t h e f l i g h t c o n t r o l l e r , t h e physician, o r anyone e l s e . One of t h e contacts in t h i s investigation even mentioned t h a t a person spending many weeks o r months in a Space S t a t i o n might wish t o speak p r i v a t e l y t o h i s broker! 13. Use of portable f a n s . Five contacts were asked t h i s question, and none of t h e f i v e ventured an opinion. Comments: 14. The question was not presented t o t h e o t h e r f i v e . None. Opinions regarding t r a n s l a t i o n a l a i d s , control/switch p r o t e c t i v e devices, o r i e n t a t i o n cues, and p r o t e c t i v e gear f o r personal wear. 15 �Five of t h e ten contacts were not asked any p a r t of t h i s q u e s t i o n . Of the f i v e remaining, only p a r t s were asked, o r only p a r t s were answered. Four subjects expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h e coninon "wicket-type" switch guards. One person s a i d he could not v i s u a l i z e r o l l r a t e s of such a magnitude as t o require personal p r o t e c t i v e equipment such a s headgear. He a l s o said rounded corners and o t h e r methods should be used t o p r o t e c t a person moving about in t h e cabin. be required. Comments; 15. One o t h e r person s a i d he did not b e l i e v e headgear would None. Opinions regarding t h e a i r l o c k on Skylab. This question was presented t o only t h r e e people, and only one of them had an opinion. He s t a t e d , "There should always be a s a f e haven one can g e t t o . The racetrack design I s good. To have a s a f e haven in each module I s too c o s t l y , I t takes up t o o much room." Cocmaents: 16. None. Ideas regarding crew q u a r t e r s . This was addressed by nine out of t h e ten Interviewed. f e e l t h a t p r i v a t e crew q u a r t e r s were necessary. very Spartan conditions. Only two did not One of t h e s e two advocated He commented t h a t we c a n ' t a f f o r d t o build a Space S t a t i o n t o accormodate anybody and everybody. We must s e l e c t crews t h a t can t o l e r a t e Spartan l i v i n g conditions f o r ninety days. they can hang up anywhere." "Olve them a sleeping bag The o t h e r one of t h e s e two s a i d he compared a ninety-day Space S t a t i o n t o u r with an overseas m i l i t a r y t o u r o r a camping trip. He s a i d , " I d o n ' t t h i n k you need t o have a p r i v a t e room and a l l t h a t as long a s you have a place t o s l e e p . " 16 �One of t h e remaining seven who commented s a i d he saw two c o n f l i c t i n g requirements, one was t h e need f o r q u i e t and privacy, and t h e o t h e r was t h e need t o be near t h e work s t a t i o n t o respond t o emergencies. He suggested t h a t NASA explore t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of providing a "sea cabin" f o r one o r more crew members. He a l s o f e l t t h a t any alarms sounded In t h e crew q u a r t e r s should be p r i o r i t i z e d - perhaps only a " B a t t l e S t a t i o n s ! " type of alarm. One contact with Skylab experience said he thought t h e crew quarters should be a t l e a s t twice t h e s i z e of t h e Skylab q u a r t e r s . He a l s o advised t h a t they not be located near t h e exercise area t o diminish t h e noise l e v e l s . One person commented t h a t t h e Apollo s l e e p r e s t r a i n t s were adequate, and one commented t h a t t h e Skylab s l e e p r e s t r a i n t s were good. With t h e exception of t h e two "Spartans", everyone believed p r i v a t e , individual, comfortable q u a r t e r s should be provided. Comments: There seems t o be no question but t h a t p r i v a t e crew quarters should be provided. These should be a s large a s I s practicably possible. It Is evident t h a t t h e e a r l y Space S t a t i o n w i l l not be large enough t o provide commodious q u a r t e r s , but I t seems t h a t , given t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s , privacy I s more t o be desired than volume. 17. Medical t r a i n i n g f o r crew members. This question was presented t o e i g h t of t h e ten c o n t a c t s . The most common response was t h a t e i t h e r a f l i g h t surgeon be on each crew, o r t h a t two of t h e crew members should be t r a i n e d t o t h e level of paramedics. One respondent said he believed a l l crew members should have extensive t r a i n i n g 1n physiology so t h a t they would b e t t e r understand medical o r physiological problems t h a t arose In themselves o r In o t h e r s . He a l s o f e l t t h e r e should be a f l i g h t surgeon on board f o r long-term exposures. Another f e l t t h a t every crew member should have t h e equivalent of paramedic t r a i n i n g , and t h a t a physician was not necessary unless he was dual t r a i n e d - a s a payload s p e c i a l i s t f o r example. One o t h e r contact suggested t h a t i f a physician were assigned he should be 17 �dual t r a i n e d . Another contact reconnended t h a t NASA. 1n t h e i r s e l e c t i o n program f o r mission s p e c i a l i s t s . Include s u f f i c i e n t physicians a s t o provide one f o r each Space S t a t i o n crew. Comments: C l e a r l y , a minimum of two people on each crew must have some competency 1n providing medical c a r e . other can take care of him. If one of t h e s e two becomes 111, the A good compromise would be f o r one of t h e crew members t o be a dual-trained ( a s a payload s p e c i a l i s t ) physician and t h e other a s a dual-trained person with medical t r a i n i n g e q u i v a l e n t t o t h a t of a paramedic. 18. Need f o r group dynamics t r a i n i n g . Group dynamics t r a i n i n g was b r i e f l y described a s a psychological technique which helps people t o work together and t o give each o t h e r mutual support and tolerance. This question was presented t o nine c o n t a c t s . Only two f e l t no t r a i n i n g was required, and one f e l t I t should be given only If a problem a r o s e . stated he had heard t h e Russians had had a problem. One One commented a s follows: *I think t h a t I t ' s going t o be Increasingly important t h a t they have a t l e a s t some amount of t h i s [group dynamics t r a i n i n g ] because you would l i k e t o have a preconditioned a t t i t u d e of how t h e y ' r e supposed t o work t o g e t h e r . You d o n ' t want t o have some highly motivated mission s c i e n t i s t back t h e r e [ I n the space lab o r an analogous p a r t of a Space S t a t i o n ] who d o e s n ' t understand where t h a t p r i o r i t y I n t e r f a c e s with t h e s e o t h e r p r i o r i t i e s . " Another commented t h a t he f e l t f u t u r e crews, who would not have a s much I n t e r a c t i v e t r a i n i n g a s those of today, should be required t o function In some s o r t of environment together before they launch. He suggested t h a t Survival School might be useful f o r t h a t purpose. One contact was e s p e c i a l l y concerned In regard t o t h i s m a t t e r . His coenents took up more than a page of single-spaced t y p e s c r i p t , and Included t h e following statements: 16 �' I think t h a t [ t h e lack of p s y c h i a t r i c o r psychological support] i s one of the shortcomings of NASA over t h e y e a r s , and I d o n ' t know i f they've solved t h a t problem yet today, and t h a t i s t h a t t h e r e i s no a c t i v e program having t o do with t h e behavioral sciences t h a t helps e i t h e r t h e astronauts in dealing with one another o r t h e a s t r o n a u t s and t h e i r families dealing with t h e situation." ' I think i t i s unfortunate t h a t astronauts have never been given any kind of opportunity f o r behavioral science understanding. There has been such a stigma associated with psychologic o r p s y c h i a t r i c therapy t h a t everyone stays away from i t l i k e i t i s some kind of poison." ' I though i t was j u s t r e a l l y too bad t h a t t h e r e was not some s o r t of a program in NASA t o help i n some s o r t of an upbeat way - t o give them access t o these people - give them some t r a i n i n g on techniques of dealing with t h e s e problems. The problems a r e t h e r e ! " Another c o n t a c t ' s comments f i l l e d t h r e e single-spaced t y p e s c r i p t pages, but were mostly personal experiences with h i s f r i e n d s , and cannot be reported here because of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of revealing t h e source. He l e f t no doubt in t h i s i n t e r v i e w e r ' s mind t h a t he was strongly i n favor of professional psychological support f o r t h e crews and f o r t h e i r f a m i l i e s . Comments: 19. See comments t o Question 1 9 . Should f a m i l i e s have s i m i l a r psychological support? This question was posed t o e i g h t of t h e t e n c o n t a c t s . One had no comment, two said i t need not be provided, and one s a i d i t should be provided only on a voluntary b a s i s If t h e family member f e l t t h e need and asked f o r i t . The r e s t f e l t i t should be provided In some degree o r another. A commonly expressed suggestion was t o keep t h e f a m i l i e s very well informed about a l l a s p e c t s of t h e program, and t o g e t them involved with whatever i s going on. One man s a i d , "The more you involve t h e wives i n t o t h e 19 �operation, t h e more support you g e t from them. Keep them Informed and give them l i n e s of conmunlcatlon t o , f o r example. Mission Control Center." He also s a i d , ' I know when I was t h e r e [assigned t o NASA], t h e wives and t h e families were r e a l l y I s o l a t e d . They were r e a l l y pushed back In a c o r n e r . I s , t h a t kind of treatment was I n f e c t i o u s . The program t r e a t e d t h e wife t h a t way, and p r e t t y soon we s t a r t e d t r e a t i n g our wives t h e same way. really tragic." The problem " I know I t cost a l o t of guys t h e i r m a r r i a g e . " I t was He continued by saying. 'You c a n ' t t r e a t people l i k e numbers, and t h a t ' s what NASA d i d . t h e wives were unhappy, w e l l , t h a t ' s t o o bad! If 'Think of a l l t h i s Important work t h a t your husband I s doing and go home and s h u t u p ! ' I t d i d n ' t work." On the other hand, another contact s t a t e d , "The t h i n g s t h a t d o n ' t k i l l you make you s t r o n g e r . I , f r a n k l y , think t h e experience was a p o s i t i v e experience f o r my w i f e . " He was not one of those In favor of a formal program f o r t h e f a m i l i e s . Comments: Because Question 18 and Question 19 a r e s o c l o s e l y r e l a t e d , comments t o both of them w i l l be presented h e r e . For some reason t h e r e seemed t o be more enthusiasm expressed f o r providing some s o r t of psychological support f o r t h e crew members than f o r providing s i m i l a r support f o r t h e families. I had expected t h e reverse would prove t h e c a s e . I t would seem Important t o ensure t h a t f u t u r e Space S t a t i o n crews have t h e opportunity t o work very c l o s e l y together in s i t u a t i o n s t h a t w i l l r e q u i r e mutual support. Although I t might be d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y giving survival t r a i n i n g t o Space Station crews, t h a t s o r t of s o c i a l I n t e r a c t i o n would probably pay large dividends when t h e crew occupy t h e Space S t a t i o n . I t might a l s o be of benefit f o r NASA t o Introduce a c e r t a i n amount of psychological t r a i n i n g I n t o t h e program. The contacts, f o r the most p a r t , were not concerned about providing psychological support f o r t h e f a m i l i e s . However, t h o s e who were In favor of such support were very p o s i t i v e In t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s . My personal f e e l i n g s in t h i s regard, and many of t h e s e f e e l i n g s have been generated by t h e very strong �and sincere statements expressed by two of t h e c o n t a c t s , a r e t h a t NASA has been remiss In not Including t h e f a m i l i e s a s p a r t of t h e program. I t seems that more d e t a i l e d b r i e f i n g s might be given t h e wives so t h a t they would have a better Idea of of what t h e i r husbands a r e doing. This action might not Improve the effectiveness of t h e husbands, but nevertheless should be provided if only f o r humanitarian reasons. The question of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s was never presented a s a formal question, but I t did come up spontaneously In t h e discussions with most of t h e contacts. From t h e i r expressions of belief and f a i t h 1 t I s my conclusion t h a t a resident chaplain a t JSC would be of g r e a t value t o t h e program. 20. Crew I n t e r a c t i v e t r a i n i n g In a one~g simulator. Because of t h e many very strong polarized f e e l i n g s brought out by t h e questions on group dynamics t r a i n i n g (Questions 19 and 20), I t was f e l t t h a t t h i s question should be eliminated. misinterpreted i t . I t was asked of only one contact and he His answer r e l a t e d t o command s t r u c t u r e of a Space Station crew, and will be included with t h e answers t o Question 45. Comments: 21. None. Problem of ambient nois e. Here I s another question t h a t was, f o r a l l I n t e n t s and purposes, eliminated. The contacts a c t u a l l y answered I t when speaking of t h e need f o r quiet In p r i v a t e q u a r t e r s . The question was posed t o t h r e e I n d i v i d u a l s . One Implied In h i s answer t h a t noise was not a big problem - one g e t s used t o I t . On t h e o t h e r hand, unanticipated noises o r motions of t h e s p a c e c r a f t a r e very d i s t r a c t i n g . The third said t h a t on h i s f l i g h t , crew member noise prevented sound sleeping In shifts. Comitents: None. 21 �22. Wardroom, e n t e r t a i n m e n t , e x t e r n a l v i e w i n g , and E a r t h p o s i t i o n . All t e n c o n t a c t s a g r e e d t h a t a wardroom was I m p o r t a n t . There was near-unanimous o p i n i o n t h a t p e r s o n a l l y s e l e c t e d books and music t a p e s were I m p o r t a n t t h i n g s t o t a k e a l o n g . Other suggestions Included the p r o v i s i o n of movies on VCR t a p e s , and one I n d i v i d u a l s u g g e s t e d t h a t books, movies, and o t h e r forms of a u d i o - v i s u a l e n t e r t a i n m e n t c o u l d be p u t on l a s e r video d i s c s . Hany I n d i v i d u a l s commented on t h e f a c t t h a t r e a l - t i m e coimerclal news progratming and e n t e r t a i n m e n t shows c o u l d be u p - l i n k e d w i t h l i t t l e difficulty. Only one person had no s t r o n g o p i n i o n on t h e need f o r windows, b u t even he s a i d t h e y were h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e , b u t n o t o f prime I m p o r t a n c e . One person s a i d , 'Nobody e v e r g e t s enough t i m e l o o k i n g o u t o f w i n d o w s . ' Another s a i d , 'They should make s u r e t h a t t h e r e a r e a s many windows a s p o s s i b l e . ' He suggested one be p u t n e a r t h e e x e r c i s e d e v i c e s o one c o u l d l o o k o u t w h i l e exercising. One man s a i d t h e windows a r e e x t r e m e l y 1nQ)ortant from a recreational as well an Inspirational standpoint. p o r t s and t i m e t o u s e t h e m . ' spacecraft the better. He s a i d , 'You need viewing One of t h e c o n t a c t s s a i d , ' T h e more windows In a One of t h e most e n j o y a b l e t h i n g s you have t o do up t h e r e 1 s t o look o u t t h e window. I n f a c t , even a b u b b l e window might be n i c e . * One of t h e more a r t i c u l a t e c o n t a c t s s a i d : ' I , f o r o n e , am t o t a l l y convinced t h a t t h e magic of s p a c e and t h e v a l u e of being t h e r e I n v o l v e s being a b l e t o s e e w h a t ' s o u t t h e r e . . . I t 1 s from t h e human s t a n d p o i n t t h a t I t h i n k you need l o t s of viewing p o r t s . Important. I d o n ' t c a r e I f 1 t does c o s t more money. I t h i n k t h a t ' s very The r e t u r n I n keeping p e o p l e ' s I n t e r e s t , and t h e m o t i v a t i o n and a l l t h a t s o r t o f t h i n g , t o d o more and more, and t o g o f u r t h e r , 1 s v e r y d r a m a t i c a l l y enhanced by b e i n g a b l e t o see.' Comments: The most c o n s i s t e n t answer t o a n y of t h e f i f t y - o n e q u e s t i o n s was t h e s t r o n g p o s i t i v e e x p r e s s i o n of a need f o r a wardroom w i t h some s o r t of entertainment equipment. Individual preferences. The s u g g e s t i o n s f o r t h i s equipment c l e a r l y followed Of equal unanimity was t h e e x p r e s s e d need f o r many 22 �and large windows. This has such g r e a t importance t h a t i t would appear important t o consider t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of providing bubble windows, a s was suggested by one of t h e c o n t a c t s . 23. Body waste c o l l e c t i o n and d i s p o s a l . Six contacts were asked t h i s question. Two had no ccHwnents, and two said they f e l t t h a t t h e Skylab system was adequate, although they did not l i k e t h e idea of bagging t h e f e c e s . One man said even t h e Apollo system was a l l r i g h t in s p i t e of t h e need t o bag t h e f e c e s . The t h i r d comment related only t o urine collection and t h a t person said he f e l t t h e ordinary a i r c r a f t , r e l i e f tube was adequate. Although he d id not say s o , i t was c l e a r t h a t he meant such a device would have t o be adapted t o t h e zero-g environment. Comments: 24. None. Personal c l e a n l i n e s s . Since t h i s question had a l s o been addressed in Question 8 , Personal Hygiene Equipment, i t was presented t o only f o u r of t h e c o n t a c t s . Two of them had no comment; one recommended t h e use of a spring-driven razor; and another, who uses a blade r a z o r , s a i d he f e l t frequent o r d a i l y shaving was good f o r crew d i s c i p l i n e . Conments: 25. This was t h e second contact t o make t h a t comment. This was considered in t h e comments t o Question 8 . Exercise. This question was asked of nine c o n t a c t s . important. All agreed t h a t exercise was One s a i d he f e l t e x e r c i s e and good food were t h e two most in^ortant things t o provide f o r long-duration space f l i g h t . Two others said they f e l t e x e r c i s e was important from a psychological and morale standpoint a s well as from a physical well-being point of view. Five people recommended t h a t both a bicycle ergometer and a treadmill be provided. One mentioned only a treadmill and one mentioned only a bicycle. a �Two people mentioned that it Is also necessary to exercise the upper torso and arms. One of these recoimiended spring or bungee devices for this purpose. Another thought a Nautilus-type of exercise device should be provided. One person said he thought the Cxergenle was a very useful device, but another stated that he tried to use it on his flight and found that the nylon ropes heated from the friction of use and stretched, making the device useless. Another person said he believed there is a need for something that will provide structural stress to the skeletal system, but he had no ideas on how to do that. Only two people suggested a duration for the exercise period. One suggested ninety minutes and the other sixty minutes. Coniwents; The need for exercise was strongly supported by all. It Is my understanding that investigations into the types of exercise equipment needed are being conducted. I can only urge that these Investigations be continued both on the ground and In flight. 2b. How to manage books and manuals. This question was presented to only four of the ten contacts. One stated he preferred books, but could learn to live with Information presented on CRTs. One contact had no comments, and the other two said that they did not think that everything had to be In data banks. Some material can best be presented in book form, and other material can be stored In data banks for retrieval when needed. The feeling seemed to be that recreational material was best presented In book form, but technical material (with the exception of emergency checklists) could be stored In data banks. Cowaents: None. 24 �27. Han/machine interface. This question was put to five of the ten contacts. One suggested that color be used more in the design of the Space Station, and one said color was not a11 that important. One had no comment. One man suggested that NASA employ what he called "functional artists" to help in designing the interior of the Space Station. He stated that the wardroom should be of a "relaxing* color and the flight deck should be of an "alerting" color. One individual urged caution in accepting the use of digital displays. He said: "Digital offers various advantages in terms of accuracy, precision when you need precision, but the human being is an integrator, he doesn't take snapshots, and there is a lot of information and intelligence lost when you're looking at a digital display." Comments: The science of architecture is advancing at a great pace. NASA would be well advised to use the services of this discipline in establishing interior design criteria for the Space Station. I was impressed by the warning about digital displays. From a purely personal standpoint I find it easier to integrate analog informational displays than I do digital displays, but this may be purely cultural. An interesting area for investigation would be to assess whether people get more or less information from one display than the other. Unquestionably, it is easier and quicker to read, for example, the exact time from a digital display, but does one find it also easier to tell how many minutes have elapsed since a given event or how much time remains before a given action must be taken. I am sure similar analyses could be made of altimeters, and other displays of changing quantifiable information. 25 �2B. Three s h i f t s o r one? This question was asked of s i x people. One had no connient. Only one of t h e remaining f i v e f e l t t h a t a l l crew members should be allowed t o s l e e p a t t h e same time. times. They f e l t t h a t someone should be awake and on watch a t a l l One man s a i d t h a t t h e crews should be a b l e t o work longer than eight-hour s h i f t s . He s a i d , 'You're not t h e r e on a v a c a t i o n , even f o r three months.' One contact s t a t e d t h a t timelines should be f l e x i b l e enough t o accomnodate t h e mission, and t h e crew members should be i n d o c t r i n a t e d in t h e occasional need f o r working on t h e i r off-duty time. For exati^le, an Earth resources task night require t h a t t h e Earth resources s p e c i a l i s t t a k e photos a t a p a r t i c u l a r time on a p a r t i c u l a r o r b i t , and t h a t might occur during h i s o f f - d u t y time. This question a l s o asked t h e contact t o comment on whether e x e r c i s e should be an off-duty endeavor o r a duty-time a c t i v i t y . obtained. Only t h r e e answers were One man said exercise should be done during o f f - d u t y hours. The second said t h e question was i r r e l e v a n t because one i s never ' o f f d u t y ' In space. The t h i r d said he thought half of t h e e x e r c i s e should be done during on-duty time and half of i t when off d u t y . Comments: As was t h e case i n most of t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , t h e r e was no r eal unanimity of opinion unless i t was t h a t someone should be awake a t a l l times. This seems t o be a most reasonable and l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . 29. Importance of real-time TV. Here i s another example of a question t h a t was covered f a i r l y well i n an e a r l i e r question. See Question 22. which addresses wardroom accommodations. This question (29) was asked of only t h r e e persons. One had no comment: one thought i t was very important; and t h e o t h e r did not b e l i e v e i t t o be of g r e a t importance. Comments: None. �30. Who should s e l e c t t h e crews? All but t h r e e of t h e contacts were asked t h i s question and, a s one might expect, t h e r e was a wide range of opinion i n t h i s regard. person a r e summarized in t h e following paragraphs. (1) A crew s e l e c t i o n committee has v i r t u e . made by one person. The r e p l i e s of each No r e a l p a t t e r n emerged. The s e l e c t i o n should not be Perhaps t h e Captain should be s e l e c t e d f i r s t . He would then s e l e c t a second person; t h e two of them would s e l e c t t h e t h i r d ; and s o on until a l l crew members had been chosen. (2) Overall Management should make t h e s e l e c t i o n . The Commander should not have s o l e s e l e c t i o n a u t h o r i t y , but he should have veto powers. The peer review concept has v i r t u e i n t h a t i t i d e n t i f i e s t h e unpopular individuals. (3) The crew should be s e l e c t e d by Management - they have more information a v a i l a b l e t o them than does anyone e l s e . i s a useful t o o l . The peer review process Management needs an input from t h e crew Commander. This contact believed t h a t a small group of crews should be selected and flown frequently. This saves expensive t r a i n i n g time over t h e o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , which i s t o have a l a r g e pool of candidates from which crews a r e selected t o fly less fre q uently. (4) Believes a nucleus of crew members should be s e l e c t e d . These people fly frequently and t r a i n t h e i r own replacements ( t h e r i g h t - s e a t man eventually moves i n t o a l e f t - s e a t assignment). Whatever system i s used, i t should be well understood by a l l t h e candidates. Each should know what the s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a a r e , and how t h e process o p e r a t e s . (5) Mentioned t h a t he l i k e d t h e way Slayton handled t h e s e l e c t i o n process, but believes t h e s e l e c t i o n pool i s much too l a r g e . (6) Also mentioned t h a t he liked t h e way Slayton did h i s job i n t h e p a s t . (7) NASA management should s e l e c t t h e operational crew. authority should s e l e c t t h e t e c h n i c a l crew. Some o t h e r The combined group should work together f o r a period of time, and t h e Commander should be a b l e t o e x e r c i s e veto power over members of both groups i f he f e l t an individual would not f i t in. Conments: I am i n c l i n e d t o go along with respondent Number 3 . Number 7 made e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same comments. 27 Respondent My disagreement with Number 3 i s �only i n regard t o t h e concept of peer review. I an s u r e i t does point out the unpopular i n d i v i d u a l s , a s s t a t e d by c o n t a c t Number 2 , but a t what expense? I am s u r e t h e unpopular individual i s already known by Management by t h e time they g e t around t o s e l e c t i n g t h e crews. One i s i n c l i n e d t o ask how important i s popularity anyway? 31. Does EVA require t h e 'buddy system"? Only four people were asked t h i s question. One had no conntent, and the other t h r e e said they believed i t was necessary. One of them s a i d he thought the buddy might be a f u l l y s u i t e d a s t r o n a u t who remained i n s i d e t h e s t a t i o n , but was ready t o go outside a t a moment's n o t i c e . None said they though t h e buddy system was unnecessary. Comments: 32. None. How can t h e EVA s u i t be in^troved? This question was asked of seven people. Again, t h e comments were not c o n s i s t e n t , and r e f l e c t t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s personal views. There i s a l s o some overlap in t h e answers with t h e answers t o some of t h e o t h e r q u e s t i o n s . (1) For prolonged EVA t h e astronaut should be provided with a 'motorman's f r i e n d * , a d i a p e r , water, but no food. (2) For missions t h a t w i l l require EVA soon a f t e r a t t a i n i n g o r b i t , t h e EVA crewman should be s elected from a pool of i n d i v i d u a l s who, by t h e i r past experience in o r b i t , have shown t o be r e s i s t a n t t o space motion s i c k n e s s . Nevertheless, vomitus containment apparatus should be provided ' j u s t in case.* (3) Consider using honey water a s a source of energy and f l u i d . glove needs improvement s o a s t o provide b e t t e r t a c t i l e s e n s a t i o n . The A wire saw (Gigli saw) should be taken along on every EVA f o r emergency u s e . (4) Mentions b e t t e r gloves with improved t a c t i l e s e n s a t i o n . (5) Suggests t h a t t h e problem of f i n g e r t i p i n j u r y could be solved by c l o s e r trimming of t h e f i n g e r n a i l s . (6) Recommends t h e hard, r i g i d , high-pressure ( 8 p s i ) s u i t . (7) One man had no comments. 28 �Cownents: The suggestion t o use honey water a s a source of nourishment and of fluids c e r t a i n l y deserves i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Methods f o r c o l l e c t i n g urine and feces (a diaper should be adequate f o r emergencies) a r e e s s e n t i a l , and I believe t h a t some s o r t of vomitus containment device i s a l s o e s s e n t i a l . People s t i l l become i l l , even on t h e s u r f a c e of t h e Earth in a one-g f i e l d , ^ and there i s no reason t o suspect t h i n g s w i l l d i f f e r i n space. ^ problem comes up with t h e food s t o r a g e equipment, t h e r e might well be some gastroenteric I l l n e s s e s developing. In f a c t , i f a F i n a l l y , i t seems logical t o develop a suit t h a t provides a t l e a s t 8 - p s i p r e s s u r e , more If f e a s i b l e . The advantages to such a garment a r e t o o well known t o warrant elaboration in t h i s r e p o r t . 33. EVA r e s t r a i n t s , t e t h e r s , hand holds, l i g h t s , e t c . After receiving t h r e e "no comments" i n a row, t h i s question was eliminated. I t was asked of f o u r c o n t a c t s and only one had any comments. His are as follows: "There i s a need f o r a s m a l l , multipurpose t o o l k i t with interchangeable end-effectors. Small l i g h t s on t h e f i n g e r t i p s a s were used in the Mercury program a r e extremely u s e f u l . These can be d i r e c t e d b e t t e r than a helmet-mounted l i g h t . " Comments; effective. 34. The use of f i n g e r t i p l i g h t s on t h e Mercury s u i t was most This might be i n v e s t i g a t e d again f o r t h e Space S t a t i o n s u i t . Suggestions regarding mortuary a f f a i r s . This question was posed t o f o u r of t h e persons interviewed. Two s t a t e d that the sensible t h i n g t o do would be some form of o n - o r b i t d i s p o s a l . said, in some s e r i o u s n e s s , "Shoot me i n t o t h e Sun!" (One He was aware of t h e high-energy c o s t of doing t h i s , s o t h e r e was some l e v i t y i n t h e remark t o o . ) 6ut they a l s o recognize t h a t t h i s would not be acceptable in today' s s o c i e t y . I ^ One of t h e contacts s a i d t h e problem should be addressed and solved before we go t o Space S t a t i o n , but he had no i d e a s . The f o u r t h person agreed with the necessity t o bring t h e body back i n a condition s u i t a b l e f o r an open-casket f u n e r a l , but he had no ideas on how t h i s could be accon4)lished. 29 �Conroents; One approach t o mortuary ser vices might be t o c o n s u l t with various museums of natural h i s t o r y . One of t h e modern methods of taxidermy i s t o place the animal In a l i f e - l i k e pose and f r e e z e I t in t h a t p o s i t i o n . A vacuum i s then drawn on t h e container, and t h e animal i s c o n p l e t e l y d e s i c c a t e d . The desiccated specimen i s then placed in a sealed c a s e . This technique could be adapted t o t h e Space S t a t i o n as a method of preserving t h e body of a deceased crew member u n t i l a r e l i e f vessel makes c o n t a c t . 35. Foot r e s t r a i n t s a t t h e work s t a t i o n . This question was given t o four s u b j e c t s . Three had no comments, and one s t a t e d t h e t r i a n g u l a r shoes used in Skylab worked f i n e . Topics explored in t h i s question were a l s o addressed i n Questions 33 and 36. Comments: 36. None. Locomotion a i d s . Only two s u b j e c t s were asked t h i s question. One had no comments, and the other s a i d , 'Only what i s needed f o r f a c i l i t y and s a f e t y . The best locomotion i s j u s t t o head out and across!* Co—mnts: 37. None. Body r e s t r a i n t s f o r t a s k s requiring extreme s t e a d i n e s s . This question was presented t o only t h r e e s u b j e c t s . Two f e l t i t t o be no problem, and one s t a t e d t h a t perhaps a r i g i d arm could be i n s t a l l e d a t t h e work s t a t i o n . This could be swung out from a stowed p o s i t i o n and used t o clamp t h e a s t r o n a u t i n t o p o s i t i o n . Comments: None. 30 �38. Thoughts on a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y . This topic was discussed with nine c o n t a c t s . make. Two had no connients t o One s t a t e d c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t he thought t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t medical need for a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y . Three were of t h e opinion t h a t a r t i f i c i a l gravity should not be considered unless an overwhelming physiological need developed. One expressed t h e opinion t h a t when t h e time comes when we can build very-long-term-exposure f a c i l i t i e s , a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y should be provided because t h e time expended in e x e r c i s e (he estimated one t o one and a half hours a day.) a r e nonproductive hours which could be put t o b e t t e r use i f a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y were provided. No respondent f e l t a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y i s required f o r psychological reasons. One was very s t r o n g l y opposed t o i t . Our conversation went a s follows: 'Another thing - I wouldn't worry about a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y . i s considering a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y any more. I hope nobody I t h i n k t h a t ' s a waste of time. And you destroy many of t h e advantages you gain by being weightless. Particularly f o r those people who may have a g r a v i t a t i o n a l handicap. don't have a g r a v i t a t i o n a l handicap in space. They They ought t o be permitted t o participate a s f u l l - f l e d g e d workers and crew members i n space. 0. There i s some consideration being given t o t h e so-called t e t h e r system, which w i l l provide a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y . A. Well, I ' l l t e l l you - I t h i n k t h a t ' s a waste of money, a waste of manpower and i n t e l l e c t s t o even worry about i t . have a good reason t o do i t . F i f t y years from now you may I d o n ' t t h i n k you have a good reason now. Certainly calcium loss i s not a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i n my o p i n i o n . " One person f e l t t h a t t h e r e was a need f o r an a r t i f i c i a l g r a v i t y area in the Space S t a t i o n , but he had no ideas a s t o how t h i s could be accomplished. He said: 31 �•There are some good benefits from zero-g, but I would hope that in the Space Station there would be some area or some volume of the Space Station that would have artificial gravity. I don't know whether it should be the gravity of Earth or the gravity of the moon, but some light gravity field would prevent the deterioration, the decondltioning, of the cardiovascular system, and also the sickness that comes Initially with exposure to the weightless environment.' Comments: I am in agreement with the contact who stated that the provision of artificial gravity negates one of the more Important reasons for being there. Of course, it Is self-evident that If an overwhelming medical or physiological need arises for artificial gravity. It must be provided, but lacking that, I can see no justification for It. The concept that the provision of artificial gravity would eliminate the need for exercise and thus be an economically justifiable approach warrants study. The economics of this question Is beyond my area of knowledge, so I do not feel competent to coiment one way or another on the suggestion. 39. What about autonomy? This question was presented to eight contacts, and all but one had very definite opinions on the subject. Four contacts stated that they believed the Space Station Commander should be the final authority. ground should perform strategic planning only, Four felt that the other comaents included one that the Control Center should be used only for their more extensive resources. Two others stated that Hisslon Control Center should be used for routine data analysis only, and this because 1t was more economical to do this kind of Information processing on the ground than in the Space Station. Another connent was that the Control Center should be informative, not protective, and finally, one person commented that the Control Center should be absolutely honest with the flight crew; no information should be withheld from the crew using the Justification that they were being protected by this action. This respondent also said that the crew must be open and honest with the ground as well. 32 �Conments; All of t h e contacts were i n c l i n e d towards more autonomy f o r the Space Station, and l e s s r e l i a n c e on t h e ground. logical and a p p r o p r i a t e . This trend seems t o be most I concur with t h e conment t h a t t h e g r e a t e r analytical resources on t h e ground should be used in preference t o i n - f l i g h t analysis. 40. U t i l i t y of a miniature helmet-mounted TV camera. This question was presented t o only two c o n t a c t s . useful, but only f o r c e r t a i n (unspecified) t a s k s . One said i t might be The o t h e r contact had no connents t o make on t h e s u b j e c t . Conntents: 41. None. What about an expendable launch vehicle rescue c a p a b i l i t y . The question was put t o f i v e people, of which one had no comment. Only one person was e n t h u s i a s t i c about t h e concept and he s a i d : "I d o n ' t s e e why n o t . I t would be expensive, but i t would be only a one-time expense. Once you got t h e t h i n g ready t o go, t h e expense of recycling i t would not be t h a t g r e a t . You could even go with a s o l i d . have t o be reserviced a s o f t e n . I t would not Over a period of years t h e r e ' s going t o be some times when i t j u s t might be needed, and i t would c e r t a i n l y pay f o r itself.' One said he would r a t h e r put t h e emphasis on more on-board r e l i a b i l i t y . Another said he would r a t h e r use t h o s e resources t o expand t h e o r b l t e r f l e e t so as t o provide a quick-rescue c a p a b i l i t y . One individual said he would rather have t h e escape c a p a b i l i t y b u i l t i n t o t h e Space S t a t i o n i t s e l f . Comments: 42. None. How can man-on-board reduce redundancy? This question was presented t o only f o u r c o n t a c t s . that they had no comments. 33 Three of them said �One s t a t e d he did not want t o g e t Involved 1n a lengthy discussion of the question, but did want t o venture h i s opinion t h a t we a r e s t i l l designing too much redundancy I n t o experiments because t h e s c i e n t i s t s r e f u s e t o accept t h a t man can make up f o r i t . Cowwents; The comments following Question 2 point out t h e u t i l i t a r i a n value of man on t h e scene. Again, we should design equipment f o r r e p a i r and maintenance on o r b i t r a t h e r than provide layer s of redundancy. A3. Ideas f o r design of a safe haven. This question was put t o seven people. Two of them had no comments. One s t a t e d t h a t he did not think we needed more than two s a f e havens on t h e Space S t a t i o n ; another man said he thought every module should be I s o l a t a b l e ; and a t h i r d suggested designing t h e s a f e haven s o t h a t t h e occupants could continue t o be productive. He f e l t t h i s was e s s e n t i a l t o t h e i r morale. One contact s t a t e d , " I would put my e f f o r t s I n t o Introducing realism t o t h e public." When asked t o explain t h e statement he s a i d t h a t we must prepare the public t o accept the f a c t t h a t we're going t o lose a s p a c e c r a f t sometime. pomnents: The suggestion t o provide means f o r crews t o remain productive as a morale booster In t h e s a f e haven I s one t h a t deserves some thought. 44. Philosophy f o r EVA use. Of t h e f i v e people who were presented with t h i s q u e s t i o n , one had no comment; two f e l t t h a t I t should be used r o u t i n e l y ; one s a i d I t should be used when c o s t e f f e c t i v e ; and one s t a t e d only, " I am s u r e i t would be u s e f u l . " Conmmnts: 45. None. On-board command s t r u c t u r e . This question probably stimulated a s much discussion a s any of t h e 51. was presented t o a l l ten c o n t a c t s . Six of them unequivocally recomaended a strong Commander with a c l e a r and d i s t i n c t chain of conmend. p o s i t i v e voice In t h i s group was one who s a i d : 34 The most It �•The Commander 1s the boss—just like 1n a military vehicle [or] In polar exploration trips. He's the boss. varied opinions on things. He can appoint deputies. He's a real strong individual. 'This is the way it's donel [Strikes table for emphasis.]. He can ask for He's going to say, We're not even going to question it.'" A considerably milder comment was made by another contact who said that a clear chain of command was needed but, "...you don't need a man beating his chest." The nearly opposite view was expressed by a contact who said: "Yog know the stereotype of Marine Drill Instructor - you don't need those kinds of abilities up there - you need people with a broad perspective; people who are interested in enough different things outside their own area of expertise. I think that would be especially apropos of the Commander of the mission." He went on to say, "When you go to autonomy in space and you have your scientists up there [there are going to be conflicts which the Commander will have to solve]. You have to be able to compromise, and accommodate all those kinds of things. The Commander will have to be real diplomat." Another contact recommended a strong authoritative Commander, but he has to be the kind of person who knows how to lead, and "...just to give an order is not the best way to lead." But, he said, there also has to be a strong connand structure. One man who stated there must be a chain of command suggested that there night possibly be a Commander for each shift with interaction between them. He said that the Commander should be not be resistant or blind to suggestion and inputs from the rest of the crew. When asked if he would recommend a military hierarchial system, he replied that he would prefer a NASA hierarchial system, which he said is not as rigid as the military system. Another contact also recommended a dual command system, but constructed around different lines. He suggested a military Commander and a scientific 35 �conmander. The military Conroander would be in ultimate charge, but as long as things are going well, he would delegate command to the chief scientist. He agreed tha,t this might be somewhat analogous to the relationship that exists between the Captain of a carrier and his Air Sroup Commander. The contact stated that the ultimate responsibility must be assigned to one person. said, 'You cannot have a voting situation up there." NOTE: He The term "Hilltary Commander" as used above was not meant by the speaker to imply that he advocated the Space Station be conuianded by a DOD representative. Conments: He used it as a figure of speech. Most of the respondents focused on the role that the Conmander must play, and how he must act in exercising that role. One contact really caught the significant part of the question and stated that even more important than the Commander's actions was the need for a strong comaand structure. It has been my observation that some Military Commanders get the job done by virtue of the fact that their subordinates are afraid of them; others because they are respected:and others because they are idolized. Regardless of the Commander's attitude, the job always gets done unless the conmand structure breaks down. Even the autocratic Commander gets the job done unless he attempts to dissolve the command structure. When he does that, the organization falls apart and the mission is a failure. 46. How Hi-Fi should the Space Station simulator be? This question was given to five people. Only one recownended that the simulator have as much fidelity as possible recognizing the limits imposed by gravity. Two men felt that a complete simulator, a duplicate Space Station, was not needed. Part-task and modular simulation should be adequate. These were thought to be especially valuable devices for problem solving. one man suggested that the Space Station control room should be fairly well simulated, but the other functions of a Space Station need not be 36 �duplicated on the ground. He suggested a minimum ground training period and conpletion of training In the Space Station itself under the supervision of the crew. He presupposed that only part of the crew, perhaps two out of ten, would be replaced at any one time. One man had no comments. Conments: The suggestion that part-task and modular simulations should be adequate seems to be a reasonable approach. The concept of training after arriving on station is an interesting one and might be an area for investigation. 49. Accommodating diverse groups of people. Seven people were asked this question. Two people expressed disapproval of the concept of taking the "man on the street". Both of these contacts felt that, in the foreseeable future, we would be taking selected people. One mentioned that we would select them first for their skills, second for their motivation, and third for their physical and mental health. mentioned construction workers. One contact He thought we would ask for volunteers from the population of construction workers, then we would select the most skilled and the most fit. Three contacts mentioned their opposition to the practice of applying arbitary age limits. They felt that the results of a physical examination should determine a person's fitness to fly, not his age. One mentioned a Dr. Vincent in Houston who has a program that is an excellent predictor of mental acuity. The respondent thought some of the airlines were using Or. Vincent's technique. One stated that we could markedly relax our physical requirements because there are no stresses in space. Another felt that most of the problems will be societal, and the Commander will have to deal with them. 37 �Another suggestion was t h a t planning f o r medical c a r e f a c i l i t i e s must take Into consideration t h a t crew members of t h e f u t u r e may n o t be 1n t h e b e s t of health o r of optimum age. Comments; I was pleased t o hear one of t h e contacts s t a t e t h a t we could markedly relax our physical requirements because t h e r e a r e no s t r e s s e s In space. I do not know. In any g r e a t d e t a i l , what physical l i m i t a t i o n s NASA places on s e l e c t e e s f o r space f l i g h t , but senators and school t e a c h e r s a r e now being considered. From a purely s c i e n t i f i c standpoint 1 t seems reasonable t o f l y a group of "average" people t o see whether they perform any d i f f e r e n t l y than the highly selected and superbly f i t persons we have flown In t h e p a s t . There was r e a l l y no reason f o r s e l e c t i n g t h e cream of t h e crop a f t e r Mercury and Gemini. Both of those e a r l y missions had t h e unknown p o s s i b i l i t y of requiring t h e a b i l i t y t o s u s t a i n hIgh-Q reentry followed by a survival experience l a s t i n g several days a t sea o r on t h e d e s e r t . e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y f i t human specimen was required. Obviously an We might be surprised t o find out t h a t the average person who I s accustomed t o a more sedentary l i f e might even perform I n t e l l e c t u a l t a s k s In space a t l e a s t a s well a s t h e more f i t person does. I have not followed up on t h e suggestion t h a t Or. Vincent In Houston be contacted because of h i s a b i l i t y t o p r e d i c t mental a c u i t y s e p a r a t e from age. 50. Thoughts regarding s a f e t y hazards. This question was presented t o nine c o n t a c t s . nothing t o c o n t r i b u t e . One said t h e only thing he could t h i n k of was a k i t t o s e a l meteorold punctures. redundancy a s p o s s i b l e . Three s t a t e d t h a t they had Another suggested only t h a t we build In a s much One person said t h a t a s i d e from t h e pure vacuum of space, living In t h e Space Station I s no d i f f e r e n t , from a s a f e t y point of view, than l i v i n g on Earth. The hazards a r e t h e same and you p r o t e c t against them with s t r u c t u r a l design. You c a n ' t p r o t e c t a g a i n s t a l l e v e n t u a l i t i e s . f e l t compartmentallzatlon w i l l solve many problems. 38 He �Another person made t h e s e f i v e p o i n t s : 1. Follow e s t a b l i s h e d p r o c e d u r e s . 2. Have two c u e s t o a p r o b l e m , i . e . , a u d i o and v i s u a l warnings i n case one o r t h e o t h e r i s m i s s e d . 3. Eliminate single-point failures. He s a i d NASA has done a v e ry ?oo(l job of doing t h a t . 4. When a f a i l u r e d o e s o c c u r , f a l l back t o a s a f e p o s i t i o n iimediately, and examine t h e f a i l u r e . 5. Use e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y w e l l - t r a i n e d p e o p l e i n p o s i t i o n s of p r i n c i p a l responsibility. One respondent urged t h a t NASA d o c a r e f u l f a i l u r e mode a n a l y s e s , and where they discover h a z a r d s t h a t t h e crew w i l l have t o l i v e w i t h , t h e n make s u r e t h e crew i s well t r a i n e d , o r e v e n o v e r t r a i n e d t o d e a l w i t h t h e m . One of t h e most l e n g t h y and t h o u g h t f u l comments was: 'The hazardous s i t u a t i o n i s a c o m p l i c a t e d one i n which you a r e n o t q u i t e sure what t o d o . The s i m p l e r t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e s s d a n g e r t h e r e i s of screwing i t up. I t h i n k t h e most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g from t h a t s t a n d p o i n t i n Space S t a t i o n i s t o c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y and c o l o r - c o d e a l l t h e v a r i o u s p i e c e s of equipment a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of h a z a r d . The most s e r i o u s b e i n g r e d , t h e n e x t yellow, then maybe y e l l o w - a n d - b l a c k s t r i p e s . now. B a s i c a l l y l i k e t h e m i l i t a r y does Mark 'NO STEP' and 'HAND HOLD', and s o f o r t h . A c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t should be made t o s e e t h a t we d o n ' t g e t s h a r p c o r n e r s and t h a t s o r t of t h i n g . "The dangers a r e g o i n g t o be i n t h e p r e s s u r e s u i t p e o p l e w e a r . With a l o t of people up t h e r e working around t h e r e i s g o i n g t o be a s u i t p u n c t u r e , o r swneone i s n o t g o i n g t o p u t t h e w r i s t s e a l on p r o p e r l y and a g l o v e w i l l pop off. Those a r e t h e k i n d s of problems we a r e g o i n g t o h a v e . We a r e n o t going to have any problems i n s i d e . " Cowitents: Of a l l t h e r e s p o n d e n t s , I c o n c u r most c l o s e l y w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l who made t h e f i v e p o i n t s . They s h o u l d be remembered and p r a c t i c e d by a l l who have any r o l e i n s a f e t y d e s i g n o r p r a c t i c e s - and t h a t i n c l u d e s n e a r l y everyone. 39 �51. Suggestions which would help maintain crew h e a l t h . This question was asked of nine c o n t a c t s . t o make. Two s t a t e d they had no comments Proper n u t r i t i o n o r d i e t was mentioned by t h r e e people, a s was proper e x e r c i s e . Recognition t h a t people have t h e same psychological needs In space as on Earth was mentioned frequently. One c o n t a c t urged t h a t t h e time l i n e be structured t o provide time f o r q u i e t r e f l e c t i o n and contemplation. The b e n e f i t In crew member contributions t o t h e mission w i l l outweigh any cost In time. Another said t h a t we must choose s e n s i t i v e . I n t e l l i g e n t people t o serve on Space S t a t i o n . You d o n ' t need t h e "machonnan", and b r u t e - f o r c e kind of people - they should be kept o u t . One man s t a t e d , "Try t o make I t a s much l i k e a normal c i v i l i a n l i f e a s possible, recognizing t h a t we're going t o have a connand s t r u c t u r e , and by t h a t I mean If a guy wants t o have a g l a s s of wine with dinner o r a s h o t of brandy a f t e r , he ought t o be e n t i t l e d t o do s o . I t ' s home!" He's not f l y i n g an a i r l i n e r - One other man had mentioned t h a t he thought moderate consumption of alcohol was probably b e n e f i c i a l . Another man, who I am s u r e would have agreed with the comments above regarding wine with t h e meals and brandy a f t e r , nevertheless warned against what he perceived a s t h e c u r r e n t s o c i a l acceptance of overindulgence by m i l i t a r y p i l o t s . s a f e flying t h e next day. He f e l t t h a t behavior was hazardous t o The mental health aspects of t h e Space S t a t i o n were considered by another contact. He s a i d , "He should allow a routine-enough work c y c l e and approach t o Space S t a t i o n operations so t h a t If someone does g e t s1ck they can go take a day off and r e s t . L e t ' s ease off on t h e work load. L e t ' s l e t the astronomers have some time t o j u s t s i t t h e r e and look through t h e telescopes. Hhat's wrong with t h a t ? g r e a t Ideas anyway." Coweents: T h a t ' s where a l l t h e g r e a t astronomers got a l l t h e i r Here a g a i n , I was pleased t o s e e t h e emphasis on f a c t o r s Influ e n c i n g m e n t a l h e a l t h . If one lesson should have been learned from a l l of 40 �our space f l i g h t p r o j e c t s , i t i s t h a t we must guard a g a i n s t overloading the crew metrtier. I was most impressed by t h e l a s t comment recorded, " L e t ' s ease off on the work load. L e t ' s l e t t h e t h e astronomers have some time t o j u s t sit there and look through t h e t e l e s c o p e s . What's wrong with t h a t ? That's where a l l the g r e a t astronomers g o t a l l t h e i r g r e a t ideas anyway." I can only applaud t h a t a d v i c e . SPONTANEOUS COMMENTS As stated in t h e s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d METHOD, t h e 51 questions were a c t u a l l y used only t o s t i m u l a t e d i s c u s s i o n . Although a g r e a t many comments were received in response t o t h o s e q u e s t i o n s , t h e r e were some additional statements •ade either spontaneously o r a s a r e s u l t of thoughts stimulated by t h e questions. Some of t h e s e spontaneous statements a r e presented in t h i s s e c t i o n . 1. I t had been several y e a r s , and even decades, since some of t h e contacts had flown. One of them opened t h e interview with t h i s statement: " I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g your coming around doing t h i s . I commented t o [ h i s wife] t h i s morning t h a t t h i s i s t h e f i r s t time anybody has asked my opinion about anything s i n c e t h e day I l e f t NASA. And, consequently, i t i s of a l o t less value than i t might have been a year a f t e r I l e f t NASA." Conments: In l i g h t of t h e remark made by one c o n t a c t t h a t h i s remarks might have had more value had he been contacted a year a f t e r leaving t h e program rather than several years l a t e r might suggest t h a t NASA give consideration t o establishing a procedure whereby a l l former a s t r o n a u t s would be interviewed a year or two a f t e r they leave t h e program. 1 f e e l confident t h a t individuals who are no longer competing f o r a f l i g h t p o s i t i o n , o r who a r e no longer hoping for advancement i n , o r rewards from, t h e system might well be a very valuable source of information. Among t h e t e n people I interviewed, 1 f e l t t h a t some of there were so long out of t h e program a s t o be of l i t t l e value t o t h i s project. On t h e o t h e r hand, some who were more r e c e n t menders of NASA had •any good conments which t h e y probably would not have made had they been corepeting f o r f l i g h t assignment. 41 �2. One stated that he feU gymnastics might be a good training procedure, particularly use of the trampoline, in combatting space motion sickness. Cowwents; 3. None. In view of the fact that EVA astronauts do not appear to use their legs very much, one contact was asked his opinion regarding a suit without separate legs. He replied; •Some of the EVA tasks would require that you anchor your feet somehow, because that's the way you apply the torque. If. of course, you have some umbilical 'belly-button' kind of thing with which you attach yourself rigidly through your center of gravity, then you could obviously use your arms pretty well without a foot restraint. I would kind of think that having your legs separate would give you much better torque and muscle control." In response to the same question another contact said•But If you're thinking In terms of a Space Station where you're going to have to do some manual work with your arms, and you look at the situation Where you put In a torque motion. I don't know how you would counteract that without having your feet somehow [stabilized], speaking of construction work 1n space he said. "It Is In that kind of a mode where I would envision that you might want [to use your legs].' Comments: 4. None. When speaking of training, one contact mentioned what he called an advocacy position In training, it Is sitting down ahead of time and asking what^one will do If a certain event takes place. He said: •Within certain limitations you could take the advocacy role ahead of time. It's a 'brain-washing', and I know that's a bad word, but you train to the point where, when you get there, the actual case Is a piece of cake. many times It doesn't have to be a hands-on kind of training. And You can sit In a room and discuss what we're going to do If this happens and why do that one. But you gotta go through that exercise. 42 It's a very Important part of �getting ready t o go." The contact then gave two examples from h i s f l i g h t where f a m i l i a r i t y with the system and procedures saved t h e mission. Cofiments; The remarks regarding "advocacy" t r a i n i n g were i n t e r e s t i n g t o me. The mental exercise of s i t t i n g q u i e t l y alone o r with o n e ' s colleagues and contemplating possible events and how t o cope with them I s probably an excellent way t o t r a i n f o r foreseeable e v e n t u a l i t i e s . Perhaps such t r a i n i n g methods could be encouraged. 5. At the close of h i s interview, one contact offered t h e following independent thought: "One of t h e t h i n g s I d o n ' t think we're doing t o o w e l l . . . i s designing things l i k e t h e Space S t a t i o n , taking advantage of t h e r eal and unique environment. Using t h e d e l t a temperature and t h e d e l t a pressure a s driving forces t o some degree in equipment design. We're s t i l l designing things f o r here t h a t we then make a l l s o r t s of special precautions t o operate up t h e r e instead of designing them t o r e a l l y optimize the environment they have t o be in. I think when t h a t happens we w i l l have problems t e s t i n g i t down here, but i t w i n [work b e t t e r up t h e r e . ] " When asked f o r examples he said t h a t he had none a t t h e moment. Comments: 6. None. Another contact i n explaining why he thought he did not g e t motion sickness i n f l i g h t s a i d : "We would go up and do parabolas in t h e T-38 where we could do between 15 and 23 r o l l s on a given parabola. with each r o l l . We put our head i n d i f f e r e n t o r i e n t a t i o n s I ' d do t h a t maybe twice, and a l l of a sudden t h e sweat would break out—you'd s i t t h e r e with t h e world going around and you'd t r y t o f l y s t r a i g h t and level f o r f i v e minutes u n t i l you could g e t t h e world back together again, then you'd go a t i t a g a i n . [before t h e f l i g h t ] . I did t h a t down a t t h e Cape I got t o where i t r e a l l y took something t o g e t me s i c k . I d o n ' t know whether i t was t h a t conditioning t h a t helped o r whether i t was t h a t I was j u s t more n a t u r a l l y r e s i s t a n t than some. 43 You can do t h e same thing �in a swlnwing pool. nystagmus.* You can get some pretty high rates—until you get severe He continued t o cowaent that performing r o l l s In a zero-g parabola and holding the head in different positions a t the same time was the most efficient way of producing nystagmus that he knows. He got t o the point where he could make the world 'twitch* in any direction depending upon how he held his head during the r o l l . £ommsntsj_ NASA might give some thought t o investigating t h e training routine described by the contact who stated he and his partner executed 15 t o 23 rolls while in a zero-g parabola, with t h e i r heads in a d i f f e r e n t orientation for each parabola. I am astounded a t the piloting s k i l l which t h i s maneuver requires, but if i t can be done I t might be of value i n anti-motion sickness training. I know that aerobatics have been attempted t o t r a i n against motion sickness, largely without benefit, but t h i s i s the f i r s t I have heard of stimulating the semicircular canals while in zero-g. 7. One contact was asked for his ideas regarding the changing crews. He said that i t might be necessary t o bring up one o r two s p e c i a l i s t s for short periods t o perform specific tasks, but he f e l t i t was important t o change the e n t i r e basic crew a t the same time t o maintain a cohesive u n i t . Comments: 8. None. Another Interesting concluding remark was: "There i s one other thing I always make a pitch on. and t h a t i s that they do not realize that people in space f l i g h t o r in zero-gravity condition are no different than down here. You have zero gravity and a b e t t e r view, but other than that you are dealing with the same person and the same working environment and they can do exactly the same thing they can do down here. If a person i s exceptionally good as an observer o r working out something analytically, or if he i s good a t doing any kind of a detailed task (for example, a photo interpreter), you can put him up there where he i s looking a t 44 �the real thing. He can do just as good a Job up there as down here. no reason for not using a person's intellect fully. There is So far, the way space flights have been constructed, they want to dictate everything by checklist and take away your ability to think. Coninents; 9. See comments following Statement 9. Another man expressed the same thoughts in this way: "My big 'soap box' effort is the thing about let's not forget who we are and what our needs are as people, and carry those things with us. Let's not lull ourselves into thinking that this is such a special environment that all the rules change and everything is different, and that people will give up this and give up that In order to be up there. They will do it for a ten-day mission, but they won't do it for ninety days." He went on to say, "One of the problems we ran into on our mission was that we forgot to think about those things, and we got ourselves caught up in a workaday thing where we were working fourteen to sixteen hours a day, and working strictly following a carrot - following a very precise agenda every day. Halfway through the mission we began to get inefficient and made mistakes. Me finally recognized our problem and did something about it, and came out at the end of the mission in good shape. We finished everything we were supposed to do and got it all right." Comments: I commend the two remarks regarding utilization of people for their capabilities and their human abilities to NASA for serious consideration. I agree with both comments. If we are to put people in space we must take advantage of their capabilities and their "humanness", whatever that is. He should recognize the tendency to overschedule and actively correct for that tendency. 10. One contact believes that the absence of low-frequency electromagnetic radiation in space might have some physiological consequences. this radiation is commonly referred to as Schumann resonance. this subject he said: 45 He said that Speaking to �•W1th1n the Ionosphere-Earth surface cavity there is, I think, about an 8-H2 to 32-Hz oscillating field with a series of peaks in that field that is generated by lightning storms on Earth, but the net result of all that electromagnetic activity is that we're exposed from conception to death to this oscillating field, and there is some evidence that if you play with that field here on Earth, particularly by superimposing a 5-Hz, 4-Hz, or 3-Hz field on what is already there (and it is very difficult to isolate the individual from it unless you go underground) and you get some neurological problems. It does affect people, and it is probably related to what happens to you when you get a relatively low-frequency strobe light flashing at you. A lot of people feel very very uncomfortable neurologically when that happens. course, it's absent. In space, of Once you get above the ionosphere that field is absent, and there is some concern among physicists who have a background in neurophysiology that there might be an instantaneous effect contributing to the Space Adaptation Syndrome, but they are more concerned about what the long-term effect may be if the brain actually uses that frquency on occasion or continuously to reset it's own timing signals in it's central processor. So, 1 would FLAG that as an unknown." This contact was also concerned about "intermittent sleep." could cause difficulty from the standpoint of loss of REH sleep. sleep is different from simple insomnia. He felt it Intermittent Intermittent sleep is that situation where a person wakes up and goes back to sleep several times during a sleep period. It should cause no problem over short periods, but if continued for two months or so it might. It has been noticed in sleep labs on the Earth, but the contact was of the opinion that it occurs more frequently in space flight than it does on the Earth. Comments; I cannot connent on the role of low-frequency electromagnetic radiation in space and its physiological consequences and I am unaware of "Schumann Resonance", but I do want to underline this individual's connent as a possible route of inquiry, which NASA might investigate. I also am unable to comment on this same contacts remarks regarding "Intermittent Sleep". 46 �11. One man mentioned t h a t he f e l t h i s mind worked b e t t e r i n space. When asked t o elaborate on t h a t s u b j e c t he s a i d : ' . . . i t might be j u s t t h a t you a r e doing i t f o r r eal r a t h e r than in practice. The f a c t t h a t you're i n 100X oxygen environment - t h a t should allow you t o perform a l i t t l e b e t t e r . I think i n a place of reduced g r a v i t y , t h a t could have a contributing f a c t o r t o o . including mental. Cownent; 12. [There was a ] changed response p a t t e r n , That i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e in the weightless s i t u a t i o n . " None. One contact mentioned t h a t i t took him four t o f i v e days t o g e t adjusted to the zero-g environment. He s a i d t h a t he knew t h a t i f he moved about Quickly he would become s i c k , s o he moved very slowly and very d e l i b e r a t e l y until he became accustomed t o t h e environment. He a l s o mentioned t h a t upon h i s return t o Earth he had " v e r t i g o " . as if t h e bed was i n c l i n e d about 30 degrees head down. for about a week. He f e l t This sensation lasted He mentions t h a t he was unable t o c l e a r h i s e a r s during parachute descent a t t h e end of h i s mission and wonders i f t h a t did not contribute t o h i s f e e l i n g s of " v e r t i g o " . He believes i t would have been interesting t o go through v e s t i b u l a r t e s t i n g during t h a t period, but o t h e r matters seemed t o occupy t h e time of t h e physicians. Comments: The contact who said i t took him four t o f i v e days t o g e t adjusted t o the zero-g environment was t h e only one of t h e group t h a t admitted t o even the l e a s t t r o u b l e . I found i t i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t he experienced a head-down sensation a f t e r return t o Earth. I would have expected him t o experience a head-down sensation in f l i g h t due t o migration of f l u i d t o t h e head and a head-up sensation upon return t o Earth. 13. Several s u b j e c t s mentioned d i f f i c u l t y sleeping i n f l i g h t . The consensus seemed t o be t h a t f r e e - f l o a t i n g s l e e p was not comfortable o r r e s t f u l . One man mentioned t h a t i n o r d e r t o g e t a comfortable n i g h t ' s s l e e p , t h e head and hands have t o be r e s t r a i n e d t o prevent them from moving about i n random fashion. 47 �Coimients; I believe this last remark regarding the unsatisfactory nature of unrestrained or free-floating sleep has been made before, so It requires no further Investigation, but should be kept In mind when sleep restraints In the Space Station crew quarters are being designed. 48 �APPENDIX A 1. Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program; Discuss in context of SS vs Skylab, Apollo, and STS. Worthwhile? Retain? Eliminate? Modify? 2. Do you have any thoughts on facilitating SS maintenance activities of the crew? 3. Discuss alarm systems: False alarms. Lights. Horns. Voice. Tactile. 4. Any thoughts as to tools for on-orbit repair and maintenance? Including "work bench", location, equipment, etc. 5. What about food and meals? A11 eat same foods on same days? Individually selected menu? Suggested changes/improvements. 6. Any suggestions regarding trash disposal? 49 �7. Any thoughts on clothing design? One piece c o v e r a l l s v s . pants and s h i r t ? Pocket l o c a t i o n , design, closure? Off-duty and on-duty. Any d i f f e r e n c e ? Special clothing f o r e x e r c i s e ? What kind of sleepwear would you choose? Any personal Items of c l o t h i n g f o r you? 8. Suggestions a s t o personal hygiene equipment. 9. Aids t o t r a n s f e r of massive o b j e c t s . 1 0 . Skylab crews found t h a t they o r i e n t e d t o t h e f l o o r In small compartments, but t r a n s l a t e d h e a d - f i r s t in large compartments. Does t h i s Influence your thinking In regard t o I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of "up" and "down"? Would visual o r i e n t a t i o n cues a s t o "up" o r "down" be helpful o r harmful? [At l e a s t one Skylab crew member reported t h a t he always o r i e n t e d down towards h i s f e e t . ] n . What about using vented gases f o r a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l , o r what about using opposing vents t o cancel any e f f e c t from venting? 1 2 . What I s the Importance of p r i v a t e coniminlcatlons with o p e r a t i o n s s t a f f , medical s t a f f , f r i e n d s , and r e l a t i v e s ? 1 3 . Some Skylab crew members reported t h a t p o r t a b l e f ans were of l i t t l e use f o r crew comfort, but were useful f o r equipment c o o l i n g . Others reported that they a r e u s e f u l , e s p e c i a l l y t o cool a person during and a f t e r e x e r c i s e . I s your opinion? 1 4 . Oo you have any Ideas concerning: Translation a i d s ? Control/switch p r o t e c t i v e devices? Orientation cues? Protective devices f o r personal wear (helmets, g l o v e s , e t c . ) 50 What �15. Skylab crew's coimients about the airlock Included such remarks as: It was too small for two crewmen. Insufficient stowage volume. "Like a rat's nest during EVA.' Lack of foot restraints. Poor location; -Between Multiple Docking Adapter and Orbital Workshop. -In mainstream of traffic. -Failure of any one of three hatches would be cause for mission abort or even catastrophic situation (EVA crewman being trapped outside). OUESTIOMS: Here any of these problems present on STS? What suggestions have you for Space Station? 16. Any Ideas about the Individual crew quarters? Location. General arrangement: (1) Size (Skylab nominal was 28 In. x 38 In. x 78 In.). (2) Restraints. (3) Stowage. Noise. Lighting. Temperature. Ventilation. What kind of sleep restraint? Should washing and toilet facilities be Included? -Cofflode? -Urinal? -Both? What about shift occupancy? Communications? Warning signals? 51 �17. How much medical training should crew members have? Equivalent to CNT? More? Less? 18. Oo you believe crew members should engage in 'group dynamics* training before being assigned to SS? Should one CH be trained in this discipline? 19. Should families be given similar psychological training and support? 20. What about crew interaction training in a one-g simulator? 21. How much of a problem is ambient noise? 22. Wardroom: What suggestions for entertainment? Will external viewing be of great importance from a recreational standpoint? Is It Important that the Earth appear "down"? 23. Discuss body waste collection and disposal. 24. Personal cleanliness. Shaving. Haircuts. Showers. 25. Exercise. What kind? 26. How best to manage books and manuals. Should everything be in data banks with CRT display? 27. Han/machine interfaces. Brightness. Shape, color, texture. 52 �28. Three shifts or one (or two)? All sleep at the same time? How long a work day? Eight hours? Hore? Less? Should work time Include one to two hours of exercise, or should all exercise be performed In off-duty time? 29. How Important would be real-time TV, Including network news? 30. l>/ho should select the crew? What Input should crew members have In regard to crew composition? 31. Does EVA require "buddy system" or can one person do It alone with monitoring from the Inside? 32. How can the EVA suit be Improved? Urine collection. Fecal collection. Provision for food and water. Vomiting. 33. EVA Restraints and tethers. Hand and foot holds. Lighting. Helmet mounted? Tools. 34. With a twenty-one-day rescue time at worst, do you have any suggestions regarding mortuary services? 35. What about foot restraints at the work station? Locking grid and shoe. Stirrups. Clangs. Velcro. Other. 53 �36. Loconotlon aids. Lines, slldewlres. Distributed handles. Other. 37. What about body restraints for tasks requiring extreme steadiness? 3B. Any thoughts on artificial gravity? Need. Methods. Rotating SS. Tether. Continuous or Intermittent? 39. What about autonomy? Is "control" by NCC a pain, or Is It reassuring? 40. Would a miniature helmet-mounted TV to record EVA activities be useful? 41. What about an ELV rescue capability? capsules. For example, a Titan with reentry 42. How can man-on-board reduce redundancy? 43. Any Ideas for design of a safe haven for two to three weeks' occupancy? 44. What about EVA? Use only for contingency? Use for contingency and major tasks only? Design for and use routinely? 45. On-board command structure: Strong, authoritative Comnander with clear chain of command? Participative management? Coenlttee decision making? 54 �46. How H1-F1 should the SS simulator be? 47. Is the orbiter overdesigned for safety? Can safety requirements be relaxed for SS? Any examples? 48. Any suggestions as to docking techniques or aids? Proximity operations. Approach corridors. Plume impingement considerations. Others. 49. In the future many diverse groups of people will have to participate in Space Station activities. For many of these people—scientists, construction workers, and so forth—there will be no arbitrary age limit. Can you think of any investigations that should be performed now, either to select those persons or to accommodate them in flight? 50. Do you have any thoughts as regards safety hazards? 51. Do you have any suggestions as to measures that would help maintain crew health? 55 ��National Aeronautics and Space Administration APPENDIX B Ames Research Center Moffett Field. California 94035 rUASA aeiirioAdnai: LMA:239-2 Dear Space Missioa Participant: The purpose of this letter is to introduce Dr« William K« Douglas and a project that he is conducting under the sponsorship of NASA's Anes Research Center. The Ames Man-Vehicle Systems Research Division under its Space Human Fac tors Office is in the process of planning research that will help to as sure high levels of crew effectiveness on future space missions, including NASA's proposed space station. Several expected differences between the space station and previous missions suggest that such research is warrant ed. Such differences include more heterogeneity of crew members in back ground and experience, broader variety of work requirements (including more EVA), larger crews, and longer durations. To accommodate some of these changes, plans and designs are being developed for configurations of the total station, individual modules, and work stations, as well as for habitability Issues and operational pro cedures. In many cases the appropriate design or plan for promoting and maintaining effective crew performance under the changing conditions is unknown. Numerous cases involving new designs for work stations and habi tats have been documented, in which serious performance problems have ar isen because of either the lack of human factors information or the failure to incorporate available information. The Division has been active for several years in research to support the aviation community in developing methods for avoiding such errors in design, and operations. One of the more valuable sources of Information that has directed our research activities has been the Aviation Safety Re porting System (ASRS), which we direct (through a contract, under the sponsorship of the FAA). The system solicits voluntary comments and recommendations from pilots and air traffic controllers that concern any procedural problems encountered in the aviation system, and how these might be corrected. The reports are completely deidentified to insure anonymity of the reporter. Publication of the obtained information is generally in the form of a report that synthesises Individual comments and recommendations related to some particular Issue. Information such as that generated by the ASRS has proven of value, not only by indicating problems that require research for their solution, but by Indicating when research is unnecessary, either because Information is available to effect a solution, research is already in progress, or the 57 �problem Is not amenable to research. When research has been prescribed, the value of Its product has been enhanced significantly by the direction received from such information. The project being conducted by Dr. Douglas Is consistent with the intent and spirit of the ASRS. We are convinced that the experience of partici pants in previous space missions can form the basis for cogent recommenda tions for design, operations, and appropriate research relevant to future space missions, similarly to our experience in aviation. Therefore, we have asked Dr. Douglas to solicit thoughts regarding apace station design and operational requirements. The information obtained will be used to help us (and others) supply guidelines to designers, and to discover inadequacies in available knowledge that Indicate a need for further research. Dr. Douglas has contacted you as part of that process. Dr. Douglas was the first flight surgeon for the Mercury astronauts. We sought his assis tance in this project because of his reputation for sensitivity, objec tivity, general knowledge of and appreciation for the human in space mis sions, and his acquaintance with many members of the astronaut corps. We are requesting your participation because of our sincere interest in helping to assure a high level of effectiveness for future manned space missions. Dr. Douglas' approach will be informal. He will ask you a series of questions designed to focus your consideration of design and operational Issues, which we judge are important to the success of future missions. In your answers to the questions we are asking you to project from your experience to the expected conditions on a space station. We are not interested in documenting or reporting problems, either person al or general, from past missions. Rather, we are asking for your judg ment of where impediments to task performance, motivation, morale, etc. could arise; what changes in design and operations would you recommend, based on your experience and expected mission differences. Dr. Douglas will be assisted on the project by Mr. Donald K. (Deke) Slayton, whom you may know personally. Mr. Slayton's experience and knowledge should be of great assistance to Dr. Douglas in interpreting and syn thesizing the information, and producing a useful report. Please be assured, should you elect to participate, that the information obtained by Dr. Douglas will be completely deidentified from you as the source. Not only will your individual anonymity be assured with respect to specific information that you volunteer, but the identity of those per sons interviewed will not be revealed by Dr. Douglas or Mr. Slayton. 58 ��1 fttcori No. NASA CR-3942 4. Titlf and SuMiM 2. Geynwuwi HICHDH NO. Human Performance Issues Arising From Manned Space Station Missions J Autttorlll 3. Reopant't Cralog No. & Report Dite October 1986 e. Performing Orgeniotlon Code 8. Perfornung Or^izabon Report No. William K. Douglas 9. ^lormina Orfonitation Nama and Addras McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company 3301 Bolsa Avenue Huntington Beach, CA 92647 17 Soomortnf A^ncy Nama and Addra« National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546 MDC H1363 10. Work Unit No. 11. Contract or Grant No. NAS2-11723 13. Type of Report and Period Ceiwad 14. Sporaoring Agency Coda FLS IS Supplamantary Nolat The author was the flight surgeon for the original Mercury Seven Astronauts. Point of Contact: Trleve A. Tanner, MS239-2 (415)694-5185 Ames Research Center. Moffett Field. CA 94035 FTS464-5185 IS Aeanoei Ten former NASA astonauts were Interviewed using a set of 51 questions developed to encourage the contacts to discuss any thoughts, opinions, con clusions, or suggestions which might have evolved since they left the astronaut program. Strict confidentiality was maintained. The reader will not be able to attribute any recorded remark to an individual person or to a particular mis sion. At least one astronaut from each of the NASA manned space flight programs, excluding the Space Transportation System (Shuttle), was Interviewed. The report records the answers to the questions asked, spontaneous comments, and the Investigator's oim personal evaluations of the material obtained. No statistical analysis of the material was attempted. The professional opinions of these ten experienced astronauts will be of value to persons concerned with the design and operation of mannoH space craft and manned space stations. 17 Key Warm ISunxtad by AutbarNIl l& OtiMutMn StPMiweW Crew health, maintenance, alarms, food, Unclassified - Unlimited clothing, personal hygiene, "up and down" identification, private communi Subject Category 54 cations, psychological support, crew selection, group dynamics, crew quartet s 19 Secieity OmuI.|o(itM'•pert) 20. Sacurilv Otmri.lef tN* page) 21. No. of Pagn 22 Unclassified Unclassified 62 'Forseleby the Nst>onii T*hriieel Infemriitttn Semee.Spnflgfield, Virgmi* 22161 . A04 ^ NASA'LANGLEY, 1986 ��National Aeronautics and Space Administration Code NIT-4 BULK RATE POSTAGE & FEES PAID NASA Permit No. G-27 Washington, D.C. 20546-0001 0*hcrat Business Penalty toi Pftfjie Use. S300 rwvsA M-sCT^ AcxrB • njS>lMA^IkK. If Undelfvcrablc (SBCCiun 156 MtnuBl) Do Not Return � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Skylab Collection Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973-1979 Relation A related resource https://libguides.uah.edu/ld.php?content_id=10578214 <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/80">View the Skylab Collection finding aid on ArchivesSpace</a> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Skylab Collection Description An account of the resource Skylab was the first space station operated by NASA; it was launched without a crew on May 14, 1973. Skylab had three manned missions: Skylab 2, launched May 25, 1973, lasting 28 days, Skylab 3, launched July 28, 1973, lasting 60 days, and Skylab 4, launched November 16, 1973, lasting 84 days. Crews on Skylab conducted a variety of experiments during their missions, including experiments in human physiology, circadian rhythms, solar physics and astronomy, and material sciences. Important earth resources studies were conducting including studies on geology, hurricanes, and land and vegetation patterns. Two of the more important components for conducting research on Skylab were the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) and the Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP). The ATM was a multi-spectral solar observatory, and NASA’s first full-scale manned astronomical observatory in space. The ATM yielded a significant number of images and provided useful data for understanding our sun. The EREP provided thousands of images of the Earth’s surface in visible, infrared, and microwave spectral regions. Skylab remained in orbit, unoccupied after the Skylab 4 mission, until July 11, 1973, when the space station reentered Earth’s atmosphere. References: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skylab#Manned_missions https://www.nasa.gov/missions/shuttle/f_skylab1.html https://history.nasa.gov/SP-402/ch4.htm Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000074 Title A name given to the resource "Human Performance Issues Arising From Manned Space Station Missions." Description An account of the resource This is a series of interviews with various anonymous astronauts from various programs including Skylab, focused on the future of manned spaceflight. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Douglas, William K. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1986-10-01 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1980-1990 Subject The topic of the resource McDonnell Douglas Corporation United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Skylab Program Human factors in engineering design Neutral buoyancy simulation Provisioning Airlock modules Extravehicular mobility units Experimentation Type The nature or genre of the resource Interviews Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Skylab Collection Box 16, Folder 2 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/201/14402/sdsp_skyl_000067_001.pdf 54af932513b89bdd15db2aa0321af4ff PDF Text Text MEXK » ME iCO CAfilttHKA.\ SEA I* fOllnh* ItAMCAiU �I IHOUR MRTl ^ULV '11^197©' M0 Q 0 11 j-*rA\ AlflHiA Oi'TH4 R A H PmUPPiRR" 1619> CEA N 2t*UKD � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Gerald Wittenstein Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000067 Title A name given to the resource "JULY 11, 1979 1 HOUR REPORT." Description An account of the resource This is a report about the Skylab 1 reentry. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1979-07-11 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Skylab 1 Reentry Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Diagrams Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Gerald Wittenstein Collection Box 8, Folder 4 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/23/14366/sdsp_skyl_000017-000018.pdf 36310d73f1bec5b0b3110d0cfdef5fe0 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Charles A. Lundquist Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/46" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">View the Charles A. Lundquist Collection finding aid in ArchivesSpace</a> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Charles A. Lundquist Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000017-000018 Title A name given to the resource "LAUNCH OF THIRD MANNED SKYLAB MISSION." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Merritt Island (Fla.) John F. Kennedy Space Center Skylab Program Skylab 4 Gibson, Edward G. Carr, Gerald P. Pogue, William R. Saturn launch vehicles Type The nature or genre of the resource One-Sheet Posters Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Charles A. Lundquist Collection Box 60, Folder Photograph University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/199/14372/sdsp_skyl_000026-000027.pdf 2a719c89accaa502da452c8ef62bb9eb PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Richard Heckman Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000026-000027 Title A name given to the resource "Memo regarding the Ben Franklin's Applicability for the Orbital Workshop. 1970-02-26." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Chief, Spacecraft Design Office Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Skylab Program Space habitats Grumman/Piccard PX-15 (Ben Franklin Submersible) Human factors in engineering design Life support systems Provisioning Type The nature or genre of the resource Memorandums Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Richard Heckman Collection Box 2, Folder 2 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/199/14397/sdsp_skyl_000062.pdf b3974fd8300b383bc50112f435a8786a Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Richard Heckman Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000062 Title A name given to the resource "MSFC SKYLAB CREW SYSTEMS MISSION EVALUATION." Description An account of the resource This is a hardware evaluation and assessment of the skylab habitat systems based on the feedback from the Skylab crews. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-08-01 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Madison County (Ala.) Huntsville (Ala.) George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Skylab Program George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Apollo Telescope Mount Space habitats Multiple docking adapters Airlock modules Provisioning Experimentation Extravehicular mobility units Life support systems Onboard equipment Film Vault Experimentation Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Richard Heckman Collection Box 1, Folder 1 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/201/14401/sdsp_skyl_000066_001.pdf f209bcd1b458b451f84b4da9bef890fe PDF Text Text MSFC'S ROLE IN THE SKYLAB REACTIVATION MISSION INTRODUCTION ide 1 On July 11, 1979, Skylab impacted the Earth surface. The debris dispersion area stretched from the South Eastern Indian Ocean across a sparsely populated section of Western Australia. This presentation discusses in some detail the events leading to the reentry of Skylab and the role the Marshall Space Flight Center played in these events. BACKGROUND On February 9, 1974, Skylab systems were configured for a final power down and Skylab was deactivated. Prediction of solar cycle 20 activity, the solar cycle predicted to begin in 1977, indicated that the final attitude in which Skylab was left, the gravity gradient attitude, would result in a potential storage period of 8 to 10 years. However, in the fall of 1977 it was determined that Skylab had left the gravity gradient attitude and was experiencing an increased orbital decay rate. This was a result of greater than predicted solar activity at the beginning of solar cycle 21. This increased activity increased the drag forces on the vehicle. Skylab was not predicted to reenter the Earth's atmos phere in late 1978 or early 1979 unless something was done to reduce the drag forces acting upon it. It was necessary to make a decision to either accept an early uncontrolled reentry of Skylab or to attempt to actively control Skylab in a lower drag attitude thereby extending its orbital lifetime until a Shuttle mission could effect a boost or deorbit maneuver with Skylab. �2 0 S^3e 1A (leave up) In order to verify what options could be accomplished with the onboard Skylab systems, a small team of NASA engineers went to the Bermuda Ground Station to establish communications and interrogate Skylab systems. On March 6, 1978, the Airlock Module (AM) command and telemetry (TM) systems were commanded on from the Bermuda Ground Station. The reception of t"he AM TM carrier at Bermuda was proof that the onboard AM system had responded to the commands. For the next several days, the AM electrical power system was properly configured and the AM batteries charged whenever the simultaneous conditions of ground station coverage at Bermuda and solar energy availability permitted. Subsequently AM power was trans ferred to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) systems and the operational status of the ATM systems was determined. On March 11, 1978, power was ^applied to the ATM Attitude and Pointing Control System (APCS) bus which in turn supplied power to the primary Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer (ATMDC)/Workshop Computer Interface Unit (WCIU). Power was maintained on the APCS bus for approximately 5 minutes and the receipt of ATMDC telemetry data at Bermuda was confirmed. The receipt of fcbi'fiC data~irid±cated thatrthe primary ATMDC/WCIU hardware and attendant .soft ware were operational and cycling. On March 13, 1978, engineers concluded the interrogation test on Skylab. The resulting data indicated no discernible degradation of the Skylab systems during its 4 years of — orbital storage. Aided with this data,(the knowledge that Skylab was in an unstable tumble prompted investigation into schemes which might extend the orbital lifetime of Skylab. # �o 3 <§) Scheme Development and Operational Modes March 1978 to July 1979 The first scheme investigated was to use the onboard Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS) to maintain a quasi-stable tumble of Skylab. However, it was soon determined that this option would not extend Skylab lifetime sufficiently to correspond to the operational readiness of the Space Shuttle for a possible reboost or deorbit mission. The only alternative left was to reactivate and continuously control the Skylab in a minimum drag attitude. Slide 2 In order to accomplish this the End On Velocity Vector (EOVV) minimum drag attitude control scheme was developed by MSEC engineers..and-used-afher-bhe-4ntt-i-at- Skylab-reatrivatton- on .June—1-4-r—4-9-7#: The EOVV mode was a minimum drag attitude with the relatively small surface areas of the front or back ends of Skylab being pointed approximately along the velocity vector. This mode was a modification of the Z Local Vertical (ZLV) mode (vehicle "Z" axis along the local vertical) that was used during the original Skylab Mission. fe-rte^e¥V-™rfer^^«W^^rdinat«-axe8 were r,ffs«^iightiy^om_theJLV^xes-d:o-align-the- vehicle-principle ^ax^S—with—the-ZLV-axes-*—lhajzehicl-e-was—theirToiled—such-that-i-ts soLar—amays—poiinred-toward—the—sun near"orbttTn~n7ToTrWTaa^imum power—eoHectrftra—and—att-ltude—reference—updatir.gr—Desaturation oiL-GMG—momentum—was done-with- gravity gradient torques-and-was _continuously~active ground-the~orbx"t. �T h e r e w e r e two s u b s e t s o f t h e EOVV mode, EOVV A a n d EOVV B. The EOVV B mode c a n b e t h o u g h t o f a s a b a c k w a r d EOVV A mode. The EOW A mode h a d t h e S k y l a b Command M o d u l e d o c k i n g p o r t p o i n t e d a l o n g t h e v e l o c i t y v e c t o r w h i l e t h e EOW B mode h a d t h e aft end of the workshop pointed along the velocity vector. The EOVV B mode w a s d e v e l o p e d t o p r o l o n g t h e l i f e o f CMG # 2 by a l l o w i n g maximum s o l a r i m p i n g e m e n t o n CMG # 2 s p i n b e a r i n g s f o r n e g a t i v e s u n a n g l e s . F o r t h e same r e a s o n , EOW A was u t i l i z e d when t h e v e h i c l e e x p e r i e n c e d p o s i t i v e s o l a r a n g l e s . The EOVV mode w a s u s e d i n t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e S k y l a b R e a c t i v a t i o n M i s s i o n t o r e d u c e a s much a s p o s s i b l e t h e S k y l a b d e s c e n t r a t e . I t was h o p e d t h a t t h e o r b i t a l l i f e o f S k y l a b c o u l d b e e x t e n d e d u n t i l a r e b o o s t / d e o r b i t m i s s i o n by t h e S p a c e S h u t t l e c o u l d b e l a u n c h e d . T h e e f f e c t o f t h e EOVV mode o n t h e d e s c e n t r a t e i s shown i n t h e n e x t v i e w g r a p h ( S l i d e 3 ) T h e r e was a n o t i c e a b l e s l o w i n g down o f t h e S k y l a b f a l l when EOVV was e n t e r e d J u n e 1 1 , 1 9 7 8 . I t was e s t i m a t e d t h a t i f S k y l a b h a d r e m a i n e d i n EOVV t h a t r e e n t r y c o u l d h a v e b e e n d e l a y e d u n t i l a t lide 3 lease April of 1980. Referr-in-g--to—slxde—1-A~,—the—transition - f r o m a-.no...control- -to a c o n t x a l i e d - T o o d e - C s o l a r i n e r t i a l ) — o c c u r r e < i ~ J u n e ~ £ . -^Tlris -was -feTJ-owed—two—days—1-a t er"wh en—th-e—t-r an sifion-t o - -the- EOW-A at-titude—oc-euired~. 1/ IA It should be noted that transitions from the o l d S k y l a b o p e r a t i o n a l modes ( S I , ZLV, e t c . ) t o t h e s e new o p e r a t i o n a l ¥ a Or "— 11 0: (^ | rt) m o d e s ^ r e q u i r e d many h o u r s o f e q u a t i o n a n d s c h e m e d e v e l o p m e n t , s o f t ware implementation and verification, the generation of computer �0 uplink loads and their verification, and finally close surveillance of vehicle operation once the operational mode was activated to insure that the vehicle responded as the theory p r e d i c t e d i t w o u l d . N u m e r o u s m e e t i n g s w e r e h e l d w i t h i n MSFC a n d J S C a n d a t NASA H e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n s u r e a l l l e v e l s o f NASA Management approved and agreed with proposed Skylab operations. For example, between January 1978 and the i n i t i a l Skylab SI acquisition on June 9, 1978, four Skylab presentations were made to Mr. Yardley, one to Dr. Frosch, and two to other headquarters personnel. , ±.t) , , -j ,v^ B.e£er°rl«^^ on June 28. ^ A J ^ a transition from SOW A to SI occurred This was necessary because of abnormal momentum s t a t e s w h i c h c o u l d l e a d t o CMC g i m b a l s t o p p r o b l e m s . T h e p r o b l e m w a s eventually traced to the inability of the strapdown updating scheme to compensate f o r the movement of the i n e r t i a l reference, particularly at high sun angles. When t h i s w a s u n d e r s t o o d , a strapdown update bias term was successfully used to compensate for the observed Z axis drift due to orbit plane and sun motion. On J u l y 6 the vehicle was again returned t o the EOW-A a t t i t u d e . On J u l y 9 t o t a l v e h i c l e c o n t r o l w a s l o s t i n c l u d i n g a t t i t u d e reference. The cause of t h i s loss of a t t i t u d e was due to a power f a i l u r e . The vehicle had been placed in a power configuration w i t h t h e AM b a t t e r i e s n o t o n t h e l i n e d u e t o t w o u n e x p l a i n e d b a t t e r y c h a r g e r f a i l u r e s i n t h a t s y s t e m . T h e ATM p o w e r s y s t e m a n d ^ t h e AM s o l a r a r r a y s w e r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o c a r r y t h e l o a d i n t h e EOVV m o d e c a u s i n g t h e ATM b a t t e r i e s t o a u t o m a t i c a l l y t r i p o f f line. As was done previously, i t was decided t o go from the the �a m T c e • ...J u n c o n t r o l l e d a t t i t u d e t o S I A (Uuly 1 9 ) a n d t h e n t o t h e EOVV-A attitude (July 25). \ — (X c-c -?1 c J EOW-A t o EOVV-B T r a n s i t i o n On November 4 , 1 9 7 8 , S k y l a b w a s m a n e u v e r e d 1 8 0 d e g r e e s f r o m i t s n o r m a l EOW o r i e n t a t i o n w i t h t h e MDA p o i n t i n g t o w a r d t h e p o s i t i v e v e l o c i t y v e c t o r (EOW-A) t o a new EOW o r i e n t a t i o n w i t h t h e MDA p o i n t i n g t o w a r d t h e n e g a t i v e v e l o c i t y v e c t o r ( E O W - B ) . The p u r p o s e o f t h i s m a n e u v e r was t o i n c r e a s e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y f o r extended Skylab lifetime by providing the most favorable thermal c o n d i t i o n s , i n EOW o p e r a t i o n , t o r e d u c e t h e s t r e s s o n CMG 2 . A n a l y s i s o f S k y l a b d a t a a t MSFC o b t a i n e d d u r i n g EOW o p e r a t i o n u p t o t h i s t i m e showed a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f CMG 2 a n o m a l i e s , t h e s u n a n g l e , a n d t h e o p e r a t i n g t e m p e r a t u r e o f CMG 1i d e 4 2 (Slide 4). This data indicated that the stress conditions on CMG 2 c o u l d b e a v o i d e d o r r e d u c e d b y p r o v i d i n g a h i g h e r o p e r a t i n g t e m p e r a t u r e e n v i r o n m e n t f o r CMG 2 . The EOW-A o r i e n t a t i o n p r o v i d e d m o r e s o l a r e x p o s u r e f o r CMG 2 a t p o s i t i v e s u n a n g l e s w h i l e a n EOW-B o r i e n t a t i o n w o u l d p r o v i d e m o r e s o l a r e x p o s u r e lide 2 a t n e g a t i v e s u n a n g l e s a s shown i n S l i d e 2 . The 1 8 0 ^ t r a n s i t i o n m a n e u v e r was s c h e d u l e d f o r e a r l y November 1978 to coincide with the upcoming positive-to-negative change in s u n a n g l e ( i . e . , s u n a n g l e movement f r o m N o r t h t o S o u t h o f t h e orbit plane). A modification to the flight software had to be d e v e l o p e d (SWCR-S4016, b u f f e r 1 5 ) a n d was i m p l e m e n t e d t o a c c o u n t f o r c o m p u t a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e EOW-A a n d �7 EOVV-B orientations and to automate maneuver sequencing to support the transition maneuvers. Slide 5 The transition maneuver sequence was developed and simulated, based on available station coverage (Slide 5) to minimize TACS utilization and to provide favorable conditions for initiation of EOVV-B operations. Normal and contingency procedures to support the transition maneuver were developed and executed from 11/2/78 through 11/4/78 with the transition maneuver taking place on 11/4/78 as the sun angle passed through zero. It should be noted that trh^P design and simulation effort enabled the maneuver plan to be executed for no TACS usage, saving this limited resource for future operations. Skylab remained in the EOW-B attitude from November 4, 1978 until January 25, 1979. During this time, all Skylab systems functioned satisfactorily. After Skylab was brought under active control, in a low-drag attitude to minimize its rate of decay, it was decided in mid-1978 to accelerate the development of an orbital retrieval system that might be accommodated on an early flight of the Space Shuttle, increasing chances of rendezvousing with Skylab. A proposed mission sequence with the Skylab boost/deboost 51ide 6 options is shown in Slide 6. �8 The rate of orbital decay, however, continued to increase due to increased solar activity. Skylab's onboard systems also showed signs of deterioration and there were increasing concerns over the Space Shuttle's schedule. For these reasons, the concept of Skylab recovery was terminated in December 1978. At that time, it was decided to reorient and control the vehicle in a solar inertial attitude which was the normal vehicle orientation for original Skylab mission operations. accomplished January 25, 1979. This was The vehicle remained in SI control until June 20 when TEA control was activated. TEA Control As Skylab's altitude decreased, the magnitude of the aerodynamic torques on the vehicle increased. Studies/indicated that vehicle control in the solar inertial orientation would no longer be possible below about 140 n.m. due to these increased aerodynamic torques and the limited control authority available from the Vehicle Control Moment Gyros (CMG's). Aerodynamicists and control engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), while investigating vehicle orientations which produced minimal disturbance torques on the vehicle, found certain orientations where the summation of these disturbance torques was zero. These attitudes were called Torque Equilibrium Attitudes (TEA s). A TEA attitude control law was developed to utilize these zero torque points. This control law was unique because it was the first spacecraft control scheme which used upper atmospheric �9 aerodynamic torques to desaturate CMG momentum. In the normal SI Skylab mode, CMG momentum was managed by dumping excess momentum using gravity gradient torques. In a TEA attitude, the aerodynamic torques and gravity gradient torques are equal and opposite. By offsetting the vehicle slightly from this attitude, the relative magnitudes of the gravity gradient and aerodynamic torques can be increased or decreased as desired to maintain the CMG momentum at the desired state. Through a concentrated effort at MSFC, the TEA control law was developed, programmed and verified between January and May 1979. There were several TEA attitudes and each resulted in different atmospheric drag on the vehicle. The limiting factors in maintaining control were meeting the electric power requirements and being in a dense enough atmosphere to generate the desired aerodynamic torques. Most of the TEA attitudes were unuseable because the Skylab solar arrays could not collect sufficient solar energy to run the various Skylab systems in the specified attitude. Other attitudes could be used only during a range of certain sun angles and below certain altitudes. Two of the 7 useable attitudes, the T275 and T121G are shown in Slide 7. The T275 attitude has a smaller projection of surface area into the direction of flight and a corresponding lower atmospheric drag than the T121G attitude. By maneuvering between TEA attitudes the drag on the vehicle could be modulated to slow or speed the desired descent rate of Skylab. This provided the capability to shift the reentry time several orbits if necessary. �Based on early reentry predictions of mid-June 1979, initial procedures were developed to begin TEA operations in the T121G attitude on May 26, 1979. At this time the vehicle altitude was predicted to be approximately 150 n.m. and the sun angle profile such that the T121G attitude would supply sufficient solar power from this point to the predicted reentry. However, as the time approached, it became apparent that Skylab was not reentering as fast as predicted and reentry slipped to early July 1979. As a result of this delay in reentry, a maneuver from T121G to T121P or T275 would be required to provide sufficient power over the sun angle range from 20 of May to reentry. Because of this, and the fact that Skylab would be around 157 n.m. on May 26, it was decided to delay TEA operations and stay in SI control until late June 1979. In the June 18-20 time frame, Skylab altitude would be approaching its lower limit for SI control (140 n.m.) and the sun angle would be such that the T121P (Slide 8) attitude would provide sufficient power all the way to reentry. In addition to requiring only one TEA orientation for solar power, this delay provided additional benefits. More time was available for TEA control analysis; development of procedures for power management, rate gyro bias compensation, TEA parameter updating, and contingencies; and ground controller training. Ori—May—2ff,—the alt ifu"de~"af"the vehicle was! approximately 160 TIJJL Skylab-could be-controlled in the SI~ mode only until. �11 The Skylab _.descent rate- and- expected :Ms solar—aetdv±ty~daTHicalTe3TTfhat altitude VouSd be reached_ .th.is_time,-the_-. - »•» ware-avai-ia^ • Thw. velocity vector and perpendicular to th.orbital plane and the v provide a high atmospheric drag on the ve T^un- angle would-allows the T275 atmospheric density wo —— attitude to he useable, ^ ^ ^ It was planned to use the ,f ^ modulation during the fnal 36 hour P lated orbit. predicted reentry occurred during a high y P P 20 the delayed ZLV commands contain 7 3:24 «T, dune 20. t ^^ o£fsets were uplinked. At time to start TEA acquxsxt At At 8-17 GMT, the CMG ,30 CHT, TACS control ^^^second „ gimbal rate limit was mc more TEA Slide 9 ^ to lnltlal control authority during •^ initiated at 12:53 for phases of ^lnertial control. The maneuver: sequ ^ ^ ^ X121P is shown in Slid allM ^ ^ ^ q£^ Santiago station was eoverage. At 13:01 CKT, shortly^ ^ ^ ^^ acquired, the OlO's were c a g ^ ^ ^ new TEA attitude. was complete. At xo- ^^ ^ �12 TEA Control Reacquisition (?— To support the normal maintenance of TEA control, t-he~ slope matrix was programmed to receive updates by ground uplink. This was a 3 by 3 matrix relating the momentum errors to attitude errors about the torque equilibrium attitude. This slope matrix was a function of atmospheric density and the TEA attitude. Since atmospheric density was increasing with the vehicle descent, the slope matrix required periodic adjustment. At 16:13 GMT on June 24, the first slope matrix update since TEA acquisition was uplinked. However, the flight program required that the slope matrix elements be commanded in row order, but it was uplinked from the ground in column order. This meant that the elements in the slope matrix were reversed and the flight program had actually received the transpose of the desired , . .. C-O-vJ Vt matrix. With an incorrect slope matrix, the vehicle cannot Ujo-asJL cL properly manage the CMG momentum and wifd slowly lose attitude control. The first pass through the TEA control calculations with the transposed slope matrix occurred after the telemetry station was lost. There was no indication of a problem until the next station acquisition occurred at 17:44 GMT. The telemetry data from this station showed that the CMG momentum was becoming saturated, TEA control parameters were off-nominal, TACS had been used and that, in general, TEA control authority was being lost. An analysis of the DCS commands issued during the previous pass was made and it was discovered that the transpose of the slope matrix had been transmitted. �13 A contingency TEA control reacquisition procedure had been previously developed for use during the initial TEA control acquisition. Although this contingency procedure was developed assuming that TEA control might be lost due to an offset in the assumed X axis center of pressure, it also applied to the current situation. The commands necessary for the procedure were already resident at the ground stations and were readily available. The reacquisition procedure was executed when the next station coverage occurred over Madrid. The entire process of losing TEA control and reacquiring TEA control used approximately 1100 lb f-sec of TACS fuel. Although this fuel usage had been unplanned, there was still sufficient fuel remaining for any required maneuvers prior to reentry. �14 Skvlab Reentry ............< ™ i ,Hlitv amount of reentry control capability. Procedures to maneuver Skylab from the high-drag T121P attitude to a low-drag (T275) or ZLV attitude were developed to provide a means o prion By maintaining a low-drag shifting the reentry predrctron. y i A Tip pxtended over that m attitude, the orbit lifetime could be exten T121P attitude. This would make it possible to s r h.f o£ high population density predicted reentry from an orbrt of hrgh p one with a lower population density. A <-Viat~ TEA control (T121P) °r T275 Since several factors indicate m ^gQ and TACS only control could no n m procedures were also developed to initiate VI ilts in a predictable average drag tumble. A random tumble results P A-i «-t-i nns By controlling tne ;rr.r:::irr::-r;rrrir ::::rr:jr.-::.......----« . i.n predicted reentry and July 9 at ^ hours prior Beginning on July Headquarters, h six hours thereafter, NORAD supplied NASA Hea each six nour reentry predictions. MSFC and JSC with Skylab tracking a a these centers was constantly maintained K Communications between these staining cxi-Tvrrk loop. Decisions pertami g — * -lecosraunications netw k p _^ ^ to executing procedures M A cA H P A dnuarters under or ^ ^ �15 3 As it turned out, only T121P control was required. NORAD data received between the 48 and 18-hour-to-go time points indicated that Skylab would reenter during the minimum population density orbit, but the predicted impact point was in the highest population density area of the orbit. This was reconfirmed at the 12-hour time-to-go point. The decision was therefore to continue the T121P attitude until altitude of approximately 80 n.m., at which point the vehicle control was finally terminated when Skylab was commanded to tumble approximately 9 hours before reentry. (Reentry took place on July 11, 1979, at 16:37 - 28 GMT.) The vehicle tumble Slide /O decreased the vehicle drag and by selection of the time before entry to initiate the tumble, an extension of the footpring by approximately one quarter of a revolution was realized. �16 FINAL COMMENTS D u r i n g b o t h t h e p r i m a r y a n d r e a c t i v a t i o n m i s s i o n s , many S k y l a b s y s t e m s w e r e r e q u i r e d t o o p e r a t e i n modes n e v e r i n t e n d e d b y i t s designers and to accomplish tasks dictated by unforseen events. T h e S k y l a b r e a c t i v a t i o n m i s s i o n o f f e r e d NASA a u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t y to evaluate complex power generation, mechanical, computer and environmental control systems after having been in a space environment for over six years. Further, these systems were in orbital storage for over four of the six years in an uncontrolled s p a c e e n v i r o n m e n t b e f o r e b e i n g r e a c t i v a t e d i n March 1 9 7 8 . S y s t e m degradation was found to be minimal. U n i q u e c o n t r o l s c h e m e s w e r e d e v e l o p e d (EOW a n d TEA) w h i c h e n a b l e d Skylab to fly through the gravity gradient/aerodynamic torque transition region. Torque equilibrium points were discovered where gravity gradient and aerodynamic torques balanced. At these points very l i t t l e vehicle control authority was required to maintain control. Moreover, vehicle orientations at these points were such that one could choose attitudes exhibiting high or low v e h i c l e - d r a g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . By m o d u l a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e s e orientations, the rate of vehicle descent could be increased or decreased, forcing i t into an impact orbit characterized by a low population density. After control of Skylab was regained in June 1978, a t an a l t i t u d e of 218 nautical miles, the vehicle was e s s e n t i a l l y u n d e r c o n t r o l down t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 0 n a u t i c a l m i l e s b e f o r e i t w a s commanded t o r e e n t r y . ( R e e n t r y t o o k p l a c e o n J u n e 1 1 , 1 9 7 9 , a t 1 6 : 3 7 - 2 8 GMT.) The vehicle tumble decreased �17 the vehicle drag and by selection of the time before entry to initiate the tumble, an extension of the footpring by approximately one quarter of a revolution was realized. XIKKKXEBKIMKMES � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Gerald Wittenstein Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000066 Title A name given to the resource "MSFC'S ROLE IN THE SKYLAB REACTIVATION MISSION." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1979-07-11 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Skylab 1 Reentry George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Gerald Wittenstein Collection Box 8, Folder 4 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/46/14395/sdsp_skyl_000060_001.pdf 11825ce2945e9c0a8ab900531c9504cc PDF Text Text L I V I N G NASA PROJECTS APOLLO SATURN SKYLAB SHUTTLE I N S P �The documentary archive described in this catalogue will be sold as a single lot by auction at Sotheby's in their Large Galleries 34/35 New Bond Street, W1A 2AA [Telephone 01-493 8080 Telex: London 24454 SPBLONG) at approximately 8 p.m. on Monday 20th July 1981 All enquiries about this sale should be made to the Manuscript Department Sold subject to conditions printed in the main catalogue In sending commissions this catalogue may be referred to as "Shuttle" Front cover designed by Raymond Loewy �S • T H E B Y ' S ��Raymond Loewy and Living in Space Significance of Space Exploration and of its History With the successful mission of the first re-useable Space Shuttle, code-named Columbia, from 12 to 14 April 1981, man's vision of living in space was given practical reality and assured of a future. The Shuttle marks a new era in space exploration and in the history of mankind. The potential benefits arising from this momentous event are virtually limitless, but already it is envisaged Cand the first 60 flights are already committed] that payloads of regular Shuttles will establish: • journeys into orbit as routine as commercial airline flights with Shuttles operating under their own power without the necessity of lift-off boosters • military communications, navigation, weather and surveillance satellites ["the nation that controls space will control the world"] • the construction of a giant 96-inch telescope operating high above the distorting effects of the atmosphere enabling astronomers for the first time to see any planets around nearby stars, to observe objects 100 times dimmer than those that can be seen through ground-based telescopes and perhaps also to detect light emanating from the very edge of the visible universe, which will contribute to our understanding of evolution and the origin of life • the construction of space platforms and even of space colonies with space nations under their own governments, flags and laws • the construction of the European spacelab • a network of permanently located satellites able to destroy enemy atomic missies • the return of raw materials from space and the extraction of unlimited energy from the Sun • the solar polar mission • a new industrial revolution: the development of virtual vacuum-free technosphere manufacturing plants free of gravity, thus making possible, for instance, the production of an estimated 400 alloys from metals that do not successfully mix under the pull of Earth's gravity which tends to separate the lighter metals from the heavier ones; the manufacture of perfect ball-bearings: stable foams; crystals of new semi-conductor materials: and super-pure vaccines and drugs produced in totally antiseptic conditions. f U success of the Columbia Shuttle will also refocus attention on all aspects of the development of the Shuttle and its forerunners as subjects for academic investigation and exhibition in museums and industrial centres. ��The Raymond Loewy Files The present collection - from the files of Raymond Lcewy, NASA's official Habitability Consultant from 1967 to 1973 - is a unique and fundamental record relating to the first steps in manned utilization of space and the birth of space exploration. It contains material that NASA itself does not have, such as the original drawings and sketches and the abandoned and experimental designs, or which, as a government agency, it is not at liberty to release. However, under American Government regulations all drawings, documents, blue-prints, statistical data, sketches and scale models remain the personal property of the consultant. The importance of the collection and of Loewy's contribution are reflected in the success of Skylab and the Space Shuttle, for both of which Raymond Loewy was retained as Habitability Consultant. His designs will form the basis for all American manned spacecraft: "Manned space stations of the future will require few design changes for man to work comfortably in Zero-G operations, based on the 171-day occupancy of the Skylab workshop by nine astronauts" Aviation Week & Space Technology, 8 April 1974. This documentary archive comprises some 3,500 items and includes: • original conceptual drawings, designs, sketches and detailed sections together with finished art-work executed with airbrush or body-colour, on card, paper or tracing paper Cc. 520] some initialled or signed by Loewy and a few consisting of reproductions reworked by hand; mechanical drafts; blue-prints; reflex negatives Ca number on large sheets]; coloured and black and white photographs Cused by modern designers particularly in relation to mockups]; negatives; VU-graphic overlapping transparencies; plates; plans; emblems; textual matter; reports; notes; photocopies; lithographs; press-type samples and data format cards contained in large folders. • two space work-overalls and one jacket • four scale models: •• Apollo-Saturn V •• crew's quarters ejected from the Shuttle Orbiter •• a future space base •• Skylab �Habitability Reports prepared for NASA �• the official reports of the habitability consultant, in 47 illustrated volumes, mostly with spiral bindings, containing some 4,800 pages, sent by the Loewy team to NASA and consisting of 13 Final and Contract Summary reports C7 or them in two volumes], relating to Earth Orbital Space Stations (Skylab], the Shuttle, a Modular Space Station and a Wardroom Gallery Module together with general habitability studies covering all areas of human survival in space-sleeping, nourishment, hygiene, waste-management, the collection of samples, their dehydration, identification, dating and freezing for chemical analysis upon return to Earth after 90 or more days in orbit (27 being duplicates and a small number in photocopy] • NASA's Habitability Design Support Technical Summary Statement for the design of the Shuttle dated 1972 as sent to Loewy by NASA's Deputy Chief of Manned Spacecraft Design • commemorative photographs and letters signed by NASA officials and astronauts including Frank Borman, Buzz Aldrin and John Stafford. • Raymond Loewy's own compilation consisting of originals and copies, relating to his part in the NASA Programmes, including magazine reports • a space collage by Raymond Loewy, signed and dated • index volume of NASA's terms and definitions Skylab and the need for a Habitability Consultant George Rodney, Director of Martin Marietta Aerospace and NASA's Contractor, explained the need for a Habitability Consultant in a letter to Raymond Loewy dated 12 February 1975: "Our space programs Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Skylab - have been the exclusive preserve of the scientist, the engineer and the medical doctor It was only with Skylab that we first recognised that, if man were to survive for extended times in space, perhaps we engineers needed some added help." As it stood, all characteristics of existing space vehicles [primarily Saturn IVB] had been determined entirely by their function as a fuel cell and were heavily mission-orientated. Grids and internal structural members had been designed for the container's rigidity and suitability to cryogene liquid hydrogen fuel flowing through it. This produced a hostile metallic environment with distracting reflective light sources coming from the aluminium foil dome lining and filtered through the multi-layered grid flooring. To heighten the visual confusion and sense of a mechanical not a human environment, colour had been used to emphasise the different structural elements rather than acting as an organising medium. �CONTRACT SUMMARY REPORT A1 - MSC Shuttle Orbiter Crew Compartment/X-Axis Docking HABITABILITY STUDY SHUTTLE ORBITER JANUARY 1972/DECEMBER 1372 PREPARED FOR NASA BY RAYMOND LOEWY/WILLIAM SNAITH, INC. 1 1• EAST 5 3 STREET. NEW YORK. N.Y. 10022 �Skylab, the first manned space station, in fact supported three separate crews for 171 days in space between 15 May 1973 and 8 February 1974. Clearly, as much attention had to. be paid to "the physiological safety and comfort of the astronauts" as had been paid to getting them into space. In the pithy dictum of Dr. George Mueller, NASA's Deputy Administrator for Manned Space-Flights: "what comes out of the sliding rule is not necessarily compatible with human life." Raymond Loewy: reasons selected as Habitability Consultant Following an investigation of various organisations, Dr. J. L. McLaughlin, Chief of NASA's Division of Space Medicine, recommended Raymond Loewy and his team and confirmation of the appointment was made on 15 November 1967 Loewy was a pioneer in industrial design and had had a distinguished career in both commercial and public projects (see curriculum vitae at the end of the catalogue]. In 1962 he had designed the exterior markings and interior appointments of the U.S. Presidential Air Force One and, "on the floor of the Oval Office", had explored with President Kennedy the idea of "re-designing America". Kennedy had arranged a meeting between Raymond Loewy and Jim Webb, then Administrator of NASA. In the 1950s and 1960s Loewy had established the habitability standards of the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard and Department of Commerce Maritime Administration. He had also worked on the experimental submarine Tektite, emergency flying hospitals, helicopter ambulances and the interiors of the White House helicopters. He had also had comprehensive experience in solving human problems in such projects as the design of trains, passenger ships, aeroplanes, automobiles, buses, hotels, houses, hospitals, hydrofoils, interior components for the Inter-Allied Command Headquarters in Washington during the Second World War and even a prison. ��The Skylab Assignment Raymond Loewy's task in 1967 was outlined by George Rodney, the Project Director of Martin Marietta Aerospace: • "Consultant is to conceive and develop means to insure the psycho-physiological comfort and safety of the crew operating for prolonged periods in exotic conditions of Zero Gravity [Zero G], while exposed to micrometeorites and other risks inherent to frequent EVA's [Extra Vehicular Activities] in deep space" • "Consultant to suggest ways and means to organise the interior of the workshop to allow the crew to operate efficiently in a confined semi-dark space, while exposed to claustrophobia and little-known forms of space sickness" • "Desirability for the designer to keep in mind possibilities of psychic disturbances, even among men of outstanding physical and intellectual excellence, triggered by isolation and impossibility of rescue in case of serious operational failure and/or acute sickness" • Establish a system to evaluate the fitness of individuals to become astronauts. Special Problems and Unknown Factors In 1967 the U.S. had little experience of manned space-flight and none of extended missions. There were four constants for the designer, each with unknown consequences for human physical and pyschological endurance: • Zero Gravity, producing weightlessness • Missions of long duration • A surrounding hostile environment [including micrometeorites] • A totally closed system with no visual access to Earth Owing to the unique limitations of space, weight and materials, almost everything displayed or discussed was outside the range of accepted habitability standards and practices. For instance, in 1967, no one was certain how the crew would move about the station and the Apollo project was too undeveloped to provide data on how to translate from point to point in a Zero Gravity environment. Ignorance of the potential problems resulted in the proliferation of development designs, many of them, such as for protective helmets, sleeping devices and exercising and guide rails, ultimately proving to be unnecessary. Such unused designs greatly add to the historical value of the collection. �HiCwLAa A<Tiy»Tf SATURN FIVE SPACE STATION HABITA6ILITY STUDY RAYMOND IOEWY|WILLIAM S:.' NASA Extra-vehicular activity (EVA] HQ �Lack of knowledge also demanded some bizarre experiments, such as the following described by Loewy: "Because of the impossibility of reproducing weightlessness on Earth nobody knew whether or not the device we had designed to collect fecal matter [for eventual analysis on re-entry] would create sufficient suction to be effective. An engineer from the team with which we collaborated had an idea in order to obtain visual confirmation of correct vacuum suction. View-ports were provided at strategic locations in the fecal collectors installed in a fast aircraft. Volunteers were paid $50 to be fed pure prune juice and after a pre-established time interval the aircraft took off at a steep climb. At a given signal, it went into an outside loop creating for a few seconds a Zero Gravity condition of weightlessness. Any volunteer that produced the necessary bowel movement was given an extra $50 bonus payment for its contribution to the project's development." Raymond Loewy^s General Recommendations for Skylab After an initial briefing and indoctrination in Zero-Gravity living Raymond Loewy realised that the life of the crewmen "would take place while subjected to many unfamiliar, often forbidding influences and stresses, both physical and psychological. Besides discomfort, there might occur strange expressions of space-sickness compounded with EVA risk and, perhaps, deep emotional distress. However, I felt that even men of transcendental courage, and physical fitness, thoroughly trained through simulation devices and prepared for all sorts of contingencies, would react in predictable ways in regard to atavistic personal and social needs. Successful behaviour in prolonged 0-G and in close proximity to other men in cramped quarters deserved subtle understanding and plenty of down-to-earth feelings on our part. In addition, I felt that there was a value in surrounding them with a semblance of life-on-Earth familiarity at least in social areas. To induce relaxation and relieve strain were, I thought, necessary requirements. I did not pretend, I freely admitted, that my opinions were necessarily based upon scientific premise; they were simply a case of what we called 'educated intuition', the result of decades of field experience." �£TA-r//J - - •fiAS-r- PRELIMINARY Jh 1 197) J?zn-£.r/ v • Conceptual design for Food Management in the Shuttle •' �A plenary session was held at NASA's Headquarters in Washington under the chairmanship of Dr. George Mueller attended by scientists, psychologists, space medical doctors, engineers and astronauts. Loewy was invited to express his views. He made the following general recommendations, which have influenced all later concepts: • A port-hole to maintain visual contact with Earth [debriefing remarks by crewmen as reported by NASA after Skylab's first mission included the statement that the most important off-duty activity was the window, and they wished they had more and larger windows) • The need for sleeping areas giving total privacy for each crewman with the possibility of reading and listening to recorded music ["primary recreational activity during 70.5 million miles of manned space flight was listening to taped music..." recorded on wire to avoid fire risk. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 April 1974) • The necessity of a wardroom providing some measure of communal living at meal times and during leisure periods • The importance of adopting a vertical up-and-down monodirectional [Zero G) mode of living or stance [foot restraints were particularly important in achieving this) • The development of systems to prevent the ascendency of one crew member over his fellows [the triangular eating surface was one outcome of this) Practical Solutions by Raymond Loewy, primarily for Skylab Raymond Loewy began his work under the enormous limitations imposed by the concept of a "wet" launch [based on the crewmen's moving all internal equipment from the Multiple Docking Adaptor to the Earth Orbital Space Station after the evacuation of residual fuel — Skylab was at first to be in a used fuel tank). With the change to a "dry" launch [whereby the laboratory would be fitted out before launch) the designer came into his own: among the many practical solutions produced by Loewy's team [working in conjunction with the technical consultants) were: ��• WASTE MANAGEMENT — details of positioning, privacy and configuration taking into consideration the impossibility of using toilet paper because the fibres floating in Zero Gravity could cause pneumonia. The waste management system was one of the most significant technical and habitability advancements of Skylab over earlier missions. The system was highly sophisticated and enabled measured samples of urine and fecal matter to be retained in a freeze-dried state for analysis on return to Earth to detect possible chemical changes in body due to Zero Gravity. • FGOD MANAGEMENT — including designs for food preparation and utensils, with packaging Csome collapsible) for convenience, attractiveness and control of errant food debris and surfaces that were flush and easy to clean to prevent the accumulation of matter ejected through space sickness. • HEADGEAR—the design of helmets to prevent injury through collision in Zero G [ultimately proved to be unnecessary). • CREW QUARTERS — the initial suggestion was that the living deck be divided into areas for exercise and experiment, dining, waste management, sleep and storage: Loewy provided designs for privacy and group relationships in three areas with toilets separate from basins. • COLOUR SELECTION — with emphasis on a congenial, warm spectrum. • PERSONAL HYGIENE — remembering that showers do not work in space. • SLEEP STATIONS OR AREAS —the first layout made this a communal space with bunks and storage pouches arranged in conventional bunkrooms. This took account only of the comatose state of sleeping; but sleeping also involves undressing, a period of reflection, awakening, rousing and dressing. Loewy insisted on privacy. The summary report stated: "Joe reads in his sleep compartment at night. At night Pete uses the headset so no one else has to listen to the music." • RESTRAINTS — so that while sitting and moving the crewmen could stabilize themselves by making toe-holds with the toe-cleats in their sandals into the honeycomb floors or ceilings. • RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES — Robert L. Bond, Principal Investigator for Skylab Crew Activities and Maintenance Studies reported: �< 7(?l£RQ/v) f LoS-^V yo*«. c.^»B«I1ToJ3 'foT^r U.S. Sp«cr on Tke ^?pd '/o X / A foot on the moon �.. they all say the most important item is the window - and they wish they had more of them and bigger ones. They didn't start reading until the spacecraft altitude became such that they couldn't track the ground out CofD the wardroom window, or when the major daylight ground track took them primarily over water — they have used the balls a few times mainly out of curiosity. Paul is the champ holding two records - C1) a toss from the MDA that bounced off the lid of the Trash A/L and went into the CM without touching a thing (2) a toss around the same path the run around the lockers that continued to strike the lockers in sequence 111 times before running out of gas and going off line. No one has used any of the exercise gear. They prefer to ride the bike or lope around the lockers. They all use the binoculars to look at the ground Cevery day). They all enjoy the tapes and use the recorders in the wardroom, at the ATM, and in the bedrooms... they all feel that the unique effects of Zero-G are just about enough to fill their off-duty time with interesting things to do. They also feel that Earth bound interests stay with them in orbit and whatever a guy's hobby or fun things to do on the ground might be is also what he would enjoy having for relaxation in flight within design reason. Oh yeah - and the darts don't work!" Assessment of Raymond Loewy^s Achievement Loewy's contribution has been the subject of laudatory articles in numerous magazines and reports, but perhaps most telling are the assessments in letters from members of the NASA team. Dr. George Mueller, Deputy Administrator of NASA's Manned Spacecraft Division wrote to Loewy on 29 July 1974: Dear Raymond: Two significant events in the last decade will, I believe, shape the future course of human history. The first was landing on the Moon with its demonstration that humanity was no longer bound to the Earth. The second was the manned orbiting space station with its demonstration that man could live for indefinite periods of time in a weightless environment and that he could perform useful, yes, unique work in that environment. Raymond, in my opinion, you and your organization played a crucial role in the latest of these momentous steps that man is taking to the stars. I do not believe that it would have been possible for the Skylab crews to have lived in relative comfort, excellent spirits, and outstanding efficiency �8 l-V*. TW NasA HQ "* Conceptual design for a space taxi I 17c. �had it not been for your creative design, based on deep understanding of human needs, of the interior environment of Skylab and the human engineering of the equipment and furnishings which the astronauts used. That design and engineering applied, in turn, to our follow-on space stations has provided the foundation for man's next great step - an expedition to the planets. You should be proud, as all of us who know of your contribution are proud, of the key role you have played in laying the foundation for man to live in space. My most sincere congratulations for your work on the Skylab Program and my best wishes for your continued contributions to man's role in space. Sincerely, George Mueller, Chairman and President. William Schneider, Director of the Skylab Programme, wrote to Caldwell Johnson, Principal Investigator at the Johnson Space Centre, about his and Loewy's work: ".. .Your contributions both to the basic concept for the workshop living provisions and to many of the detailed features that made it work well, were clearly instrumental in making Skylab the good place for living and working that the crews found it to be. And the systematic collection and organization of data from the missions will surely be of inestimable value in the design of the Shuttle, the Spacelab, and the experiment hardware they will carry into orbit..." ��George Rodney, NASA's Contractor and Chief of Martin Marietta Aerospace, wrote to Raymond Loewy on 12 February 1975: Dear Raymond: It was a pleasure to hear that the works of Raymond Loewy are going to be displayed at the Smithsonian Institute. That thought has caused me to reflect on the unique place you have had in our infant space program. Our space programs - Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Skylab - have been the exclusive preserve of the scientist, the engineer and the medical doctor. It was only in Skylab that we first recognised that, if man were to survive for extended times in space, perhaps we engineers needed some added help. We enlisted the aid of Loewy Snaith Inc.; and it was your influence, Raymond, that caused us to soften the lines, provide better crew accommodations, and consider the colors and light and the many other factors that helped make life reasonable for the astronauts. You, in short, among your many other firsts were the first to introduce the fine arts into space. Your imagination and personal enthusiasm left an imprint on both the hardware and all of us who had the good fortune to be associated with you. Skylab has convincingly proved that we can live and work for indefinite periods in space and, therefore, manned space travel to other areas of the universe is practical. I for one am convinced that our civilization, if it continues to advance at all, will be setting forth on other planets within the next fifty years. So I say to you my dear friend that, as you reflect on the many achievements in your fabulous career, you can take special pride in your contribution to this next major step in man's evolution. My best personal regards. Sincerely yours, George A. Rodney In 1973 Raymond Loewy was invited to become Habitability Consultant for The Space Programme of the USSR. He declined. �A 5A HO •X'— OME11S10US: 5"* K>~ Conceptual design for the Shuttle ["Earth Orbiter Shuttle/Recuperable/Early studies"] ��M Conceptual design for advanced Shuttle liftoff �Raymond Loewy Raymond Loewy is generally recognised as one of the founders of the profession known as industrial design. Under the headline "A brilliant designer streamlined the shape of things by joining form to function in bold new looks", he was hailed [in company with Edison, Bell, Ford and the Wright brothers] as one of the major influences on the American way of life in a special report in Life magazine [bicentennial issue, 19753 entitled "The 100 events that shaped America". He was also listed as "One of the Thousand Makers of the Twentieth Century" in the London Sunday Times [colour magazine], 1969. Loewy's career was summarised thus in Life magazine: "Operating on the principles that 'form must follow function' and that 'weight is the enemy', Loewy, in 1929, began by remodelling an ugly duplicating machine into a handsome piece of office equipment. Subsequently Loewy's streamlined and elegantly simple designs shaped thousands of products - from locomotives, tractors and refrigerators to... vacuum cleaners. He created the revolutionary 'lean and hungry' postwar Studebaker. Later he designed the interior of the Skylab and the emblem of the U.S. Postal Service. His innovations in packaging, like the white wartime packet he created for the formerly green-packeted Lucky Strikes, started the trend toward clean designs in which bold letters seemed to jump out at customers' eyes. Through the influence of Loewy and his contemporaries, manufacturers now spend millions to make their products and the packages they come in physically attractive, and in testing to determine which designs the public likes best." When creating him a Grand Officer of the Legion d'Honneur President Giscard d'Estaing wrote to Loewy: "Vous n'avez cesse d'associer le nom de la France aux brillants succes qui font de vous I'une des personnalites les plus marquantes de notre temps et de servir la cause de I'amitie entre la France et I'Amerique." ��Among the many products and designs with which Raymond Loewy was involved may be mentioned: • Coca Cola bottle and can • U.S. Postal Service emblem • Lucky Strike packet • Greyhound buses 1945-1950 • Studebakercars • Presidential aircraft Air Force One • Coldspot refrigerator • Gestetner duplicating machine • Kennedy memorial stamp • Concorde interior and cutlery • Shell and BP emblems, service stations and packages • Heinz soup packaging • Four Square Tobacco package • Avanti cars • Wrigley's chewing gum package • Pennsylvania Railroads, locomotives and passenger cars CGG1; K4S; S1;T1) • Schick razors • Total - service stations • Hupmobile cars • Lever Brothers packaging • USSR - design of a large range of mass-manufactured products • Rosenthal crockery • Sucaryl bottle • De Dietrich - kitchen products • Canada Dry soda bottle • Black Label beer can • Bird's coffee package • Vosene medicated shampoo • U.S. Navy nuclear destroyer 1938 • Exxon - Standard Oil of New Jersey's new trade mark • Roots Brothers' Cars • Hilton Hotels • Austin 1948 model • Fridgedair products • Elna sewing machines • Howard Hughes private aircraft 1951 • International Harvester trademark and tractors • Aerodynamic ailerons �SFAC6 S U I T F O R fcV'A Conceptual design for donning a space suit for extra-vehicular activity (EVA] �Raymond Loewy was born in Paris in 1893. He became a naturalized American citizen in 1937 and married Viola Erickson in 1948. His honours and positions include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Grand Officer of the Ldgion d'Honneur, 1980 Croix de Guerre, 1914-1918, four citations Inter-Allied medal Liaison Officer with American Expeditionary Force 1914-1918 Founder; Fellow and former President of the American Society of Industrial Design Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, London Member of the American Academy of Achievement, Hall of Fame, Boston Honorary Doctor of Fine Arts at the University of Cincinnati, Arts Center College, Los Angeles and the University of Linz, Austria Award of Honor, California Design Institute, Los Angeles, 1979 Member of the Board of Education, New York City Citizen of Honour of France, New York City, Chicago and Palm Springs Member of the Psycho-Physiological Institute, Washington Honorary life member of the American Railroad Association, Washington Counsel to the American Society for the study of human factors in aviation Lecturer at MIT, Harvard, UCLA, University of Paris and of Leningrad, USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the All-Union Institute of Industrial Research, Moscow, and U.S. Academy of Engineering, Washington • Habitability Consultant to NASA's Saturn-Apollo Applications Programme, Skylab and Shuttle Orbiter projects • Member of the U.S. Space Medicine Association Exhibitions of his designs have been held at the Smithsonian Institute, Washington DC "The Designs of Raymond Loewy" in 1975; and at Centre Beaubourg, Paris, 1975. Articles about him have appeared in Time [cover 1949); Los Angeles Times ("Loewy puts his stamp on the 20th century"); Life magazine "The Great Packager" (1949), as quoted above or in the main body of the catalogue and elsewhere. He is author of The Locomotive, its aesthetics; Never Leave Well Alone (his autobiography); Raymond Loewy: Industrial Design and "Second-Best is not Enough" Reader's Digest 1963. Last year the U.S. Foundation for the Arts made a television documentary about Loewy entitled "Looking Back to the Future". �NASA HQ MT69-4807 3-17-69 Conceptual design for a crewman's quarters �r i ' m Illustration on back cover: The Earth from Skylab i r\ J 1 -J I ! Catalogue Price £4.00 Illustrations on pages 1, 2. 4, 25 and on the back cover by courtesy of NASA. Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Ltd. �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Human Factors Engineering Collection Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Human Factors Engineering Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/12">View the Human Factors Engineering Collection finding aid in ArchivesSpace</a> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000060 Title A name given to the resource "Raymond Loewy Living in Space." Description An account of the resource This biographical portfolio booklet describes the role that industrial designer Raymond Loewy's designs played in the Skylab program. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sotheby's Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Skylab Program Space habitats Human factors in engineering design Extravehicular mobility units Spent Stage Workshop Provisioning Type The nature or genre of the resource Portfolios (Groups of Works) Biographies (Literary Genre) Still Image Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Human Factors Engineering Collection Box 2, Folder 3 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/201/14403/sdsp_skyl_000068_001.pdf 9ce0453d7e9289409afc7552a73c8644 PDF Text Text j?CMO ll/tS/fcO SATELLITE DRAG STUDY G r a n t Number NSG 8 0 6 9 Final Report F o r t he period 1 April 1979 to 3.1 July 1980 Principal Investigator • J a c k W. Slowey Prepared for National Aeronautics and Space Administration Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812 October 1980 Smithsonian Institution Astrophysical Observatory Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 The S m i t h s o n i a n A s t r o p h y s i c a l O b s e r v a t o r y and the Harvard College Observatory a r e members o f t h e Center for Astrophysics The NASA T e c h n i c a l O f f i c e r f o r t h i s g r a n t i s D r . R . E . S m i t h , Code E S 8 1 , Space Science Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812. �... ' •* m m i m. m wmm IotB.'S 1 ' • m 1 • BpM 5 9 |$ V ' mm • - •'%• m •• m �SATELLITE DRAG STUDY G r a n t Number NSG 8069 F i n a l Report For t h e p e r i o d 1 A p r i l 1979 t o 31 J u l y 1980 Principal Investigator Jack W. Slowey Prepared for National A e r o n a u t i c s and Space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Marshall Space F l i g h t C e n t e r , Alabama 35812 O c t o b e r 1980 Smithsonian I n s t i t u t i o n Astrophysical Observatory Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s 02138 The S m i t h s o n i a n A s t r o p h y s i c a l O b s e r v a t o r y and t h e Harvard C o l l e g e Observatory a r e members o f t h e Center for Astrophysics The NASA Technical O f f i c e r f o r t h i s g r a n t i s Dr. R.E. S m i t h , Ctide ES81, Space S c i e n c e L a b o r a t o r y , Marshall Space F l i g h t C e n t e r , Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812. ��1. Introduction The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO), under a grant from NASA (NSG8058), first began an analysis of the effects of atmospheric drag on the Skylab satellite, 1973-27A, in the fall of. 1977. Under that grant we determined, from orbital data obtained from NORAD, the observed atmospheric drag on Skylab with a resolution of 5 days or better in an interval that was eventually to extend from March 1974 to the end of 1978. At the same time, we compared the observed drag with that predicted by an atmospheric model and made numerous forecasts, based on predicted solar and geomagnetic activity, of the orbital lifetime of the satellite. The current grant work at SAO is essentially a continuation of the original grant work. Under this grant we continued to monitor the drag on Skylab and to make lifetime predictions up to the time of final decay. These activities were described in some detail in an earlier report and will not be covered again here. We also continued to act as consultant to MSFC in matters relating to our various atmospheric models and, in particular, to the implementation at MSFC of our most recent (1977) model. These activities have been conducted on a relatively informal basis, by telephone and letter, and will not be described here. We have also conducted a "post mortem" analysis to determine how the techniques that we used on Skylab might be improved in the future, especially with respect to the question of separating possible variations in area-mass ratio from departures of the atmospheric density from model values. A short summary of this work, together with some suggestions for future work, are given in what follows. 2. Technical Progress We had hoped to utilize a second satellite in a comparative analysis of atmospheric drag during the final portion of the lifetime of Skylab. The object was to see if the drag on a second satellite could be successfully used to separate variations in the observed drag on Skylab that might be due to variations in the area-mass ratio from those that are due to variations in atmospheric density. An atmospheric model alone is not entirely adequate for this purpose since present models, as good as they are in representing the large variations in density that occur, are subject to appreciable systematic errors having characteristic times of up to a month or more. These errors are due mainly to failure of the decimetric solar flux to adequately represent the variations in the solar EUV radiation that actually heats the thermosphere and to similar inadequacy of the planetary geomagnetic index as an indicator of the heating associated with geomagnetic disturbance (and of present models of that very complex phenomenon). Except for short intervals in which �'tci 5 • lv : j. :l -• -rsoa -»w • : fj e«fca .&iill9cre» srf:J io ' -1 P isniglio arte :o �PAGE 2 geomagnetic disturbance may dominate, the densities determined from drag on different satellites are generally quite consistent among themselves. Thus it should be possible to infer density at another location with greater accuracy from the drag on a satellite of known area-mass ratio than is possible from any model based on the usual geophysical parameters. Of course, a model would still be required to provide a means for interpolating between the location of the probe satellite and the desired location. Unfortunately, the problems of data acquisition, program development (mainly the conversion of several large programs to run on a new computer), and processing proved to be too great to carry out the projected analysis within the constraints of this grant. Instead, we made use of densities we had previously obtained from the drag on the Explorer 32 satellite (1966-44A) to make a comparison with the orbital accelerations of Skylab that we had determined under the earlier grant (NSG 8058). The interval covered by this comparison was 265 days beginning in late March, 1974. The orbital acceleration (rates of change of the mean motion) of Skylab that we determined from the available NORAD orbits are plotted for this interval in Figure 1. These were obtained by drawing a smooth curve through the observed values of the argument of latitude (M +w) and numerically differentiating the curve using a 5-day time-step. In the same figure are shown the corresponding accelerations determined by differentiation of the results of numerical integration of the orbit using an atmospheric model and, at the bottom, the ratios of the observed accelerations to those computed from the orbit integration. The model used in the integration was an updated version of Jacchia's 1970 model (Jacchia, 1970) and the assumed area-mass ratio was 0.0369 cm2/g. The drag coefficient was allowed- to vary around the orbit, but the effective value was very close to 2.24 throughout the interval. The relatively large short-term variations in the orbital acceleration seen in Figure 1 are due to variations in thermospheric heating by both solar EUV radiation and the particle precipitation and/or ionospheric currents associated with geomagnetic disturbance. In models, these two heat sources are tied, in the first instance, to the 10.7-cm solar radio flux and, in the second instance, to the Kp planetary geomagnetic index. In Figure 2, we have plotted 5-day means of both the 10.7-cm flux and the Kp geomagnetic index, on scales that are roughly equal in terms or their expected effect on the exospheric temperature of the atmosphere (the scale for Kp is slightly exaggerated in this regard compared to that for *10#7). As can be seen, the two indices are quite independent of each other and may act either in unison or in opposition. ��PAGE 3 In Figure 4, we have plotted the exospheric temperature Tj that results from . the 1970 model when only the short-term variation in the 10.7-cm flux (the so-called "27 day" variation) and the geomagnetic variation are taken into account. These temperatures were computed from Tj = 665.2+1.8 ( P10#7 ~ 85.) +28 Kp+ 0.03 exp (Kp), where F Kpare the 5-day mean values from Figure 2. We 7and give them"here only to better illustrate the expected short-term variations in density in the interval being studied. Note that these temperatures differ somewhat in detail from the computed accelerations in Figure 1. This is because the values in Figure 1, as a result of the differentiation process, actually represent means over a slightly longer interval than 5 days. In comparing the observed acceleration of Skylab from Figure 1 with either the corresponding model values or the temperatures of Figure 3, it will be noticed that several of the expected sharp maxima or minima are missing in the observed values. It is these points on the plot that result in the more prominent "outlyers" in the ratio of observed to computed acceleration. There is little doubt that some of th,ese apparent departures from the model are, in fact, due mostly to errors in the observed values resulting from the relatively crude method used to derive them. And, it follows that the scatter in the values of the ratio is adversely effected generally for the same reason. This difficulty could, of course, be overcome by differentiating with a considerably larger time step, but this would automatically rule out the possibility of resolving shorter-term variations of any kind. In Figure 4 we have plotted 5—day means of atmospheric densities obtained from analysis of the drag on the Explorer 32 satellite. The densities are those at the effective height (approximately 1/2 scale-height above the true height) of perigee. The average effective height in the interval plotted was about 300 km. These densities were obtained by direct analysis of radar observations from selected sensors. The densities were originally determined with a general resolution of 1 day and a resolution of 0.5 day during larger geomagnetic disturbances. The 5-day means plotted in the figure should have a relative precision of close to 1%. These densities confirm the accuracy of the model with respect to 4 of the 5 worst values of the ratio in Figure 1. The exception is the point at MJD 42205, where the minimum predicted by the model and missing in the Skylab accelerations is also missing in the densities determined from Explorer 32. Other differences in the Skylab accelerations are also confirmed as being atmospheric in origin and not due to errors in the observed values. �V �PAGE 4 At t h i s p o i n t we s h o u l d m e n t i o n t h a t our o l d e r a t m o s p h e r i c models a r e n o t c u r r e n t l y o p e r a t i o n a l a t SAO due p r i m a r i l y t o a change i n c o m p u t e r s . I t was o u r i n t e n t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t analysis t o compute model v a l u e s f o r both S k y l a b and E x p l o r e r 32 using our most r e c e n t a t m o s p h e r i c model ( J a c c h i a , 1 9 7 7 ) , which i s operational, and t o make a c o m p a r i s o n between t h e two s a t e l l i t e s using the r a t i o s t o t h e s e v a l u e s . Much t o our s u r p r i s e , however, the o r b i t a l a c c e l e r a t i o n s of S k y l a b computed w i t h t h e new model did not agree i n d e t a i l w i t h t h e o b s e r v e d v a l u e s a s w e l l a s d i d those from t h e o l d e r model n o r d i d t h e d e n s i t i e s computed f o r Explorer 32 r e p r e s e n t t h e d e t a i l s of t h e o b s e r v e d v a l u e s a s w e l l as i t was e x p e c t e d t h e y would. I t i s n o t y e t known w h e t h e r t h i s a p p a r e n t d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the new model i s i n t r i n s i c o r i s somehow due t o t h e way i t was implemented i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The o n l y o t h e r application of t h e model t h a t we have made i n a d r a g s i t u a t i o n was during t h e f i n a l d e c a y of S k y l a b . I t seemed t o perform q u i t e well in t h a t c a s e . T h a t was h a r d l y a d e f i n i t i v e t e s t , however, and i t may w e l l b e t h a t t h e most i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t of t h e p r e s e n t analysis i s t h a t it revealed a major difficulty in the model-related, a p p a r e n t l y , t o t h e "improved" model of the geomagnetic v a r i a t i o n t h a t i t i n c o r p o r a t e s . When means of t h e computed d e n s i t i e s f o r E x p l o r e r 32 were taken over 10-day i n t e r v a l s , t h e y were q u i t e smooth and d i d reproduce most of t h e s y s t e m a t i c d e p a r t u r e s o b s e r v e d i n t h e ratios for S k y l a b . I n view of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e model, we do not f e e l t h a t we a r e j u s t i f i e d i n p r e s e n t i n g t h o s e r e s u l t s as proven f a c t , however. We m u s t , a t l e a s t f o r t h e time b e i n g , consider t h e a n a l y s i s t o have been " i n c o n c l u s i v e " . 3. Conclusions and Recommendations an Our e x p e r i e n c e w i t h S k y l a b d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e need automated p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e h i g h - r e s o l u t i o n d e t e r m i n a t i o n of densities from s a t e l l i t e d r a g . For r e a s o n s of e f f i c i e n c y , should be an a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e a n d , l i k e t h e program t h a t previously e x i s t e d a t SAO, s h o u l d be based on d i r e c t a n a l y s i s of the individual o b s e r v a t i o n s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r s a t e l l i t e i n o r d e r to yield t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e p r e c i s i o n and t i m e r e s o l u t i o n . As a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , i t s h o u l d b e f u l l y a u t o m a t i c and f r e e of reliance on hand methods of any k i n d . I t would be e x t r e m e l y valuable i n a v a r i e t y of programs i n o r b i t a l dynamics, such a s the s t u d i e s we made of t h e d r a g on S k y l a b and t h e kind of comparative a n a l y s i s we s u g g e s t i s f e a s i b l e i n t h e c a s e of s a t e l l i t e s w i t h unknown o r v a r y i n g a r e a - m a s s r a t i o s , and a s a research t o o l that could contribute significantly to the improvement of models of t h e t h e r m o s p h e r e and e x o s p h e r e . We recommend t h a t MSFC s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r t h e development of such a program. �' �PAGE 5 We would a l s o recommend t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n be g i v e n t o t h e possibility of u t i l i z i n g t h i s program i n a p r o j e c t t o monitor a small number of s a t e l l i t e s on a c o n t i n u o u s b a s i s . No d e n s i t i e s from s a t e l l i t e d r a g have been d e t e r m i n e d i n any a p p r e c i a b l e quantity s i n c e 1 9 7 4 . T h e r e a r e , however, some problems i n thermospheric s t r u c t u r e and model development t h a t would b e n e f i t greatly from t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s u c h d e n s i t i e s . There i s s t r o n g evidence i n measurements of s o l a r EUV i r r a d i a n c e , f o r example, of major d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e c u r r e n t s o l a r c y c l e and t h e previous one ( H i n t e r e g g e r , 197 9 ) . Our a n a l y s i s of S k y l a b revealed t h a t t h e r e s p o n s e of t h e a t m o s p h e r e r e l a t i v e t o t h e decimetric f l u x was n o t g r e a t l y d i f f e r e n t i n t h e two c y c l e s . The exact nature of what d i f f e r e n c e may e x i s t remains t o be s e e n , however, and i t would seem t h a t d r a g a n a l y s i s o f f e r s t h e o n l y means by which i t can be a c c u r a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d . Densities determined from d r a g h a v e t h e a d v a n t a g e of c o n t i n u i t y ( t h e d r a g record extends back t o 1958) and freedom from t h e problems of cross-calibration between experiments that is lacking in densities determined by mass-spectrometers and other satellite-borne i n s t r u m e n t s . �• �PAGE 6 References Hinteregger, H.E. 1979 Development of s o l a r c y c l e 21 o b s e r v e d i n EUV spectrum and J. Geophys. R e s . , 84, pp atmospheric a b s o r p t i o n s . 1933-1938. Jacchia, L.G. 1970 New s t a t i c models of t h e t h e r m o s p h e r e and e x o s p h e r e w i t h empirical t e m p e r a t u r e p r o f i l e s . Smithsonian Astrophys. Obs. Spec. R p t . No. . 3 1 3 , 87 p p . 1977 Therraospheric t e m p e r a t u r e , d e n s i t y , and c o m p o s i t i o n : models. Smithsonian Astrophys. Obs. Spec. Rpt. 375, 106 p p . new No. ��PAGE 7 These captions pertain to the following figures (1-4). Figure 1. Observed orbital acceleration of Skylab (top), acceleration computed from an atmospheric model (middle), and ratio of observed to computed acceleration (bottom). Figure 2. 5-day means of 10.7 cm solar Kpgeomagnetic index (bottom). Figure 3. Exospheric temperature computed for just variation and the geomagnetic variation. the 27-day Figure 4. 5-day means of observed densities at effective for the Explorer 32 satellite. height flux (top) and ��PAGE 8 42125 . MJD 42225 42325 1974 Figure 1 ��PAGE 9 IT) IU- ��lO CM CM M" in CM to CM m CM CM CM Q "3 in O £ o ^ N ��o> CM E o Figure 4 �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Gerald Wittenstein Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000068 Title A name given to the resource "Satellite Drag Study." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-11-25 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1980-1990 Subject The topic of the resource Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory Skylab Program Skylab 1 Reentry Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Gerald Wittenstein Collection Box 4, Folder 9 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/69/14387/sdsp_skyl_000052_001.pdf 827ef65ee83ef8f90448cec871c07b30 PDF Text Text JACK R. LOUSMA Pilot Also making his first space flight. Jack R. Lousma was one of 19 astronauts selected by NASA in April, 1966. He served as a member of astronaut support crews for the Apollo IX, X, and XIII missions. A major in the U.S. Marine Corps, he has logged more than 2,600 hours of flight time. LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM (LES) APOLLO COMMAND MODULE (CM) APOLLO SERVICE MODULE (SM) Space Div Rockwell International ALAN BEAN OWEN GARRIOTT JACK LOUSMA 2nd Skylab crewC. SPACECRAFT - LUNAR MODULE ADAPTER (SLA) ALAN L. BEAN Commander •INSTRUMENT UNIT (IU) International Business Machines, Inc. Commander for the second manned Skylab mission, Alan L. Bean is a veteran of the Apollo Program, having served as lunar module pilot for the flight of Apollo XII in November, 1969. During that Apollo mission, he brought the lunar module to a precision landing within 300 feet of the targeted landing point. He helped install the first nuclear power generator on the moon. He has logged a total of 244 hours, 36 minutes of space flight, which includes seven hours and 45 minutes outside the spacecraft on the lunar surface. •S-IVB STAGE McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. -1 J-2 ENGINE Rocketdyne Div Rockwell International . INTERSTAGE A captain in the U.S. Navy, Bean became a NASA astro naut in 1963. He was born in Wheeler, Texas, on March 15, 1932. After graduating from Paschal High School in Fort Worth, Texas, he received a BS degree in aeronauti cal engineering from the University of Texas in 1955. •FIRST STAGE BOOSTER Chrysler Corp. Bean holds many awards, including the NASA Distin guished Service Medal, Navy Astronaut Wings and the Navy Distinguished Service Medal. During his career, he has flown 27 types of military aircraft, logging more than 4,410 hours flying time. 8 H-1 ENGINES Rocketdyne Div Rockwell International OWEN K. GARRIOTT Science Pilot Each member of the space team has an im portant role in achieving the Manned Flight Awareness objective of preventing errors and defects in space flight hardware and operations. The error prevented helps en sure a safe and successful mission - and eliminates the cost of correction. Error-free performance truly means more space pro gram per dollar. MANNED FLIGHT AWARENESS Marshall Space Flight Center, S81A - DIR Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812 Making his first space flight, Owen K. Garriott was selected as a scientist-astronaut by NASA in June, 1965. He has since completed a course in flight training and has logged more than 1,600 hours flying time. SCIENCE & ENGINEERING IN OR Garriott was born in Enid, Okla., on Nov. 22, 1930. He graduated from Enid High School and then received a BS degree in electrical engineering from the University of Oklahoma in 1953. He also holds a master of science degree and a doctorate in electrical engineering from Stanford University in 1957 and 1960, respectively. He has performed research in ionospheric physics since ob taining his doctorate, and he has authored and coauthored more than 25 scientific papers and one book. He was awarded a National Science Foundation Fellow ship at Cambridge University and at the Radio Research Station at Slough, England, 1960-1961. He was born in Grand Rapids, Mich., on Feb. 29, 1936. He attended Ann Arbor High School and received a BS degree in aeronautical engineering from the University of Michigan in 1959. He holds the degree of aeronautical engineer from the U.S. Naval Post-graduate School in 1965. Lousma has been a Marine Corps officer since 1959. He was awarded the MSC Certificate of Commendation in 1970. BACKUP CREW Vance D. Brand, Commander William B. Lenoir, Science Pilot Don L. Lind, Pilot SL-3 EXPERIMENT ASSIGNMENTS Number M071 M073 M074 M092 M093 Ml 12— Ml 15 M131 M133 M151 M171 M172 T003 M479 T002 T027 M487 T020 SOI 9 S020 S063 S073 SI 49 S183 S228 S230 S052 S054 S055A S056 S082A S082B S190A S190B S191 S192 S193 SI 94 S071/ S072 Title Cluster Location Science Pilot Cmdr. Pilot • • • • 0 • • • • • • 0 Mineral Balance Bioassay of 8ody Fluids Specimen Mass Measurement In-Flight Lower Body Neg Press. Vectorcardiogram Blood Studies OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS Human Vestibular Function Sleep Monitoring Time and Motion Study Metabolic Activity OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS MDA OWS OWS • • 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 OWS • OWS • Body Mass Measurement In-F light Aerosol Analysis Zero Gravity Flammabiliiy Manual Navigation Sightings ATM Contamination Measurement Habitability and Crew Quarters Foot Controlled Maneuvering Unit UV Stellar Astronomy UV/X-Ray Solar Photography UV Airglow Horizon Photo Gegenschein/Zodiacal Light Particle Collection Ultraviolet Panorama Transuranic Cosmic Rays Magnetospheric Particle Collection White Light Coronagraph X Ray Spectrographs Telescope UV Scanning Polychromator/ Spectroheliometer X Ray Telescope XUV Coronal Spectrohehograph UV Spectrometer Multispectral Photo. Facility Earth Terrain Camera Infrared Spectrometer Multispectral Scanner Microwave Rariiometei/ Scatterometcr Radai and Altimeter L Band Radiometei Orcadian Phythm of Pocket Mice Orcadian Rhythm of Vineqai Gnats OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS OWS ATM ATM ATM ATM ATM ATM ATM MDA OWS MDA • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 © 0 0 0 0 0 TBD T8D • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 • • • • 0 0 0 0 0 MDA MDA • • 0 MDA CSM CSM • • • 0 0 �SCHEDULE OF EVENTS DATE TIME/EDT EVENT AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION JULY 7:08 a.m. Liftoff of Second Skylab Crew 7:10a.m. First/Second Stage Separation 7:18 a.m. Spacecraft in Orbit 9:26 a.m. First Spacecraft Maneuver to Accomplish Rendezvous 2:21 p.m. Final Maneuver Toward Rendezvous With Skylab 3:38 p.m. Docking With Workshop Cluster 3:21 p.m. Undocking From Cluster 8:38 p.m. Landing 28 of persons in NASA and industry worked around the clock to conceive, design, produce, and test the methods needed t o save the mission. The effort was successful. A sun shield was deployed over the station's habitable area reducing temperatures to acceptable levels. Later, the astronauts made a space walk that resulted in a suc cessful deployment of the jammed solar array wing. PARASOL (Sun Shade) SEPT. 22 NOTE: At printing time of this brochure, the above timeline was tentative and subject to change MISSION PROFILE The second Skylab crew will be launched to a rendezvous with the orbiting cluster atop a Saturn IB and aboard a modified Apollo Command and Service Module. They are first launched into a preliminary orbit. Several sequence maneuvers are required to reach the orbit of the Skylab cluster. After docking, the crew rests before en tering the station. Present plans call for the crew, early in the mission, to re place a sun shade which was deployed above the cluster by the first Skylab crew. Tests have shown that the sun shade deteriorates in strength due t o exposure t o direct rays of the Sun. The shade will be replaced by the astro nauts working outside the orbiting station. They will deploy two long poles. The new sun shade will be sent out along the poles in a manner similar to raising a flag. While the first crew completed a 28-day mission, the second crew plans to remain aloft for 56 days. The mission will be similar t o the first one, but places more emphasis on solar astronomy and earth resources experi ments. SKYLAB REPAIRS Two problems developed during the launch of the unmanned Skylab cluster on May 14, 1973. The meteoroid shield, a thin, .025-inch aluminum cover on the out side of the station, was torn loose during launch. This caused extreme overheating of the station. The second problem involved the loss of one of two large solar array wings attached t o the sides of the station. The second wing deployed only partially. This caused the loss of more than half the electrical power needed to operate the station. Because of these problems, the launch of the first crew was delayed eleven days. During this interim, thousands TYPICAL WORK DAY IN SPACE The mission will be run on Central Daylight Time and the sleep periods will run fairly constantly from 1 0 p.m. to 6 a.m. After entering the workshop, the first two big jobs will be shutting down the command module and activating the Workshop. During a regular mission day, the crew will spend the morning hours from 6 t o 8 preparing for work. Check lists and plans for the day's work will be sent t o Skylab from the ground, and received on a teleprinter aboard Skylab. The major experiments are solar astronomy, using the Apollo Telescope Mount; earth resources, using the camera and sensor package; biomedical, involving the crew and several items of equipment; and another large group called the corollary experiments. SATURN WORKSHOP Each of these major areas, with their various experiments, must be fitted into the crew's work day. Conducting earth resources experiments will depend upon the orbital position of Skylab and the condition of the cloud cover on earth. When the solar astronomy experiments are being conducted, the ATM consoles must be manned dur ing every daylight pass. However, solar flares or other sun conditions might call for manning the console at odd hours. Two out of every three days, each crewman will be a sub ject in the various medical experiments. At other times he will monitor equipment while another crewman is the subject. Element Command and Service Module Function Crew Ascent & Descent The one period in which the astronauts will attempt to stop work and get together will be the dinner hour. At this time they can take a look at the flight plan and tighten up loose ends. Docking Interface Apollo Telescope Mount Airlock Module/Fixed Airlock Shroud Instrument Unit Orbital Workshop Solar Observation Power Control & Distribution Launch Vehicle Control Primary Living & Working Area Environmental Control ATM/EREP Controls & Displays Experiment Laboratory Utility Center Stowage Data System SKYLAB OBJECTIVES President Nixon: "...the Skylab... will be aimed not at advancing the exploration of deep space, but at gaining in space new knowledge for the improvement of life here on Earth. It will help develop new methods of learning about the Earth's environment and the Earth's resources, and new methods of evaluating programs aimed at pre serving and enhancing the resources of all the world. It will seek new knowledge about our star, the Sun, and about its tremendous influence on" our environment." Extravehicular Activity Port Length (ft) 34.3 17.3 13.3 17.6 3.0 48.1 Diameter (ft) 13.0 10.0 - 10.0 21.5 21.6 366 1,140 ~ 613 ~ 9,550 Working Volume (cu ft) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Robert McBrayer Collection Title A name given to the resource Robert McBrayer Collection Relation A related resource <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/112">View the Robert O. McBrayer Collection finding aid on ArchivesSpace</a> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000052 Title A name given to the resource "skylab 3 SCIENCE & ENGINEERING IN ORBIT" brochure. Description An account of the resource This brochure describes the duties and responsibilities of the Skylab 3 crew, including experiments and repairs. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Madison County (Ala.) Huntsville (Ala.) United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Manned Flight Awareness George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Skylab Program Skylab 3 Lousma, Jack R. Bean, Alan L. Garriott, Owen K. Saturn launch vehicles Apollo Telescope Mount Experimentation Skylab 1 Space habitats Skylab 1 Space habitats Type The nature or genre of the resource Brochures Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Robert McBrayer Collection Box 7, Folder 10 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/199/14398/sdsp_skyl_000063.pdf e44cf24b1a3363bf266af0833e7cd70b PDF Text Text M&-1 JSC-08833 SKYLAB 1 / 4 SYSTEMS DEBRIEFING (COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE/ SATURN WORKSHOP) PREPARED BY TEST DIVISION PROGRAM OPERATIONS OFFICE 0 NOTICE: This document may be exempt from public disclosure u n d e r t h e F r e e d o m of I n f o r m a t i o n A c t ( 5 U . S . C . 5 5 2 ) . R e q u e s t s for its release to persons outside the U. S . Government should be handled under the provisions of NASA Policy Directive 1 3 8 2 . 2 . National Aeronautics and Space Administration LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER Houston, Texas MARCH 6-7, 1974 �SKYLAB 1/U SYSTEMS DEBRIEFING This document is a verbatim transcription of the postflight command and service module/Saturn workshop systems debriefing conducted by the Skylab h crew at the Johnson Space Center on March 6 and 7, I971*- Where possible, questioners have been identified by their last names. However, the attendees and questioners are too numerous to identify or list here. The astronaut participants are as follows. Gerald P. (Jerry) Carr William R. (Bill) Pogue Edward G. (Ed) Gibson CARR t'OGUE GTBSON • Commander Pilot Scientist Pilot The subjects for this portion of the debriefings are listed as follows. Command and service module Electrical Power, Fuel Cells and Cryogenics, Propulsion, and Batteries Structures, Mechanical, Thermal and Docking Environmental Control, and CSM Crew Station Guidance, Control, and Rendezvous Communications and Television Operational Cameras and Photography Launch Vehicle and Emergency Detection System Saturn workshop Instrumentation and Communications Structures and Mechanics Contamination Thermal/Environmental Control Systems Electrical Power System Attitude Pointing and Control System Crew Systems EVA Systems and Operations In-Flight Maintenance A series of three dots (...) is used to designate those portions of the communications that could not be transcribed because of garbling. One dash (-) is used to indicate a speaker's pause or a self-interruption and subsequent completion of a thought. Two dashes (- -) are used to indicate an interruption by another speaker or a point at which a re cording was terminated abruptly. ii �SYSTEMS DEBRIEFHG Morning Session JOHNSON I'm Jerry Johnson . . . on the sequential subsystem. To start off with, we thought you might be interested in looking at what we found on the circuit breaker. QUERY Flip your switch and'... you get through. JOHNSON We thought you might be interested in seeing what we found out on the circuit breaker. CARR Okay, good. JOHNSON The BAT A circuit breaker. X-rays here. I've got some photographs and These are X-rays of the breaker before it was taken apart. And here's a normal breaker and this is the CB-20, which is the BAT A breaker, and as you can see this bottom contact here is canted. It should be flat like you see here - CARR Oh, yes. JOHNSON - - for the contact. are on a slant. And what happens is the top contacts Well, as the breaker comes down, it contact on the outer edge; and then as you push it all the way in and it latches, it rolls over to a new surface area in the �* JOHNSON (CONT'D) middle. Well, in this particular one, when you close it - I have the views reversed here - As you can see, it just barely makes contact here on this one little edge, instead of being flat or over in the middle on a bigger surface area. And another view of the pictures, of what that does on the contacts themselves. that contact. As you can see here, this is Normally, what you'd expect to see - here's a breaker here, is as you close it, it makes contact and then it rolls to a new area. In effect, it makes contact - a normal contact like over here, would make here an arc you always have an arc involved. And then as you mash it on in, it rolls over to a new, clean surface area. Well, on this particular one, it was always coming down and stay ing in this one spot; it stayed right there. So it was actually always hitting on this - where the arc is. CARR So we essentially did have contamination just - - JOHNSON Right. CARR - - because it didn't roll. JOHNSON Right. Now this area over here - we found out what causes that is, when you push in additionally, like we were having you do, it would flex it on over here to a new area. CARR I see. See? �a> JOHNSON That's what was causing that. And the reason we mentioned to you to - on the load test - Well, mainly, the reason we first mentioned the cycling is we thought if it was normal configuration you should have been getting seme sort of wiping action. But that wasn't happening; so on the ground in a few of these cases when we put a load on it and cycled it, it was reasonably clear. Something - in terms of surface contamination or something. So that's the reason we went ahead and asked you to run a load test of 20 amps or so. CABR Okay. Well, I'm sure glad you were able to find good proof positive of why we had the problem. That's great, JOHNSON There was definitely a problem with that surface. GIBSON When you cycled it and it finally worked, what really happened? JOHNSON Did you - - The only thing I can think of is - what we think of is if you arc in here enough to - throw this material out of the way enough to finally get down to - - GIBSON Good metal to metal, huh? POGUE One side isn't enough, huh? 3 > �JOHNSON No. P01UE And out the other, huh? JOHNSON See, the current flows into one side and . . . and back out the other. have to have both sides. See? So you actually So even though the one side was good, all it took was one of them being bad there to mess it up. CARR Yes. JOHNSON But you're right; we definitely found something wrong with it. :ARR Well, I guess our conclusion was that in the future, when we test batteries and things like that, that maybe we shouldn't be happy with just open circuit voltage; that we should make sure that a system will carry a load, and that maybe we should change our way of testing things in the future and make them carry a few amps too, as well Just check and make sure their voltage is good. Because heaven only knows when that first got to the point where it wouldn't carry a load. It could have been on day U or something. JOHNSON Yes, I think I agree with you, particularly in a long mission like that. And where we got the capability to �JOHNSON (CONT'D) charge the batteries back up, there's probably - it actually gives the battery people - they might want to comment, but it actually gives them a better data point here in the mission, too, I think, if that's done. Doesn't it, Bob? BRAGG I would like to - - QUERY Get a mike, Bob. BRAGG I would like to make one comment; my name's Bob Bragg. Would like to make one - there is a reason that we - at least from the battery standpoint, that we have been look ing at open circuit. And that is that for a solar-sync battery you can tell more about its status and what its status is by watching the open circuit than you necessarily can under a load test. And we - this was established pretty early in the mission, that this was how we wanted to do it. thing else. Now, to tell - continuity of a circuit is some And you're probably right; you do need - if there is a question that we will not be able to get a con tinuous circuit - QUERY Right. BRAGG - - we'll be able to do something like that, I guess. CARR Okay. So we shouldn't say when we're testing batteries, we want to carry a load; it's more to test a circuit. 5 �BRAGG Yes, on the battery standpoint, that's right CARR Yes. QUERY Okay, we do have a couple of questions here. Okay. One thing we want to know is, after splashdown - of course, we don't have any data on the DSC at that time, or any airborne data, because we killed the main buses. But we wanted to know, did you notice any - if you were doing any checks on the battery currents or voltages, did you notice any indication of a high drain or any indication of flicker lights, like a short or something, momentarily? o POOUE After splash? QUERY Yes, after you were on the water, or like in stable II. POGUE I certainly didn't do any checking, and I did not notice any flashing. Jer would have been in a better position than the - to notice flashing. You had the only lights on. CARR Yes. I didn't notice any flashing at all. QUERY Well, what prompted the question was that the engineers out at Rockwell had noted that on the circuits associated with the four SPS circuit breakers that the pins were either missing or just a corroded piece left. 6 Of course, what �QUERY (CONT'D) happened is they had - they came off the battery bus up stream of the main bus and they still had power on. And in the salt water, there was probably a current drain on that circuit. Now it wasn't enough to open the circuit breakers, because they were still closed. But we Just wondered whether you had see any indication on board of any current or something. CARR I didn't notice a thing that would indicate it. It was such a bright, clear day that any - you know, the postlanding floods - you didn't even really know they were on. QUERY Right. Okay. The other question we had goes back up around CSM SEP time and has to do with Ed - Ed made a com ment ; at the time he hit the manual RCS TRANSFER switch, he heard a noise. Was that more of a click or clack or Just kind of a zip noise? (Laughter) GIBSON . . . my choice? QUERY GIBSON Just a dull muffled thud which - I suspected at the time it was due to a relay closure somewhere. be a - may have been something else. It may or may not �QUERY Well, the reason for I was asking for kind of - the motor switches we have in the vehicle kind of give you a zip you know - type thing when they get .. . - CTB30N No, it was more of a - - QUERY Relays have more of a click or clack. GIBSON - - . . . muffled. QUERY Okay. Well, in looking at the data, of course, it - we have indications that both of the RCS TRANSFER motor switches did transfer. GIBSON Okay. QUERY Because one of the motor switches gives you RING 1, AUTO and both SYSTEMS DIRECT, and the other one gives you RING 2, AUTO and both SYSTEMS DIRECT. And we saw on the ROLL circuit both RING 1 and RING 2 indications come up on the data, which indicated - right at transfer - we did get both RCS TRANSFER motor switches. CARR That's auto transfer? QUERY Right. GIBSON Okay. Auto transfer. Must be - - 8 �Well, it looks like - I got with Chuck Finch, and looking at the data, it looks like - right at the time in the trans cripts where you indicate you were throwing the switch and heard the noise, it looks like we picked up - an RCS engine valve being picked up for the first time. In other words, Jer always actually had operated the hand controller and picked up a valve, so that could have been a clank in the solenoid. And it looks like it's almost exactly at the same time. So as soon as I hit the switch, I heard something and Jerry got firing and I thought that was i t . Yes . Okay ... - It looks like ... what happened. Yes. We - after finally realizing what the problem was, why we didn't get that - those auto coils, then I was willing to back off and say, well, then maybe we misinter preted the data when we decided we hadn't gotten auto transfer. And of course, the sound that Ed heard - - �GIBSON That was the only thing that led me to believe, other than the fact that he didn't get firings, that we did not get an auto transfer. QUERY Right. Well, when we read that in the debriefing, that's when I went back very carefully to see that; because if one of those motor switches hadn't trasferred when you hit that switch, of course, you would then have transferred one. CARR Yes . QUERY And it would've been more of a zipping sort of noise like a real fast running ... Well, you've probably heard the motor switches go, I'm sure, in the command module; they've kind of got a little zip to them or something. But the data had indicated they'd already transferred, and then a couple at the back we located. CARR Okay, that all sounds fine; that all sounds good to us. QUERY Okay. That's all the questions we have on the electro- power distribution. Now the battery and fuel cell people are here too, and - but if there's any questions you fellows have - 10 �QUERY Fine. Go ahead ... QUERY Well, we don't have any more on the power, but we do have one general question on the RCS ... subsystem manager. QUERY You got it. QUERY One other question we want to address to you guys is of general nature. One of the things that always interests us with hyperbolic direction control system is contamination. This is a big concern in the Shuttle Program too. We're wondering if at any time during your excursions outside, or even inside at the windows or anything, you noticed ^ anything on the order of contamination that you might have attributed to a RCS activity. We had a pretty good lot of it this time with big burns, we did. So it's a good data point to see if we actually got anything that was detectable srt this . .. GIBSON Yes, we did. We could see on the outside of the total cluster a darkening of all the light colored surfaces. One was - we attributed it to two reasons: One was solar, and we could tell that by shadowing effect, and the other was some sort of a contaminant which was getting all over the outside of the vehicle. And we know it was a contam inant by seeing it on the command module windows. > that ... - 11 And �QUERY It wasn't - it was permanent; it wasn't temporary in nature? It was permanent? GIBSON Yes. It Just increased as the mission went on. To try to associate that in time with the RCS burns we made, that we did not try to do. CARR When I went out on EVA and went over the Sun end of the ATM and took those pictures of the command module, I definitely saw contaminants around the RCS quads. It looked to me like it was probably - had - you know, was definitely con nected with the RCS quads. QUERY Now we expect it in the plume shape ... That's more of a thermal discoloration than a contaminant. But you're dif ferentiating those two. CARR No, I wasn't. QUERY Okay. CARR But you could see what looked like - - QUERY This is one of the pictures you took, and what I see there I would expect that - - CARR Yes, there are some better pictures than that, Dwayne. think that - is that a little bit fuzzy? 12 I I think what that �CARR (CONT'D) is ... 16 millimeter frame that's been blown up to a still. I got several Nikon frames of the command module with the 35-millimeter lens, which ought to be much better photo graphy. good. And the exposures on that particular frame are not The contamination that you could see does not show up in the l6-millimeter film. QUERY A better indication might even be the comment you made on windows. CARR Yes. Something right around - - You got the word about what we saw on the windows in the water? We had film over the windows, and as they got into contact with the sea water, it wrinkled up, much like a top on a custard or something like that. QUERY CARR No, we didn't. That's interesting. And then after a while, as the swimmers moved around there and sloshed water up on it, touched the window and every thing, all this contamination was gradually washed away or bunched up into sort of like ... GIBSON It looked like there was enough left over to get a sample, though, and I'm wondering whether anybody did try to get a sample of contamination. 13 �QUERY No, I looked over the thing pretty good. You know, we got it back in the hanger there, and there wasn't anything on it at that time. GIBSON Is that right? QUERY Yes. QUERY Well, they might have even washed it down. GIBSON Oh boy. CARR But the windows were very definitely - command module windows We were hoping you'd be able to ... - - very definitely had a film of contaminant on them that we could see from the inside. When you got on low Sun angle you could see that there was sort of a tan cr beige con tamination on the window. And you could tell just by the reflection of the light. QUERY It's a shame we didn't get some of that. GIBSON That occurred quite early in the mission too. QUERY Was there any particular change once - right after that oh, your two longer burns, 80-second and 180-second burn? GIBSON We didn't try to make that correlation; it would have been useful to do, but we didn't. lit �CARR I don't know how we could've made any correlation. It was Just a gradual buildup, so that near the end of the mission you could look out the window and you'd say, boy, there's sure a lot of crud on the windows, and it wasn't that way in the beginning of the mission. GIBSON We might have been able to take pictures at the same time, before sunset, before and after the burn. CARR Yes. QUERY Very good. Okay, that's all I had. Now you guys had some questions about all the things that transpired in the ^ RCS system. CARR We'd be glad to try and - - I think we've been pretty well clued in on RCS and what the deal was, the ring 2 problem, and of course, the one we induced ourselves that gave us a little trouble for a while until we got into the direct mode. QUERY You got the story on the valves ... GIBSON Yes. I guess one question I still have on the leakage we had on the helium. We saw it come down, and it appeared as though it came down to close to 2000 pounds, and start to level out. And this applied to the people on the ground as well as to us, if we really had a propellent leak as opposed to a - - �a> QUERY GIBSON QUERY No. helium leak. That was initial decay? Yes, it was almost an - exactly a theoretical orifice blowdown, a gas-helium blowdown. perfect curve all the way down. We plotted it later and It ended up, actually, 600 when the guys got it on the carrier and bled it off. It was a - And we pretty well knew that, even in real time. And there were communication problems. Some of the problems we were sure you guys found ... you probably know about. But we looked at that thing; we said, hey, we're 95 to 98 percent sure that's helium. effects we saw looked like helium. did foul us up: But one thing that Every so often one of you would say, hey, there goes some more ice. GIBSON All the And we were a little - - We tried to make that clear that we saw that before. We had - - MS CARR There was one place where you didn't hear us, and that was - - QUERY So we got a little edgy ... what are the consequences, you say. And you just go ahead. We used ... rings all the time, because I know on the mode, the ... mode, you 16 �had the backup going. quences. And there were no adverse conse On the other hand, if you'd gone the other way, there were some ... problems, so that I ... well let's Just play it safe and not worry about it. the decision went. And that's how But it's unfortunate that the word got to you, obviously, later, that we felt it was a propellant leak. Yes, that Just had us wondering about where the propel lent leak was. We had a communication problem over here, between this desk and over there. And then the problem with you guys - so we had little minutes here and there, and bad communi cations ... but we were Just playing it fat and cozy, is what we were doing. Okay. No problem operationally on the STS. It was Just that we thought propellants might be floating around - - Yes, well if it had been ... it would've dumped them. It would've had to dump that whole fuel into that ... bag, which would have been a little problem handling. why we tried to get the message to you. That's You know, you might've wanted to put your masks on so you don't have to worry about fume ingestion, things like that. 17 �CARR Yes ... - - QUERY But that got kind of fouled up. CARR Yes, we never got that word. We found out later that we had decided not to wear the masks. RCS system just occurred to me. One question on the We had you know that quad Bravo problem, PSM to the quad. lem? What was the prob It was never absolutely clear to me just exactly what our problem was. I was under the impression it was an isol valve. QUERY Yes, the propellant isolation valve, the oxidizer, ran out or they filled on quad Bravo. That is, the propellant isolation valve was crosstalking with the manifold pres sure early in the mission. It wasn't a gross leak, but every time the pressures would go up on one, you could see them reflected in the other and they were - there was a little bit of lag situation. So we knew £t was just a leak, and we debated a long time on whether you really wanted to perturbate the procedures in doing something about it. The idea we finally came up vita was, we could go ahead and use the PSM to quad propellant isolation valve which was holding good. Then we could still isolate all the quad propellant and saturate all the other quad systems 18 �QUERY (CONT'D) from that quad; so if you developed a leak in another quad for instance or another - any place other than line, you wouldn't leak quad B propellant through that valve you thought was closed out. CARR Yes. QUERY it was Just a scheme to positively contain all of our propellants and know where they were all of the times for propellant management. There was a - As it turns out, it was probably just a small piece of contamination kind of leak and typical of the isolation valves. Then it wasn't a great concern and it caused a little bit of perturbation of procedures but that's all. That was all about - propellant management was what we were trying to do. CARR Okay. QUERY Any more on propellants? QUERY We don't have anything. QUERY You get the thermal and SMD? QUERY QUERY You have any fuel cells? 19 No, that was propellant. �QUERY No, we didn't have any. CARR We got an extra day out of those fuel cells, didn't we? It seems to me we shut them down a day later. QUERY No. CARR Didn't we? QUEF'1 No> didn't. we We got about 18-1/2 days; actually, a little bit less ... CARR Okay. QUKRY You Just had that one thermal question, P.D.? Yes, . . . if he has - he has another question . . . QUERY Like t0 pursue this contamination a little bit further. We looked at - QUERY Mike. Leave the mike open. QUERY Okay. QUERY We looked at that l6-millimeter film - - QUERY You have to turn your switch on. QUERY Okay? There you go. We looked at the l6-millimeter film and we've seen some things on this film frame, this one picture that we 20 �QUERY (CONT'D) have a print of. We'd like for you to look at it and see if you could explain what we think we see. CARR Our problem is that picture is so bad that it really doesn't show too much of what was there. I -would hope that you could get the Nikon photography pretty quick here, and I'm told that the color on that is a lot better. Yes. That's the sort of stuff we saw. QUERY Is this a charred section that ... black or could you tell? CARR I couldn't tell. I didn't really have time to look at it closely, but I didn't have the impression that it was charred. QUERY What about this section in here? Is that - - CARR That looked to me like it was kind of oily. QUERY Oily? And what about from here down through here? Looks like we have some dribbling of seme sort in here. CARR Yes. I noticed that too and didn't have a feel for what it was. But it looked like something had come out of that area there and was just kind of eating the paint. QUERY Did it look like it had eaten the paint? 21 i �) CARR Yes. There was - it was a stain or a smear on there that was covering the paint Just like that photo shows you. That's a pretty good photo. It shows that stuff is there, but the coloring is wrong because everything is darker. All these white surfaces that you see are more gold or beige than you see there. These pictures - the 16 milli meters - apparently we Just didn't have the f-stop right, and everything got overexposed and is much whiter than it ought to be. And like I say, I'm told the Nikon stuff is darker-looking photography and said if it's darker, it's probably more correct than the 16 millimeter. And I think I took two or three frames of the command module from that same position that that movie was taken from. That was - I crawled out over the Sun end of the ATM and Just essentially let go and took as many pictures as T could before I had to grab again to make sure I didn't drift away. QUERY On the same EVA as this one? CARR Yes, um-hum. QUERY Thanks. QUERY That's the only question that we had. We do have the Earth landing system people and mechanical systems people in case you have any questions for us. 22 �) CARR No. The ELS just worked like a champ. GIBSON What do the pictures show in the landing as to why we got the stable II? From us, subjectively, inside, it appears as though we hit and immediately went stable II. And it wasn't being - because we were dragged over at all; it was just the dynamics of the hit. I wonder if one of those pictures shows the same thing. IANGLEY I'm Art Langley. We certainly didn't expect you to go into stable II, but it's not unfeasible if you hit the wave slope at the proper time. It's quite common that you can flip at that particular time. CARR It sure had ... - - GIBSON Did you see the motion pictures? Were they able to show anything, or was - QUERY There are not any available. GIBSON Okay. CARR In area structures, I must say that the folding and un folding, the stowage and unstowage, of the center couch was extremely easy, much easier than one g. Of course, you know one g is - that's a hernia operation, and in zero g, it's just a piece of cake. 23 And it was typical �CARR (CONT'D) of any high-inertia situation in zero. The large, massive pieces of equipment with high inertia are much easier to manage in zero g than are the little pieces. And the Y/Y strut, which is nothing but trouble over in the simulators Just worked beautifully in the Spacecraft. But everything worked well from a structural standpoint, you know, whatever structural pieces we had to fool with. The hatch worked Just fine; it was sort of a snuggy fit, working it up into the tunnel and getting it in there. But again, that was no great problem either. The probe - is that part of your structural area? QUERY Yes it is. CARR Wopked according to Hoyle. photographed it. The drogue situation - Bill Have you had a chance to see the photographs yet? QUERY No. Not the drogue - photographs of the marks on the drogue. POGUE I have not seen them either - sort have been interested to take a look at than. CARR That drogue really took a beating. We're interested to know whether or not we added any scratches to it or 2h �CARR (CONT'D) whether it was already there, because I really battered that workshop on that when we finally got captured. I wasn't about to drift back out of there again and I really rammed it. POGUE Yes, but I don't think you hit it that hara, Jer. Anyway we got some good photos. QUERY Any more questions? Why don't we give these to Gibson, the SPT. CARR Okay. Thank you. QUERY As long as the ... S people are on their way over they'll probably have some good questions from them. CARR Do you know if the SWS systems people have been alerted that there's a good chance of starting early? QUERY Yes. CARR That's what you guys get for designing such a good system. It worked so well that there's nothing to talk about. QUERY We like it better that way. QUERY At the end of the - - CARR Is your mike on there? 25 �QjJERY At the end of the deactivation and after tunnel closeout, Jerry mentioned that you were concerned about not doing the PGA suit integrity check. You were aware then that the CSM suit circuit integrity check - if you have a successful suit circuit integrity check, you don't need to do the PGA? CARR That's what I thought, but reading the checklist indicated it and inferred to me that we were supposed to do one and then go back and pick up and do the other. And that's the way I read it and it bothered me because it seemed to me having done the suit circuit check we were sure - QUERY This then appears that we may need to make a clarification on the next CSM trip ... CARR I wasn't about to do it anyway because I didn't figure the time and I thought the suits were good and tight. QUERY We had a good suit circuit integrity check then. There is no reason to do the PGA itself. CARR I guess the only other thing in ECS on that day that really bothered us was that doggone flapper valve that hung up. We had to throw on two suit compressors and then pop that - - 26 �QUERY We have the CSM subsystem manager, Don Helves5 he'll be here shortly. CARR Okay. Q UERY Okay, could you speculate on what might have caused the damage to the overwrap of the LiOH element which was rejected. CARR You know you changed out the - - Those two canisters were just rattling around loose in A-6, and we were putting pieces of equipment in there and taking them out all through the mission. Just bumped it and scarred it. And I think we What we did was we pushed the plastic up against something sharp or hard inside, v We Just ended up lacerating it. And I wasn't sure - Well, the fact that the plastic was puffed out instead of sucked in tight like most of the canisters was enough for me to think about it. And I went over and looked in that locker 151 or whatever the locker number is. There was a thousand canisters in there and so I just picked a nice looking one and took it. I had so many things to choose from that I didn't worry about it. But I think all we did was - let's see, the Dewar cooler S192 was in there and it's got lots of sharp protrusions on it. That was rather rattling around in A-6 with these two LiOH canisters. 27 Si' �CARR (CONT'D) And the S009 was in there Just floating around. So everytime you'd open that locker to get something, you'd bump those things. You know they play pinball machine for the next 2 hours, bumping into each othe»", and so I think that's the reason. QUERY I would like to hold these other two questions in abey ance until they get here. QUERY Okay, I only have two very quick questions to work out. In your technical debriefing you reported your problem involving the VERB b6 coming off the SIVB, and we were wondering how you achieved the plus-X translation or did you not have any plus-X translation when you came off? Because you shouldn't have had any if you were in CMC control without having done the VERB U6. You were still on the ... DAP and it wouldn't accept any plus-X translations. CARR Good point; hadn't thought about that. QUERY What did you mean when you say, "We pickled off." That's a new term to me. CARR That's a close-air support pilot's term. punched the button that fired vis off. 28 That means we Pickling off the �CARR (CONT'D) bombs - There's a pickle on the top of your stick on your airplane. You punch the button and that pickles off the bombs or whatever it is you're shooting. So what we did is we threw the switches to sep from the workshop, I mean from the SIVB and I frankly don't remember if I had plus X or not; it's been so long ago. QUERY You didn't use DIRECT VOLTAGE? You would have remembered that. CARR Yes! That's right. But the thing is we did separate from the workshop - the SIVB. And I felt no problem there. CARR And I don't even know whether I got plus-X or even tried to use it. But the thing was, when you're going to start the pitch maneuver, you're supposed to start it in ACCEL COMMAND and then throw it to RATE COMMAND when you got CMC AUTO to pick it up for you. The thing there, as I remember, was just to make sure that you started pitch ing in the direction that you wanted to. QUERY Yes. CARR And when I threw it back to RATE COMMAND, then CMC AUTO ground to a halt. y And so the only thing I could think of 29 �CARR (CONT 'D) to do was to do another VERB 1*6 to make sure the DAP knew it was driving and it was going to pay attention to the VERB 1*9 data that I put in there. And it worked. So I assumed that what I had done was probably right; then the next time I did it, it worked perfectly. QUERY We don't think that there was any sort of a problem with DAP or anything because it worked so fine the rest of the mission. CARR Well, I don't understand why that son of a gun ground to a halt on me because - - QUERY Well, it would depend upon several factors. We don't have the data to go through the sequence of events, the time line of mode changing, and so forth, but we attempted to reconstruct what might have happened that would have explained it, and if you had done a VERB 1(6 and then followed that after you get the maneuver started, follow that with PRO, PRO on your VERB 1*9, you would have to do them in that order because VERB 1*6 - If you had PROed on your VERB 1*9 first and then did your VERB 1*6, that would just put you into an attitude-hold mode and it wouldn't attempt to drive you back in anyway. So you would have had to do the PRO, PRO after you'd done the VERB 1*6. And then that would depend upon what sign of attitude errors 30 �QUERY (CONT'D) you had at the time. If you had a positive attitude error, then it would attempt to pitch you up and you had Just commanded the pitch down maneuver; so they would be then in opposite directions and would stop the rate and attempt to drive you back the other way. So it would be a function of what the sign of your attitude errors and how many errors there were at the time. Of course, we have no way of knowing. CARR Yes ; well, that must have been it. QUERY But procedurally, you can cause a ... to occur. CARR Kind of off of that thing, the VERB 1+6 should have been done way back around tower jett. We put VERB 1+6 in twice in the boost card. QUERY Yes, and your checklist prior to sep, called for it again. CARR Yes. And then, we called the undock DAP, don't we, prior to sep? We set up the undock DAP and we're supposed to do another VERB 1+6 and that's the one - I figured when it did work right, I figured, well, I must have forgot to do a VERB 1+6 after I loaded the DAP. over again and everything worked. 31 So I did it and started �GIBSON When we finally turned around, we were pretty far out, so I'm sure we got seme plus-X. How we got it in there, I'm not sure. CARR Yes. QUERY You may have very well done it twice then, especially if you had any appreciable separation distance. CARR Yes. We had good separation distance. There was no question that we were well separated from the workshop, I mean from the SIVB. QUERY Okay. That's kind of a tricky procedure and there's several things that you can do that can dork [?] it up. CARR Yes. QUERY We've had a problem with it before. CARR It was no big thing, you know. I was prepared to just go ahead and do the whole thing in either ACCEL COMMAND or MIN IMPULSE, but it was kind of a surprise to have it grind to a halt after I had already set up the rates. QUERY Okay. 32 �CARR And then I was willing to accept - Just doing a VERB h6 solved the problem, so I was willing to accept that possibility that I had probably forgotten to do a VERB U6 after I loaded the DAP. QUERY If you could have remembered whether or not you had gotten plus-X, that would have told us whether or not you had done the first one or not, but it's kind of academic. The only other question we had: We would like to verify, if you can for us, there was no other TRACKER fail light that occurred during the mission other than the one you had during the rendezvous sequence around the NC-1? CARR Man, I'd forgotten we even had that. QUERY Well, you made no mention of it. CARR The data's so bad and the tapes are so bad during the rendezvous - You know, we tried to do the tech debrief ing, and we can't remember the rendezvous very well. It was apparently so nominal. And so we asked them to bring us over the tapes so we could listen to them and they were so lousy we couldn't figure out what had happened there either; so I'm sorry to say the rendezvous is pretty hazy in our minds. 33 And I knew something else �CARR (CONT'D) was - we had a problem and that's it - the TRACKER fail light - and I don't think we ever had it again. QUERY Okay. CARR If we did, I'm sure we would have told you. QUERY We didn't see any evidence of it in the data, but, of course, there's a lot of periods we don't get clearly when the G&N is OFF. CARR I don't remember seeing another one. QUERY All right. G&N guys just now walked in so unless they have any other questions, I guess we're through. QUERY You had something about the CU fail. Do you happen to remember when you had the TRACKER fail - You may not be able to recall it, but when you had the TRACKER fail, did you ever go back and see if the T packs really read zero at that time? CARR Yes. I'm pretty sure. Isn't that one of the steps in the malf procedures? QJERY Yes. CARR And I remember we got the malfs out and went through them very carefully. 3b �y, QUERY There's a question in our minds. You thought you did and that would help us solve the problem? CARR Yes. I do remember that one thing - making sure that the T packs went to zero and we called NOUN 92 I think it was to make sure that the CMC was commanding to zero, as well as the T packs being in zero, and it seems to me, Ed, you were down in the hold then at that time and I was having you verify those things to me. GIBSON Yes. QUERY The I remember that. call went up when the problem disappeared that you were in the process of doing a 52. I believe you recall that you do not know when it went out, when the TRACKER fail light went out. CARR Yes, it must be. QUERY Okay. GIBSON A long time ago. CARR B°y> Is that true? I can't remember. Thank you. I'll say. It's pretty bad when you can't even remember the anomalies. (Laughter) 35 �QUERY We appreciate the good words about the G&N system in your tech debriefing. CARR Well, it worked like a champ the whole time and when we flunked that horizon check on the shaping burn, I was supremely confident the G&N system was GO, because we had just gotten finished doing a start check and Ed said he could probably mark on the start without even going to O MANUAL. And I was supremely confident that we had a good G&N; I'll tell you, the guys in Flight Control are still scratching their heads as to why we didn't - why we missed the horizon check by 8 degrees. Doesn't make sense at all, but it happened. QUERY If you're interested, I have that strip chart of the separation problem prior to entry if you'd like to look at it, but that's all I have. CARR I think we understand pretty well now just what happened there. I might also add that when we were using the system for the trim burns, it was really nice. We could call up NOUN 56 and take a look at the rates, and it's really pretty nice when you can finish up a burn with the command module driving that whole big logging truck and you're reading four balls and a small number for your rates. 5) The old CSM DAP was just doing a magnificent job. 36 �QUERY That's the last on that? CARR Go ahead. QUERY On the ECS secondary coolant loop checkout at ... to Then let's get back to ECS. insertion, the evaporator steam pressure dropped to lower limits. In an attempt to obtain a satisfactory operation, you noted that twice you obtained steam pressures of 0.15 to 0.16 psi by going to the RESET position of the SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP, EVAPORATOR and RESET switch, but you were unable to sustain the proper pressure or cause the evaporator outlet temperature to come down. During these attempts, do you recall if you returned the switch to EVAP or OFF position after each of these partial closing of the back pressure valve? GIBSON First - As I recall, we went back to the EVAP the first or perhaps the first two times; didn't get it to work. And then went to the RESET to close the valve and then went to OFF and that's when I recall it working. That's pretty hazy recollection. QUERY What we're trying to ask, did you leave it in the OFF or the RESET position for any length of time? GIBSON We didn't leave it in RESET position for a long length of time. What? 58 seconds it says. 37 Oh, that's for the �GIBSON (CONT'D) primary. It's close to that for the secondary, I guess, so it'll drive it full scale. QUERY But it only operates in AUTO mode when you're in AUTO and - - GIBSON Yes. QUERY - - and the RESET only closes the valve and shuts down everything else and OFF shuts down everything and appar ently what happened when you left it in OFF, it dried out. Or did you leave it in RESET for any length of time; that's what we really - - GIBSON On the order of a minute or two at the most. QUERY Because in the RESET, the water flow valve is inhibited and it cannot drain. GIBSON Okay. It was only in RESET for on the order of a minute or two at the most. QUERY Okay. GIBSON I think that was - Now I don't recall the explicit action of doing that, but I remember that's the way we were trained and that's the way we understood the system. QUERY Yes. 38 �GIBSON Whenever we went to - Q'ffiRY Well, the primary works when you can control it in the manual position and the secondary cannot be controlled in the manual. GIBSON Yes. POGUE Yes; we knew that. 39 �3 GIBSON Okay. I'm giving you the best guess of recollection; that's more about the way we were trained than - QUERY Your training was in the primary mode at the Cape in the chambers? GIBSON Yes. QUERY And evidently you thought you could do that with the secondary. GIBSON Yes, probably so. QUERY I had to look it up to finally realize you couldn't do it. (Laughter) And then number 2 was during ECS systems reactivation, the water glycol evaporator servicing pro cedure. Apparently, it was interrupted due to the flapper valve operation with the CDR's suit flow control soaking valve, and our ground data indicated that considerable excess water was added to the primary evaporator. And that after the flapper was sticking, the secondary evap orator was serviced nominally. Your self-debriefing indicated that the SECONDARY EVAPORATOR WATERFLOW switch was left in the ON position for maybe 30 minutes due to interruptions. CARR No, that was the PRIMARY. 1*0 �QUERY Yes, that's really our good question. CARR The SECONDARY was left a little more than the 3 minutes, but it wasn't significantly more. But the PRIMARY was right in the center of that big flapper valve flap, if you'll pardon the expression. And 32, I started the det and it was reading 32 and I remembered that we should have turned that switch to the other position. QUERY We did experience quite unusual startup activity on the primary coolant - - CARR I would expect so, with that much water in there. QUERY I think that's because of your pipe - pipelines. CARR Yes. I thought about that when we saw the ice. I figured that that's what the problem was - was why we have all this ice because that water valve was on for so long. QUERY Of course, at that time I think most people thought it was from the RCS. CARR Well, we did not make it clear on the air-to-ground that the sparklies started by before we activated ring 2. Now the folks on the ground just didn't realize that, but we knew that what we were seeing going by was very likely the - Hi �GIBSON We made that statement once hut I think it was not under stood and we should have made it again when we realized that people were misinterpreting fireflies and their source. QUERY You have any more questions? QUERY There was one question I had, Ed. It wasn't clear in the debriefing here as to whether you actually activated the postlanding of the ventilation system. didn't deploy the ducts or anything. CARR No, it was not. not to do so. You say you Was that activated? As I understand it, we were instructed It was mainly because people were concerned about the propellents in the area. QUERY You got that part of the instructions, but the part of the instruction about the oxygen masks and that sort of thing? GIBSON All we heard was something about oxygen, and it was only when we were listening to the TV station in San Diego that we realized we had decided not to use it. (Laughter) QUERY That's all the questions we have. GIBSON I'm wondering a little bit about the amount of water Do you all have any? which we finally found down there in the LEB of the CSM. U2 �GIBSON (CONT'D) Jerry, as you know, used to take towels and towels full of water out of there and during the on-orbits day and before we came back, we tried to get as much water out as possible. I was Just wondering how much can be accu mulated up behind the panel that you Just can't get to. Because after the first burn, I was moving around down there in the LEB and put my foot in a big puddle of water. That's when I realized we might have a fair amount down there, and apparently they found some in the equip ment . I guess S201 was concerned about getting water on their film. QUERY They said it was a possibility. Well, I guess this was - this suspicion; it wasn't any colder than previous Skylab missions. The lines are insulated, but like the valves are not. So you are going to get condensation back there, and previous crews have experienced the ice become condensation. And when you do a burn from Apollo coming back from the Moon, whenever they do a burn, they have to get down and mop it up. all congregates down there on the floor. CARR Yes. QUERY I can't really answer your question, assess how much. We tried to do that and we really failed. U3 It �GIBSON There was no way for us to get down there and mop it up because there's so much equipment stowed down there that Jerry couldn't get to the surface where it was all congregated. CARR But every day I did - Everytime I did the housekeeping, HK7, in the command module, every 7 days, we'd fire up the secondary loop; and that would melt the ice down there next to panel 377, I think it was, the BYPASS valves down there. It would melt all that ice, and then I had about four towels full of water that I could get up out of it. And so I really conducted a neat wieking experi ment for the student who lost his other working experi ment down in the workshop. But you could just take that towel and lean it up against those lightning holes that are over to the left of that panel. There's little - about 3/l6-to lA-inch holes back there. You could just push a towel up against that and hold it. And you could almost hear the water slurping out of there and into the the towels. And it worked pretty well. Prior to - Well, during the deactivation phase, I tried to get as much of that water out of there as I could. all out through wieking action. I tried to get it But you - obviously I didn't get it all because Ed discovered it aovn in the aft bulkhead after the first burn. lots of ice. But it was there and There was a patch of ice about that wide UU �CARR (CONT'D) and about that long right down that vertical bulkhead, and I think if you look at the - look at the spacecraft, you can see where I did some battering on it to - to break some of the ice off. And then I got smart later and found out that if I did my water sopping right after the 7-day housekeeping exercise, I didn't have to chip ice; it would all melt and go into the towel. I started doing it that way. And - so But there's a lot of paint chipped off the command module right there. I might also add for, I guess, the structures people or somebody that we had corrosion. You might take - Walt you might tell your people to look at the left girth shelf, right by the A the water glycol panel, 326 I believe it is, and at the inside edge of the cabin relief valve handles. There was considerable metal corrosion underneath the paint, and the paint was lifting. And it was white, powdery aluminum oxide underneath. And this was the only area that I saw this, but it was right - right around that area. It looked like it probably hadn't been properly treated before they painted it. And there was a good amount of corrosion under that. But down ax the area where I was chipping ice, that was - it looked like it was well Ilodyned [?] and the paint would come off when I'd bang it, but the metal underneath looked pretty good. �QUERY Okay. Are there any more ECS questions? QUERY No. QUERY Okay. QUERY This next area will be comm. questions so you ... CSM comm? U6 We don't have any specific �CARR On the CSM coram? I guess the only comment we have on coram was that I hope that next time we build a - a spacecraft or any sort of a space station, that we should think simplicity in comm. The command module comm system is a complicated system full of traps that - that put you in a position where things come down on the air-toground that you didn't want to come down, and on the others - the other side of the house, you try to talk down air-to-ground and it doesn't get down. Or things get recorded when you don't want them recorded and vice versa. And then you take a complicated system like that and plug it into another system that grew like Topsy in the - in the SWS. The whole system was just a great big bag of snakes and you could see the first few weeks of all three missions, we were all screwed up on comm until we finally got it settled down. And then all the comm problems would settle down, and then only occasional ly would you embarrass yourself, with some dumb thing happening. But it's Just that you had so many different ways to configure the system and it - it Just bit you; every time you turned about you got bit by the comm system. QUERY And - Can you attribute that, Jerry, to - to - to design rather than to procedure? 1+7 �CARR Simplicity of design is what you've got to go for, and and a lot of people will come hack and say, well, if you want flexibility, you're not going to get the simplicity that you want. And to that I say hogwash. You can design a system that's flexible and - but you've got to design your - the - your panels - the - your man-machine or your man-panel interface so that you know what you're doing when you're throwing a switch. GIBSON The largest problem I saw in trying to understand the comm system from the operator's standpoint, is you can never follow the flow of information - - POGUE GIBSON Six, 9, and 10. never sit there and say-here's - here's where it comes in the antenna, here's the power amplifier that goes through here, and follow the flow and - and see the controls and displays that go with that flow. It was just a hodgepodge of switches sitting in front of you with no way of reb - or groping at it. It was kind of like grabbing an elephant; you Just didn't quite know where to start. CARR But another good thing about comm systems, too, is - is some indication of your modulation, whether or not you're 1+8 �T> CARR (CONT'D) you're modulating, getting down and getting up - little gain meters or lightB or anything, I think are good. And they ought to be designed in coram systems of the future. If you're going to tie your tape recorders into your coram system, you ought to have a little - little idiot lights that tell you either you are or are not recording. And of course, we only had a little bit of that, and that is the green light in the service - in the SWS that said, yea, verily, you're recording. POGUE We had talkback, of course, but it was only visible from one panel. CARR Yes. GIBSON But that really goes back to our own inputs many years ago. I mean we - we asked for it so - CARR We got it. GIBSON Yes, we got it. CARR But, we're convinced not that your recording capability ought to be completely divorced from your comm. Our - our idea is that you - in a - in a space station sort of thing of in Shuttle, that each guy ought to have his own recorder - tape recorder with him. b9 And when he fills up �CARR (CONT'D) a - a tape, then he can put the tape in a dump mechanism and throw a switch that tells the ground that there's a full cassette sitting on the dump. And the ground can dump it and clean it, and then they'd turn on another light that tells the guys up there that this tape has now been dumped and cleaned and ready for use. And you just need a few extra cassettes, and you'd have a very, very simple communication system where you could get your voice data up and down without getting messed up in the comm. And, of course, this would be separate from your data - your data recorders, which are ship systems. QUERY I got a question. CARR Yes. QUERY I'm really with the workshop ... but ... I guess I don't understand what you mean by completely separate. You mean have separate mikes for the recorders? CARR Sure; carry around your recorder on your hip with a mike, And if you need time-tagging on your - your thing, you could - you could probably have a jack or something that you could plug into whatever workstation you're working at, so that you could - you could time-tag your data. But - 50 �QUERY You mean the - the SIAs in the workshop? CARR Yes, they're confining. We're going to talk about that some more in just a minute. QUERY But - but you're saying that it would have been much better if we had had tape recorders that - individual tape recorders, some way or another we'd dump those CARR Right. QUERY - - and they have their own microphone and that sort of thing? CARR Right. POGUE We certainly did not have enough flexibility in the workshop comm - recording. 51 �r 1 QUERY Yes, I realize. CARR Well, I'll tell you I was never confident Just exactly Okay. where any signal was going when you - when you talked. You got channel A and channel B in the workshop and three audio panels in the command module and capability to inter - interconnect and change over and all those different antennas. POGUE Indian-wrestling with the ground when you came up on AOS. QUERY Any more comments? CARR No, that's it. QUERY Okay, the operational cameras and photography. GIBSON Hello. QUERY Okay, we have a few questions to ask you about cameras. Realizing that we had a number of problems, we'd like to try to - to get a few answers to help us solve problems for the - for the future. Okay, first of all, were you ever required to reindex on 11+0-foot film magazines, 16 millimeter - to reindex the film in the aperture to the little orange lens? POGUE It was always right on. 52 �QUERY It was always right on? That sounds good. Okay, early in January, we sent up a couple of procedure changes on l*00-foot magazine operations, you know, delete putting it into thread mode when you remove it frcm the camera. So that we got the impression from the ground that after we deleted these procedures, that some of your problems cleared up? Is this true. POGUE That's corre ct. CARR Yes. When we quit messing around with these cameras and running them at 2b frames per second and thread and then go on to operate and all that stuff, we immediately reduced the number of failures that occurred. POGUE I think that the failures that occurred after that were random and, occasionally, maybe one or two problems due to the fact that the selection was inadvertently to Was it single frame - time - whatever it was? QUERY And exposure, yes. POGUE Due to that. The - You're aware that - I know that we're all supposed to know, when you move that lever around, where it's supposed to be pointing, but you are aware of the - - 53 �QUERY Right. POGUE - - optical distortion that exists there. QUERY Okay, when DAC 06 blew the fuse early in the mission, was that the first time you had attemped to use that camera? CARR Golly, I can't remember. I don't know. QUERY Okay. CARR That's just too long ago and - QUERY Okay, you were - it was a procedure that was instituted to remove 6 feet of film from each canister before you tried to thread it. Okay, we gather that you did that. Do you recall if any of the film that you removed looked curled or disordered? POGUE Discolored is the best word on - QUERY Was discolored? POGUE Yes. QUERY Okay, what about - - POGUE But only about the first 3 or It inches. QUERY Yes, okay. Did it feel sticky? 51* �POGUE No, never sticky, always hard, "brittle maybe, but the only I would say that any character change was restricted to the first few inches. QUERY Yes. Okay, pertaining to the DAC 08 failure, do you recall having any kind of difficulty interfacing the magazine to that camera at any time? POGUE No. CARR Can you review what our DAC 08 failure was? QUERY That was the one that you suspected had a claw problem; that it wasn't pulling film, it - POGUE I think that was you again, Jer. CARR Oh, that's right. No, it seemed to be perfectly normal as far as the interface between the - the - the transporter and the - and the camera itself. But it just seemed that no matter what magazine you used, the claw would just rip holes in the - in the perforations. QUERY Yes, well we found the - the problem was not with the claw but rather with the little drive coupling. The foot had been bent over on that little coupling, and we were trying to determine, you know, how that might have, you know, some difficulty with making a magazine or ... the reason for the question. 55 That's �CARR I don't remember any problems with mating any of the magazines. You - you - There was always the possibility that you'd put a magazine on, and if you didn't get it locked in Just perfectly, it wouldn't - it wouldn't mate in. But the thing is, you wouldn't get bhe green light then. QUERY Normally that - that should - that should occur. You shouldn't be able to operate the cameras if the thing isn't CARR That's right, and we found that interlock system to be pretty doggone reliable. QUERY Okay. POGUE The only trouble we had on that was that one transporter did not have an end-of-film light that was operating, and we reported that a couple of times. We went ahead and used it. QUERY Yes, that was - that was one of the other cameras. I don't recall which one, but we - we found a problem that was happening to it. It was - Okay, during the last EVA, in the flyaround and reentry using DAC 02, when did you notice the failure? 56 �POGUE You mean that stuck in the 2 k frames a second? QUERY Right. POGUE Jer CARR Oh, let's see. I'm not sure, but it seems to me it was one of those nervous times when I decided, well, I'm going to check this camera one more time and see how it's running, and then - then's when I realized that it was running at 2b instead of 12. It was one of the pin firings that I had done. QUERY You don't recall - - CARR It seems to me that prior to undocking, isn't there a place in the checklist prior to undocking where you you recheck or where you make sure the camera is set up properly with all the - the right settings? QUERY I believe that's true. CARR That's - I'm pretty sure that's the time when I realized that that son of a gun was running much too fast. QUERY Yes. 57 �QUERY Okay, it - it appeared from looking at the film that that the EVA turned out okay. But your flyaround and reentry was the one that looked like ... CARR Yes. QUERY That problem could have occurred - We were trying to, you know, pinpoint whether we had a - maybe a terminal problem during a EVA or - or what it was that might have caused this failure. CARR Quite frankly, I don't remember noting any problem. I took that - that DAC down, and, let's see, I stowed 1^0—foot magazine in Bravo 3 or one of those lockers down there it. where the transfer checklist told me to put And then, after a while, I got to thinking. that's ridiculous. I said, I'll put the DAC in the window, and the film will be down there, and Bill will be suited, and we're going to need the film, and it's in the wrong place. So on entry day, when I was just closing out - doing the final closeout on the command module stowage, I decided, well, I'm going to get that film out and put it on the camera. And I did that and tested it. And I honestly can't remember noting at that time - apparently I didn't notice, if it was running at 2h, that it was. 58 But I �CARR (CONT'D) did make a test firing then. And then - then the next time I test-fired it was just prior to undocking when the - where you come to the place in the checklist where you check the - the shutter speed and the - and the exposure and all that. That's when I believe I said, oh, for crying out loud, this son of a gun is running at 2h. And we're probably going to shoot our whole wad before we ever get to the flyaround. QUERY Well, it looked like you got - got the flyaround pretty good but not much of the reentry. CARR Yes. By the way, Bill got one good Hasselblad shot of the - of the chutes. QUERY Yes, good. QUERY And one of the helicopter. CARR Yes. POGUE Not so good. QUERY (Laughter) GIBSON What was wrong with the camera? QUERY (Laughter) We'll Just say from - from our point of view, but - 59 �CARR What did you find with the camera? QUERY That camera we found a blown transistor in the electronics, CARR A blown transistor. QUERY That's why we think possibly a thermal problem, but we're not sure. CARR Yes. Son of a gun, we were down to 3 DACs and - and then we had to pick the one that was bad. QUERY (Laughter) QUERY QUERY Okay, I have a curiosity question, Bill. You reported sometime fairly early in the mission that - was one of the UOO-foot cassettes, that the tab had pulled back in, that you went into your sleep quarters and tried to Did you have any success? POGUE The reason was - you know I - I fully intended to go back and try it again later but never did have time. There's not enough room to get your finger in there or anything, to push that - QUERY Yes, that's true. 60 �POGUE - - Lead that film back in. You know that this happened - The problem occurred twice, once with me and once with Ed. And - no, excuse me, the tab three times. That time I lost the - the leader completely, and I reported that I must have put it on the wrong side. see how I had done it. hadn't. But I couldn't Then later, I became convinced I I had the thing on right ... shoved it back in twice more. And I know that I had it on the right side because that - you know that it has the little orange marks only on one - on one side for lining it up, and if you could see the orange marks after you put the supply in, you've got it loaded right. QUERY Right. POGUE SO I had it loaded right, and that thing was - and I - I think it was a different - QUERY Transporter? POGUE - - A transporter each time. tab back in there. But that thing was shoving that The other two times, fortunately, I was able - it had enough left - I'd get the Swiss army knife or something and pull it back out. QUERY Yes. 61 �POGUE Really weird. Now I'll tell you this - it - I'd never seen that happen before, and I was convinced I had made some kind of goof-up the first time. QUERY That is odd. Okay, I - I have no other questions. Jim has some on the 35 millimeter. QUERY Okay, just about all my questions relate to NK 02, being as we had a problem with the - with the film. And I'd like for you to just discuss with me the - the problems you had loading the camera, getting the back closed. Was it an every-time affair, or was it just the certain cassettes? POGUE Every time. QUERY Every time? POGUE That's right. CARR We never had that nice tight line. It just wouldn't close? There is a picture right up there; we're showing somebody else what was that line on the - the end of the door wss - never looked to us like it was completely closed. It looks like the little cam locks, or whatever H is that pulls it in, just really hadn't quite pulled it all the way. 62 �POGUE But it did look like the - the back was closed far enough that it - We had a good light seal and everything, and I had no reason to suspect that there was any sort of geometry problem. QUERY' CARR The film ... seen here looked flush to us. QUERY The film was not fogged, so you didn't have a light problem. The light wasn't getting in. Didn't - did it did the back at all appear to be bent in any way? POGUE Not to me. CARR Like I was saying, it appeared to be flush, it's just at the end - - POGUE The little - there were two little lugs down there. CARR Yes. POGUE They weren't working right. GIBSON always engaged, except ... - - POGUE The geometry in the back looked completely intact. QUERY But you had no problem with NK 01? camera. 63 That was the other �CARR No. POGUE No, sir, just the NK 02. QUERY Do you remember whether that happened on the first - The first film you shot in there was an IR roll, your body pictures for the medical people. And you even had it then? POGUE As far as I can remember, I had trouble on it the first time on. QUERY Something happened after - IR 01 looks good, and every other roll after that is completely out of focus. Do you recall - you know what the pressure plate is in the camera? POGUE QUERY Can I show you a picture? Yes. Okay, and the question I have - I don't knew whether you can recall or not, but was it there? POGUE You know, I honestly can't remember. QUERY Okay. CARR I don't think it was, Bill. GIBSON Well, now wait a minute. 64 I suspect it wasn't. �POGUE How in the world can you lose a pressure plate? CARR If it had gotten loose, it would have ended up on a screen. QUERY CARR If we'd have found that on a screen we'd have said, Man where did this come from? QUERY That's right, but I don't know how it got out of there. POGUE Just a second, let me look at ... GIBSON You really notice the difference between that and Nikon 01, *** you notice the difference. QUERY Yes, yes. I see a barreling effect of the film, which says the pressure was not in there holding the film in. And I see overlapping of - of - from frame to frame, either overlapping or not properly spaced, which says the pressure plate wasn't there. know. It - it - it's ... - - 65 Now how it got out I don't �GIBSON What - what held the plates there? QUERY It's held by four rivet-type things. physically pull it and get it out. You can - you can You got to pull it this direction and pivot it this direction to get it out. It - it's tough to get out, but it can - you can get it out. GIBSON I don't know why the heck - how it would ever get out there. QUERY Now, I don't know how it got out, but every - everything I see on the film says it wasn't there. POGUE I'll bet you're right, because that would explain all that defocus and everything. QUERY That's right. GIBSON How the heck did it ever get out and where did it go? Where did it go? QUERY I don't know, because we went back to the - SL-3 film and looked at all the film that we shot in NK 02, and it was there then, because it's all good. QUERY ••• (laughter) That little green Martian guy went in there and took it out between missions; I don't know. 66 �QUERY That's what the film looked like to us, that it Just flat wasn't there ... CARR . . . got t o he i n the same place as those mask weights are for - - POGUE Yes , the SMMD weights. (Laughter) POGUE You can lose things in the spacecraft and never recover them. GIBSON How'd it even come off though, Bill? POGUE That's - that would require positive effort. QUERY You - yes, you physically got to try to get it out; it just won't come out by itself, because it's caught this way one direction, and this way another direction. GIBSON And that makes me think that, even though it sounds like a neat idea, a nice solution, but I don't think any of us ever worked on the cameras that - - QUERY Yes. GIBSON - - with that much aggressiveness to try to take something like that off. 67 �QUERY No, you would have known; you couldn't do that by accident. QUERY No. CARR But I don't remember seeing ... - - QUERY The only thing I can see that would have caused it - the only other thing - you could take the camera and just stretch it this way and that's - (Laughter) QUERY Could you have pressure - pressured it in to where it was flat against the back? QUERY It's strained steel and you can sit thez'e and hold it all day long and when you let it go, it's going to spring back out. I even shot some film on - on one here on the ground, pulling one side loose, and it - still there's enough pressure to hold the film right. CARR Have you tried removing the plate and taking some pictures and comparing them? QUERY Yes, and it's very close. CARR It is? 68 �QUERY QUERY Very close. That focus varies which also leads me to believe that the that the film was floating in there. QUERY Yes. QUERY It varies; it looks like, you know, it's 3 or U feet, or sometimes 6 feet and it Just - - CARR I never felt like the back of NK 02 was loose when we were using it. It always felt tight, but it was Just always disturbing to see that one seam there - that it wasn't as snug and - and clean looking as was the NK 01. QUERY I even tried leaving the back completely open and Just taping it with the gray tape like you had on board, and the film still is in focus. So the only answer I came up - We tried even putting ... maybe there was a spacer ring between the lens and the body. But that - that had nothing to do with it. QUERY No. GIBSON No, no we ... QUERY We had - We had the problem before we ever put that K-l adapter in. 69 �I GIBSON Yes, we used a whole host of different lenses, too. QUERY Yes, I think you would have found it. You might have shot it once that way, hut then you would have seen it. Not r- not every roll. POGUE Well, that's going to be one of the unsolved nysteries - - QUERY That's right. POGUE - - of Sky lab, because I can not figure for the life of me how a piece of - came out of there. GIBSON Do you recall whether the SL-3 guys had any occasion to work with that camera? QUERY That - oh, yes. We shot probably 20 rolls with that camera on SL-3. GIBSON To work on the camera, I should say. QUERY Oh, to work on it? CARR ...he says our first roll was in focus. QUERY The first roll - - No, I don't think we ever worked on it. MS 70 �GIBSON ... whether they might have loosened it up by having to do any work on it, and it came off very easily. Because I know we never did any extensive work on it. QUERY The thing that would really fool you, too, is that your eye tells you by looking through it that you have good focusing, but if the pressure plate's gone, you don't know where the film is; it's not holding the film flat anymore. POGUE That's right. QIJERY And that's the only answer that I can come up with, that it somehow got out of there, and I don't know how it got out of there either. But that's the only thing I can see that would do that, because you could just about bend the back in half almost. Well, you have - you know, you'd have to have a space that wide before the pressure plate wouldn't hold it in there. And then you would be light fogged very bad, and there was no streaking - no fogging in the film. CARR Wait a minute, now. We always had to really hold that thing down tight to get it to latch. There was something pushing that back open when we were trying to close it and latch it. 71 �QUERY Which - which should be the pressure plate. The pressure plate should - you know, you should feel the resistance. It also springs out as you open it - As you pull the lever down those ... CARR Yes, and I remember one time when you and I loaded it prior to an EVA. I was holding it down, while you were manipulating the lock knob. And it took some force on that knob just to hold that thing down there. it would just come open. If you let it go, So that tells me there must have been a pressure plate in there. No pressure plate, it probably would have just - QUERY Should have plopped right in place. CARR Yes. No, we never had that. We always had to push that thing against some sort of - GIBSON Also holding a Swiss army knife also helped in order to get the - the back plate to hold down, which hit against the edge, and you had to put the knife in there and pry it back a little bit. QUERY Pry it back so it'd go down. It sounds like it must have got bent a little bit, but that - even if it was bent a little bit, as long as you got it closed ... 72 I don't �7) QUERY (CONT'D) know, I don't have the answer for that. one on the flash operation. I have one other Did you have any trouble with chat flash at all, or - POGUE We changed the battery about a week before the end of the flight. QUERY Is that right? flight. You used the same battery all through the So you had plenty of battery power. CARR Oh, yes. QUERY Okay. CARR The biggest single problem we had was forgetting to charge the darn flasher. We'd take a picture without charging it, and then we would have to take it over again. QUERY Yeah. CARR But other than that, the flasher worked like a gem. POGUE This is a very good unit. If you notice the - the pictures we took there at the end, where we - using the the fixed settings for the strobe. manual, or something like that. QUERY Yes. 73 You know, it Just says �POGUE Every one of those shots came out great, QUERY Yes. POGUE I t ' s when you - when you s t a r t e d - w e l l , I ' d say - Some of the fixed operations with the K-l adapter we had an awful lot of trouble with. You've seen those. QUERY Oh, yes, yes. CARR What about - what about some of those body photos that are so grainy and fuzzy? QUERY Was that done with the flash? CARR Yes. QUERY I assumed it wasn't done with the flash. It - it looked like it would either CARR No, no wait; it was done without a flash. POGUE It was done without a flash. CARR This is - this is the - the photos we took when we did an IR picture - the three views? POGUE Yes, one-half of the stereo. was the three views. 7U It was stereo, otherwise it �POGUE Yes. That's right. QUERY And they were without the flash? CARR Without the flash . POGUE That's right. QUERY Yes. CARR They were rotten pictures. QUERY I also assumed they were probably early in the mission. POGUE No, we continued taking - taking them without the flash, because that's what the card said. QUERY Yes. CARR Of course, the stereo - we always had trouble counting down, and getting both cameras - or that they wanted the flash to go off a little bit before the - - POGUE If they - if those worked out, it was Just a fluke. (Laughter) POGUE Because that - that - that was really ridiculous ... that strobe . .. 75 �> QUERY We had - we had ... something and we couldn't sell that, so I knew it would "be a real pain for you. I don't know, that's the type of picture you tend to get without a flash. We lost more because of the radiation to the film, whereas you didn't see it near that bad on Apollo you had a 10, 15-day mission. when But as long as you were up there, the radiation really gets to that film. CARR And the flash helps overcome the radiation. QUERY Oh, yes. CARR You're really supersaturated to begin with. Okay, so that's why those no-flash pictures are so grainy looking. QUERY Plus, we're pushing the film a lot more without a flash than we are with a flash. CARR QUERY Yes. We're pushing it another stop or better, which makes it look grainy. CARR Okay. QUERY That's basically all we had. questions of us? We could 76 Do you have any other �POGUE There are two - two comments I'd like to make. The photomic head is a beautiful piece of equipment, but because of our continual changing of - shifting of photomic heads and so forth, every time I picked a camera up, the little buttom had been pushed, and the little white ring was showing. QUERY Which said the battery - - POGUE Which said we were discharging those batteries like crazy. So about halfway through the flight, all of them were going out, and I didn't trust them any longer. QUERY Right. POGUE Which meant then you had to use a spotmeter. Because of my accommodation going down the tubes, I actually had trouble reading that spotmeter; Jerry didn't. I had to put my glasses on to read it. QUERY POGUE I see. So once you take - I mean, I don't know what can be done about that, but it's hard to read, and maybe Just keep that in mind. QUERY Yes, hopefully we'll have something different from now on. After ASTP. 77 �POGUE The photonic head is the way to go. You know, the batteries are small; you just carry a handful of them up. QUERY POGUE CARR Right. We used - I think we sent up five ... I changed all out. And - and I had one spare. And I - - He was really hoarding that spare near the end of the mission. (Laughter) POGUE We only had one, and, of course, you would like to keep that on the color interior, because that was the thing to use it on. QUERY I think if we had it to do over again, on ... - one of the electrics we didn't fly with a photonic head, on account of weight, but I think we would so it would save you swapping heads. MS Yes. QUERY That was a real pain. CARR QUERY And swapping the light, the flash unit, was a pain, too. The flash ... 78 �CARR Because you had to take that lens off to remove the foot that holds the - or you had to change the whole photomic ... POGUE ... because there were medical photos and after postflight - for postflight medicals, one of The photographers just put some velcro on his photomic head and was - was using it that way. And I thought, why didn't I think of that? MS (Laughter) POGUE Because that's all we really needed to do. QUERY Right. POGUE We wouldn't have had to keep unscrewing that thing. CARR Yes. QUERY Well, when we started out with those cameras there was Right. no - ever an intention of having a flash, and then that kind of developed so that a few did. The next generation of cameras will have a flash unit. POGUE I'll tell you, I'm really impressed with that flash unit, because you notice, regardless of the distance, they all came out pretty good. 79 �QUERY That's really good. Hopefully, we'll get one - the one problem with that one was that you only can shoot at 2 feet or farther way. If you got much closer you could wipe out something. POGUE Yeah. QUERY Now you could kind of get it away from the camera to do that. And hopefully, we'll have one in the next generation that will be where you can get a lot closer. POGUE I did some where I held the flash unit over to one side. QUERY Yeah. As - as I recall, those came out real good. On the - the - I forget the ED number, but the plant growth the rice seeds [ED61/62] - now that was done with Just a high-intensity light hanging on the side. And those came out real good. CARR Yeah. POGUE In other words ... - - GIBSON What came out well was everything except what you wanted to see. MS (Laughter) 80 �GIBSON The rice seeds themselves were so blurred because they were emersed in that - that agar, which is translucent. QUERY Right. GIBSON So you really couldn't see the details. But all the numbers on the outside of that container really came out beautiful. CARR Oh, yeah. MS (Laughter) QUERY Yeah. Well, I think this was what - you know - they were expecting to see, but at least they give you some idea what - how the other roots - I don't know. QUERY I guess that's all we have. GIBSON Are you going to, even on ASTP, have a reflex finder for the Hasselblad? QUERY Not on ASTP. GIBSON Because, boy, we look at the - - CARR Why don't you get rid of that Reseau plate and put that reflex back in it? 81 �"5 GIBSON Boy, I'll tell you, we look at the pictures, and you can for example, you're looking at a smoke plune, and you say why didn't I include the whole smoke plume in the photograph. QUERY Yeah ... - - GIBSON You just couldn't line it up; you don't know what you are looking at. QUERY Right, that's - - GIBSON That reflex finder is so beautiful. CARR I'm sure you noticed in a lot of the pictures that the item of interest was in the - you know - not in the center of the picture. It was offcenter somewhat. QUERY Right. CAER And that was strictly because we were using - looking down the side of the camera. And we even tried the ring sight a little bit, but I'm not so sure that did a lot of good. POGUE Really the ring sight still doesn't - it helps, but it still doesn't give you the - the full field of view you're getting. 82 �GIBSON Yeah, when I used the ring sight - I remember the few times that we actually had it on the camera and used it, and it did help. But it still didn't show the full field of view, which lets you know what you're getting in the picture and whether you want overlapping pictures. QUERY Right. POGUE Well, also, for stereopairs it's awful nice. CARR Yeah. QUERY The - the one problem with that is, early when we first started flying Hasselblad we couldn't ever get the mirror to not break in vibrations. It sits there and flaps, whereas the Nikon camera - it locks down, has a positive lock that holds it in place. Maybe we can overccme that with the newer technology we have today, but POGUE Well, what's wrong with installing it in flight? QUERY That's difficult to do. POGUE It is? QUERY You would never get it - you would never get it to line up properly. You'd have to keep the distance between it and the - the screen exactly the same as the distance 83 �QUERY (CONT'D) back to the film plane. And it would be a real problem. That's a real precise alignment. You could never do it in flight, I don't think. POGUE You could ... - - GIBSON . . . package i t so you could take that packaging out during flight? QUERY Yeah. That's possible; you'd cram it full of foam or something so that you could yank it out and have the mirror locked up. That's a possibility. POGUE Uh-huh. QUERY That's a real possibility. CARR Well, I guess our message to the camera people is that the cameras we had were good for their dayt but there's better stuff on the shelf down at the camera supply right now. And let's don't perpetuate the stuff we got Just because it worked neat for Gemini and Apollo. up with the times. we do. Let's stay And I know you guys feel the same as We made the same pitch to the managers, and that is, let's keep up with the times with our photographic equipment. There's no reason to saddle ourselves with old stuff Just because it was reliable and worked well in its day. 81+ �QUERY Right. POGUE There's a couple of human factors and things, too, when you're going to select these new cameras, and that is cables, for instance, have nothing to do wiuh cameras as such, but they ought to all be coated. I think we mentioned that at tech debriefing. QUERY Right. POGUE And we ought to have cable caddies. You ought to be able to easily attach and remove cables with the magazine and transporter installed. And you can't do that. You just tear your fingers up trying to get those on and off because there's not room. You know, the little things like that that enhance the operational use of the camera. There was a continual sort of irritation when you were actually - had to take - the thing that was really bothering us was that every time we took a transporter, handled a transporter, we - we got all nervous because we had so much trouble with them. And so every time you touched that transporter, took it off the mag, off the camera itself, you figured you were flirting with disaster for that 1*00 feet of potential film. QUERY Um-hum. 85 �POGUE And you - but you had to take it off to remove the remote timer or to remove the power cable and then put it back on and then check it again. There for a while we were checking it again, too. QUERY Um-hum. POGUE Little things like that can sure make that operation go smoother. GIBSON We shouldn't shortchange ourselves on the amount of equipment we take up, especially the small stuff. The - the manual release cable, manual timer - CARR Yeah, that was something. GIBSON We had times where we had both people wanting to use it and you'd have the whole time line constrained because you only had one of them up there. CARR Yeah. QUERY And that thing weighed nothing, a tenth of a pound or something. POGUE I always wondered - - QUERY In a sense you would have been better off if you could have ... 86 �POGUE You could carry 10 of them in a suit pocket. QUERY Yes. GIBSON One thing that vould also help in the future that I think really slowed us Tip of those pictures. in taking pictures is the documentation Writing it down and then getting it into a voice recorder, for some reason that seemed to take much longer than taking the picture. QUERY Yeah, I'm sure. GIBSON And maybe we could find a much more efficient way of doing that. QUERY Hopefully - - GIBSON Especially for Earth resources, you could do a heck of a lot better. QUERY Hopefully we'll have that data recording system vhich not only records the time but also the f-stop and the shutter speed as well. GIBSON So all you have to do is then give some verbal description of what picture you took. QUERY That's right. 87 �GIBSON That surely would be better. QUERY I think that would help. GIBSON We were inhibited in taking an awful lot of pictures. That's sort of ... If you only had 2 minutes at the window you knew you could never take a picture and document it. QUERY Right. CARR Well, a couple of times I took my pictures during the day, and then finally at 10 o'clock at night I would try to sit down and document everything that I did. And that's hard to do. QUERY Well, another - - CARR It's better than nothing. POGUE - - another thing, too, when you get a golden opportunity to take a long series of photographs, you start - first you see something that you've been waiting 3 weeks to get, you see, and you grab the camera. You start taking pictures and then all - after you've taken about 15, well, you don't - if you take. 15 or not, you don't knov when you started - what frame you started with, or whether the previous guy forgot to log his. in a mess. 88 And, bqy, you're really �CARR Yeah, there were a lot of ... positions, where we'd sit down and say, "All right, what frame did you finish with?" "Well, I'm not sure; what did you finish with?" MS (Laughter) CARR "I think I took six pictures." But one thing, you guys really shortchanged us on the little log. We had to make our own logs. QUERY Yes, there wasn't enough on - - CARR Oh, golly, yeah. You only gave us maybe 25 percent of what we needed. POGUE We used 10 of those apiece. GIBSON The guy who was last one to write on the page was the one who had to make out the next one. MS (Laughter) CARR Yeah. GIBSON So you'd find it - for half the day you'd find one line He had the problem ... - - at the bottom and everybody was afraid to take pictures MS (Laughter) 89 �POGUE MS Either that or he'd draw another line between that (Laughter) QUERY (Laughter) POGUE CARR Squeeze in an extra one in there. But we found it was - it was good for us, too, to try to be meticulous about keeping track of our pictures. QUERY CARR Yeah. But of course, unfortunately we left one little book up there stuck in the window which represents - I think it was about 22 pages of data. POGUE CARR Most of it is voice recorded. Little bitty pages like that, but about eight frames per page, eight pictures per page. But it looks like we're probably going to have to sit down and help Dick Underwooc and those guys figure out what some of those pictures wen Luckily, near the end of the mission where w2 knew we had lots of film, we start taking great ... of pictures, and all you got to do is identify one feature and you Just identified eight or ten frames. 90 �QUERY Yeah. GIBSON Have you seen any of the Nikon out-the-window stuff yet? QUERY Unofficially. GIBSON How did some of the 300-millimeters turn out? QUERY They looked good. CARR No sir. QUERY You didn't? CARR No. QUERY ... much better than anything we seen previously. GIBSON We used ... 1/1000 of a second and stepped the ... opened Yeah, I've seen it. it up accordingly. I assume you used a bracket a lot on those. And also, the bracket I didn't think was the way to go; I used image motion compensation. Look through that viewfinder and track a given subject as you're taking a picture. That seemed to be - otherwise, you're just sitting there watching the ground speed by and you know you're going t o smear i t . POGUE Well, you sure can see it in that 300 lens. GIBSON Oh, yeah. 91 �CARR Yeah. The "bracket was too floppy, too flexible. It vould've been better if we'd Just - if you're going to have that bracket, to design it to fit into the two holes that hold that big piece of bridge structure that goes across for S063. QUERY For S063; right. CARR And you could have had Just sort of a lighter bridge with a camera hanging down there with some sort of a ball Joint so that you could move the camera. QUERY Uh-huh. GIBSON But a bracket doesn't seem to make sense in taking pictures going over the ground. It only makes sense If you're taking pictures of something fixed inertially in space, when the spacecraft is fixed and you're taking a picture of a star or a comet. But taking pictures of the ground, you - you're best off following it with your eye and getting image motion compensation. QUERY Well, you did a beautiful Job because they're much better. The other pictures, the only reason they put that bracket on originally was to - to try to help seme of this body motion you get in the pictures as well as being able to tell you, "Hey, at a certain position you're going to be able to see something come up in 2 minutes." 92 �GIBSON I thought most of the smear which they had on SL-3 was due to the ground whistling by rather than body motion. QUERY I'm sure it was. Plus, I - I'm sure they didn't shoot at that - CARR Well, proper body restraint helps a lot, too. If you can get yourself well restrained you can sure do a better Job of taking a picture. POGUE Another thing - yeah, and if you'd put the lens up against the window cover protector, a lot of times that would and then Just lever it. GIBSON Pivot it on there. That's what we used to do: hold one end up against the edge and then Just watch it and raise yourself up as you're going over. CARR Right. QUERY Well, they were very good; better than we've ever seen with the 300. And the EVA pictures are probably the best we've ever seen on EVA, both on the 16 and the 35. outstanding. They were Very good. GIBSON Well, I hope we finally get to see them one of these days. QUERY When the DOD releases them? 93 �GIBSON Something secret in those EVA pictures? MS (Laughter) QUERY Every one of the CX films is tied up on the 35; they haven't been released yet. QUERY CARR But they do look good. Any more questions on that? That's about it, I think. That's all the comments ve have. MS Thank you. GIBSON Thank you. QUERY Okay, George McKay [?] from Marshall's here; he'll take over. CARR Your locomotive has square wheels, MS (Laughter) GIBSON But don't tell the Chrysler people that. McKAY Now I'm going to ask you to remember in great detail the first 10 minutes of this 3-month mission. MS McKAY (Laughter) It's going to be real exciting, I'm sure. Now, I guess the thing that - it's probably moat obvious to everybody at this time that most of the excitement took place on the ground. 9b �McKAY (CONT'D) And I guess the thing I would ask you was, do you recall anything that wasn't as you expected in terms of the sensations and sounds and what - what have you? CARR Well, I don't think we were prepared - you know - for much of any of that. Having never done anything like that before, you never know exactly what to expect. can tell you exactly what it feels like. GIBSON And nobody There's no way. And each guy that gives you an idea of what they thought it was like seems to describe it in different terms, very subjective. I felt we were on top of a tall building and the bottom floor exploded. You really felt - felt a lot of - initially I felt a lot of vibrations associated with isolated explosions, which were different engines lighting off and most likely to holddown clamps letting go I thought I was going to be able to initially identify the holddown clamps going, and think I can get the general time frame but I don't recall that I was able to get the specific instances of them letting loose. CARR Subsonic, it seemed to me we were getting a lot of the acoustic stuff and we were getting a lot of vibration. When you got ignition you got lots of vibration. And to my way of thinking there was no doubt when the holddowns let go, because then you immediately start getting the 95 �CARR (CONT'D) acceleration along with all that acoustic and the structural vibration. I didn't recognize anything or know anything that felt like any kind of pogo or anything like that. But it was a good strong acceleration, and when we went sonic, or through sonic, things immediately quieted down. And then all we had left was what little structural vibration there was and, of course, the constant increase in g as we were pushed back into the seat. GIBSON That buffeting sensation as you're going through max q, which was to me very similar to when we were ccming back in and reentering and went through max q there. QUERY Was that max q or transonic? CARR Well, it was around the time ... - - GIBSON Pretty close but it was - - CARR - - pretty close. GIBSON I think it was just about - - QUERY Well, max q comes about 15 seconds after transonic. GIBSON Oh, is that right? QUERY Yeah, you get quite a - - 96 �POGUE I think it was probably the transonic - - GIBSON Maybe it was the transonic then. CARR Yeah, I think so. QUERY I think one of the things that - well, one question I wanted to ask: Yeah. did you notice a decrease in the acoustic levels, let's say 10 or 15 seconds after liftoff. Did you any significant decreases at that time? QUERY It'd be about the time of tower clearance. CARR Yeah. I think during the whole period of time, from ignition all the way up, it's - or all the way through the sonic - the transonic area. That is, the vibrations and the acoustic vibrations - structural and acoustic are diminishing slightly. But it's very marked; once you go transonic and get supersonic and get out ahead of the noise, there's a very marked difference. But it's sort of a - I felt sort of a gradual smoothing out. The most vibration, the most buffeting and everything, is right at the pad. And then as you begin to get away from the tower and things begin to pick up speed, it's very slowly smoothing out. But when you go through sonic velocity there is a rather distinct change in the vibration feelings 97 �3 CARR . (CONT'D) that you get and I just decided that had to be because / the fact that we moved out ahead of the acoustic vibrations and now we're Just feeling structural vibrations GIBSON But on the pad and close to it you do have a awful lot of acoustics, maybe because you're CARR GIBSON - T Oh, yeah. - - you're - things are so quiet now, all of sudden when it does cut loose it's such a marked change that you feel that. Maybe you get a little oblivious to it after you've experienced it for a minute or two. QUERY GIBSON CARR I don't think there's any way that - - T^e first 5 to 10 seconds I thought was pretty noisy. I felt a lot of the bang-bang in the spacecraft that I felt and heard when I observed launches, both Saturn V and S-IB. You know, the bang-bang, pop-pop sort of thing. And I felt like I could feel and hear that while we were in close to the tower, and you know that's strictly the acoustic side of the house, but QUERY I don't think there's any way that you can properly describe this. I guess the first questicr - one of the first questions we ever got when the astronauts began to 98 �QUERY (CONT'D) familiarize themselves with the Saturn equipment as opposed to brand X, that we - the first question we got was "What does it sound like; what does it feel like?" And of course we didn't know, and I guess we still don't know. But everybody describes these things differently. And of course the people who have ridden on the Sat V and the I-B both say that the I-B is much quieter and it's much smoother. So if you're so impressed with the I-B part of it, you know - (Laughter) GIBSON ... satisfied ... QUERY Like to. We've got some good ones left. subjective thing. But it's a very And we've never been able to get a good handle on it, and we've been asking these questions for a long time, mostly because the people have been asking us questions. And the only thing that we can say is it's normal. (Laugher) GIBSON Have you got it on the onboard recorders, the way QUERY Yes. GIBSON - - ... vibrations? 99 �QUERY Yes, we've recorded many of these things and we continue to do so. And the results that we're getting now are quite repeatable from flight to flight„ We've damped out all the little closed-loop cycles that we had inside the thing. GIBSON I'm wondering if you would play one of those for us whether we could tell you whether that's representative of what we hear? QUERY We don't ordinarily put them on tape. I don't think I've heard but one myself, and the CARR I don't think it would do any good to play a tape, unless you feel it while you're listening to it. I think it's a completely different thing. GIBSON Well, I don't know - - QUERY Yeah, a lot of it would be in the feeling region as opposed to the audio region. CARR Yeah. GIBSON Yeah, that's part of it, but if you really wanted to get a feedback from us as to whether you actually got anything of worth there - - 100 �POGUE You know - - QUERY Depends on what you're actually experiencing when we - - GIBSON - - I think you could get something worthwhile out of it. POGUE When you start getting down around 3, 5 cycles per second, or 3 to 5 hertz, you start picking up an awful lot of physiological response, which - if you Just played a acoustic, or just a regular cassette-type recording, you Just wouldn't get it. QUERY Right. 101 �QUERY So, if you're so impressed with the IB part of it, you know - - CARR Holy cowl (Laughter) GIBSON Can you get us a Saturn V ride? QUERY Like. to. (Laughter) We've had some good ones left. But it's a very subjective thing, and we've never been able to get a good handle on it. And we've been asking these questions for a long time, and mostly because the people have been asking us questions. can say is it's normal. GIBSON And the only thing that we (Laughter) Have you got any onboard recorders in the way of sound vibrations? QUERY Yes. Yes, we've recorded many of these - these things and we continue to do so and the - the results that we're getting now are quite repeatable from flight to flight. We've damped out all of the little closed loop cycles that we had inside the thing and - GIBSON I'm wondering i f you would play one of those for us whether we could tell you whether that's representative of what we hear. 102 �i) QIJERY We don't ordinarily put them on tape. I don't think I've heard but one myself and - GIBSON Okay. CARR I don't think it would do any good to play a tape unless you - unless you feel it while you are listening to it. I think it's a completely different thing. GIBSON Well, yes. QUERY A lot of it would be in the feeling region e.s opposed to the audio region - - POGUE Yes. GIBSON Yes, that's part of it, but if you really wanted to get a feedback from us as to whether you've actually got anything at work there - - POGUE GIBSON You know, Ed in terms of what you actually experienced, at least, I think you could get something worthwhile out of it. POGUE When you start getting down around 3 to 5 cycles per second or 3 to 5 hertz, you start picking up an awful lot of physiological response which, if you Just played an acoustic, or Just a regular cassette-type recording, you Just wouldn't get i t . 103 �QUERY Right, and personally I have always felt that there was more of this pop, pop on the IB than there was on the on the Sat V and the instruments don't show that. POGUE GIBSON Well, from ray observations I would have said the opposite. I thought the first stage was relatively smooth and I thought I could feel a little chugging on S-IVB. QUERY GIBSON Well, it's sort of a softer thing. It's ~ - It's softer, but I thought that the thrust was more intermittent, at least it felt 9 CARR Yes, these guys both said they felt like we were kind of going like this on the S-IVB, and I didn't have that feeling. QUERY I don'-t remember feeling that at all. The - the - the words that we have heard all along that the SII when that thing was involved was even more of that and it's Just a seemingly softer thing. It's not really a pogo or closed-loop thing; it's Just a sort of a - the Atlas, I think, had much the same kind of a feeling to it and perhaps even more so than.either one of these two and - but that softness tends to - to damp out the - the higher frequencies and it is very quiet for the most part. And the SII being the softer is the quietest one of the group. 10 It �QUERY On the J57 engine with the afterburner on some of the early models of it had the - the characteristic of what we used to call a hard light with a burner. A normal J57 afterburner light was Just baroomph, and it went, but if you didn't get things tuned Just right and your eyelids weren't opening just right, you'd get a - a bam, a sharp bam. POGUE A choked flow temporarily. CARR And - and I felt a lot of that on the booster, on the S-IB. Bam, bam, bam, and you could feel it going on. And, of course, I would characterize the S-IVB ignition as being more like the properly tuned afterburner on the J57. It lit in smooth; it ramped up and then Just moved right on and I - like I said, I didn't feel this gentle sort of a pulsation that Bill and Ed felt. Well, the H-l is of a different generation than the J-2 and the plan was, back in the design days, was to ram the thing right on through start as rapidly as possible, because the period in between is relatively unstable, you don't have the pressure drops and the damping and so forth. And so it starts very hard in comparison to either the F-l or the J-2, and it starts very easily too, as a matter of fact. And so as a result, you'll get the these shocks on start. 105 �POGUE You couldn't feel all eight of them, but there was defi nitely a ripple effect.there. GIBSON Was there abnormalities from your standpoint? QUERY We only had two that I consider to be significant. We had a little control helium leak in the engine, the J-2 engine which caused us to use a bit more helium than usual. The part of the engine cycle that was involved in this leak was terminated at the main engine cutoff, so it did not leak any more after that time and it was it's interlocked with or interconnected with the stage helium supplies, so the stage helium made up a large portion of what was lost. And except for the fact that we really don't know where the leak was, we got it down to three - three possibilities, one of which I consider to be impossible and one has never happened before and the third was never supposed to happen again. And so we - we haven't accomplished very much on that thing except to go back into the 210 and make sure that none of those possibilities exist for that - for that engine. And then the other one we had which I consider to be significant was in the APS, one of the thrusters. The oxidizer side was partially blocked, apparently due to corrosion. If the valve has a little seepage through 106 �QUERY (CONT'D) there, with the humidity and things that you have down at the Cape, by the time the propellent's been on there a couple or three days, you can get some corrosion which will block the system. This is the first time that we have seen that at all on flight hardware. We've sort of deliberately introduced that in times past, but none of these things were significant and without the data, I guess we never would have really noticed it. CARR I don't know if you folks got in on the data that we saw it when you were blowing down the APS, I gue3s it was. But we could see the - the mustache on the S-IVB. When we - right after we'd done the separation from it and we were moving away, we saw the - the poof. It looked like it had a - had a handlebar mustache. QUERY I don't think anybody mentioned that to us, but really the the stage was quite controllable insofar as that 30 percent is concerned. I guess we could get by with - in most cases there, with at least two thrusters out and a part of another one in most of the combinations that you could get. So we had control all the way through, but we were well satisfied with mission. launch vehicle as we've had. 107 That was about as good a �GIBSON Yes, it went right down tfre pike. I was watching on the DSKY and the predicted and the actual were right together all the way. I wish we could have done that well in simulations. (Laughter) QUERY Yes. GIBSON We never seemed to have a trajectory which matched the one we were flying on the simulator. So we never got used to seeing one that matched. QUERY We - we've been well pleased in the more recent flights because Just one right after another have all been like that, right down the center and the amount of propellent left at the end of the burn and everything was within Just a very few 100 pounds of what would be predicted. And so I really think that you couldn't get a more reliable setup than what we have now. GIBSON I got a - Just a gee-whiz question and that's, when we are going through the region which gives us the contrail, what exactly determines the cutoff of that contrail at a high altitude? Is it a decrease in density? I guess, initially, it's a temperature effect that causes the condensation to finally come out in water vapor. What happens as you get up to a higher altitude and it cuts off sharply? 108 �QUERY I wouldn't have an answer to that question. The thing that is involved there is there's all kinds of different flow regimes going on back in the back changing as you go. And- it seems to me that you ought to be able to produce a contrail almost any time with all the hugs amount of water vapor that's being generated there, but it would appear that as you begin to get the plume interference is when when the thing dies out. As a the plumes begin to spread and eventually get to the point where you get flashback up into the boat tail-as the plume impinges, some of it goes back into the boat tail - and along about that time is when it appears that the contrail dies, when the con ditions are appropriate to get one. That is one of the heating regimes, I guess, that we've watched the most closely. But we've never - I don't think we ever spent near as much time and effort in describing what goes on in the base region through the different flow regimes that you get during assent. I don't think we ever would have had enough time in the whole program to do that, l because there's so many different combinations with all those engines back there. QUERY Yes, I - that's very true because - in aerodynamics - I listened one time to some 15 different - - 109 �QUERY QUERY Would you use your mike, please? Turn it on. Yes, I think, from an aerodynamicists' point of view type of thing, that the description of a contrail is part of the base pressure, base heating regime where there are a great number of variables, both geometric and atmospheric o in thermodynamics, that influence the plume and the base heating and the base pressures and that type of thing. And it wouldn't surprise me at all if you're never going to find out exactly when to predict something like that. GIBSON It was essentially a temperature effect though, in other words these combinations of - of the geometry of the plumes and the thermodynamics involved would change the temperature to the point QUERY It's a function of about lU or 15 different things, of which temperature is one. GIBSON Okay, I was just thinking condensation would end up being a function of temperature primarily and all those other things affect temperature, but I don't know. QUERY You - we get several different pressure to pressure to pressure temperature relationships, one through - first one regime and then to another and to another all within 110 �QUERY (CONT'D) the same operating period, you see, and our people have not really reached a good, firm agreement about how combustible are the products that are coming out of the engine after it's - after it's finished, you know, there's much less that type of thing. We had quite some arguments seme years ago when we decided to put the bG exhaust products into the star area between the four inboard engines whether it would be warmer or cooler to do that particu lar job. And so it finally turned out it was cooler, but there are some people who still don't believe that. And then recently when we started flying the later versions where the thrust was up about 5 K per engine, which is really very small in terms of the total thrust there, we picked up some increase in radiant heat but no increase in total heat, and the increase in radiant heat was quite o significant and we still don't have a real good explanation of why. We can correlate the thrust level, but that's all we can do and the environment is so complex and the there is just no way that you can get enough instrumentation to say what is going on here is different from what is going on there. GIBSON And I think it's - - Of course, we could see the contrail, but apparently it was a pretty clear day and most of the people who did see it always end up asking me that simple question and I can't give them a simple answer. Ill �* QUERY I think you can tell them very honestly that we don't think anybody knows. (Laughter) GIBSON Nobody knows. That's a simple enough answer that people will understand it. QUERY QUERY And we're not even interested in finding out. I wouldn't say that now, I - I - but we'd certainly be interested in finding out and it would be a lifetime study for a large group of people. GIBSON Sounds like a good graduate student project. QUERY Yes, an excellent type thing for that. GIBSON Good riding. CARR Yes, indeed. QUERY That's it. QUERY We did enjoy it. Okay, I guess we're ready to go to the SWS systems then. Jerry, do you guys want to take a little break before we start? CARR Well, we're kind of in the process of doing it now. (Laughter) QUERY Okay. CARR I Just had mine. So we'll Just start now. 112 �QUERY What are we going to do, the I&C - CARR Okay. QUERY - - structures and mechanics and contamination today and we can start those now and go down through them. CARR Very good. QUERY We can ... after lunch or we can do that. CARR Well we're - we're willing to - to give in on seme of the lunch time today; we'd like to be able to walk out of here by about quarter of 3, if we could, in order to - to go take the first look at the movies that have been made now. QUERY I'm leaving Just as soon as QUERY You guys did a nice job on the set of debriefing, by the way, but we've still got quite a few questions for you. QUERY Oh, you sure did. GIBSON It was satisfying for us. CARR It's nice to be nice. in May. QUERY Very good. CARR Mid-May, sometime. We'll see you folks out there 9 Around the 15th, or so. • 113 �GIBSON ... perhaps the most exciting part of it, that and the EVA. QUERY CARR It all worked real well. It all worked real -well. ... (laughter). Well it, you know, it operated up there just exactly like it went through test and that was kind*of nice to see. The one - the one you got sitting at the Cape now is probably going to be real clean if anybody ever gets to use it. GIBSON What - Where's that going to end up? Do you know what's - CARR ASTP ... - _ GIBSON Our - our vehicle. QUERY It's backup for 3 - - GIBSON No, our vehicle that we came down in. QUERY Oh, I don't know. GIBSON Where are they going to - Is it going to end up in a schoolyard somewhere or - QUERY GIBSON I don't know - - - - can we put it in our backyard or is it 111+ �QUERY - - You want it back? GIBSON Sure. Over at Jerry's house. (Laughter) QUERY QUERY You ... QUERY QUERY Are you ...? Blocks won't work. Jerry this is Billy Adair on the end from Marshall who's responsible for the I&C systems so he'll - he'll ... QUERY Okay. Jack Horner, here in the blue suit, is going to lead our discussion today and we do appreciate your technical debriefing and you covered a lot of material in there and eliminated a lot of our questions. There will be one or two questions, though, asked to clarify some points that you said in your - in your technical debriefing. And with that, I'll turn you over to Jack and the rest of the fellows. HORNER Okay, the first system we'd like to touch on is the V . TV system in flight, for Jack Dougherty, of Martin to ask some questions on that. DOUGHERTY You've expressed your recommendations for remote controls and display in the TV system and we'd like to ask - - 115 �7 QUERY Is that mike on, Jack? DOUGHERTY' I think I have got it now. You've expressed your recommen dations for remote controls and displays in the TV system, I would like to ask if the controls that were on the TVIS and the video switch were adequate within their functional intent. Were the switches located - - CARR On - On the input station? DOUGHERTY' Yes, sir. Were the switches located and designed in a manner that you found suitable? CARR *7 Yes, I think so. It was only one switch - one switch and a ... plug. DOUGHERTY' And on the video selector switch, the selector switch itself? CARR Yes, the only - the only problem there was that that was the only - the only switch and if you could access - if you could access the video tape recorder from different areas without all having to go through one switch, it seems to me it would be a lot better because you lost a lot of video tape recorder time Just translating from having turned the switch on and turning on the recorder to getting down to where we were. 3 116 �DOUGHERTY Yes. I understand. GIBSON Yes. Not Just the translation time - To dc video - to work the VTR, for example, the science demo down there in the OWS, you had to get yourself strapped into the - a headset and you had to get everything all set up around you so you were set to go and that might have taken a minute - minute and a half or maybe even 2, in some instances. If you had a switch right down there where you could turn the VTR on and off, you could have made it. Got all set up, turned it on, made the science demo, turned it off, and then moved on to the next one. As it was, you had to - you didn't want to waste the • time going back 311(1 ^rth, so you then took the time to set up for the next demo while you were - had the VTR running. So there's an awful lot of inefficient use of that VTR. So many times we would have loved to be able to control that from down there; and, certainly, we would like to have seen a - a light that says -yes, it's really getting on of VTR" or "it's going out live." so many times. And to be able to figure it locally too. But - I made that point but, it -We could have really been much more effecient. We could have gotten a lot more good data 117 �POGUE (CONT'D) on the VTR. The way it was there was an awful lot of extraneous lead-in and TV of the guy leaning over - "Hey, Ed, would you turn off the VTR," and a bunch of this stuff and I - I've Just seen this within the last 2 weeks. And it can all be eliminated by Just having the controls at the place where you're doing the work and all the indica• tors, too, to let you know that you have got it figured correctly and you have - that last 1*5 minutes haven't been shot. QUERY I think our next question is about the VTR and its control. And, again, taking into account your recommendations for the remote controls, were the switches and lights on the VTR adequate as they were? GIBSON For what we had to do with them I thought they were. QUERY Yes. GIBSON Well, the ground essentially controlled that thing. I see. Other than us turning it on to use it, the ground said, let us control it completely from there on. So we never had to worry about rewind - completion of rewind or any of that. POGUE One thing' that would - I think would have been helpful on the VTR itself, assuming we have to manage in some fashion the way we were doing on this one, would be a - an 118 �POGUE (CONT'D) indicator to tell us how much was left and how much was taken, or something like that. QUERY Oh, I see - - GIBSON That would have been useful - - POGUE The ground is always telling us but - Another thing too, a lot of times you - you screw up - you start taping something and there was something wrong, you see, with the setup and you - it - it would be real nice if we had a way of indexing to start, or if nothing else, if you had a real accurate analog meter or a digital readout as to where you started, so that you could rewind and do it over, putside of ground contact. Of course, we hope that we'll have satellite coverage the next time but it's still - that's a good capability. GIBSON • Yes, that's a real good point. Many times we would start - we were out of ground contact and we didn't know how much time we had available and you knew you had 5 minutes, whatever it is, for a demon - demonstration or something else you wanted to do and you didn't know whether you were going to make .it or not. That, plus trying to fit o in whether you had enough time left over for the ATM which had its own requirements. o 119 �) POGUE And it would be another - Another nice thing to have along with that would be a warning device that was some - that did something to tell you when you were within 5 minutes or 2 minutes or 1 minute to the end of the tape. Then you'd know you'd have - you'd - well that, at least, would be a warning. QUERY Are you talking about a ... or an audio? POGUE Either one. Both. One that has both, because sometimes the audio would get back on your mike, you could - It would be nice to have both of them. QUERY The next question has to do with the TVIS locations.. And would you have liked to have seen more TVISDS for different rotations or were your cables adequate in length? CARR Well, the cables were adequate in length. I guess the locations were okay and the big problem with the cables was that they Just got in the way and it would have been a whole lot better to have had cables on - on caddies or something like that, you know, these inertial reel things like you get at the gas station, essentially. You pull . itvout and you - then you let go of it and that goes back. If you could have one with an inertial locking system on it where you could pull out as much cable as you want and I 120 �CARR (CONT'D) then lock it like the seat belts on your car and then use the cable and when you're through with it, you'd give it a pull and let it go back. That would have certainly have been a lot neater organization up there. -But, of course, I don't think that's your problem as much as it is people that are Just designing the workstations. But things like that would certainly have made the TV system easier. GIBSON I think I would like to have had one more station in the MDA. There was one adjacent to the ATM and I would like to have had one opposite - on the opposite wall, closer to the CSM. Because many - many times in doing TV in there you had to rig that wire and run it all the way around the vehicle. 180 around and then along the axis some way and if you wanted to leave the TV set up you had to really tie that thing down so someone - no one - someone else couldn't snag on it coming through. CARR Yes, that's a good point. You probably could have used the one right there at the EREP area. QUERY Yes. EREP activities. CARR Yes, so we didn't have to string the cable. 121 �POGUE And another thing, too, that occurs to me, first off, we used the zoom end to focus on - oh the subject, to define focus. One of the things that bothered me, occasionally, was, did - what was ay depth of field for the particular zoom end and I was - when we were setting up science demos it would have been nice- if we would have had some little gizmo to - to put in - a sort of slider rule we could have put down that would have had two bars, you know, for resolution determination and GIBSON To set up the camera, huh? POGUE To set up your cameras. In other words. Just a little assist to say do I yea, verily have depth of field to cover the objects that are going to be in this demo or this scene or what? Just a little crutch to use - to know, perhaps, what - what zoom flexibility I have that can still stay inj focus. GIBSON Well, there are lenses on cameras which have that built right into them. I wonder if it would be possible to have something like that built right into a TV, essentially the same opticals type of device? QUERY Well, of course, there are^all sorts of devices that can be used for that for closeup work to - in other words 122 �QUERY (CONT'D) extremely critical. I - The viewing that I saw, I thought that you Just did an excellent Job on depth of field. The lenses are excellent, to begin with, and-it seemed like the same content that you wanted was always in there and adequate, depth of field. POGUE We spent a lot of time setting it up. CARR TV setups were a very costly thing for us. It would have been easier if we had - if our TV system would have been designed for quicker setup. QUERY Would it - Well, would it have helped, at all, to have had anything on the camera that indicated what the depth of field was for the particular focal after selected in the f-stop or do you feel it would have been better to have the actual physical depth of field indicator to put in O your scene? POGUE I - I was wondering how you'd have use it on - if you had it on the camera. by that. I'm not quite sure what you mean I know on the camera - - CARR . . . decal you're talking about on the side of the camera? QUERY Yes, sir. I - I - I think you would, first of all, see how far it was to your subject - your point of interest, 123 �QUERY (CONT'D) then for the f-stop you'd selected and the zoom that you'd selected for that activity. You'd then look and take off at the depth of field that you have. o. POGUE That little chart? QUERY Yes. CARR That would have been good. POGUE I - I like that. GIBSON Yes. CARR Would have been useful to help us kind of walk out a scene an£ how we were going to do it. POGUE I'll tell you another thing I want to mention now before I forget it and that is that we need much better distinctive fields on the zoom focus in aperture. And also the - they need to be more - the friction needs to be better designed because one of them that was real loose.- CARR Was it f-stop? POGUE We had to tape it down. CABR You could just touch it and it would - it would drift F-stop was awful loose. around it was so loose. 12U �\ POGUE So you didn't - you didn't dare really manhandle the - the camera when you were using it. But - And another thing, too, I was always grabbing the f-stop when I wanted zoom and you know if you - if I'm over here looking at some thing and I'm trying to zoom in on it, I shouldn't have to turn around there and look at the lens. And those - those do not have distinctive fields t o them at a l l . And I ' d like to have coarse sandpaper or something on the one that - you know something like that. CARR Dimples [?] POGUE Yes. on one and nubbies on the other one? Airplane controls are done this way. Mixed - you know, the old'prop planes used to be this way so you didn't cut your mixture when you were actually trying to change the prop setting'or something like that. CARR Before I forget some things too, number 2, the next item that I think is important is the monitors. The little monitors were good but they deteriorated with time and got worse, and worse, and worse. And the ones - I got a question about the one that I said there's a little rubber grommet floating loose in there. I'm interested to know if you ever found out what that was that's loose in there? And the other thing, before I forget too, is that in O the area of monitors, it would have been nice if we'd 125 �CARR (CONT'.D) had a large - say a lU-inch screen or larger vhere we . could have taken a look at some of the stuff we'd done so we can get a value Judgment as to the quality of this the work we were doing and if it would be in color. POGUE That's right. QUERY On your first question, I'm afraid I can't answer it. The - The hardware involved is not at our center so we wouldn't - we weren't involved in that. And I do know about your desire - your comments on the larger monitor - CARR If you're going to do television productions, and that's what we were doing up there, it seems to me you ought to have all the right kind of equipment to see how you're doing and what you're doing and this could be part of the VTR setup. You should have the capability of playing the VTR yourself and seeing how something worked and if you don't like the way it worked, erase it and do it again, a little bit more independent television production capability because I think everybody now has seen the value of television up there. POGUE We needed a - a better mount and steering capability. The , » mount, itself, the friction varied with the three Joints that we had. So you - there was no sort of harmony involved o 126 �POGUE (CONT'D) there. You couldn't achieve a harmony in panning or even repointing. And another is that we actually reached down and grounded and used the pigtails to get the right O mechanical advantage. We were actually grabbing ahold of the cable pigtails back on the back of the TV camera to steer this thing and particularly when we were doing these science demos when stuff was moving around slowly, but definitely moving, we'd - Trying to pan slowly was extremely difficult because you'd get the friction getter and would jerk and snap and it was hard to keep the stuff in the center of the field of view. It needs to be more professional, because by the - by the end there we were getting so, you know, we thought we were - we were cranking out some pretty good stuff. But it surely would have been enhanced if we'd had a little more pro fessional approach to the mounts and the steering capability QUERY This is the SUM now - This is the SUM, this universal mount that you had to carry up? POGUE That's correct. CARR Yes. QUERY Yes, sure. 127 �Yes, th§re was not a lot of locations to even put that universal mount, especially, in the MDA. For much of that TV I ended up taping their camera to some location. Oh, I s ee. You ended up taping the front, the handle underneath, and the wires in back. And when it all steadied down - stelled - settled out then you could go ahead with the picture. In order for that universal mount to have been properly , useful ±00, it should have had a telescoping handle, because with that closeup lens that's an extraordinary critical setting adjustment and you either have to move your scene around to get it in the rigit position but all you have to - jrou have to have more flexibility in adjusting the - the camera itself. Yes. Going back to that TV lens especially, for use in the MDA, I would like to have seen a wider field of view. When we were trying to - In one scene, in particular, I was trying to work on the ATM panel and show the whole panel and I Just had one heck of a time trying to get the camera far enough away from it and-not such an oblique angle that you couldn't see it 128 �POGUE That's a real good point, QUERY Uh-huh. GIBSON I just couldn't back that camera off enough to make a reasonable coverage. POGUE I was taking pictures of Jerry up there and the EREP, too, and I was in back a good 10 feet and still having trouble getting an intelligent field of view. QUERY Uh-huh. QUERY We haven't got the cameras back yet, that why ... - - QUERY Oh, I see. POGUE Another thing that would be neat, we have the - I know O we have that universal camera mount that the - the blade type thing mounted all over that camera, and still it seems like that you always wanted to turn that monitor in some direction that - that you couldn't achieve. And it would-be nice to have .some kind of swiveling capability and a little bit more flexibility on that thing because, a lot of the times, you - you are in the back there - you are behind the camera holding it and you got a great field • of view there. Other times, you are in some sort of 129 �POGUE (CONT'D) awkward position but maybe it's a maintenance thing that you've set up and in order to get the camera in position O to take the field of view, you - y*ou don't have any flexi bility at all. There's just one or two places to put it and when you are in a position to try to do the work and look back and see if it's still centered in it, the monitor's pointed away from you and ypu can't see it; it'd be a little bit n;Lcer if you had that- greater capability to move that monitor and point it. QUERY Once you have your camera oriented and you had your scene content developed, did it hold its orientation while you ' were tightening down the adjustments on the SUM, or did o you get a shift in the *actual tightening down activity? POGUE I don't think that was really too much of a problem. CARR No. POGUE It would be nice to be able to take TV of the exterior of , the spacecraft from inside. QUERY That was a question we were going to ask you in 130 o �POGUE Boy, you had an IVA crewman in there with all kinds of time and Just no capability. Could have gotten some real good TV of them. QUERY We had some good schemes people were Just beginning to look at. When it was way too late they were sticking the television camera out - out the solar - or scientific airlock and using the - essentially the lunar rover remote control device to sort of set up where you could sit inside and point the camera - ginbal the camera to a good position and take pictures and . . . QUERY As I recall, that was in the planning. Definitely in T - QUERY ' T027. QUERY Yes. T027 had that capability. I - - QUERY And we lost the SAL on the Sun side. QUERY Some of the SAL was lost, too. QUERY Yes. Well, our question also was one where we were interested in whether or not you felt a built-in capabil ity should have existed beyond the T027 capability where you could have hooked the TV outside - shared the thing and - 131 �3 QUERY Above a window or something. QUERY That's right. CARR Oh yes. We could make all sorts of observations of con tamination and things like that out there. POGUE We're talking about things that are so nice to have and now they're becoming extraordinarily defensive and by in later programs. Because - But it's just the sort of thing that Just gives you tremendous flexibility in seeing what's going on outside. And I know just frcm a "gee whiz" there's Joe Schmo EVA type thing, but boy that's ) really good for maintenance, too. QUERY I don't think we'll see that on Shuttle and maybe even spacelab, but when we finally build a good specestation - - POGUE I would just like to sort of stimulate your quriosity in this area. I think there are ways of doing this. The people - when you mention this, you say, "a periscope capability," they immediately, you know, think of the U-boat commander type thing, but what we're doing is addressing a capability. Now I don't know how - I couldn't care less how it's implemented or mechanized. So I think there - you know, there are probably many ways of doing > 132 �POGUE (CONT'D) this. Now, I know fiber optics still aren't there yet. That's the first thing that would suggest itself, but, ! you know, try"to sort of think about this, because I think there are ways even of getting it on Shuttle, if we are clever enough. Now, if you start getting a big piece of folded optics that takes up 15 cubic yards of space and that kind of stuff - 1500 pounds of weight, your out you know you are out of business. I still think you can do it; I don't know how to do it. QUERY The next question we had was: Was lighting or the arrangement of lighting a problem for you during TV? GIBSON It was a problem in the sense that it took a little attention - a little care, but you could pretty much figure out how to do it. I think especially in the - I was taking a closeup TV using the closeup lens. That was a little hard to figure out just what was a lighting optimum - what background you ought to use. Taking pictures of moth eggs, for example, do you put a black background or a white one or one which is reflective or scattering? That was just trial and error, where you put the lights. CARR There's the spacecraft lighting where that low level TV would certainly zap it if you didn't pay attention to 133 �CARR (CONT'D) what you were doing. But I thought that low light level TV was excellent. QUERY Yes, I - that's kind of what I was interested to hear you say. I wondered if you were able to see the camera and the settings and so forth sometimes to just operate the system ... little by little. CARR We didn't have to fool with that. We would set the camera up first and then the only thing we changed after that hopefully, the only thing we changed was the zoom and the focus which you could look in the monitor and see how that was going. I Just felt very comfortable with that low light level TV. I was pleased that we had it. Now every time we turned on the spots, the flood lights in order to get better lighting, I think it degraded the tele vision, because there was so much backshadowing and every thing from those rather directional flood lights that we resisted - GIBSON CARR That would depend on what you were doing. - - we were able to resist using them. Now, yes, in the case where you are doing closeup work with a closeup lens, and you are right in there tigfrt, then you don't worry about shadows, because you don't have them too much, but 13U �CARR (CONT'D) you got better TV with ambient lighting than if you turned on a bunch of floods and try to get TV because you would have shadows all over in the background. POGUE The only exception to that was that one sequence we took of the - of you and the EREP, and I deliberately did not use spots in the high intensity lights and i z - they came back and said i t was - they were working on i t , but that they thought they could get some good film out of i t , but that there wasn't enough light. And I think the reason there was, I was taking the picture into a lighted area with lights in the scene, although we tried to avoid i t as much as possible. Other than that, there was always a problem of probably having too much light, like leaving the wardroom window open or something like that when you are taking pictures in the experiment compartment. GIBSON Are there TV's which are designed specifically for outthe-window use, which if we had along, we could have done a better Job on the earth photography. Apparently, when ever we got a cloud in the picture, i t Just completely saturated the - or brought the - that light level up and dropped the remainder so that you really couldn't see anything else except the cloud. 135 �QUERY Well, essentially the camera that we had this time coped with that problem and that the ALC took over. And I thought that the out-of-the-windcw viewing, again, was very fine, some of the best television was the out-thewindow - GIBSON Well, it worked pretty well, but apparently we got lots of feedback from the ground that whenever we came across anything with significant cloud cover, it obscured the remainder of the picture. QUERY Well, I'm - I'm sure that can be - be worked, but I think it was the intent in this camera to have that capability in the ALC that was in the camera. Automatically cope with that high light level within the brightness range of the camera, which it certainly was. Brightness range with any one scene was 100 to 1. GIBSON Yes. QUERY The . . . from the camera . . . GIBSON We - we could not Judge that. looking at them. But we did get that feedback from the ground. QUERY We were not on the ground I see. 136 �POGUE There's another case where a monitor would have been invaluable, a large color monitor. We - we could have - we'd have felt a lot more confident about taking those out-the-window scenes. QUERY I see. GIBSON We'd also like to have the capability of having TV up, so the idea of a large TV monitor is really not quite as bad as you might think. We would have one for onboard use for both cassettes. We'd have on board as well as other information which would come up for entertainment and training. QUERY On your closeup lighting, I Just - I think your lighting for closeups was very adequate. The only comment I guess I would have was occasionally it seemed a little flat, and I think the only answer to that would have been a softer auxiliary light off to the side to give a little dimen sionality, which you probably - I'm sure you didn't have to use. GIBSON Yes, we had some. QUERY Did you? 137 �GIBSON Well, we could have taken the high intensity light and Just turned it down low and used only one. QUERY With all the - - POGUE Well, there's portable lights too. CARR We also had the portable lights too. Of course ... But see, not - you know, not being able to see the pictures, we didn't know how they were coming out. QUERY A lot of the detail was there. All the content was there. Just a fine point. Could you comment on the use of the TV system for EVA? You did not use it on EVA. Do you have any thoughts about problems you might have had in such an application, or - CARR Well, the only problem would have been handling the cables and all, but we were disappointed that we weren't allowed to take TV out with us and get some shots. GIBSON Is there any reason that was not used or suggested? QUERY No, sir. QUERY One of the thermal ... the camera was - — QUERY Thermal problem. QUERY Thermal on the camera. I don't know the reason. 138 �GIBSON But on that last EVA, when we still had two cameras left over? QUERY Well, the camera is - is okay for EVA application. temperature must be monitored, of course. The Maybe that was part of the problem. QUERY The next question is one oh general system operation. Apart from your express comments on the mini-monitor, you you pretty much talked about your mounting and pointing problems with the camera. monitor: Another question on the mini- Were you able to discern spots or lens contamin ation using the mini-monitor? I noticed a scene or two where it looked like maybe there was a little lens con tamination, not enough to be a problem, just picking out a spot on the lens, something like that. CARR I don't think we could have. POGUE The thing was too degraded. CARR By the end of the mission, yes, they were both getting It had ... chunks. pretty degraded. QUERY Did you notice any lens contamination at all in just look ing at the camera in general? 139 �GIBSON I think I cleaned the lens twice, I believe. QUERY Do you know what the material was, or Just general accumu lation of dust? GIBSON Once when I was doing the fluid mechanics experiments, one of the bubbles backfired and completely coated the camera. QUERY Was that mostly through the VTS that you were seeing the spots you're referring to? QUERY No, the - the spots that have been seen throughout the entire mission, all three manned periods have been - in the portable camera have been internal spots. And we do see those, and occasionally we've seen spots that felt maybe were contaminants on the outside of the field lens. Those spots internally have been - QUERY I know; we've picked them up during the ERLP pass, and that's what I was wondering. I thought most of that was in the VTS system. QUERY No, there are some in the VTS. I can't distinguish, but some are also in the camera as well. We see quite a few in the outer window viewing of the Earth because you're at a longer zoom and a smaller f-stop and it - for some 1140 �QUERY (CONT'D) reason that focuses them. The spots are contaminants on the faceplate of the vidicon and also on the back of the filter wheel is what I've been told. And I don't under stand the mechanism whereby going to a smaller f-stop focuses them any better, but it surely does. QUERY On the ATM, would you comment on the overall system per formance on the ATM TV: the controls and displays and the - the camera performance, monitors, things like that, in general? GIBSON Okay. • Start off with the switch itself. That was no problem, you were always right at the ATM, and that switch was the only thing you had to make sure you had in the ATM position. Apparently that - I know on a couple of occasions you had it in the T - we had i\ in the TV or the wrong monitor; but I don't think that was a major problem, and not anywhere near the problem we had when we were working with the TV in remote locations. different story. That was a The monitor, two monitors we had on board, one we took up and one which was there. we took up was an excellent monitor. The one There for purposes of solar viewing conditions we could see things which we'd never expected to see in - in the way very faint emissions. We were looking at Alpha 1, for example, off Ikl �GIBSON (CONT'D) the limb and see prominences Just - with clarity which we never expected to see. tionally good one. out. tion. I think that monitor was an excep Tom Barnes at Marshall picked that one An exceptionally good - good contrast, good resolu It was white, which was a black on white, rather than a black on yellow, which monitor 2 was. Apparently, number 2 had degraded, turned slightly yellow. That seemed to make quite a bit of difference in the contrast which, you know, I could perceive as contrast. Then the other is we'd get into the vidicons associated with each TV system. And each one, as you know, had its own peculi arities and its own problems. here, we can. If you want no discuss that Is that part of your - your area? We can go into it if you like. QUERY Well, yes, I'd be interested to hear any comments you might have on the individual vidicons. The white light coronagraph, for instance, we know we got several burns toward the end of the mission, and we were wondering whether you'd seen any excessive light levels during the activities that might have explained those turns. There's other things that could cause them, but that would be one area ... - - 142 �GIBSON The only way those burns - that we could see, could get in there - one is a continuous offset of the white light coronagraph. of the Sun. Its ... wasn't always right at the center That was because there were experiments ... misalignment, and they also had the constraint that they had to operate when their pointing error system was within certain constraint. So we ended up operating purposely misaligned slightly, which put a certain amount of light always over on that one edge of the vidicon, which in turn, they say over a long period of time could have caused the burned-in spot to all of the sudden appear. That was the explanation we got for the first burned-in spot. It also saw short transient high light levels whenever the door was closed with the TV still on. And that happened on our mission a couple of times the same as it happened on previous missions because of the no interlock feature there. That was - is you do something hundreds of times, you're - It was off and on where you're bound to make - make that error, and we did too. But the burned-in spot did not appear immediately after that any times which that happens. QUERY Well, that wouldn't appear to be the cause then because - - 1U3 �GIBSON From our standpoint it was not related, but that was a possible contributing factor to the total amount of high light level which I had seen. Once we did get the second burned-in spot, I thought the contrast of the remaining features went down considerably, and maybe that first one also had caused quite a bit of decreasing contrast. It turned out that we were not able to see transients in the coronal which people say did exist looking at the film, whereas they were obvious from the previous missions. Even the pictures - Polaroid pictures which were brought back frcm the previous missions, we could see transients there which were just obvious to us, and the Polaroid pictures were degraded quite a bit from what you saw on the TV. We went up there and looked at the TV, we did not - did not see any at all other than one very bright one. The real disappointment to us was in the H-alpha 1 vidicon. That appeared to decrease significantly in contrast, or I should say -I'm not sure, it's seme combination of contrast and resolution. QUERY Did the crosshair also decrease at that time, or did you notice? GIBSON Could you tell any difference? I don't recall that being suffi - significantly degraded. lUl* �QUERY It's really hard to tell because it's - it's black and you can't see the degradation as readily, of course. And we couldn't see it at all on the ground. GIBSON Yes. I could not see - did not notice a - an accompanying decrease in the resolution of that crosshair. But that was either a - I guess there's three things: either the filter drifts, the contrast goes down, or you Just lose the resolution due to the optics changing. And I got - I think probably more of the latter. QUERY Did you notice that decrease in resolution on both moni tors? GIBSON Yes. It did appear on both monitors, and it occurred maybe 10 to 15 minutes after you turned the vidicon on for the first time of the day and you'd let it sit - turn it off and let it set for an hour. cure the problem. That didn't seem to Even a couple of hours, as we'd leave it off during the Z-LV passes. QUERY During the off time was the filter heater also turned off - or on rather. GIBSON No. QUERY On. It was much - - The filter heater was always turned on. 1U5 �GIBSON There was only one occasion that was turned off, and that was inadvertently and that was H-alpha 2. H-alpha 2 Just never was a - anywhere near the quality system in terms of what we could see on it as H-alpha 1. But I think that was more the - the filter itself and other charac teristics of the telescope. It was good for overall pointing, but we never really tried to push that in terms of high resolution. The white light display - white light slit had its problems. Apparently that - the optics there degraded so that we could not get the limb scan or limb pointing functions to work, which depended on the TV inputs, right there towards the end of the mission. And also we could not see the white light features anywhere near as well at the end of the mission as we could at the beginning. Penumbra of sunspots for example., very good when we first got up there; couldn't see them very well at all at the end. GIBSON XUV monitor: We would love not to have used that in the INTEGRATE mode. A longer persistence phosphor on the scope would have helped. We ended up using that persistent image scope in conjunction with the INTEGRATE. And that worked but it was a very awkward way to use it. There we were Just not getting enough - apparently they're 11*6 �GIBSON (CONT'D) not getting enough photons to the front of 'ohe vidicon low light level vidicon. I'm not sure. Now how they get around that They had a couple of filters in there which they could have taken out but talking with Doc Tousey, he said that still wouldn't have done it. So maybe just the next generation of low light level vidicons might do it for you. QUERY Thank you. Can't think of anything else. After having seen the ATM video downlinked, could you compare it with what you saw on your monitors? GIBSON I haven't seen the downlink. I guess before I went I saw it and I don't think it's as good as what you can see on the monitors up there. Apparently there is some degrada tion of the signal but I don't know how to give you a quantitative feel for that. QUERY It was a general question. On the first manned period, the comment was made that it was better on the ground than it was on the monitor and then I think the next period it was the reverse. GIBSON Maybe that's because we had that H-alpha 1 - or the monitor 1 up there which we installed which was an excep tionally good monitor. 1U7 �QUERY Well, we would expect it to be much better on the monitor of course because of the strain of the band width on the downlink. POOUE Haven't done any reprocessing of the signal tc try to enhance the downlink signal? QUERY No, not at Marshall. GIBSON I guess a good - a good measure of that was when we saw the comet. On board we could see the sunward spike when *I we were at perihelion in the S052 coronagraph TV. Took a picture of it and we could see that - we tried to put a TV picture of a - or the picture of the TV tried to show that down. By that time we had lost all the evidence of that spike, but we could see that spike very well on board. In the TV which came down they could not. QUERY Absolutely not. CARR I think the next questions we have in television have to No, there was no sign of it. do with hardware oriented questions, on the MDA hardware and John Vega is going to ask those. QUERY I just wanted to ask a little bit more about that ATM monitor, 1 and 2. You said that the ATM monitor 1 that you'd installed was much better than the monitor number 2. ll»8 �QUERY (CONT'D) Did you notice any degradation from the beginning to the end of the mission between the two monitors and - you know, did you notice any degradation in the monitor number 1 which you installed? GIBSON No relative degradation. degradation. I could not notice any relative Of course there's a wide range there which, over a long period of time, you might not pick up. But the monitor 1, when the vidicon in H-alpha 1 was working at the beginning of an orbit it was as good as - subjec tively as when we first got up there. I should say that monitor 1 was used - was the best only in terns of looking D at H-alpha 1. When we would put the XUV monitor or one of the other displays on it, it didn't seem to make that much difference. H-alpha 1 is where you try to get very subtle feature in terms of faint features off the limb or very fine features in the chromosphere. You're already pushing the resolution and that's when it would make the difference. In the corona, for some reason, it didn't seem to make too much difference. QUERY One more question. Regarding that, we were talking about the sunward spike on the comm. both monitors? li+9 Could you see that, on �0 GIBSON Yes, I think you could, as a matter of fact. I think it probably showed up a little bit. CARR I thought it showed up better on 1 than 2. QUERY That would give us a point though because on the ground we couldn't see it at all and it would tell us how much that one monitor had degraded. You could still see - you think you could see it? GIBSON Yes, as a matter of fact I always used monitor 1 in look ing for the comet, in all the JOP 18s we did. But I also had 2 called up at the same time, and as I recall you V* could see it better on 1. They usually appeared a little bit easier and you could CARR Yes. QUERY Okay, fine. VEGA Basically, I have quite a few questions associated with Let's go to John Vega then. marking and connectors and so forth which hopefully we can get your views on. Basically, the first question I have is there was an awful lot of use the TV system and disconnections and connections of the cabling and .so forth. First question is what was the - you feel the condition of the alignment marks and identification markings on the 150 �0 VEGA (CONT'D) TV is, the VTR, and the video switch? usable? Were they still Were they still in good condition? They didn't cause you any problems when you went to hook up your station? CARR No, there were no problems. They were still usable and they're probably the better markings than a lot of the other systems had. I think you guys apparently pay a whole lot more attention to the markings and alignment marks. POGUE We had that one problem on the TVs and - - GIBSON I was just thinking of that one; yes. CARR I think we must have Just brute forced that one or something. GIBSON I'm not sure what the heck happened on that one where we had the pin which was bent, and I was the guy who tried to put it in there and I just line it all up and put it in and it just didn't go in. And we finally ended up looking in, saw we had a pin bent and tried to straighten the pin and it broke off. VEGA Okay. I'll Jump over. I have a question on that one. Let me just ask you one thing about - did you recall at I 151 �0 VEGA (CONT'D) all on that pin, was it a solid or a twisted pin? See there is two different kinds of pins and there is a solidtype pin, and also the coaxial pin is a twisted - actually a twisted wire. And if it was solid - - GIBSON It was solid. VEGA It was a solid pin. Okay, then I know which one it was. It wasn't the coaxial pin. Okay, that's good because that identifies which, you know, identifies it to another area. GIBSON I had a tough time figuring how that could have gotten bent, how one pin could get bent like that. VEGA Well, there is a - along with - let me jump over the pin items since we're talking about that right now and that is that early in the program, in fact prior to the launch of the Skylab, there was a lot of problems associated with the connectors - the back shells, the identification mark ings and this. We worked the hell out of it to put it bluntly, and we got to the point where we tried to elimin ate as many problems as we could with the alignments as far as getting the pins lined up so that they would go in properly. But there is a situation where due to the way the connectors are actually built that you can go in slightly cocked and you can get pressure on the pin. 152 And �VEGA (CONT'D) actually if you push hard enough, you will bend the pin. It has to be - If it's aligned Just perfectly, it won't happen; but if you're Just a little bit off, you can have that happen. So what undoubtedly happened during the multi-multi connections and disconnections that you maybe opened up - There's actually three little guides in there. There's three slots, and you may have opened up the slot Just a little bit. And eventually it got to the point where you were off enough, and it isn't very much, that you were able to cause the pin to be bent. And then next time around you - like I say, when you tried to straighten it, you broke it. tion: You've answered really my second ques Are the alignment marks adequate and you said yes, they were. And the next question I had is really with the slop on the alignment, and I guess you're saying it was adequate and it really isn't - the marks themselves were pretty much aligned when you made the connections. CARR Yes, I think they were pretty good. GIBSON The marks would tell you where to make - where to get it roughly aligned to begin with and then you go the remainder by feel. At least that's the way I made almost all the connectors. Jiggle it around until it felt it was going to slip on and then you give it a little more force. 153 �POGUE That's exactly what I did and when you're explaining that previous design in there, I was wondering why we didn't break more. I did exactly the same way Ed did. I'd wind up the little mark and sort of feel it - as soon as I got the slot in the guide, I'd push it in. VEGA Right. And it is a little difficult to push in, too. I mean it isn't - So the feeling that you have when you push it in is good for is though - even if you're bending the pin, you might not know it because it is a little bit hard to push in. On the overall question of alignment marks, do you feel that maybe - did you have any general comments on improving these like color, size - POGUE Are you addressing a general problem or Just related to the television? VEGA Related to the television because that's - I can't . . . rest of them. CARR Design criteria should indicate that you should never have two of the same size that can be crossed, and that's Just to protect against Murphy's law. You should always try to color code and if - whenever possible make two con nectors be of different sizes so that you can't crossconnect them, if cross-connecting them will cause any 15U �CARR (CONT'D) kind of damage to the equipment. And those are just overall, general desk philosophy of connectors. have any special revelations on that. We don't I think that most of that that's in the system right now is design criteria for connectors. Color coding is good; alignment marks should he as accurate as possible; and whenever possible you should try to change sizes. VEGA All right, next one. Again, we're going back to the connectors and that is did you have any other problems with connectors within the MDA that gave you any kind of problems, as fas as mating/demating - whether they had standard pins or coaxial pins, as far as in the MDA? CARR No. I think that there were a lot of people that were scared to death we were going to screw up the ATM when we were doing some of the connector mating and demating down underneath the kick plate. GIBSON But - - To put the auxiliary - S082B auxiliary timer on, we had people all the way up the line worried about that one; and it turned out to be a very simple Job. CARR As long as you got time to be careful it's not too. much of a problem. If you get in a big rush-rush situation * that's when you starting banging up and ruining connectors 155 �GIBSON TV installation also had lots of connectors that had to be made and broken, seme of those fairly fragile coaxes and that proved to be no problem. CARR As long as you're careful. Care is the big thing. If you take your time and don't rush you can usually do a good Job of connecting; you can do as well as a techni cian who does it for a living, I think. POGUE Probably better. (Laughter) GIBSON You worry more than a technician. VEGA I think that answers my next question because I was going to ask you if you felt that things like this pin being broken could have been avoided if let's say that the way the actual connector shell or the way it was actually designed externally - what you have to see and what you have to hold are a little bit different? CARR Externally, no, because the TV input stations were were high-use stations and frequently we were in a big hurry. Because we were running behind, we had to get the TV sys tem tossed together and set up and running. POGUE Now that thing could have been fatigued before we ever put that plug on there. 156 �9 GIBSON I think the secret is to make something where the tolerances which will allow you to make any kind of a start of a connection at all will assure you that you're not going to bend the pin. POGUE Yes. VEGA Okay. Very good. Let me ask you one more question on that pin and that is before you went to plug it up, you didn't realize of course it could have been bent prior to then? CARR You really didn't know that? We're not in the habit of inspecting the male and female side of a pin - connector before you mate it. V) You don't have time for that, but I'm sure that's a good procedural rule to do before you ever make it - make any kind of a connection; you should inspect both to make sure your pins are okay. GIBSON That's Just not realistic. I did that on putting the auxiliary timer together, but I think that's the only time I did that. CARR Oh, yes. But that's a one-time thing. GIBSON That was a one-time thing which I knew everybody was superworried about. 157 �VEGA Yes, I guess really sort of a summary area, basically saying that the - as far as future design of any hardware like this, all we really have to do is use some good design practices, and have good alignment marks, and ensure we have good tie tolerances and then frcm there it's up to the astronaut to do the Job. CARR Just be aware of the fact if you got a type of connector that's going to be frequently done and is likely to be done in the heat of battle or when you're in a big rush-rush situation you need to design protection into it. But if it's a one-time sort of thing where you know the guy is to be very conscious and careful, it seems to be Just what normal, standard design criteria would hold. You have to kind of think about under what circumstances is the connection going to be made and broken. GIBSON I had the feeling that those connectors on the TV were a little bit sloppier in amount of off-axis angle you have and still start the connection. It's not like seme of the ones which really had to be precisely lined up before you could even insert it all the way and start turning down on the collar. little more play in it. detriment or not. It Just seemed to have a I'm not sure whether that was a It may have been an advantage. 158 �9 VEGA All right, that ties in with my next question a little bit, and I'll just try to wind these questions up a little bit quickly here, because I think you've summarized it real good. And that is, were there any connectors again associated in the MD that might have had any back shells or anything of these things come loose on you? Did you have any of those where actually you found that - CARR No, I think we hollered enough about loose back shells to where people got very ginchy about that, really checked back shells all over the workshop, but I don't remember having any back shells come loose on me? we surely got a lot of them interested. V) Do you? But We did a lot of hollering and people really turned to them and made sure it didn't happen on the flight vehicle. GIBSON On one of the TVs we could - I noticed this especially when I working in the MDA and trying to back the TV up against the wall; you push those cables which came out from the TV and into the monitor; if you'd push on those cables, sometimes you would lose the picture, indicating we had some sort of a transient or sane sort of wire there which was making or breaking either the wiring in the cable or the cable connection to be - That happened on just a couple of occasions and I could readily clear it 159 �9 GIBSON (CONT'D) by Just moving it away from the wall. It never turned out to be a permanent problem so I never really made anything of it. POGUE That's right; I lost a monitor once. monitor picture. VEGA Okay; well, fine. I couldn't get a You told me about that. That's all the questions I have on the connectors and I appreciate the answers. GIBSON Thank you. QUERY Okay, next we'd like to discuss the airlock communication systems and the Bill Wiggins with - of - McDonnel East V) will lead that. WIGGINS Now the first - the first question I have is on the teleprinter when you clean the heads. Do you remember the mission day that you cleaned the heads with the alcohol? CARR And did your problem clear up after this? Yeah, that was the day where they sent us up seme messages and we said they were terrible and the we change the paper and they sent us up another batch and they were still terrible and so we changed, the entire head with a-new roll of paper and they were still bad. 160 �WIGGINS And then you cleaned it up. And then I cleaned it. This was probably around day TO - - POGUE Somewhere along there; it was pretty late. CARR It was near the end of the mission. But the reason why I decided to clean it is because after we failed three times with different rolls and different heads, we got I stuck my head down there and started looking at it and I saw little bits of - of white along the head, along the print, and it looked like some of the coating on the paper had rubbed off on the area there and was Just deposited. And so I figured - Well, let's see. This thing uses heat to do it, and so if I kill the power and clean it with alchohol and then let it sit for a good time until I'm sure it's dry, it - it probably will be all right. WIGGINS And you didn't have any problems after that? CARR No, it - it - boy, it was immediate. It Just worked very nicely. POGUE One thing. It seemed like it would be real nice to be able to adjust the pressure with some kind of double-set screw on both sides of that head, because even though we pull down on the head when we're installing - when we change paper, we pull down before we tighten the Calfax. l6l �3 POGUE (CONT'D) You really weren't doing all that much good because if you looked in there, there was physical restraint to prevent the head from pulling the paper against the head very much. It sure would have been nice to have an adjustment in there on that. WIGGINS Right. Where you'd put it in there and have a lever that you flipped it up? POGUE Or that with a predetermined pressure and then maybe some kind of differential pressure adjustment on both sides, because a lot of times there was one side or the other that was dim. WIGGINS Let me ask a question. Just a minute. Lee, can you pinpoint that day, based on that info? QUERY We can get it out of the logs. WIGGINS Okay. QUERY Are you talking about the - - WIGGINS The day it happened. QUERY We went back and checked our logs, and we related.it to I - I think we can. mission day 19 or 20 when we really had a big, big flap going. 162 �3 POGUE It was lat er than that. CARR This was around - around TO something. QUERY TO something. CARR Yes. GIBSON We might have looked at it. CARR I think it was in the - Was it in the deactivation phase? GIBSON Yes. POGUE I remember it occurred on a day when it was a fairly slow 3 pace at that point, because I was up there watching. were all up there in the MDA diddling around there. We I was Just trying to - CARR I didn't figure we had much to lose by then. a few more days left in the mission. We were only And the teleprinter was really crapping out on us, and I figured I ' d clean i t . If it dissolved that - the write heads and would never write again, I figured, well, it's better than what we got. QUERY So it was worth a try. Yes, well, much earlier, I guess, in the mission we had period of time there that we couldn't get the teleprinter pads up for the next day. 1 163 �CARR Yes. QUERY And the - we worked up a procedure of suggested steps to go through if you - if you - I think they sent messages time after time and they were printed real light. And one of the questions INCO had, I think, was - Well, they should clean - clean the head. And the - we make the recom mendations, and we didn't really con - We said, well, we felt like it wasn't - it wouldn't do any good to clean the head itself but that you could Just pick loose particles off the head, possibly. But apparently there were things that did stick to the head that you did clean in there. CARR Yes, there was some sort of a white deposit on there. GIBSON Yes. POGUE Didn't we have on a whole extra head? GIBSON Yes. CARR Yes, but it was failed. QUERY Yes, sir, but you had the broken drive roller on it. You couldn't - We did have the spare on board, but we never got into using i t . POGUE Oh, okay, because I trained to repair that. 16U �QUERY Right. That's right. POGUE Okay. QUERY Trained to repair it, but we never had the occasion that We decided that the head was bad, you know, and it just it seemed to be - I believe the whole problem was that contamination, because early in the mission we had problems with paper. You know, put a roll on it, and it wouldn't work. And then you'd put another roll on, and that would work. Maybe that had to do with the pressure that was getting against the head, too. CARR Yes. QUERY But there's those two things we have noted, and - and we take those into consideration. WIGGINS Okay, the next - the question I have is on the time reference system. On the mission day 27 at 12:15 GMT, the EREP day counter Jumped to day 28 and remained one day ahead for the remainder of the mission. And then the question we had is, did the GMT clock also Jump? CARR On two occasions the - the clock Jumped a day on us, and we went back and set it. POGUE I think one time it jumped 165 �3 CARR It was right around day 28, too. POGUE Yes, I guess it was. I - I think I did that. doing something with the system. I was up And I put my hand over it as a handrest while I was doing something on panel 201 or 202, and I thought I hit a switch. And I looked over, and everything, you know, looked normal. And I think what I did is, I advanced the date one. GIBSON Yes. And then a couple of days later, I think I went back and reset that one. J POGUE An - and reset it. GIBSON And I think, Jerry, you reset the first one. When we first got up there, we were a date ahead. CARR Yes. QUERY Let's see. This particular one, do you recall when that EREP day counter was off, late in the mission there? CARR No. WIGGINS You don't? On SL-3 they had a portable timer mechanical malfunction. You know; those timers you carried around. Spring had broken on it. Did you have any problem on this mission with those at all ? POGUE That had red tape on it; we never used it. 166 �CARR The one was red taped, yes. We left it in there and never used it. WIGGINS You - Right; that was the one I wa6 - The ones you did use, did you have any problem with them - malfunctions? POGUE Yes, my battery was starting to go down, I think, but I never did change it; I had to shake it a couple of times, to get it to run - quite often there toward the end to get it to start. Another thing. This is a failure - sort of a failure mode that was a bit disconcerting and - That is, you got intermittent operation as the battery got down low. And a couple of times I got caught off because I set my timer for a key event; and if I didn't watch the second hand start moving, I could put it in ny pocket and then it would Just not run. It would - You know, it wouldn't do anything. QUERY I see. ... get down to a weak battery should Just quit. CARR (Laughter) Those timers were Just useless, though we've got lots of words in our tech debrief of what we think of the timing system throughout the spacecraft. QUERY The ... timers or the - - CARR All the different kinds of timers that we had available to us. They all stink. 167 �QUERY We didn't - we didn't see that in the tech debriefing, did we? QUERY Do you remember what part that was in? CARR Probably under crew equipment. QUERY Crew equipment. QUERY Crew equipment. CARR Someone should sit down and invent - develop e timer that has got versatility and flexibility for use by people working up there. POGUE I had a presentation made up at one time which I never gave anybody, but - all the nice features that you'd like to have in a timer, including, you know, the feature design features as well as the display features. But that thing had an awful lot of bad features in that - Well, one of the things was, you - you could set the timer to start running; and then you release the button, and may take several seconds before the thing would start moving. If you were trying to set it on an accurate digital timer, on that basis, of course, you - you - a couple of other things, too. 168 �/ CARR Yes, we had no - The timer reference system in the space craft system, we had no objection to it. And we would like to have had more repeaters, a repeater at every single workstation that required time sequ^hcing, for instance, around the SAL and things like that so we didn't have to bring wristwatches to do that work. But it's the portable timers and the event timers that we had to work with that were Just terrible. QUERY What if these displays had - had a stopwatch type of thing built in so you could hit them, would that have been - - POGUE That'd be real nice. CARR That's the sort of thing we were looking for. POGUE And another thing is that a lot of times it's very difficult to set a clock for a key mission event. If there's some way - For instance, if you had one of these repeater stations , you can dial in to GMT and say down to or up from, and push the button. Then you start your display - in addition to the regular repeater, then, you have a display which starts counting down to this key event. % J 169 �CARR It's kind of like a sports car that's got an odometer but it also has another little odometer right under it that's resettable each time. POGUE Like when you fill the gas tanks up. CARR You need that feature in a clock. You need the feature where you can say whether or not it's more convenient for you to count up from zero or count down from a number. And if you're counting down from a number to zero, you need also some time specified whether you want them to keep on counting on down, whether you want it to stop when it gets to zero, or whether you want it to start counting up again when it hits zero. GIBSON We'd like to be able to reset the counter also very easily. We had an event timer on the ATM that was just atrocious. To reset it to a new number, you had to adjust each digit independently. CARR And each one of them, each - it took a second each time for the digit to count. So if you were looking at 9, you'd wait, you know, holding the switch and waiting for it to count. If you missed zero, it would Jump to 9 again and then you would have to hold it some more. 170 It would be �CARR (CONT'D) much better if you could just flip in the dials and punch a button and it transfers it from that into your time register. GIBSON Because of the problems with that portable timer, I only used it as an alarm clock on occasion. I never used it otherwise. QUERY Yes, the previous crew said the same thing. Just to warn them that something had to be done. POGUE Yes, that's right, general warning, not an accurate warning. GIBSON Strictly an alarm - strictly a wakeup alarm clock. If I had had an operator I could have left a wakeup call with, 1 would have preferred that. POGUE Some of the systems management I used it on, because you had to set things and wait 30 minutes, wait an hour, wait 2 hours, and that was handy in that respect. I tell you, I never did trust it because of the problems that I had with it. Another thing, too, is that you could not set - you could not depend upon that thing going off and ring ing a buzzer within a minute of the correct time because there was a way of setting that second hand and that minute hand so that - that when that thing got to zero, 171 �POGUE (CONT'D) it took another minute before it actually sounded the alarm. So I never did trust the portable timer for accurate timing at all. It could be at least a minute in error. CARR Surely somebody's got the ingenuity to invent a timer that can be used accurately. We're Just too hung up with getting things off the shelf. QUERY That's right. Are you using something from a previous program? CARR Yes. WIGGINS The next questions I have are to do with audio, and you've Okay. already said quite a few things about the system. And we Just wanted to get some general data like when you had this antifeedback network in the system, did you notice that you had to get closer to the SIAs to get good intercom or downlink? CARR Did you notice that distance change? I don't think the distance was as large as people thought it was going to have - the change was as big as people thought it was going to have to be. POGUE As long as you got to put your finger on the button anyway, it didn't make that much difference - the switch. 172 �I QUERY Even at arm's length you could still? POGUE Well, you know, why be at arm's length? didn't make any difference. That's why it As long as you had to reach out and push the button, you Just might as well be a little bit closer. GIBSON We didn't even notice it. I didn't. A couple of times at the ATM, though, we were at arm's length and they could still hear you on the ground. I had a couple of calls that you couldn't hear too clearly, but - - POGUE Yes, I guess that's right. But it sure wasn't as bad as the feedback. (Laughter) QUERY Yes, I adjusted those in the OWS mockup to come down here. That's quite a lot of twiddling. QUERY I noticed in the TV that - it looked like sometimes you'd be hitting a switch and talking to the ground - that you were all 8 to 10 inches from the speakers usually when you talked. GIBSON The whole thing of the use of those input stations - first of all we needed a very good microphone, several good microphones, not Just the headsets which we had left - ) 173 �GIBSON (CONT'D) we pulled out of the command module. But I don't know, we'd go out to any small town across the countryside and they've got these things here which work at this distance. Why we couldn't have something like this up there, I'll never know. CARR Or the TV announcer's got one that he can stand out in the middle of Hurricane Carla and talk with, it's the ball with a little black sock over the top of it. doesn't need shouting. He Just Here we were up there with these little mikes with the hole in the end of it trying to talk, trying to keep it a quarter of an inch from our lips and that's ridiculous. ) POGUE What are these - everybody keeps telling me "chat you can't use these remote mikes, you know, with no wire on them at all. What's the problem there? QUERY You can use those. POGUE Well, why in the devil can't we get them? Because if the plumbers can use them - ... QUERY QUERY McDonnell made a pitch for putting them in there, and we couldn't sell it. So maybe the next time it'll go through. > 17U �GIBSON Well, you ought to put them in there because I'll tell you ... CARR We ... strong operation on the tech debriefing. QUERY ^es. POGUE Shuttle needs that. GIBSON They sure do. Well, we read it; you didn't leave much in doubt. Any time you're working on a panel and you'd like to describe what you're doing, you got both hands full and you don't want to wear a headset for a long period of time; you've got no choice. something like that. You really need We had many occasions like that where we were trying to describe what we're doing and there was data just flat lost. QUERY We had a microphone, the other thing is programatic, but we were so pound conscious on the last thing. And we threw the mike off, and it's sitting there at the Cape. It's pulled out of the locker. CARR Yes, we were - we were aware of that. about it and we protested. We felt very badly But there were Just other things that people felt were more important to be sent up. QUERY Okay. The next question is SIA number 131 that failed, and we didn't get to bring it back to check it out. 175 And �QUERY (CONT'D) what we'd like to find out is some operation when you were checking it, you know, malfunctioning - checking the SIA. When you hit ICOM with the transmit, did you notice a speaker mute? Did that work properly? You know, when you lip up, it kills the speaker on the one you're using. Could - could you ... answer any questions like that? GIBSON Oh, boy. CARR That's so long ago, QUERY How about the - - GIBSON I ' d have to go back t o the voice transcripts and t r y to I don't know how we could. dredge up anything out of memory. QUERY How about the switch, is it the same thing? feel the tension? Could you Could you hear it click? GIBSON The switch mechanically seemed to - - QUERY I noticed in the transcripts you could hear it key. GIBSON Mechanically it seemed to function all right, but Just what audio cues you got with it, CARR I can't recall. The only significant thing about 131 that made it so unique from the others is Ed had his comm umbilical connected to that thing all the time, and his little 176 So - - �CARR (CONT'D) kludgie microphone made out of a CCA was there. That's the only - that's - the only difference of the SIA with all the others is this thing had the CCU and CCA on it almost continuously. And it was being moved frequently from channel A to channel B, and I don't know how you can figure that into the - factor that into the situation. But that - that box had more CCU work than any other box in the - in the - GIBSON Yes, and talking about connectors being made and broken, gee, we used to take - I personally, about a half a dozen times a day, would change from channel A to channel B and back again, depending on whether you were ... going up to talk air-to-ground or talk with - on the tape recorder. So that really was a high use. And those connecting - never had a ... pin failure there, and they all worked great. QUERY You know, you remember solving this ALC bypass cable to get rid of this 6-hertz oscillation on channel B. CARR Yes. QUERY Okay. I was the one that did that. Did you have any particular problems with the installation of it? 177 �CARR No, I didn't. I only needed to use 1 CCU because the CCU that I used Just worked perfectly. And what I did is, on the side of the box that the recorders are in, I took my hacksaw and my Swiss army knife, and I cut a notch in the side of the fiber glass. And when you stretched out the CCU, it had very mild tension on it. It was a straight shot from the SIA in the dome to that thing and the inside of the - the back shell Just fit in the slot. It Just - It was Just a perfect fit. And so then all I had to do was go along with some gray tape and tape the CCU down so that it couldn't be kicked and stretched. And then the - Of course, the ALC bypass system was all put inside, and I got it pushed down and and routed in order to minimize sharp bends in the cable and all of that. It was a very easy setup. No problem at all. QUERY We ended up pulling that back out, though, because CARR Yes, you did, because it apparently put an impedance in the system to where we weren't getting good voice record ing any more. QUERY Right, when you are trying these - - QUERY Do you guys have something that you need to do that's time critical? 178 �CARR Not until 3 o'clock. QUERY We've got about two more questions? then we'll be through. QUERY When you install this cable, you run a test where you We've got to be someplace at 3:00. recorded on tape recorder 1 where the cable was installed and used a normal system to put the voice on 3. Could you - Do you remember how close you were to the mike when you ran the test, what the - CARR Yes, I didn't change my mode of operation, tfy normal, mode of operation was to be between 2 and U inches away from the mike. QUERY I think where the problem was was back at the ATM; we started missing. I believe I remember that. This arm's- length operation, that's when we put this bypass in and it Just wouldn't work there. QUERY We would miss those calls. When we ran the tests, it worked beautifully; you know, when you were close to it. But it Just wouldn't work at arm's length. QUERY The last audio question I have is the one about problems of that configuration of the SIA. And, if you don't mind, I'll read from your technical debriefing. It says the same thing for the intercom, so you'll know that 179 �QUERY (CONT'D) you're configured properly. "A lot of times we would spend maybe a minute, have to go off and configure other SIAs to verify that our comm box was configured right." Could you give us a more exact description of what you're talking about there? CARR Well, I think the big thing there was somebody might use channel A for recording somewhere and then walk off or float off and leave the channel in A. And then somebody else would come up on A and flip it on to talk and you would get the feedback whine. Another problem we had was Ed's microphone up in the ATM; he was in the habit of using ICOM/PTT on that. GIBSON Initially or - - CARR And then.he would hang that thing up and put it down, and you'd get all the rate gyro noise going into that hot mike. And then some guy down in the workshop would turn on channel A to start recording and you would hear all that hot mike noise. And that took time, to go correct the situation. GIBSON It turned out to be much better later. I just left it on PTT and used it in that mode all the time, and it worked very well. 180 �CARR But those are the kinds of things we'd have, where you would turn on a channel and get ready to record something and you would hear spacecraft noise somewhere. And what that meant was somebody had a CCU hooked up to channel B and it was in ICOM/PTT. And the two places where it happened the most we were at the SAL where you were doing data, and you wanted ICOM/PTT or up in the ATM. mean ATM but MDA - two places up there. I don't Either at the ATM panel, and usually right after an EREP pass, somebody would end up having to go up there and disconnect the headsets because either Bill or I would go off and leave it in ICOM/PTT. QUERY Did you ever use the call switch on the box? POGUE Never did. CARR I did once or twice by mistake snatching for the switch and - - QUERY Did it work all right? CARR Yes. POGUE There is another case where - that validates that comment. And that is, a lot of times or occasionally you go in a sleep compartment to do some recording, turn on channel A, l8l �3 POGUE (CONT'D) ICOM/FTT, do the recording, go back, leave it on. See; leave it on channel A, and some guy going to work in the wardroom and getting ready to put some stuff on recording and taking photographs and he'd get this terrible feed back established. That was a bad one because you'd go all over looking for that hot box, and I tell you, that system - we got to come up with something better than that; that is bad. QUERY Okay. POGUE I t ' s disconcerting, and you're just wasting an awful lot of time. 3 CARR If there is some sort of a feedback baffle that you could put out in front of - QUERY We tried that. The only way you can do it is put your hand over it and push down, kill it. The mikes were too sensitive. CARR All of that could have been solved by having a separate tape recording system that we carried on our person. And there is nobody to interfere with you that way. POGUE It was instigated by a recording operation of some kind or another some place. J 182 �CARR And all you would have to do when you are at a given workstation and you've got to record what you are doing, you could Just take a jack plug and plug it into a posi tion at that workstation and put TRS data on your tape and then just talk. When your tape was full, you'd take it and put it on a machine and signal the ground with a lever or, you know, a switch that there's a full cassette sitting on the dump mechanism, and they can dump it. When they are through with it, they can light a light on the thing that says the tape that has been sitting here has been dumped and is ready for reuse. And that way you get off all that feedback problem and POGUE One of the things that I found very inconvenient about the SIA design in general was that you had the same switch for TRANSMIT and INTERCOM, which is fine if you're addressing the SIA in the one-g preferential posture. If you're trying to use an SI which was mounted above the ergometer, we were always hitting the wrong position in that switch. And this is why in the tech debriefing we suggested there be a separate switch, one for TRANSMIT and one for ICOM. And also the fact that the switch should be designed for zero-g operation. There was actually - It took enough force to hold that switch in 183 �POGUE (CONT'D) position, you'd end up torquing your body around a lot of time. You would hold against the little side guard. You would actually hold that, and with the two fingers, you would end up moving your body around as you were talking. And this is the second reference I'll make to Popular Science in our debriefing, but my kid takes Popular Science Magazine, and they have a button in there - These were NASA tech briefs put in this little magazine now - This was an omnidirectional button which I thought I had invented in flight. But NASA's already got it in a tech brief, and the fact that you can move this button from any angle - all you got to do is touch it. Mine was a little different; you could pinch it from any direction, a ring-type button. But I would much prefer something like that so that you can approach this SiA from any direction. And you could reach out and there is no - you don't - it's not - You don't have a question in your mind as to which way I move that switch. You just pinch it on the ring or push the little knob. QUERY That's all the questions I had. I'll turn back over to Jack. QUERY Okay, I Just had a couple of concluding questions on the instrumentation system, specifically concerning the OWS. 18U �1 QUERY (CONT'D) I believe on mission day 25 you had difficulty determi ning the correct position of the EXPERIMENT 2 TELEMETRY MODE SELECT switch on the OWS C&D panel? I think you had to count the clicks or something to really know where it was set. And I Just wondered if - if there was a significant difference in the indicator knobs between the EXPERIMENT 1 and EXPERIMENT 2 switch; there must have been? CARR Well, yes. The knob was getting loose on the shaft is all it was. And if we'd kept on working them without being able to get in there and tighten the knob on the shaft, sooner or later it would have sheered, and you wouldn't have been able to do anything with it. EXPERIMENT 1 was little looser than EXPERIMENT 2. And But EXPERIMENT 2 was beginning to loosen up, too QUERY Oh, I thought it was EXPERIMENT 2 that was really loose? POGUE It was, Jerry. CARR Was it 2? Okay. One - The real loose one wcs the one we complained about and then the other one was not as loose but getting loose. 185 �POOUE It certainly was ambiguous. Several times I went all the way back to OFF and counted the clicks because it registered right halfway between. QUERY It was halfway between the marks then - is where, and you didn't know which one you were on? POGUE No. Fortunately I think you came along and said don't change it; Just always leave it 2 QUERY Leave it in position B - - POGUE Yes, B. GIBSON That was confusing. We lost a little bit of data, I guess, because of it. CARR But if we'd Just had a tool where we could have gotten in there and tightened that thing on the shaft again, we would have been all right. QUERY Yes, well - - CARR That was pretty inaccessible. QUERY Right. The tests showed that there was supposed to be plus or minus 7 degrees of play in the shaft, and you'd feel that on the knob. But apparently you had a lot more than that, because between the marks - you had 186 �QUERY (CONT'D) something like 25 degrees between the positions there. So if you were Just plus or minus 7 degrees, you would have know where - where you were; so if there were some other loosening back connected with the shaft there - That was a pretty complicated switch back there too and it was inaccess - unaccessible to tighten anything. There was a setscrew on the front that could have been tightened, but did you actually CARR We saw that setscrew, but it didn't look to me like you could get an Allen wrench in there to do it. QUERY Okay. CARR See the whole thing was kind of recessed slightly and QUERY Yes, yes. There was some procedure that the contractor came up with. I don't know whether it ever was uplinked but CARR No, it wasn't. POGUE Another example though where you have a feedback to tell you what you actually had selected, mechanical feedback is the greatest. I mean, if the switch had worked, right, that would have been fine. But it's Just another argument in favor of having a feedback to verify that you have 187 �.1 POGUE (CONT'D) selected what you want to select. Whether it's worth the trouble or not depends on what data you're working with I suppose. QUERY Okay; well, just one final question. Were there any problems with the I&C system that haven't been discussed? POGUE I think we hit that pretty hard in the technical debriefing. CARR Yes. POGUE Instrumentation and comm. CARR We haven't made a big thing with you today about cassette I can't think of any other areas. TV and up- and downlink capability, but it's in the technical debriefing and we verily QUERY We've read that and CARR We also made the same pitch to the managers; we're looking for support in that area. I don't think we need to spend any time - QUERY One comment on the cassette TV: That was looked into pretty hard at the time we were trying to find the video tape recorders. And the design and the development at that time wasn't along - 188 �CARR Yes, it's QUERY We couldn't commit a program at that time because it was Just too - We would have had something like that for the video tape recorder. Actually the video tape recorder, we think, turned out to be an excellent machine; it was bulky, it was large. And you - - POGUE Yes, we had the room. QUERY Yes. QUERY You carried up some pieces to fix the other one with, that had a failed part in it, but we never used that either. CARR But I think that cassette TV would be - - Very, very powerful tool to be used in the future, I think. QUERY Thank you very much. GIBSON Thank you. POGUE Can we get faster than real time though? QUERY Well, that's a real problem. POGUE Okay. 189 �0 QUERY It's taken so much band width, it's going to be a problem through the relay satellite, too, to get that stuff faster than real time. QUERY Okay, Jerry, we need to do a little planning here. You need to leave here at a quarter to 3:00, you said? CARR QUERY Yes, that's about right, yes. Harold, about how much time do you think you'll take in the structure and mechanics? > QUERY About ... QUERY Say again. QUERY About 30 minutes. QUERY About 30 minutes, and Charlie in the contamination, about how much? QUERY QUERY I'd say about 20. 20. Okay, if we double that, that's about (laughter) - What do you want - How long do you want to take for lunch then, Jerry? CARR Well, let's see; looks like we need about an hour and a half, probably, to dedicate to getting the work done 190 �CARR (CONT'D) this afternoon, and if we want to leave at 3:00 - at quarter of 3:00, that's quarter of two - QUERY 1:15 would be an hour and half. CARR 1:15 - an hour and a half from now. I think that's reasonable. 1:15? QUERY 1:15. CARR We can even get some exercise in that much time. GIBSON Sure. QUERY Okay, we'll pick up again at 1:15 promptly. 191 �Afternoon Session QUERY Okay, we're going to pick up the stuff that's in the mechanical area, and Harry Smyly from Marshall has the questions; so I'll turn it over to him. SMYLY What I'd like to do first is to start out and see if I can get some more observations that you made when you were outside the vehicle for our materials evaluation. On the ATM ... that's ... side, did you see any deteriora tion in the form of blistering, scaling, discoloration, or anything like that? CARR On the solar panels? SMYLY On the Sun side of ATM. CARR On the canister part? SMYLY Right. CARR No, I did not - did not see any blistering. of discoloration was seen. A great deal Some of it was - showed indications of a shadowing, like the foot restraint and the shadow of toe. The part that goes over the toes on the foot restraint was - could be seen down lower in the 192 �CARR (CONT'D) paint. The color that's on the zero-g fixture plate - the fixture cover that we brought back, if it hasn't done any changing, is the color of the entire Sun end of the of the ATM canister. SMYLY So that's a good - - CARR Sort of a beige. QUERY That's the zero-g plate. CARR The zero-g plate - that's 5-> 6-inch diameter. of mousetrapped on that one. We - I sort I doggone near lost that son of a gun because nobody told us in the description of that plate that there was 2 inches of foam or whatever that material was behind that, and when I was trying to pry that thing up, it just didn't come up like a flat plate. And then as I got to prying it up, I realized there was more behind it. it flipped. And I caught it in midair, or it was on its way to retrograde. blistering. And one time as I was prying, But I did - do not remember seeing any And I do remember that when I got to the screws that are - that are - holding that plate down, I dug in the paint. I dug the paint out of the slots in the screws so I could start the screwdriver. 193 And I could �) CARR (CONT'D) see that the paint was still fairly white underneath, / that the discoloration was a surface discoloration. It didn't penetrate too deeply into the paint. SMYLY Well, did you notice that any of it would smear or rub off with glove, rather than with the metal screwdriver? CARR I saw no indications that it would smear off. As I mentioned before, I - I did scramble around on the front of that thing on the last EVA in order to get pictures, and I essentially went across to the other side of it where there were no restraints of any kind and hung over the side of it, took pictures of the command module. And when I went back, I saw no indications of the scrambling that I had done and the places where I had already touched it with my boots and things. I Bav no indications of smudging at all, which to me indicated paint discoloration more than a film - Surface contamination. CARR Surface contamination. QUERY So it did look different from what you saw down around the CSM. CARR w I POGUE Yes. It all looked the same color. 191* �QUERY About the same color? CARR I shouldn't have said yes so quickly. look any different. It - it didn't The contamination was about that color too, and it could be that the contamination was in the roughness of the paint. You know, the paint on the Sun end is quite rough and doesn't lend itself too well to the kind of smudging and smearing that I think you're driving at. The paint is - was almost as rough as the stucco which you see in walls - the plaster you see in the walls around here. It's a very rough paint. SMYLY Did it look uniform, other than for the shadows? CARR Other than the shadows, it looked very uniform. SMYLY While in that area, were there any indications that the seals on the doors stuck if you tried to open them? CARR I saw no indications of it; however, the 82B door did stick. And it appeared to me that the reason for the sticking was not so much for the seals - due to the seals, but due to a warping of the door hinge itself. SMYLY Yes. 195 �CARR I tried to open that door on a dark-side pass, and it flat would not open. And so what I decided to do was just wait until the Sun came - Sun came out and then give it a chance to heat up, and hopefully the door would warp it•s way back. But you could see the - Looking at the door - It seems to me, the door looked something like this. And this was the hinge line, and if this - this dimension here being narrower than this dimension here. And the - there was a hole here, the aperture. I guess it was in further, more like this. me like the door was caught. Actually, It looked to The hinge was cocked in this direction so that this corner of the door was Jammed into the aperture or the sill, you might say, that the door closed in to. There was nice, wide tolerance all the way up here and around this corner, and it looked fairly wide here and got narrower and narrower to the corner. And it looked like the door was warped down into that corner. Now when we got to the Sun-side pass, I saw no indication that the door warped back. But once I did give it a little time to warm up, I was able to open it. But during the dark-side, I actually put my hand in here and pulled on the door a few times, because, you know, the locking handle is back here. I figured I got more leverage, more distance from the hinge line, by pulling here, and even 196 �CARR (CONT'D) that didn't do any good in the dark case. Rut once we let - It warmed up, and what we did was - As you're looking at the Sun end of the ATM, the foot restraints are here. That door, for the normal case when I was opening it, was - was like this. And it seems to me, the other - the other door was about like this. This was the A door, and this was the B door, as I remember. And this door was at my left hand, which is my weaker hand, ny weaker arm, and about here for pulling. Now what happened is, as we were waiting for the Sun to come out, I had Bill rotate the canister around so that the B door was right in front of me. And that improved the leverage situation, I think, because I was able to pull this way with both hands instead of Just with my left hand over here. the fact that we put it in the Sun. which probably helped us to open it. And also You got two factors But looking at the seal, I saw no indication of the seal getting sticky or anything like that. It looked to me like a structural abutment right there at that corner, the fact that it was Just warped right into it. SMYLY Did you make any observations on the sail that would indicate deterioration, or the PBI ropes? 197 �CARR I could look at it. I could see that it was still intact, slightly discolored. FBI rope looked faded. I'm trying to give you an example down here. 3MYLY You mentioned that there was a fold that had opened up. CARR Yes, there was a fold in the twin-pole sail that had opened up, and we got good photography of that that shows you that. And i t o p e n e d s o m e t i m e b e t w e e n E 7 A - 3 a n d E V A - k , because on EVA-3, when I was out at the Sun end, I looked back and could see no - No, I wasn't at the Sun end on EVA-3; so it happened between EVA-2 and -It. minute. Didn't we bring 1U9 in on EVA-3? Wait a Yes; so I was at the Sun end of EVA-3. POGUE Yes, yes. CARR But I didn't see the open fold on the EVA prior to the Right. one - to the last one. And then on the last EVA, I looked out there, and I was taking movies. And there was this fold open with a nice white area, and all the rest of the sail was discolored. SMYLY What about the flag? Did you make any particular obser vations there? CARR 3 The flag? 198 �SMYLY Yes. CARR You mean the one on the - - POGUE Docking end. CARR - - docking end? 3MYLY Right. CARR Yes; I saw no significant change in color there. POGUE There was yellow around it. I didn't notice that the white in the white stripes had changed any - not as much, it didn't seem like. Of course, that doesn't get quite as direct Sun, either. CARR Yes. SMYLY What about the multilayer insulation in the forward OWS bulkhead? Did you notice anything there? CARR I didn't. 3MYLY Did you notice whether any of the SAS diodes were cracked or looked like they may be coming loose from the potting or missing or anything like that? CARR I looked at that fairly closely, and I could nave gotten a closer look at it if I'd had time to really go look at 199 �CARR (CONT'D) it. But from the area where I was looking, it looked very much intact and very much unchanged. I saw no indication of any warpage or anything line - that might indicate that. POGUE Are you - You look at the "bottom of the SAS panel, you have this sort of funny looped-wlre pattern, you know, where it apparently goes out and connects up with separate little strings of solar panels. talking about? Now is this what you're What would be evidence of what you're talking about? SMYLY I'm speaking of the little diodes on the panels that absorb the rays themselves. CARR Little 3/l6ths by 1 inch. POGUE Yes, those are tiny little things. What would you notice when one of them peeled up? 3MYLY Well, it would look like if they weren't uniform flat or any - - POGUE We had some very good coverage on the flyaround, and there's enough highlights and sunglint on those panels that you ought to be able to pick it up if there's any problem with it. 200 �) CARR I also got the 16-millimeter stuff and some Nikon pictures of those panels, too. SMYLY Okay. GIBSON I looked at those also, and they looked pretty good. I could never notice anything by eye. And I always marveled at how uniform they did look. SMYLY Okay. Were there any significant events that we left out that might support in evaluating the specimens - the two sail materials or the airlock ... seal specimen or the zero-g protective cover? Was anything significant in the way they were handled or that might help us? CARR No, we tried to stay away from it as much as possible while they were out there. Let's see. You included in that the sample that we took off the airlock, which I cut off of the airlock hinge? SMYLY Yes, if you have any comments on that. GIBSON The only thing is, I tried to get another - I would have liked to have brought back another one which 3howed the effects of a light protector. You know, the little wire protectors that surround the lights we had outside. The shadowing of that was just - stood right out against the - the background of the type of materials we brought 201 �GIBSON (CONT'D) back. You can see the imprint of that, if you will, right - very clear, and that wire was only, you know, very thin; so the shadows are very sharp up there. And we only gave you one - one edge where we actually had a good shadow, and I think that still stands out very sharply. I'm not sure whether we were able to get any pictures of that one little effect of the shadowing of the light fixture. I would have liked to have brought it back because it's Just interesting to look at, but there was Just no way of cutting - cutting it out POGUE You know why one of the - This is certainly not personal. One of the fallacies of this type of question is, the time at which you're most sensitive to these unique events, like this printing of the shadows, the light guard on that, is when you first go out. On your first EVA you go out there, and you're Just like a kid, you know. And i t ' s at that point that your curiosity is peaked, and - you know - it's all over the world. Man, these questions - You could answer all these questions then, if you had them ahead of time. And now thinking back, it's awful hard if you try to remember, because you get Jaded to it after an hour even. 202 �CARR Tn handling the raicrometeoroid shield, though, there was nothing special we could do with it while we were in the suits. But as soon as we got out of the suits, we rolled them up with the outside on the inside. and taped them. I rolled them up And I think that's the way you got them back, was with - the way they were rolled up, taped, right after the EVA, so that all the exposed area was inside and the part that we touched with our hands was what was inside the meteoroid shield, on the inside there. The - What was the piece of aluminized Ifylar that was on the strut near D02U, that I think the SL-2 group put out? Was that the SEVA sail sample? I tell you, we had so many sail samples there, we lost track of what was what. And when it came stowage day and they would tell us to put the parasol sample here and the SEVA sail sample over here and this sample there, I couldn't have told you for the love - life of me what was what. QUERY I don't know what order they were in. CARR But if you showed me the sample, I could tell you where I got it. GIBSON Have you done any analysis to see what material was coated out on all that? 203 �SMYLY No, I tried to get that the day before I left. It is still in the lab, and we didn't get any results. I tried, also, to get something on that coating and - GIBSON We had that on the command module windows. And we had the question this morning, "Was that RCS or - Just where was it from?" SMYLY We'd like to get some samples of that. We don't have any samples of that coating at Marshall, and we would like to get some. GIBSON There must be some of it on the samples we brought back. '' CARR Yes, it's got to be on those surfaces. SMYLY There's some here, but we haven't got any there. QUERY You're talking about - You're talking about something like that zero-g fixture, maybe, from the Sun end or the sail samples or something like that. CARR Well, I think all over the whole place. POGUE It almost looked like something was water soluble. already been mentioned. SMYLY It's Probably a complex effect. What you are mentioning here sounds like it's very similar to the discoloration and the shadowing that was on the 20k �SMYLY (CONT'D) camera that - I believe it was Apollo 11 brought back from Moon, the old Surveyor camera. CARR Just strictly ultraviolet discoloration then. GIBSON That's what some of it is, but ... on the command module windows was not that ... If we saw it on the command module windows, it must have somehow got over the rest of the vehicle, too. 3MYLY Do you have any - Excuse me. CARR Go ahead. I was going to say that's the problem. what desimplifies this whole thing. That's And that is, we lay there in the command module on the water and watched contamination film on the window get washed off. GIBSON Also, the part which was shaded up there in the airlock still had the tan color to it, not anywhere near as dark as that which was exposed to the UV; so there was really two effects going on there - one of the coating and one of the sunlight. CARR I hate to complicate your life, but. SMYLY Do you have any comments on the performance of the ergometer - from a mechanical standpoint? 205 �GIBSON Other than the fact that I wish it could have taken a higher heat load, total heat load, because that constrained our operation sometime. I don't think any one individual any one of us ever rein into the problem, he alone starting from scratch putting too much energy into it. But we'd like to run consecutively, and sometimes we were con strained; we couldn't. I'd go put 8000 into it, and Jerry or Bill would hop on and put in 6; and that would be about all it could take. POGUE The pedals, also, you've already mentioned in tech debrief ing. Be nice if you could grease all the moving parts without having to work into them with a toothpick or something like that. We never felt like we really got the Krytox in the right pedal - into the right-side pedal. SMYLY We learned pretty early that one of our mistakes was not designing for maintenance. GIBSON One thing, I think that we all found that we tend to ride at a higher rpm up there. And I was continually bumping against 80 and maybe a little above 80. I would like to have had the capability of reading out and having it operate, say, up to 90 or so. 206 �POGUE Without any constraint, too. make any difference. I can't see that that should It's Just the way, I think, it turned out. GIBSON I don't think anybody ever worked on it as low as 1+0. Down here on the ground you sometimes do, but up there you lack the weight and also being able to exert a pull on the upstroke; you Just go the higher rpm. CARR Seems to me all of us were about - riding about 10 rpm higher up there than we were down here. SMYLY After you reserviced the airlock module coolant system, did you ever go back and inspect that saddle valve to see if there was any indication of leakage or seepage around it? POGUE Yes, sir, I did. CARR I did, too. SMYLY You noticed POGUE Nothing. Many times, I tell you, if you ever get anything like that again, we need more protection. This Just goes to show - This is a good example of why you've got to overprotect. The thing was protected well enough in normal traffic. But we started taking photographs out of the 207 �POGUE (CONT'D) STS window. And you'd go up there, and you'd get up there at night, turn all the lights out. .ted you'd be in there thumping around - you know, kicking and thrashing trying to get the camera in the right position to take a picture of the comet, and suddenly be aware of the fact that you were on top of that plate. So I checked it many, many times, and never did we disturb that plate. But once I got out of there, turned the lights back on and - in the MDA, and I Just about had a heart failure because I looked up there right where I'd been and that's where the saddle valve was. CARR And - - Of course, the thing is, if we design our systems in the future - I hope somebody's listening - for maintainability by the people there - in order to get your reliability by having component replacement capability and module replacement and maintainability capability, then you wouldn't have things like saddle valves sticking up that you had to worry about. SMYLY I'd like to discuss the shower a little bit. There toward the end of the mission, the power module, one of you said it sounded like it had water inside. wasn't running at that time. breaker? 208 I assume that it Did you check the circuit �~y CARR Oh, yes. It - For a while it would try to run. You could hear it humming in there and trying to move the rotor - I assume there was a rotor in there - but it couldn't get up to any kind of speed. JMYLY So you did run at the low speed. CARR And then finally, after we kept fiddling with it, trying % to get it to run, we let it dry out real wel3 and tried it again. POGUE Yes. It was frozen up solid then. I started trying to dismantle the vacuum cleaner, and that was bad news. That brings up a couple of points. One is that we got water irretrievably trapped in the 'Z> vacuum cleaner, which suggests that you ought to have The vacuum cleaner bag itself was a good trap, but it didn't protect the vacuum cleaner from a deluge. There ought to be some way of getting in there and getting the water out. I think we could retrieve that vacuum cleaner, but it was potted. else. The joints were potted and everything You know, you just can't take one of those apart very easy. SMYLY All that was done because, you know, it had low suction anyway and we were trying to cut down on leakage and improve the performance. J 209 �POGUE It could stand all the improvement you can give it. CARR Okay. It just flat died on us. And that filter that's supposed to protect it did not protect it well enough "because we frequently after a shower would check the filter, and after Just one guy showered, the filter would have three-quarters of it full of water. QUERY Three-quarters. CARR And sometimes it would have no water in it. But on at least two occasions, I checked that filter, and it was three-quarters full of water. And on one occasion, it was full. POGUE Okay. The next question I'm going to ask, Jerry, is, Did we follow the sequence in the checklist? And the answer is yes. QUERY Now the question I'm going to ask is, Did you ever use any of the Neutragena soap in the shower? CARR Yes, when we ran out of shower soap, the last couple of showers. GIBSON And that didn't make anv difference. 210 �POGUE Well, it can. CARR Now you were saying this Neutragena soap would foam. •t Oh, yes. your bag. And when it foams, then you pump foam into Then you get water in your filter. And the Neutragena soap will wet the filter and cause the filter to pass water. That's the way you got water in the power module. We feel that filter is good for about 10 minutes with the Neutragena, but it's good for maybe 10 hours with the Nairanol. POGUE Well, that's a possible explanation of the problem. 211 �CARR Yes, except we were having full filters before we ever started using Neutragena. SMYLY The filter's good for 2 hours with the Naironol. POGUE We only used Neutragena one time. We used it for one shower. And I got in and got ready to take a shower and turn everything on, and nothing was working. I had to get out and take a sponge bath. QUERY But another thing the Neutragena does is, it stops up the little orifices in the collection box. And then you can't collect at all. POGUE But if it had enough shampoo to fill a volume - Yes. But those big hypodermic things are way overdesigned. If we'd Just had the volumes we devoted to them for the shampoo, we'd have had plenty. CARR Yes. Boy, those were really overdesigned. SMYLY In the collection hose, now, we understand you had problems picking up the water and the other crews did, too. Did you ever try taking the little collection tool off and just using the end of the hose? 212 �I don't think that would have been any better. What you needed was a nozzle - a rubber nozzle would have been good something that had a narrower mouth on it and maybe was longer and was flexible enough to contour to your body better. But the thing was, you Just weren't getting enough suction through that thing and - since it was a metal nozzle and you didn't have much contour to your body; so the only way you could go around your arm was this way, and - They were staggered, too. made it harder. The lips were offset, which And something else in that. It was really sort of hard to get the water off the side of the shower. You'd listen; you could hear the guy in there going around and around and around with that thing, trying to - You'd try to scoop it, and that wouldn't work. use it like a scoop shovel. You'd think that you'd And then you'd try it flush, and then you'd try a blower load up. It didn't work too well. But while it ran, it was sure nice to get in there and get water all over you and then get yourself cleaned up. What was the use frequency? 213 �CARR Once a week. QUERY Did each of you use it about once a week? CARR Yes. Once in a while one of us would skip it because of maybe a time consideration or something, but that was about it. SMYLY Well, was the shower separator - Did it seem to be opera ting normally at the end of the mission? CARR We had a little trouble with the switch. There near the end, you'd throw the switch and nothing would happen. And if you just moved the switch a couple of times, it would work. And it looked - Maybe we had an open or something in the switch. It didn't seem to have anything to do with the separator because a couple of times I'd throw the switch and if nothing happened, then I would hit the separator a couple of times to see if there was something in there that needed to be jarred and that worked fine. And finally, by just cycling the switch hard, taking the switch and really banging it down to off end then back to on again, it would start up; so it indicated to me the switch contact just wasn't making it. 21k �3MYLY The washcloth squeezer - Now you rebuilt, reserviced that early in the mission. Did it seem to deteriorate any more through the mission? CARR No, the ... seal worked real well. the water out. It seemed to squeeze The reason why we changed it is just because of the odors. It just got dirty, and we cleaned it up and put a new squeezer bag on it to collect the water and hope we just could eliminate as many sources of odor as possible. POGUE On the washcloth squeezer itself, it should be as smooth with few convolutes, angles, and so forth - as possible to - because it picked up all kinds of crud in there. CARR Oh, i t was awful with a l l those mechanisms. root IE Angle irons, 90-degree bends, and all that. And fine work in some places. SMYLY Mechanically, it was - it did survive the use. CARR Sure did. Yes. But we recommended in our tech debriefing that things like the urine drawers have shrouds or areas that are difficult to get in and clean, that they be filled in say, with foam or something, and then painted with a slick paint or something so it would be easier. 215 �CARR (CONT'D) cleaning. And the squeezer is another example of a place that's difficult to clean, that is a collector of bacteria because of your wash water. Something like that should be designed in the future to have as few crevices as possible and be as easy to clean as possible. QUERY The ice buildup problem you had on the freezer doors, did that tend to increase in frequency as the mission progressed, or did it seem to remain constant? CARR I think that the frequency with - we had to clean those doors was about the same; so I don't think it got any worse. But once it got started, it really had an accelera tion time, didn't it? It seemed like it accelerated. Once you got a little bit of ice around the door that opened a little crack or something, it really got big fast. And we ended up - Between the two doors, there seemed to be two paths, Just vertical paths between those two doors, and you'd build a ridge of ice there. Once that ridge of ice got developed, the doors very quickly got hard to operate. Of course, when you couldn't hardly open the door, you knew it was time to clean the ice, because latch frictions were immediately - they'd go up exponen tially Just like the ice. 216 �POGUE One thing that aggravated the problem, too, was that little inner door. You know, you had the big door, and then there was a sort of inner door that opened with straps. That thing was really an irritation - to work around that. You couldn't really properly clean it. The thing was - looked like it had been designed with some kind of spec guarantee that there ain't going to be no frost formed. QUERY Let me explain why the front of that door is there. saw your comments from the tech debriefing. I The doors don't have coils in them, and that little inner door is the heat sync thing to transfer the heat to the outside walls to keep from having the heat short through the door. POGUE They ought to be removable. QUERY Well, we think - - CARR Yes, it was hard to get behind it. QUERY If we do it again, I don't think we'll have that door there. POGUE I guess that was really the main thing; Just that and the fact that we didn't have a proper tool for removing the ice. 217 �QUERY Was there any other mechanical equipment that we haven't mentioned here today that seemed to become more difficult to operate or deteriorate in performance? CARR Yes, the trash airlock. QUERY The trash airlock? CARR We never were able to work that as a one-man operation." Would you comment further? We had to use the technique that was used by the SL-3 crew, and that was a stomper and an operator. And we've got pictures, movies, I think, showing how we had to operate it. That was Just to close it. During the first part of the mission, we could put three to four and five full urine bags into the urine disposal bag, put it in the trash airlock, and it would Just go out clean as a whistle, Just no problem at all. And about halfway through the mission, it suddenly started Jamming; so we would remove the urine bag, and that would work a little while. And then it would start Jamming again. And about three-quarters away through the mission, it was useless % to try to put any urine bags that had urine in them down down the trash airlock. It seemed like the urine disposal bags would Just swell up and Jam against the sides of the trash airlock. And when you'd pull on the lever to force it out, it wouldn't move. 218 �0, POGUE It had so little mechanical advantage anyway. CARR Yes, you had very poor mechanical advantage on that thing. POGUE Scissors. CARR Scissors thing had pushed it out, it appeared to me. And so what we ended up doing was dumping the urine through the urine dump system into the waste tank, and then we would take the urine bag and roll it up and put a piece of tape around it and put it in the bag. And that way you could dump a half a dozen of them at one time. But it was a time-consuming thing to have to manage your trash that way. QUERY Jer, does that mean that from about mission day 60, approximately, on, you dumped urine in the waste tank? CARR Yes. If you check back in the mission log, you'd probably find somewhere where we told the ground that from now on we're going to do that. I haven't got the slightest idea why it suddenly started doing that. to be any rhyme or reason why to it. There doesn't seem And we experimented to the point where we got ourselves in trouble one day. We decided we would relieve the pressure in the urine bags by opening the valves. 219 We put three uzune bags in a �CARR (CONT'D) urine disposal bag with the valves open and put it in the trash airlock, opened the door. It wouldn't go out. Closed the door, opened the lid again, and the - those bags had put urine all over the inside of the trash airlock. ever saw. And that was the foulest smelling thing you From then on, we were never able to adequately clean it. QUERY Even when it was closed? CARR No. Did it - - Once you closed it, you kept the smell away from you; but when you opened it to dispose of trash, you had to endure the smell. QUERY Before you burst that bag, did you get any smell when you cycled the trash airlock? CARR There was a faint smell in the trash airlock when we got there. It was a faint, urine-type smell. when we really got the bad smell later. I recognized it I recognized that as being an odor that was inherent in the trash airlock earlier. QUERY Coming from the waste tank? CARR Well, I don't know if it was that or whether a previous crew had had a small urine spill and it got deposited on 220 �CARR (CONT'D) the TAL and was Just kind of hanging over, because what we had really hung on and we went in there with - Ed and I spent time together cleaning it out with biocide wipes, and then two other occasions, I cleaned it out with biocide wipes, and we couldn't whip the odor completely. QUERY Jerry, was that before you started dumping the raw urine in? CARR Yes. QUERY So it wasn't necessary CARR That was the clincher when the bags - when the bags spilled urine all over the inside of the trash airlock, that we decided, well, we had Just fooled with our last full bag of urine through the trash airlock and from then on, it would go out the - - QUERY But did you have a period of time when you were still putting it in bags - What I'm trying to differentiate is whether it was the smell trapped in the trash airlock or whether you were getting feedback from the waste tank itself. CARR I don't think we were getting feedback 221 �POGUE No, that happened before we started the regular dumping, which brings up a point. Are you people concerned with dump heaters, probes, that sort of thing? QUERY Yes. POGUE Have you read the technical debriefing, our comments there? We think they're underdesigned and wonder if there's any way that - Seems like we've been bit on these things since early Apollo - Apollo 7, you know, having trouble - You know; have to leave them on a long time before you use them. You're always afraid you're going to freeze them up and that kind of thing. And it's - I - Apparently - Well, I'm asking a question. Do you use a low-power heater because of burnout problems and that sort of thing? Is it power or what? QUERY Al, could you answer that? QUERY The answer is real - really simple, actually. Well, let's Just - The heater does not really prevent it - prevent it from fogging while flowing. The heater is to unclog it in case freezing ever did occur inside. Basically in the testing that we did, we would not get freezing inside the probe. We'd get freezing ..., and the heater would clear it with ... But the heater is not big enough to keep from freezing - - 222 �) CARR Then why in the world did the procedures require that we turn on a heater and keep it on for 15 minutes before we ever dumped anything through the probe? That doesn't make sense. QUERY From testing, that cleared the tip from the outside - - QUERY When did you ... QUERY We got big chunks of ice in the waste management. QUERY Could you get to a mike, please, so the gi$rs - - CARR I think we are through - - POGUE Well, I guess the question is that - since there seems to be a continual source of procedural problems, discussion and general backbiting - why can't we - think we could get u better heater or something like that? We were Just talking about a flight - After this problem occurred that Jerry is talking about, we had a later stoppage - when we were - when we started our regular dumping. Boy, that really scared us, because we knew we had problems with trash airlock dumping the urine. And then we had a freezeup with the urine dump, and boy, we were shaking in our boots there. We didn't know what we were going to do. Just - Well, t h e comments a r e going t o t e l l you . . . 223 �A couple of those mechanical things - one is that - what held the T003 on, that mechanical - that snaps — Just completely froze up one day, and we had to pry it off. Both of you know that the - that the The foot. The T003 is suspended from its stowage container Structural - mechanical structure. mechanical structure, and it's got a foot Photo mount. - - . . . photo mount t h a t we used. Camera mount. Camera mount, if you will. And it froze up completely so you couldn't get it out, and we had to pry th - I had to take a part of the mount off of the instrument itself. How it froze up, I'm not sure; it Just flat wouldn't come out. The dovetails, also, on one of the TV cameras - The dovetail mount on the side cut loose. 221+ �POGUE And there wasn't any way to tack it CARR And that was aggravating because the screws through the dovetail were screwed in from the inside out, and we were looking at the end of the screw and watching it over a period of time back out as the dovetail got looser and looser. POGUE And sometimes you wanted to use that shoe because it was the only way it would fit with the situation at hand. GIBSON The other things we had problems with mechanically were latches. CARR Oh, yes. GIBSON Dialatches, but that's another long story. CARR That's adequately documented in the tech debriefing. POGUE You know - But another thing that they're maybe interested in was the freezeup on the wardroom window, the ice collection on the wardroom window. QUERY Yes. We haven't heard about that. POGUE Why don't you tell them about it, Jerry. the - - 225 Jerry did all �CARR Well, we - when we got there, there was a little patch of ice in the wardroom window about the size of a dime. And then after about a week and a half or 2 weeks, it got to be about as big as a quarter. And we knew that the previous crews had coped with it, but we didn't hear what the procedures were; and so we talked to the ground, and they indicated how we should use the vacuum dump line from the water condensate tank to deac - defrost it. it in about 6 minutes. You could do Well, as soon as you hooked up the vent line and connected it to the scientific airlock and opened it for that, you could just see that ice shrinking down to nothing; and then it was gone in no time at all. QUERY There was no lingering problem then? CARR No, but in about 3 weeks it would be back, and we'd just have to do it about once every 3 weeks. There was a little water spot that looks JuBt like a water spot on a glass, too, that was left behind when the ice sublimed and was gone. We had that little dime-size water spot. But we don't quite understand how the mositure could get in there, in that sealed window. And that vent valve that's right there next to the window, we kept it tightly sealed, and we never fiddled with it at all. 226 But somehow moisture �CARR (CONT'D) managed to get in there. And on the days after the shower, when the humidity was high, was the time when you would see the little spot starting to come in; so somehow humidity was able to get through something to get to the inner panes of that window. QUERY Did you have any objectionable noise or notice any noise frequency changes as the mission progressed, from any of the equipment? GIBSON Pumps up in the airlock, the - - CARR ATM coolant. GIBSON ATM coolant pumps. That one was - Well, the three of them - I guess one we didn't use. had their problems. Bravo and Charlie both And I guess there was air in the loop which caused part of it. QUERY But after you cleared that up - - GIBSON It would come and go - - CARR You got used to it after a while. GIBSON You got used to it. You'd get a high-pitched, whine, and then you'd get a gurgle. And then sounded as though - Heck, what'd we worry about, the bearing? though. I forgot the exact noise 227 Yes, the bearings, �ifinilK Once there was a distinct change in the acoustical spectrum up there, and then they Just started whining. And we really got concerned about it. In fact, we asked to turn if off in order to be - We figured it would keep us awake at night. And I went to all the trouble getting - breaking out M^87 noise-level meter and frequency analyzer and took beaucoup readings of the pump on and off and couldn't notice any difference. But you sure could tell it subjectively. The noisiest single system in the workshop were the rate gyros - rate gyro six pack that's up there. next noisiest was the ATM C&D coolant pumps. And then the And then near the end of the mission during the EREP pass, when the 191 cooler started dying on us, it really got noisy. But, of course, that wasn't something that ran all the time; it was only during the EREP. It interfered somewhat with our communications, and that's about it. I ^ UERY That's all - that's all the questions I had. And back to that probe, in reference to the questions that you asked me concerning that. The best answer I can give you on the probe - During the initial concept for design, the name of the game was keep power use down to a minimum. And it was concluded that the power tnat was allotted to 228 �QUERY (CONT'D) that probe would be adequate with the procedures as established. And that's why it was so low. I agree with you; it's my opinion it should have been higher. QUERY Okay, other structures and mechanical questions. questions from Huntsville? Any Okay, Charlie, contaminations. Charlie Davis will lead the session on contamination. QUERY The ECS guys ... questions on that ... change in that noise DAVIS We've still got several areas we want to cover here, and David Checks (?) will start off by asking questions on induced atmosphere. QUERY I have a couple of questions on - As you went out to retrieve stuff from the ATM unit, did you notice any changes, any - in the frame of light intensity from the QCMs that were on the HLC and NRL ...? QCM looked like? CARR No. POGUE Quartz crystal? QUERY Okay, there's a picture right here. CARR What is a QCM? 229 Do you know what the �"*) QUERY Quartz crystal ... Should give you a continuous thread of contamination. POGUE Here's what it would look like on - That's - was where you were wanting - at one time talking about getting - returning one of those. QUERY Yes. Right. We got a very strange effect. That is, it continued to lose mass or give some indication of losing mass continually. POGUE Losing mass? QUERY Yes, and we don't know whether it was a change in the crystalline form of the device itself or whether just continued. I guess it should not have continued to outgas that long. Did you notice any differences or anything on the - CARR QUERY CARR Sure didn't. on or around - That's not an area where we were. The only time I was near that thing is when I was taking pictures of the command module, and I was using it for a handhold then, trying to wrap my legs around it or some way to hold myself over there. But both other - the three other times I was out at the Sun end, I was nowhere near this; so I didn't have much opportunity to look at it. 230 �*)i QUERY In connect - I have one question in connection with that water droplet before ... on that wardroom window. Did it You say it stayed the size of a dime whenever the ice would disappear? Did that droplet increase in size over each time it was - - CARR You mean the water mark, the water stain? QUERY Yes. CARR No, it seemed to stay about the size of a dime GIBSON It stayed the same. CARR It was a pretty old stain, and maybe it'd been there had gotten established maybe back in SL-2 or -3, because all - Little foggy area or ice crystal would start small and Just grow, and finally - by the time it got to be about the size of a half a dollar is when we'd do something about it. And once you cleared it up, it always came back to the same little old stain. QU^RY Jerry, was it actually water moisture - moisture that was left or just a stain? CARR Just a stain. Looked like a watermark on a glass. 231 �QUERY Okay, let's pursue one other question. You mentioned the - on the command module windows this contamination that wrinkled up that was water soluble. CARR Yes. QUERY Did you notice that as you - did you notice that Just after you'd come down, or did you notice that there was something - - GIBSON ... - No - Well, no - - QUERY - - on there prior to that? GIBSON We knew it. OARR Yes, we knew our windows were coated on orbit. We could see it on orbit before ... We could - Late in the mission, it was apparent to us that we had a lot less transmissivity through the window than we had early. They were obviously contaminated, because with low light levels - light angles, I should say - Sun angles, you could see the - POGUE Streaks - - CARR But we also - - QUERY So it was not - Then it was not uniform. have streaks in it? 232 It seemed to �CARR I always thought it uniform; I would say more concentrated towards one corner of the window. POGUE I had streaks on window number It, I guess it was, but I'm not sure the streaking was directly associated with that contaminant coating. I don't know what it was, but I know I kept moving the camera around because I had a streak right across the middle, almost horizontal. CARR I got the impression that a line that I had in my window was much like the line of shadowing that we had in other places on the workshop. But my window had a line in it that was a very, very straight line with two different intensities of contamination. I got the impression that maybe some of the shadowing on my window was protecting a little bit of it or something; the same sort of shadowing effect - QUERY While it was accumulating, it was shadowed? CARR - - that I could see other places. GIBSON When we got back down, we saw the effect of the water on it when we were inside the command module. Once we got outside and we came back down to look at the conmand module before they towed it away, I could still see it on the windows. Apparently, someone post that time washed 233 �GIBSON (CONT'D) the command, module down and, you know, made it look shiny QUERY That's unfortunate. QUERY Jerry, when you have the shadowing effect on your window, and new again and completely ruined it. could you tell whether the sunlit part had more buildup than the other on the ... - CARR All you could see was a line of demarcation. It was very difficult to see which had more or less than the other. QUERY While we're on this window - This is window number 1 you're talking about, I beleive. CARR Window number 2. QUERY Oh, well, then this was not the window that you had - took photos of S233 out of, is it? CARR Right. Window number 1 is the one that we took those pictures out of, and I - that window, as I remember, was more uniformly coated. I didn't see this line of demarcation indicating shadowing. You had to be careful looking at something like that for fear that maybe the lines you're seeing really was nothing more than just a shadow. 23^ �I got - Oh, "by the vay, I want to make a comment on photography of windows for contamination, fou need to have a dark shroud or dark cloth on the inside of the spacecraft to minimize back inflections on the window. If you'd look at the pictures that I took of the S230 for contamination purposes, they're lousy pictures, because the light came in, hit the structure inside, bounced back on the inside of the window, reflected in the camera, and ruined the pictures. 235 �POGUE So if you really want to get good contamination photo graphs, you have to make a - If I had had enough sense and presence of mind in flight, I would have rigged something up to - to minimize that back reflection. It ruined those photographs. QUERY Okay. Thank you. CARR I think back reflection had a lot of effect on the 233 photography too, Just from starlight and moonlight reflecting into the spacecraft from back on the window. And then you Just essentially made your - made your window nearly opaque, and especially if you are trying to take pictures also close to sunrise or sunset. You'd get that light on the window, and it would just look like it was beccming opaque. QUERY Okay. Let me ask one last question. On EVAs I've no - I have no - I have read several comments about the white white paints turning yellow or beige or brown. Was there any discoloration concerning other paints or, say, the bare aluminum structures that might have been in place? Or in touching some of the - GIBSON Colors seem to be a little washed out. If you take a look at the flag, we've got seme good pictures which I 236 �GIBSON think show the American flag painted on the MDA. Colors there appear to be very washed out, as well as the white turning yellow. The red and blue Just seem to lose a lot also. QUERY And how about any bare metal surfaces whenever you were around them? Did you ever notice any smudging or, you know, a layer of contaminant on there that would be CARR That's what I'm racking my brain on. POGUE You know, there - that's - that's a point. CARR Seems to me that - the aluminum took on a sort of yellow cast. GIBSON It was not shiny aluminum, but I'm trying to figure out how - in what way it was degraded. It Just appeared to lose its luster. POGUE You remember, Ed, when you put the clamps on for the S020 - - GIBSON Oh, yes. POGUE - - and T025- How you scuffed - GIBSON 23T �POOUE It was really ... scuff marks. GIBSON you could really see it. QUERY Okay, so - - POGIIE Scraped away the top surface, you could see bright much brighter metal underneath. Now this is on the ATM trusses, big structural ... CARR Yes. QUERY Okay, thank you. QUERY I had just one question on the ATM experiments themselves On the S052 TV quite often we would see particles on the downlink TV. By and large they were Just a very few number of particles. But by chance, did any of the crew happen to look out the window during any of the S052 TV activity and ... those particles? GIBSON No, we - we were asked that question the other day, and we could - most of the time when you looked out the window you could hardly see any particles at all. QUERY Oh, but you did see particles? 238 �GIBSON When you were looking out the wardroom window, you'd occasionally see one or two particles go by. And you might see it especially as a reflection in the sunlight when you're up close to the terminator. CARR we had two blizzards that we saw out the wardrocm window, Just absolute flurry, and it was near the terminator both times. And it was Just - huge flurries of snow particles or bright particles. QUERY One of those, I recall that we could not identify it. I think the answer given - the only thing that happened was that there had been a mol sieve cycle change Just a minute or two before. sense. But that - that really didn't make But now, the other one I don't recall what that blizzard was. CARR One was rather early in the mission, and the other one was about two-thirds of the way through the mission. I think the second one is the one that you folks said that there had recently, Just very shortly before that, been a mol sieve cycle change. But that's the only time we ever saw any huge blizzards of — of this stuff. It looked kind of like snow, and it was very, very beautiful. 239 �QUERY You don't have any idea of what that other snowstorm was from? CARR Haven't the slightest idea. POGUE Well, a question that - that one might ask: you know in the trash - in the ops - locks tank down there in the trash airlock area - the trash area, if - if I remember correctly you had screen - big screens over the actual openings to the outside. Now, during your testing I assume that those things, if they froze over as they were supposed to freeze over and then subline out or some thing, I forget which, did you ever get any dump modes established when you were testing that, I wonder? QUERY Yes, we did have liquids go into the waste tank C. But now, during the ground test we always stayed below the triple-point pressure. Now, during the mission there potentially is over three cases there, dumping free liquids into the waste tank. You may have dumped at such a rate - such a mass that you did just bump the triple-point pressure in the waste tank. And if that were the case, you could have iced up those screens and then sublimed off the screen or else clogged them up and blown them off. 2k0 �Could the screens do any sort of a - of a - oil can or something that might just pop them and cause a million little ice crystals to start off? I wouldn't exclude that, but it's not that. I would think the next time you dump seme material in that you certainly could have ... Yes, except that both times we saw these blizzards we were not doing a trash dump of any kind, because that's the first thing the ground asked us when we said we had seen it, did you guys just dump something down the trash airlock, and we said no. And then the next question was, well how about the SAL, and the answer was no to that. So then they researched and found on - on one case that the mol sieve had Just done something. Look, I have a couple of questions now in the area of experiments optics, and it's Just basically did you observe any deposition on the handheld optics, for in stance, the S019 articulated mirror? If you did, could you describe what these deposits looked like? No, we did not. Bill indicated some - - 2hl �POGUE Yes, on the - right near the end when I was doing an S063 when you could actually look through the window you - you had a window mounted in the - I would say T025 adapter, was it? CARR Yes. POGUE I saw what appeared to be a very fine dustlike layer on the AMS mirror. Now this was, again, you had to have the Sun - the light Just right before you could see it because turning it a little bit further you could - you could see the discone antenna, and that was Just as - Just crystal clear, you know. So like I - I - I wasn't sure what I was seeing - almost a frosted ap pearance. That was near the end; I don't know when it started, and I'm not even sure what I saw was entirely valid. QUERY But other than that? POGUE Other than that, no. It always looked - when we - any time that we took the AMS - a couple of times we ro moved it out to make sure that we had it cocked right or Just to check it. It looked very good, very good condition 2h2 �SPEAKER How about any of the windows associated with the SAL, the antisolar SAL, did you have any deposits on those surfaces? CARR No . . . QUERY Well, from that then I assume that you didn't do any cleaning on orbit of any of the optical surfaces. POGUE Just the EREP. CARR The EREP S190 window, Eill did a cleaning Job on that. But, of course, that was Just the inside where we were. POGUE We cleaned off the 190 window - interior of the 190 win dow once using the optics cleaning kit. Once I brought down seme of the tissues and cleaned off the inside of the wardroom window and that was i t . QUERY So that's all of the window cleaning that you did. POGUE That was Just about i t . QUERY Okay. CARR But we found that to properly clean the Nikon with the 300-millimeter lens, you had to put your hand on the window and hold the lens up against the window and then 2k3 �CARR (CONT'D) track with the camera in order to get your image motion compensation. And so it dirtied the windows, and we found ourselves having to clean them, wipe them off on occasion. And that was - the wardroom window was - that had to be done too and also the STS windows on occasion, the command module window; that was finger smudges. POGUE And mainly on the wardroom window, too, was the window protector that we were doing this to not the optic, not the wardroom window itself. QUERY But most of these smudges you had to clean were from nose prints or finger prints. CARR Correct. QUERY I did have several questions on thermal control systems, but I think they have been beaten into the ground. I do have one. But Going back over previous debriefings, the two previous crew debriefings, one of the questions we had asked on ATM sunshield discoloration was the first crew response that it was clean, that the sunshield of the ATM was still white. But SL-2 crew, we picked up from them that it was beginning to discolor. Shadow effects were still light and door motion areas were a little bit dimmer, and then that exposed to sunlight was 2kh �QUERY even darker. But then you all have come in, and then (CONT'D) it's much darker. So, what I would like to ask is do you recall any difference in discoloration on these white surfaces between your first EVA and the last EVA. CARR I didn't. GIBSON The problem is - Yes, I was out there on the first EVA and then Jerry was out there on the last, so you have different observers. One thing I did notice at the first EVA I was out there, you could very clearly see the rib structure underneath which was supporting the front face. It looked like from squares - a square rib struc ture which is maybe 3, k inches or so in square size or linear dimension across it. And I forget whether that was darker or lighter now, but I made some - a big verbal description of it at the time of the EVA. If you are interested in that effect, it's in the transcripts during the first EVA. CARR And what was interesting was that when we first saw the workshop up there and started moving in on it, the starkness of the white, the gold, and the black. It was just very stark, and the white looked very pure white. And then I remember thinking how curious it was after we got 2U5 �CARR (CONT'D) in real close, nearly docked, and when we were docked that all the places that had looked white vrere now beige, or very light beige. And it's the same sort of effect as that 16—millimeter film that was taken — that we took on the EVA. That Just makes everything look spanking clean white. And I deliberately panned slowly across the sun end of the ATM to show all the shadowing effect and all the tan. And damned if none of it came out. It was Just pure white; looks Just white as can be. GIBSON I hope the Nikons show it better. CARR I do too. POGUE I hope so too. QUERY But you did then take scrae photographs Ju3t to show discoloration. CARR Yes, and unfortunately the l6-millimeter stuff was apparently overexposed. And in the processing they - the developing Just - they - it was probably developed normally an overexposed picture developed normally which ends up with beige looking white. And all the contrast, the shadowing, was gone, Just gone white. 2k6 �QUERY All of the surface colors that you all have a comment on, were those only on the solar side of the vehicle? During EVA did you get in such a position that you could see the antisolar side of the - - CARR Well, the other side of the panels look pretty white to me. I didn't get the impression that that was as beige. POGUE It wasn't, but it was turning. I photographed the underside of SAS panels when we came in for docking, and I think I got - I'm not sure I got pictures ccming out or not, when we undocked. But, if you'll look at those, I think you'll see that it's well, I don't know if you can tell or not. CARR You don't mean the SAS panel; you mean ATM solar panels. POGUE I mean ATM solar panels. And they were not pure white. They had starucn^to change. GIBSON But in around the FAS area, which was not exposed to Sun except for scattered sunlight whatever small amount there may be there, that had changed color. QUERY What was this, how that had changed color? 2U7 �GIBSON In the FAS, the fixed airlock shroud workstation, where you had the part we - the pieces we brought back, as a matter of fact, that you clipped out. Part of that was a very dark beige and an abrupt transition to a light beige. The light beige is the part that was out of the Sun, and the dark was the part that was in. And the part that was out of the Sun which was light, that whole area was pretty much of a uniform light beige. I did not see any shadowing effects there as though you had reflected sunlight from a given direction. It was pretty much uniform. To me, that, plus looking at the windows in command module, implied we had semething coating, some atmosphere around there which slowly condensed out on the vehicle. Whether that was really the source of that light beige, I can't be sure. But I'm sure, looking at the material itself and analyzing i t , you can tell that. QUERY Okay. QUERY Is this - what was washed off the command module window, this material, did it wash off in flakes, or was it quite even as the water would hit it? the contour ... 248 I mean, it was part of �GIBSON No, it tended to shrink up, in the same way, as Jerry says, the top of a custard pudding when it cools, shrinks up. QUERY Okay. When it got wet, it would shrink up when exposed to water. GIBSON It would shrink up, and you would see little bits of it around the corners, especially. And even after we got - as I said, after we were on the ship and the spacecraft I was on the ship for 10 hours or so, we went out and looked at it, and it was still there on the windows. And I thought, well, here these guys have got seme beautiful samples. I'm surprised that the system didn't make - take special pains to get sill that. CARR I guess we should have made a bigger thing of it while we were in the command module and mentioned the fact that these things were there. QUERY I think that that's all the prepared questions we had. Do you have another one ...? QUERY Yes, I have one. atmosphere. I have another one. It's on induced It's not particularly with contamination but with the meteoroid environment. Did you notice any - I know you talked about wrapping up the meteoroid shield 2h9 �QUERY (CONT'D) and bring that back - did you notice on any of the EVAs like up on the ATM, any impact areas that were not asso ciated with an engine or some kind of firing where paint might flake away? CARR Sure didn't. QUERY None at all? CARR It looked very good up there. QUERY Okay. CARR Of course, all the windows - they asked us a question up there one time, if the wardroom window, or any of the windows we look out, had any pits or anything in them indicating micrometeoroid impacts, and they were just as clean as a whistle. QUERY . . . you had a few questions you were going t o ask. QUERY Most of them were answered, but did you use all the Coolanol that you took up? CARR QUERY no. How much did you use? 250 �POGUE Golly, I don't really know. CARR Well, didn't they say it was a 3-quart capacity or sanething like that, and we had 9 quarts on board or something? We serviced it once, whatever that is. POGUE Yes. QUERY ... POGUE No. CARR Not to my knowledge. Did you ever have any occasion that it leaked again? QUERY CARR No. And the ground, of course, has a better handle on that, and the guy, the atmospheric volatiles concentrate guy said that they had some hydrocarbons in there that indicated that it might have to do with Coclanol. QUERY I think George Hobson and his people could probably answer those questions a little better - - CARR Yes. QUERY - from the data. 251 �POGUE You ought to also ask him about the secondary coolant loop, too, because apparently about the time we undocked, we lost the secondary coolant loop. QUERY When we started getting the warning light. QUERY I think this does us. QUERY Charlie, are we clearing now on this - I'm concerned about this film. It showed up on the command module window ... we are going to find out about that. QUERY Are we clear if this was seen on any of the other windows, the same kind of degradation? POGUE Yes, it was on number b . QIJKRY How about ... the workshop ...? Was it peculiar only to the command module? POGUE Who knows? CARR Oh, yes. Yes, I - in fact when they asked me about the pitting on the wardroom window, I said no, there was no pitting, but there was definitely what looked like water marks and stains on the wardrocm window. QUERY Well, that was ... surface, you mean. 252 �$ CARR ... on the external surface, and it was more- streaky looking. query Now, we - I think this was picked up on the first crew. And I think at the time it would have caught me by surprise. You know we did lose the meteoroid shield. QUERY As Jer was commenting - the reason I asked, you canniented earlier that you could - toward the end of the mission you started seeing degradation on the command module windows. CARR ^ I just wondered if you noticed this ... It was certainly more noticeable on the wardroom window. Now, the STS window, I didn't notice it, uor did I notice it on the 190 window, but of course the 190 window had a cover on, and we didn't open that cover very often. QUERY STS windows did, too, so I think ... there; wherean the wardroom window had been exposed for the whole mission. CARR Yes. QUERY Your command module window for 8H days. QUERY Did you keep the STS window covers on mostly or - - CARR Most of the time, yes. 253 �9 GIBSON Most of the time - the outside. CARR That's a mechanical thing for the mechanical folks, and that's those windows on the - the covers on the STS windows were a great pain in the neck, because they were so hard to open. You had so little mechanical advantage on the crank you had to turn, and there were so many things close to that - the crank throw that you were just asking for broken fingers. We were always banging our knuckles up trying to open and close those doggone STS windows. POGUE One of them in particular you could actually guillotine a finger to death. CARR There was lots of profanity used on those windows, QUERY Go ahead. QUERY That .. . QUERY Any other ...? QUERY Just one ... QUERY One more question? Is that it Charlie? Okay. 25^ �QUERY When there were shadows on the bottom of the ATM sunshield, of course, the Sun couldn't have caused it. •» Evidently there was an obstruction in the way. Did you - any of you notice any of those, and if so, what was the possible source? QUERY It looked like they were in the way of some emission that was coming towards that surface, and the structure shadowed it rather than the Sun as in so many other cases. GIBSON I'm not sure what you're referring to. QUERY On the underside of the supports of the ATM sunshield, the supports had a shadow on the bottom side of the sun shield, and we were kind of wondering just about what angle the emission would have had to come frcm to create that shadow. CARR Evidently you didn't notice though. Yes, we noticed that. In face, I think we mentioned it on the EVA that it seemed kind of peculiar that you even had the shadowing effect around on the Earth side of the sunshield. That's a mystery to me. QUERY That would sound like outgasing protection. QUERY But it seems to be caning from a def - very definite direc tion, and that's what we were interested in, Just where it might have come from if you find that out. 255 �QUERY Okay. GIBSON Are people going to run a chemical analysis of those materials which we brought back Just to see what is deposited? QUERY I'm reasonably sure that material is still ... QUERY They're doing ... I checked on that to see if I could tell anything about it before I came down, and, no, they are doing that and they are - they Just don't have anything yet to - GIBSON Okay. QUERY - - pass on, but - - QUERY . . . got a couple of questions before we break up t h i s afternoon. Now one of the - and they're general questions; they don't fit well in any subsystem - one of the head quarters offices that funds Kennedy, Marshall, and our selves for advanced technology, advanced development, always asks after the end of the mission, what did we what did we - what went wrong that we ought to fix way downstream type of thing, or takes a long lead time to get after type of thing. And to put that in context, the office that did the asking has finished and has been 256 �QUERY (CONT'D) finished for a year and a half now of funding advanced development for Shuttle, so they're about the only group in the world that's finished working on the space shuttle so to speak, and so what are the things about the mission that may require long-term effort to solve at a hardware development stage or technology stage, or stay out of technology. You know, what are the half a dozen things that might fit that category that bugged you most about the mission. GIBSON The things that we - as we Just get a real cursory look at Shuttle, it's not that the technology doesn't exist; they are Just flat not going to use it. Waste disposal system in Shuttle has taken a step backwards into using the Apollo rather than the Skylab. I guess, are that way. CARR Some of the foods, Gee, camera equipment - - Camera equipment is a big one. Requiring a U-year lead time to get cameras for Shuttle, I think is appalling why we have to have that kind of lead time. POGUE The general overall de-emphasis of the - probably the best capability of man in that we - looks like we are going out of our way to deprive the human observer onboard from having a good facility for looking at the Earth or for even looking at the exterior of his vehicle. 257 We've �POGUE (CONT'D) been continually bit by this inability to see the outside of our vehicle and having a good, well designed, pur posefully designed Earth observatory for use both in the daylit side of the Earth, and on the nightside of the Earth, the capability to look, regardless of spacecraft attitude at the daylit side of the Earth or the nightside of the Earth. I can see that this is - we're going to go into the 21st century in space flight before we have that capability. It just seems like that we have established that man can do all sort3 of neat things if he has the right kind of observing capability, but we just - somehow or another, we want to handicap ourselves, and we're deliberately going out of our way to emasculate the man's ability in space. CARR I think it's very, very disturbing to see some of the trends that are headed - we're headed for with Shuttle; as Ed said, they are steps backwards. Waste management: if you're going back to sticking a bag on your backside to collect fecal matter, if you don't - that's a step backwards, I'll guarantee you compared to what we had up on Skylab. And the fact that they are going back to a lot of the Apollo-type foods and foods packaging is also a step backwards after the things we've learned. And it �CARR (CONT'D) looks to me - and quite frankly it looks to me like we're selling our soul in order to get a vehicle, and that's a very poor situation. I can understand, because it is probably a matter of survival of the program, of the NASA - the programs that we have going. We have to sell our soul because of economic necessity. But it sure doesn't make you feel any better to see us go out and learn something and then have to Just put it aside and forget it and step backward in systems. it's Just pitiful. It's really - And it Just bothers the hell out of me to see us in a position where somebody says, "Well, by June of this year we have to have completely esta blished our - all of our photographic equipnent and get all of our - everything's cast in concrete." And I Just can't understand that because, good camera equipment is available down at the camera store. And it - I don't see where you need a U-year lead time on camera equipment. It Just doesn't make sense. And - well we're sermonizing now, but - - POGUE That's what he's asking for though. CARR That's what you're looking for, as far as I know. We're going to have to rear up on our hind legs and say what we need and do the Job right and quit going about it in a half-assed manner. 259 �POGUE Well, one of the things about it, too, and it is a basic point of philosophy involved here, and I don't want anyone here to take offense, but I don't think spacecraft should be designed solely by engineers. I think that the operator should be in and should deter mine and levy requirements on system design. In other words, what - I'm actually saying that if you are con sidering a fluid loop then the man that is going to operate that and the procedures man that's going to design the malfunction procedures for that should have a say in where check valves are located, and not just where it's convenient to put them in there because there is a tiedown, a hardpoint, here for mounting the thing. That's what has been dictating in so many cases the - the layout of our systems. And that is why the command module - the LEB down there below the com mander - actually on the left hand side - that is a big rat nest. Let's not let that go by. Now we're - we're very grateful that Rockwell can put out a spacecraft that can last 81* days. We don't want any - we don't want anyone to go away mad, thinking that we're not grateful. But to you - you're asking for a long-term look ahead. And we're going to have to face up to the time when the people who are actually going to be flying this 260 �POGUE (CONT'D) vehicle and operating it, or at least their - their representatives are going to have a good strong say in how a - how the thing is actually laid out, how the wire runs are laid out and so forth, not Just the structural considerations. Because if you start looking ahead at a Mars flight, the spacecraft now becomes your simulator. Now when - when - when that happens, you're going to have onboard maintenance capability, and you're going to have to have that thing laid out so that my kid can go in and fix i"G, you know. It's going to have to be very intelligently designed, not Just from a functional standpoint in that - in that it meets engineering requirements, but frcm maintenance and repair. We keep saying, yeah, that's real neat, if we had the money we could do it; but darn it, we - at one time or another we're going to have to bite the bullet and actually design a spacecraft that way. And following up from Jerry's point of view on the cameras, one of the things too that keeps biting us is that we - we've continually fought the problem and said, well, we - we would like to have lots of color exterior film onboard. pictures. Why do you want it? We like to take Why do you want to take the pictures? 261 Well, we �POGUE (CONT'D) Just feel like that, you know if you look out and see something interesting, you ought to take a picture of it. Well, you don't have any Justification. know, you end up - so you end up short of film. You But then we come back and we talk to - Just last night and, well, and there are meeting goings [sic] on right - right now amongst people who are very excited about Earth observations, which is - which - which is - largely not even a conceived program a couple of years ago, I guess. So once again there, you - you have these capabilities that do exist. I mean, it's very difficult sometimes to - to substantiate a claim that we do need a lot of film on board for Just sort of out-the-window photography. It turns out all that is pretty good and useful. WWEKY Let me ask you another kind of generic problem with respect, to the over - overhead and housekeeping percentages as a percentage or overall time, with the reason for asking the question being aimed at the degree of training that has to go to experimenters that would fly in - in a spacelab type of thing. With respect to your own training background and - and there being undoubt edly orders of magnitude - the difference between the the training that - that - that a experimenter would 262 ,/ �QUERY (CONT'D) get to be launched in a - in spacelab and the training that you fellows got. GIBSON Well - - QUERY In overhead time. GIBSON In overhead time - - CARR - - ... this one. GIBSON Overhead associated with housekeeping? QUERY Stowage, yeah, housekeeping, stowage. GIBSON Yes. I think it ought to be in order of magnitude different. We all found that we'd become much better if we could specialize in any given field up there. When we tried to became a jack of all trades, we ended up just literally a master of none, and chasing ourselves around not learning to become proficient rapidly. That was one of the problems we had quite early in the mission, or that really went on for the first month or so, is we were going in so darned many different directions trying to learn tasks we had not even been trained for that we couldn't do the ones which really required competence and a lot of capability. We could not really train 263 < �V) GIBSON (CONT'D) ourselves on orbit except over a very long period of time, operating the ATM or EREP or doing some of the medical experiments for them. CARR Yeah, we have to learn how to ferret out items or tasks that - that have potential large or high overheads involved with them. We've already pointed out one very high overhead thing, and that is whatever you don't train a guy for down here, you better be prepared to pay the price on orbit because the overhead is going to be excessive. now. And I think that is a true axicm right That if you - if you don't train me to do a given Job down here or if it's impossible to train me to do a Job, then you better figure about 200 percent or more time available on orbit for overhead while I learn how to cope with it in a zero-g situation. POGUE Regardless how simple it looks. QUERY It there - is there a statement there or ... that says, in a - in a case where you are launching X number of of experiments, specialist type of thing in a spacelab, let's say, that you're going - you're going to need other people Just for housekeeping type of thing? ) 26k �V) CARR Either that or design your housekeeping for minimum overhead. Another good one here is - is the fecal collection thing on our - our mission. The fecal col lector equipment itself is very good equipment and it's a great step forward, a ... jump over Apollo and - and systems previous to that. But the fact of the matter is, in order - to - to - take a crap, it's a 20-minute affair: 5 minutes are involved in the physiological function and the other 15 is the paperwork and the processing that goes afterwards. And that's overhead. When you've got a 3 to 1 overhead margin on a simple thing like going to the bathroom, you've got to start thinking ways to get around it because that time is too valuable to spend cleaning yourself up and weighing and marking labels and pulling stickyback tape off of the bag and sealing the bag and and putting it into an oven and setting a timer on an oven and all that stuff, and of all the sudden you've shot 20 minutes. And some days it was difficult to find 20 minutes available. And when Mother Nature is clawing at you, and you know it's going to take you 20 minutes, you know, you - you either get constipated or you say, I'm going, to hell with the schedule; and then you're further behind by the time you've cleared out of the head again. \ 265 And there ain't no way anybody �CARR (CONT'D) is going to schedule personal hygiene for you. When you got to go, you got to go; and it doesn't matter what's on the schedule. eat you alive. And that overhead will just Overhead time on food preparation has got to be reduced. POOUE Trash management following food. CARR Trash management overhead has got to be reduced. And these are things that it doesn't take an engineer to sort out. It just takes people that - that will get in and mess around with the nitty gritty of it and do • it a few times and say, now how is a better way to do this? And you don't have to be an engineer to do that. And that's where you say that you need people other than engineers on the team working with you, people with that rare talent to rear back and look at the big picture without getting all caught up in the details. QUERY What was the picture in trash management? POGUE In trash, depends on what you mean, but after food preparation you had a lot of bulk to dispose of. if there was - It involved two stages : Even temporary manage ment of the stuff right after the meal, and then periodic disposal of the bulk in the trash airlock. 266 �QUERY What would make it simpler? POOUE Well - - CARR The can crusher, for instance. If you had a meal that involved six cans, maybe two of the cans were wet cans; that is, food that was not in a - in a packaging in the can, which meant that you couldn't crush that can or you would squirt garbage all over the place. So those two cans had to be put in the overcans in the disposal well. Any dry cans that you had, because of our need to - to conserve trash bags and stuff, we had to crush in order to make - make room. And so you find yourself spending a lot of time just managing your trash, making sure that this gets in its right place and that gets in its right place. QUERY Have you ever tried the bean count, Jerry, or - or, Bill, Ed? What - what the overhead in your mission was timewise, the percentage of the whole. If you broke the whole mission down into sleep time, overhead time, and useful work time type of thing; what that split might be? 1 267 �CARR No, we haven't. It would depend quite a bit on the - the phase of the mission too, the time. During what we call the period of adjustment, that period where you are physiologically getting used to your surroundings, the overhead time is tremendous. Once you become ac climated to your - to your environment and you are in a situation where you're up with or ahead of the schedule, the overhead time is greatly reduced. In our particular case, there was a period of time between when we got physiologically adapted and when we caught up with the schedule, and that was an extra 20 or so days in which we were always behind schedule. And then you get into the haste-makes-waste overhead where you make so many mistakes that you - you greatly increase your overhead just because you're - you're hurrying so fast and your making errors and causing - that causes extra work that has to be handled. QUERY Let - let - let me pursue that Just for a minute if - if I can, and I'm not a crew systems type so excuse the sim plicity of the question. But with respect to your adapta tion to - to flight after you get that type of thing, in recognizing the fact that many of the ... missions are going to have to be done on Shuttle in 7-days type of thing, 268 �how does - how does the - how do you - how do you dove tail the amount of that 7 days that it takes to acclimate yourself? I think that's what we were talking about earlier in that you specialize. If any one of us had to go up and run one task, we would have adapted much easier. If Jerry and Bill were going to run strictly EREP as soon as they got up there, they could have - after the first pass, I think, been pretty good at i t , fairly proficient. If I were to run ATM after I first got up there, nothing else, and not tried to become a master of everything that was up there, spread myself very thin and try to learn 50 new tasks all in the first week, I think we all would have done much better. So for a 7-day mission, i t makes 1 sense, if you approach it from the standpoint of having the guys very specialized, trained for those specific tasks only and only require them to do those specific tasks. Yes, a real time-consumer is developing the techniques of - of coordinating a mixed bag of tasks. And if you reduce the number of tasks in the bag that the guy has got to cope with, he is going to get efficient a whole lot quicker. 269 �POGUE And you will reduce the overhead, too. CARR Yes. And so that's why we think in the Shuttle case where you got a guy that's going to go up there and he is only really required to do one main Job and he might have just a couple of collaterals that are fairly simple, he'll probably accommodate a whole lot quicker as far as his personal efficiency. But what he's got to get over first is his physiological problems. The fact that his gut doesn't feel good and he's a little bit dizzy maybe, or maybe he's Just got a headache across here because of the fluid shift that's just driving him out of his gourd. And a guy who does not have the experience or the - the access to experienced people that we've had, this - his personal well-being is certainly going to be I very - foremost in his mind for a while. GIBSON One thing that the Shuttle faces as a major disadvantage which everybody ought to recognize is that in 7 days, the best you are going to be able to do is to try to guess what the guy should be doing every minute of those days and flight plan it that way. And you are going to specify in detail what's going to happen every - every one of those 7 days. When you get up there and along around the 5th or 6th day these guys are going to say, gee, you 270 �know we ought to be running these experiments in the following way; we could get our data a little bit better. We found this true as we went on. All the way through the mission we found that we could learn how to improve things and really make significant advances that way. I think in 7 days you're going to see very little of that. You are going to see very little growth in the abilities of guys to improve the way in which you get data. Learning curve's got a shallow slope. Jerry, we're about to run over. Do you guys need to do that? Pardon? Learning curve has got a shallow slope in that case. Yes, 7 days just won't do it for you, and the problem that it's going to force you - that's going to keep you from doing it is that if it's only 7 days long, everybody is going to want something done that would add up to 8 or 9 days. And you're going to be trying to pack that mission so full the guy's not going to have a chance to think. And that's what you need, a little time to sit back and ... - - 271 �POGUE He's going to screw up the first couple of days, and then he is going to try to do 9 days' work in 5 days. GIBSON 1 think this 7 days is Just a lousy way to use man in flight. You really ought to get him up there for a good period of time where he's got a - he can learn and the whole system can learn with him and not try to overspecify what he does. That's one of the problems that NASA has in general is to try to overspecify what happens. We found this true. Guys were sending up flight plans that just had way too much detail in them. QUERY Thank you. QUERY Okay, thank you very much. GIBSON Okeydoke. o QUERY I'm sorry we ran over a little bit. QUERY And we'll see you guys in the morning at nine, huh? GIBSON Fine. \ 272 �> Morning Session QUERY Jerry, this morning we were going to check the thermal/ environmental control systems, electrical power, attitude pointing control and then get into the crew systems. Ed tells me he's only going to be here for a few minutes and ... the APCS. And that's a very short one anyway; so I think we'll take it first if - CARR Okay, very fine. QUERY if that's all right with you. And Chris Rupp [?] is here from Marshall to represent that, and I think we only have one or two questions. So, Chris, why don't you go ahead. RUPP Yes. When the CMG went out, this made the APS - APCS a lot more sensitive to problems like gimbal stops - on the CMGs hitting to gimbal stops during maneuvers. And in an attempt to try to give you of the crew the - sane cues as to how to monitor the APCS system, we came up with general message that you can use. And we tried to figure out how to word the general message where it would be suitable in Just about all the cases we could think of. And so what we came up with was, you could monitor the 273 �RUPP (CONT'D) the maneuver rates and also the - I think we put in there at one time, too, the capability for you to call up on the DAS to display an attitude-error parameter. I wonder whether you people might have some comments that would allow us to in the future maybe come up with a better scheme in monitoring the vehicle performance? GIBSON Yes, I thought that that - what was worked up, considering how long you had to do it and that we never really had thought that serious about two CMGs - we thought about it but never really pressed our nose into saying, well, here it is right now - I thought that all came off real well, and I was very - very happy with all of the schemes that came up. The details - Well, first, I guess that's TACS attitude error you were talking about that is called up. We found that it took an awful lot of crew time to monitor these things during a maneuver. And in the future, if we do come up with a system which is so sensitive that you ought to be monitoring those parameters, then we ought to do it like all of the other caution and warning parameters and have a tolerance which is allowed allowed. And if it exceeds that tolerance, then you get a - an alert or a caution. Particular, attitude error, if you're stable, or vehicle rates. 21k Maybe there's a way �GIBSON (CONT'D) of sensing what the vehicle - specifying what the vehicle rates should be for a given maneuver; and when it deviates appreciably from that, whatever you consider is off nominal, put a - an alert condition. In terms of monitoring the - the gimbals, there's another one especially when we're monitoring for - for solar inertial and you're working the ATM. There were several occasions, you know, where we got a momentum configuration which would put the gimbals on a stop and we'd deviate from solar inertial. And there again, it would be useful to have some way of predicting that ahead of time or at least giving you an early indication of it. I think we just lucked out on the one instances where we - one instance where we did get a flare on the rise, because right pre ceding that, we had gone off attitude and had put in a 3-minute maneuver time and cctne back. Had we known about that before the orbit began, we would have cleared that problem up before the - right at the outset of the orbit. So there, again, in caution - in alert condition we would like to see something which would specify the probability of getting a gimbal on a stop - if that really is a possible situation - or at least tell you that you're within 5 degrees of a stop, if you can't predict that well - can't put a scheme on board to predict it 275 �/ GIBSON (CONT'D) because, I guess, it was pretty complicated down here to predict it. Your - your model down here was very sensitive, I guess, to all the venting and all other things that we've used in spacecraft all the time caution and warning conditions and trying to get - get those parameters down so they tell you early enough that you've got a problem. In future systems, I'd like to see something like what we've talked about for a long time back in the old days, when we were flying this thing in late 68 and we didn't have enough time to change things around. That was in 66. We talked about magnetic desaturation, using the Earth's field, and / react that against magnetic moment, which you could create on board by putting current through large loops of wire, which I guess is done on quite a few other spacecraft. But the need for that never became apparent. It certainly was during our mission and - and all throughout the whole Skylab, because the use of TACS just was a - a really prohibitive. We were, as you know, really con cerned about it in the first mission, SL-1, before they even got the guys up there and we had the EGIL special attitude - which really burned the TACS up - and in pointing out that - the real problems that you run into by trying to come up with a - a limited lifetime system 276 �GIBSON (CONT'D) like the TACS, as opposed to something which is open ended like this magnetic desaturation would be. Also, we spent an awful lot of nightsides doing gravity gradient dumps from high beta when we could have been getting good solar data or good data with the scientific airlock. It was holding a fixed attitude and — and getting seme of the other experiments working, I think, that's severely limited the amount of data we will be able to bring back with all the corollary experiments and the ATM. CARR Oh, even at low beta. It really didn't matter about the beta. GIBSON Well, for the - - CARR Just the fact that we had such a long dump angle. GIBSON Yes, I was thinking high beta for the ATM and all betas for the other astronomy experiments or even Bill Thornton's chair, BMMD. We couldn't do anything with the - with a maneuver in, and again, that would disappear if we had magnetic desaturation; so I would really make it strong pitch for that in the future. But, again, it worked real well, and I was really happy with the way that - that all information came up. We all learned along with you. The cards changed about - We had a cue card up there with - 277 �GIBSON (CONT'D) We had it taped on there. And we have four or five taped one over the other, and it Just got thicker and thicker. But we learned right along with you, and it worked out real well. We did more maneuvering with two CMGs than I ever anticipated we would do with three. And that goes to - That's a credit for everybody who worked on that one. POGUE One of the things that's implied by Ed's comments wasn't mentioned specifically, and that is a limited - limit to three displays. And this, of course, is why he was wanting a caution and warning or some - some kind of indication when you're approaching limits. A lot of time, you call out the - Well, you can call any of three. You call - can call up three displays at any time. may have attitude errors. You You may have attitude or something else - rates, etc. So even though you have called about errors, you've got to keep switching back and forth. Then there's a good argument to be made for having something like a CRT, where you can display a number of parameters en masse, like it's in the MOCR. But that would of - It would have helped if you had been able to see all the stuff. We were always clicking back and forth or doing something there, trying to get the right displays up. 278 �GIBSON One last thing - which - it was in the tech debrief, but I'll Just mention it here also - on ACPS. When we started doing JOP l8D and we were really maneuvering the spacecraft around, it became obvious that there are two types of maneuvering that we were doing. One was large scale, getting over to the target, and there was a very one was a very fine pointing. you try to get on target. But once you get to it, And trying to maneuver the - the whole vehicle to large angles the way we did, it was perfectly satisfactory. Put in DAS entries and make the maneuver and monitor rates of CMGs. Eut for the small maneuvers, where we are Just maybe making a - a drift correction every 5 - 3 or It or 5 minutes in order to keep up with the ccmet or to try to locate it, center it, it took 20 key strokes every time we wanted to make a - a maneuver. And it became obvious that we were doing nothing more than what the ATM was doing on the Sun. And we ought to have a - a closed loop system - that is, a visual feedback - so you could see what you want to point at with a telescope, for example, so you can actually see the target. And secondly, have a little swizzle stick there - little control stick - the same way as we had on the ATM - which allows you to Just move over there. And you Just put step entries into 279 �GIBSON (CONT'D) the - The stick could put step entries into the CMGs in the same way you do with the - through the - through the DAS. QUERY One thing on the JOP 18D that - You Just reminded me of of it. The - One of the problems that we might have had was that nonlinearity in the television monitor, the - where a circle doesn't turn out to be a circle. And I wondered whether you had noticed, say on S052, when you were looking at the Sun and seeing it on the display, whether the occulting disk appeared as a circle or had some distortion? GIBSON That slightly - appeared slightly oval. And we called t h i s down and asked i f people wanted measurements of i t , and no one really . . . about i t . QITERY It would have been - In retrospect, it would have been useful to have that measurement so that we could correct JOP 18D measurements that you made in order to - - GIBSON Yes. QUERY - - put in the bias maneuver. GIBSON I never really felt too satisfied with that whole system. The only way - It always took me a little bit longer to do the maneuvers on JOP 18 than were allowed for 280 �GIBSON because they usually made two maneuvers rather than one. I'd go down to - If you started with - at this point out here, I usually try to maneuver twice the amount over to here and yet end up over here somewhere. that attitude error is. You see what Get yourself right back into here and then figure half of that attitude error in. Hopefully, that would eliminate that. But, again, what you're pointing out is that maybe this whole thing is nonlinear from here to here. In other words, this distance which looks half here might only be 1*5 percent. QUERY All the other TV display systems that really - you would want to mak.e measurements, you have marks on the face of your camera, too, that would show up as, say, a black spot or a white spot on your monitor, and this would provide a calibration of any - any errors in nonlinearity you might have. GIBSON Yes. What you're saying is, we should have had i t on the TV itself, right on the - the vidicon. QUERY Right on the vidicon. GIBSON Right on the face - like you have a resolve lens on a camera. 281 �QUERY Yes. '-IBSON Yes, that would have helped. Of course, the best thing is to have a telescope which gives you a - a closed loop feedback so you can just - •H'SRY : :kn v ." Completely optical, rather than electronic? Yes. Well, it could be a through a telescope. - a vidicon again, looking But, of course, this thing - whole thing was put on at the last minute. QUERY That's right. uIBSON' It was not designed for what we were doing; so I was pretty happy we were at least able to do something with it. But it was - You know, when you wanted that thing right down there to 0.01 of a degree all the time, right on the nucleus, there was no way we could guarantee we'd be any where near that close. I was figuring 0.02 or 0.03 is more like the nominal error. QUERY One thing on the minor attitude biases, we found out really too late to do anything about. That quantization in the ATMDC made it where if you entered a 0.01, it would come out to Just be something like 0.005; so this could be one of the reasons why we had some problems 282 �QUERY (CONT'D) with making these bias maneuvers. Seemed like every - 0.01 was the worst error, 0.06 was very accurate, and then 0.07 would be real bad again. And 0.0 - 0.12 would be very - - GIBSON Is this conversion of decimal to octal? Is that the - - QUERY Something in there. QUERY We had to make all the entries, though, in octal. I - I don't - - talk to you more about that. I'll I don't think it's necessary to hang up everybody in here, but that was probably on the same level of error as centering the display and reading it, too. CARR Anything else, Chris? QUERY You guys got anything else on APCS? GIBSON No. QUERY Okay, very good. We'll go to the thermal ECS then, and Bill Patterson will lead the discussion. PATTERSON The - the first question concerns humidity level. Early- in-the-mission crew comments - and then again in the tech debriefing - in - indicated that the humidity level was lower than desired during the first part of the mission, 283 �and there was some discussion about using wet towels to increase that level. Did you ever really do anything like use wet towels to increase the humidity in the first part of the mission? We never had time. Also, in the tech debriefing, the comment was stated that the humidity level was good. Was that good from a comfort standpoint or good from the standpoint that to that moisture tended to dry up, you know, and not cause any problems in that period or both? Well, after we got used to it, it was from a comfort standpoint. But at first, when we got there, it took our bodies a while to adjust to it. skin and dandruff. We had a lot of cracking We had to take a lot of special precautions to keep the humidity from bugging us. And once we adjusted to that, it was - it was good from a physio logical standpoint. And, of course, the other one is the fact that it dried up quickly. You didn't have the moisture that promoted the growth of bacteria and things like that. So we had enough fungus up there, and if it had been any - any damper up there, we would have probably had a whole lot more. 28h �PATTERSON Thank you. PATTERSON Again, from the tech debriefing, the comment was made that lint and condensate water was sucked out of the OWS heat exchangers during cleaning. There was only one time that we thought this occurred. This was on mission day 66 when we actually got - we knew we had water - or pretty sure we had water in those heat exchangers. The question is, did that occur, or did you notice that each time you cleaned them, or was that the only time you noticed that? POOUE We noticed it each time we cleaned them after I made the special tool modification. And what it was - it was a regular crevice tool which I modified with the lid on a food can to make it so that it was perpendicular on the end. QUERY Hu-huh. POGUE And then I took seme Mosite and wrapped around it so that I could mash it down against the - the vanes , cooling vanes on the OWS heat exchanger in order to create a fairly good seal. And that was - that was the first time that we had noticed water in the heat exchanger vanes. Now this was during very high beta angle. 285 �CARR We never saw water in there, did we? You'd look down there and it Just looked like a lot of lint. POGUE Only after - after I got through vacuuming. If you looked down in there when you took the cover off, it looked fine. It looked - it looked like it was crudded up with lint. CARR Yes, but dry. POGUE But dry. PATTERSON Another thing, we noticed that the dewpoint on mission day 65, the day before we asked, you know, about the cleaning - that the dewpoint went up a few degrees. Do you recall any unusual spills or anything that might have brought the dewpoint up? CARR Well, there's - there's a few things that will bring the dewpoint up in the workshop. day. Number 1 is the shower Another one would be the day that I do command module housekeeping number 7 when I bring three to four sloppy wet towels down into the waste management compart ment to dry out. The idea here was that we soaked up all the condensation water in the - in the command module and I certainly didn't want to leave the towels there to 286 �CARR (CONT'D) dry out, or the condensate would just end up right back where it was. So I took the towels as far away as I could, and that was to the waste management compart ment where we had seme towel holders to stuff them in, and we'd let them dry down there. So you might check and see if - if the log indicates that I had Just finished, maybe the day before, doing an - a housekeeping command module number 7GIBSON What day was that? PATTERSON Mission day 6 5 . GIBSON Oh, okay. 7-day housekeeping - - It was a little later than that, towards the end of the mission, when we had the rice seeds growing. We took the cover off and - and then just put water on the outside. And it was about this size of a cover, maybe about this far across. And I took and put a bubble of water on there like this. would evaporate in about a day and a half. And that So we had an area of maybe 3 inches by 6 inches or water evaporating all the time the last week or so. PATTERSON It took a day and a half to evaporate? GIBSON Yes, it took about a day and a half. 287 �PATTERSON That's - Okay. POGUE It sounds like that's about the - that was on about a day off too. CARR 6 5 , that's days. Let's see, we had a day off on day TO, didn't we, or 71? Day 70 was an EVA, I believe, 71 or something. POGUE Well, I remember - - CARR That's about right. POGUE It's about right for a day off. CARR It's close to a day off. PATTERSON Could have - could have been a shower day. CARR Yes. PATTERSON So, in summary, you do feel like it was water in those OWS heat exchangers that - - ? POGUE No doubt about it. PATTERSON Okay, that's interesting. POGUE Because we had water in vacuum cleaner bags to the point that it degraded the operation. In fact, I figured out one of those - I didn't know it was getting 288 �POGUE (CONT'D) water on - I noticed a distinct chilling effect on the the metal part of the vacuum cleaner - the handle. And I wasn't aware that that was "being caused by - by sucking water up in there, until it was too late. I got water in the bag; I got water in the hose. PATTERSON The next question concerns the ATM C&D loop. You asked to turn the pump off during sleep periods at - when we had the high-flow rates and the question is, was the noise of the pump both - bothersome during normal working hours, or only when you were trying to sleep? GIBSON I guess it was noticeable during normal working hours. I wouldn't say it was really bothersome. You had the rate gyros drilling away in your ears when you were at the ATM, and the other noise was perceptible, but not that much more annoying. CARR When you're awake, noise levels like that, you get used to. GIBSON Yes. CARR For instance, that lousy 6-cycle-per-second radio tone that we had, Just got terrible. But you got used to it. And this thing - this ATM coolant loop tone was a pain 289 �CARR (CONT'D) in the neck when you let it - you know, when you listen to it and let it bug you. But after a while, you Just mentally begin to block those sort of things out and you forget about them. But at night when you're not thinking and you're not busy, then noises like that begin to bother you, and that's why we wanted to shut it down. PATTERSON Okay, the next question concerns the ventilation system. Results of previous debriefings indicated that the ventilation diffusers were not frequently adjusted. Were the floor diffusers adjusted with any frequency to attain comfort? And if so, what position were the diffusers generally left in? GIBSON Sleep compartment, I think is the only ones where they actually changed. For myself, when we got to high beta, I used to direct the flow more up towards the sleep restraints. Other times, I'd have it Just ad - adjusted to the minimum flow rate that I could get without getting a lot of noise associated with the turbulent air flow. PATTERSON But as far as the circular diffuser, you didn't see readjust those? GIBSON No, I didn't change with those things at all. 290 �I changed the one up there by EREP, I think, twice. To keep - It got pretty cool in the MDA and - working at the C&D panel for an extended period of time or even the VTS. At one position, I don't know which it was, but it blew right on your head. This - we - We noticed the comment about the possibility of using a swivel. Yes, that'd been nice. Yes. Would you comment on your thermal comfort or general comfort throughout the mission? We had plenty of control. Except for the - for Ed's sleep compartment. That's where the hot spot was ? Yes. Yes, I really got warm in there, but there again, it didn't feel that uncomfortable because the humidity was way down. But it was a thing if you tried to go to sleep for some reason where a little too high a temperature, you Just couldn't go to sleep, and that's what I experienced. I didn't feel too uncomfortable 291 �GIBSON (CONT'D) in there, but have you ever tried to go to sleep when the - out in the desert with the air 85, or whatever it is in there; a lot of radiant heat ccming off the wall. POGUE It just was not possible. That radiant heat was - I walked in there a couple of times and it was - it really impressed you as being very, very warm in there. CARR Drives those - - There's a lot radiant heat over behind the workshop control panel - the instrument panel over there, panel 600 series. POGUE Right. CARR Lots of heat - radiant heat off those things - - POGUE And the plus-Z SAL, of course and those wat - in the water tank area above that. Where you walk over there and do something and the - the - had the dry bulb temper ature of so many degrees plus that radiant heat, boy, it would really build your body heat load up fast. CARR It's amazing how sensitive the - your body is to this these temperatures. I noticed, just as soon as we started up in the hot case, we all started having trouble getting 292 �CARR to sleep. When you get about, oh, something like (CONT'D) 2 or 3 degrees above what's comfortable to you, it starts bothering you. PATTERSON This - - CARR You have to readjust. PATTERSON You mentioned the plus-Z SAL and you - you also mentioned the water tank, directly above that on position - - POGUE Actually it was -I'm sorry, it wasn't right above it. It was over - if you were facing the plus-Z SAL, it was over to the right some. Wouldn't that be water tank 3? CARR Let's see. I guess it's more - - POGUE Or U? CARR Wouldn't you say it's more over toward T020, M509? POGUE That's what I mean. CARR Film vault area there, which I think was right tinder the edge of the parasol and sail. I think so. POGUE It must be over close to the edge of that - - PATTERSON Yes, we would suspect it would be over at the end of the - the edge of the sail. 293 �POGUE And Ed's sleep compartment's on the other end. QUERY Right. PATTERSON Did - while we're talking about hot spots, did you notice any other - or any touch temperature problems encountered following these EREPs and maneuvers at the real high betas; you know, where we turn the shield - we've got the Sun on the gold? GIBSON I never noticed a touch temperature problem at all in - anywhere in the cluster due to any reason. PATTERSON Okay. GIBSON One where they worried about touch temperature was on We turned the ATM coolant loop off and worried about the TV monitors heating up. And you could take one - have one monitor off and one on and jUBt feel the difference between the two, and it was Just barely preceptible. was having it off for half an hour to an hour. the details on the downlink once. And that I gave And I think we were really overconservative in use of that ATM C&D with the coolant loop off. PATTERSON We touched on this question yesterday in the contamination session, but, again, did you notice any changes in the 29U �PATTERSON (CONT' D\) gold or the white paint, the gold paint or the white paint from the beginning or end, through the end of the mission; any Deltas? GIBSON Hmmm — CARR I don't think we could - think we sensed it. I sure didn't sense any change. GIBSON No. CARR I'm sure there was seme. The change that I sensed was on the contamination that was deposited on the windows of the command module. As far as colors of the tape or the paint, that was awfully hard to do. I was just im pressed by the fact that it was already tan or yellow when we got there. And I don't have a strong feeling whether it was any more tan or yellow when we left. POGUE The only thing that impressed me - of course, I went out Thanksgiving Day and then later on Christmas Day, and I could tell a difference in the command module, white paint on the command module. But that's all. It was much more gold - or, you know, it was - it was white, obviously, the first week. We went out I guess about day 5 or 6, whenever it was, and then during - on 295 �POGUE (CONT'D) Christmas Day it had definitely turned a much more brown - gold-type color. PATTERSON The next question concerns the odor that was mentioned in the tech debriefing in the waste management compartment near the end of the mission. Let's see. You noticed that - well, what we were trying to do is trace the charcoal canister replacements, which - We only found one on mission day 55. And what we were thinking is maybe the canister was overused or something and allowed some odor, possibly, to get up in the motor. CARR Didn't you folks get the word that we - in our - in our dcwnlink tapes that we - we pulled the boot off the top of the charcoal canister and sniffed, and that it was the odors coming out of the canister were good and clean. But it was out of the blower, is where the odors were ccming from. PATTERSON Yes. CARR So how can you even consider there's a problem with the I guess we were - right. We - - canister? PATTERSON Well, the reason being that it was scheduled for change every 28 days. We were Just wondering if the canister 296 �3 PATTERSON (CONT'D) was left in there a long time, could have - you know, been completely poisoned or something and allowed some thing to get up in that motor to give you the odor in the motor area? CARR I don't know. You guys would know that better than we would. POGUE But you're right; it waB only changed out once. PATTERSON Okay, that's - - QUERY Okay, that's ... PATTERSON There - they have a few questions relative to the refrig eration system. MOSS Okay. Doug Moss, ... During the SL-H deactivation, you guys were asked to go to panel 6ll and close the PRIMARY LOOP circuit breaker on that RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE controller and to cycle the SECONDARY LOOP circuit breaker. Now, each of those motions should not cause any movement of the bypass valves or anything; that's Just setting us up, you know, for postmission testing. POGUE Right. 297 �MOSS But at about the time these things were scheduled, we noticed a definite degradation in the primary loop at that time that we attributed to a bypass valve motion because our temperatures started getting hotter; our pressure dropped off Just like you tried to go to a bypass mode or something, even though it shouldn't have done that. What we want to fine out - if there is a relationship between this apparent failure that we saw and the motions of the circuit breakers. And in listening to the loops, we heard that you guys were asked to doublecheck to see if you had closed those circuit breakers about an hour after we started seeing this degradation. The degradation seemed to be consistent with when you guys should have closed it. What were the results of that doublecheck? We didn't hear any words back. POGUE It was correct. MDSS It was correct? POGUE The configuration was correct, MOSS Okay. POGUE I - I had a pretty good idea what you were talk - why you were asking it. I mean, I didn't know that you'd 298 �POGUE (CONT'D) started experiencing degradation, but I knew there was a problem in this area. MOSS Yes. POGUE Because we had been fairly carefully brief - preflight. CARR When was this done? MOSS Yes, during deactivation. CARR It seems to me I remember we were fooling with the Near the end of the mission? Matter of fact - - refrigeration system real early in the mission, too. Did we - didn't you folks have us do something early in the mission with the system? And it seems to me that your freezer temps all started up and people got kind of worried about it, and then they leveled off and went back where they were, sometime like the first third of the mission, around that period of time. MOSS I don't recall right off. Bill, do you? QUERY No. MOSS But, basically, anything you guys did to the circuit breakers shouldn't have caused it. We're Just trying to see if we can get a relationship, you know, for 299 �/ MOSS (CONT'D) a subsequent check on that. I really don't recall. Listened to the contamination comments yesterday. You stated there was some difference between the apparent degradation of white paints or discoloration versus what was captured on film. Could you comment on that in respect to the radiator - refrigeration system radiator? CARR Oh, we couldn't see that. MOSS Couldn't see it during the flyby? CARR During the flyby, we may have a picture or two on that. POGUE Oh, we do have. MOSS I thought I saw some pictures on the thing, but they We - - look r><1 vpry fjptwii POGUE Oh, yea. MOSS Looked good, huh? POGUE Yes. MOSS Okay. CARR But, again, we were a good distance from it when we saw That - that aft radiator looked all right, it. 300 �QUERY Yes. CARR Because when we went over the ATM, that - at that time, I quit worrying about how close we were and I let our range open as I was moving off toward the separation attitude. And this was - this was planned. We had decided that once we cleared over the top of the ATM and got the top of the workshop, then we wouldn't worry about the range any more or waste any more gas trying to keep it in tight. The photographs, in general, are have a tendency to wash out this thing. We took a look at the master print of the l6-millimeter EVA stuff we took, and that print is a whole lot better color color definition than is the first print that we saw. You know, I - yesterday I wbb complaining because the phiil-ugl-HUhy waahoil OUl. Hi! thai /nU Sots, Wiit 1 was pleased yesterday afternoon, when we looked at the master print, to see that there is better color in that. So it appears that the more times you copy one of these things, or the further down the copy chain it gets, the more of that definition you lose. POGUE One question we should ask you, and that is, it was very easy for us, with the eye, to determine the degrada tion of, say, a white. 301 But the radiator - the refrigeration �POGUE (CONT'D) radiator, that thing on the hack end of the vehicle is, as far as I'm concerned, black body. Wha - How would we recognize the degradation? MOSS The radiator itself was the S13G white paint, that octagonal shape. POGUE Maybe it was a shadow, then. CARR One thing about the white paint is that it looks white We were in SI. from a distance even with our eye. I remember, when we got to the workshop during the rendezvous phase, being so impressed by the stark white, the black, and the gold and how stark and clear they were. And then when we got docked, all the white was all of a sudden stained brown. POGUE Gold. CARR Gold, you know, sort of that - that beige that we've been describing. MOSS So, looking at the photographs, it would be apparent that you guys were a good distance away from the radiator by the time you got around to where you could really see it ... CARR I would say 250 feet. 302 �POGUE But the photographs - there are photographs all the way around. What I suggest you do is the edge. You know the radiator come - is perpendicular and it's - it looks like it's about a foot wide; I don't know how wide it is. Is that white? Is that white paint there? If that is the same white paint that's on the surface of the radiator, then you've got a good gage to go by, because the other - QUERY That looked white to you, then? POGUE No, you look at the picture, and I think the pictures are Would you consider - - fairly accurate; it was Hassleblad. I was not impressed with the degradation of color there. catch ny eye. It looked good. I mean it didn't However, the - the flat portion of the radiator was perpen - was parallel to the Sun line so it was not illuminated. QUERY Okay. POGUE So it'll appear shaded. I thought it was black. If you'll take a look at the - at the Hassleblads, and there are beaucoup pictures as we went over the back side there, then you ought to - you should be able to compare it with the white paint on the booster pattern. QUERY I get you. Okay. 303 • ( �o CARR Yeah, you must realize that during this flyaround that I wasn't at all interested in any kind of detail. I was mainly concerned with keeping my - my vehicle from - in the right relative position to that vehicle, and I was looking at big things. Ed really didn't have much opportunity to look out at all, because he was supposed to be watching my instrument panel and doing some time checks to make sure that we were using - getting around on schedule. And Bill, in the right side, was not as interested in detail because he was busy getting photographic coverage. So i t ' s awfully hard for us to tell you too much about the details of what we saw because we Just weren't looking. > POGUE There is a good gage for whiteness in that the - one pole sail. I think you're familiar with our report that one of the folds opened up and exposed a relatively new white area? I suggest you use that as a sort of garden-variety gouge and gage. QUERY Okay. I want to show you a sketch that I made here. a crude one. It's These are the - consider this as a food storage freezer with the three doors here. We determined kind of late in our design that we had some thermal shorts where these little X's are. CARR ) You sure did. And I think that's where - - �QUERY - - you saw most of the ice buildup. ahead time. We were aware of it But what we did is run a little test program to try to satisfy ourselves that that wasn't going to be a problem versus, you know, a major redesign of that area. So I'm gonna ask you a couple or three questions as my last questions, and, if you would, comment with respect to that area as well as any other areas that might have ice on them, because I think there would be a significant difference in the thickness of ice and so forth. POGUE And - - Are you talking about the chiller and two freezers, or is that the three freezers up in - - QUERY Well, either one. I - you should have seen it between the two freezers ... CARR Between the two freezers down below? QUERY Right. CARR You definitely did have the thermal short there, and the first ice buildup that you would get would be a line, like an icicle sort of thing, right there. QUERY Sticking out between the doors. 305 �CARR Right. And then as that ice built up, as it got bigger, it would begin, apparently, to distort the door a little bit, and that would allow ice to build up all the way around the door. QUERY I see. CARR And about the time the - the ground came up with a house keeping assignment to scrape the ice was about the time we were beginning to have trouble opening the door because of friction in the - in the latch. QUERY And that was - then the first time it became a problem is the next question I have, which is really kind of routine to you. It became a problem, I guess, about every time it was time to clean it. POGUE That's about right. And when the power to close the doors - open the doors - CARR The symptom was you'd close the door, you'd slam the door, and it would close and then you would have to really fight with the button to get it to unlatch, because there was so much friction. You'd push on the handle of the door and push down on the - on the lever - on the handle in order to unlatch the door. 306 �QUERY Okay, now one other thing on that, on the freezer I guess there was a piece of metal foil tape, you know, like so wide, that went around the freezer itself that the rubber seal stood against. Did you notice that previous crews cleaned this freezer or anything? to be cleaned as you know. That thing wasn't meant Did you see any apparent mechanical degradation of that foil? Was it torn, any thing like that that might accelerate an ice problem? CARR Yes. POGUE Very definitely. CAR P And we did our bit on it, too. P0GUE That's right. We sure didn't help it any. And I would suggest that in future systems you have removable ones, replaceable ones. Either that or get a hot - have a frostfree or self-defrosting or something, because that was a real problem. It's hard to get to, too. I think we've already mentioned that little inner door there; that really presented a problem. QUERY Yes, that's right. QUERY That's all the questions I have on refrigeration. QUERY That's all I have. 307 �J QUERY Anything else, Bill? QUERY I see EGIL Steve back there. Steve, you got any questions you want to ask in the thermal/ECS area? McLENDON Now, one of the - one of the things that was - that was brought up, I think, at the first - - CARR Want to slip him the microphone there? McLENDON One of the - one of the things that you were talking about there at the first that - you were talking about some stuff that we asked you to do in the first - I think it was about the first week of the mission, as far as the oil system went. We had you play around with it. I remember that fairly well, and what the thing here was is that we saw one of our chiller temps decrease about - I guess it was about 5 or 6 degrees. parameters looked good. And all the other The only way we could explain it as far as a rational explanation was if you - if you transferred something out of the freezers into the chillers. POGUE And we hadn't done it. McLENDON And we'd asked you about that, and to this day that ex that remains a nystery to us, and we just don't know what happened there. 308 �POGUE That was a clear-cut answer that we gave you. I looked in there, and there was nothing in there and no one had transferred anything in there, and we couldn't explain that spike anyway. CARR That's right, that was that. McLENDON Okay, thank you. QUERY Okay, thank you very much. Black magic. I guess we're ready for the electrical power system then. CARR Wait until I ... without ... POGUE GIBSON GIBSON I'm sure we've got two or three or four other ones. CARR Well, I can't think of any . . . QUERY Did you guys get coffee? POGUE No, thank you. CARR I'm good for right now, thanks. QUERY A1 Woosley from Marshall will lead the questions. when you're ready, go ahead. 309 Al, �POGUE QUERY QUERY QUERY WOOSLEY What about the ... acting ... You can - It'll - the mike will lock up. There you go. Push it in and raise it. Push it in and raise it. These are the EPS nations. During predock and station. keeping, where we have reference to these Rations, are the full lights on the discone antenna visible! they visible! And wer, And do you think that they were necessary t° have lights on the discone antenna! Did you observe them? CARR I didn't observe then at night, because about the time I could see it out the front window is when we pitched for ward, so Bill, who was looking out the telescope, could probably co-ent on that. But see we were pitched up so that I couldn't see the - the workshop during the breaking during the final terminal phase. And after 1 did the last mideourse is when we pitched up, and I could see it, a*d we were already In daylight. POGUE WOOSLEY Yes, I could see the lights. You could see it? 310 So - - �POGUE Yes. CARR I would think that for night stationkeeping that you would want those lights, because you need to spread out your target as much as you can at night and get your peripheral vision as good a chance as you can, because depth perception isn't - is nil at night anyway because the loss of - what is it the rods or the cones - I can never get it straight. But anyway there - - POGUE Cones. CARR The one - one type of visual sensor Just doesn't work at night, and that's where you get your depth perception. So you need them. WOOSLEY You would - even though you didn't use them, you would recommend them. CARR Yes, sir. If I had to do any night stationkeeping, I'm pretty sure I would have been very thankful they were there, WOOSLEY Are all of the colored running lights still burning on the airlock? POGUE Couldn't say. CARR Yes, I couldn't say either. And - 311 See, we left in daylight. �WOOSLEY And you came up in - in the night. SPEAKER But on rendezvous, do you remember? POGUE I - it was a bunch of lights. I - I didn't have anything to compare it with, you know, I Just - CARR See that was U months ago. There's no way we're going to remember that kind of thing. QUERY Do you recall - - QUERY There were - excuse me. There were some photography - some movies taken at that time and stills. You might want to check the photographic record for the specifics. You will be able to tell some of that, you know, from whatever photography is there. POGUE Might be able to do that, because the - if I remember cor rectly, we got some - with a fairly good lens, we got some pictures of that during the stationkeeping and prior to docking. black. And the workshop was against night sky or the So if it registered - of course it was brightly illuminated, so it may have washed it out. But you can check it for that. CARR We talked about putting the camera up to that telescope. Remember? And taking a picture, and then we never did get around to doing it. 312 �WOOSLEY Do you recall if any of the AM EVA lights had burned out? CARR No, sir. POGUE We had plenty of light at night. CARR The lighting was excellent at night on the EVA trail. I don't think so. They were all right. WOOSLEY CARR I don't remember seeing any that were dark. WOOSLEY You commented quite a bit about the lights in the airlock, but I'm going to ask you, if you don't mind, a few more questions or one question. How many of the 10-watt and 20-watt airlock lights required replacement? CARR I changed out every one of the lights in the aft airlock on one occasion and a lot of them were still working, but they were very, very dim because the filament had plated out on the inside of the glass and just completely wiped out the light itself. And I noticed that one or two lights in the STS area and in the forward airlock *ere about ready for replacement, but I never got around to it. was just one day when I wanted the light. It I was getting ready to service the PLSS bottles or the PSS bottles. And I decided, well, once I've started, I'll go ahead and change them all. It only took a couple or 3 minutes to do it, 313 �3 CARR (CONT'D) but it was either burnt out or it was so degraded due to the plating on the inside of the glass that it required changing, but it was a very marked degradation of light, transmissivity. QUERY Now is this the bigger - the 20-watt bulbs or the hand rail lights too. Did they deposit - - CARR Oh yes, the handrail lights had deposits on them, too. QUERY Both of them? CARR The ones on the aft airlock, it seemed to me, were the 3 small lights, the 5 or whatever that amp was - 10. QUERY 10 watts are the small ones. CARR Yes. But you know, we saw a few of those light bulbs over in the trainer all plated out too, and we were kind of surprised by that and remembered the other crews telling us, yes, and you're going to see that in flight, you're going to see a lot of those lights plated out. And that's surprising to me. QUERY I guess we missed out in the other debriefings; we didn't get a report. At least I don't recall ever hearing a report until we saw yours on this deposit. 3 3U* �CARR I wasn't surprised when I saw them plated out because we've seen them in the trainer all plated out, and I was surprised why we ever bought that kind of light if it was going to plate out on us. QUERY Did you have any problems - did you encounter any problems in the replacement of the bulbs? CARR POGUE No, sir; simple bayonet fitting, no problem at all. One of the things that bugged me about those incandescent light covers was that they didn't seem to want to stay in position; they're always sliding out - out of position. CARR QUERY POGUE CARR POGUE CARR They were very easily bumped free. Now is this the ones on the handrails or - Yes, on the handrails. Those little ball detents Just weren't strong enough. They weren't strong enough. I'm surprised we didn't kick those things off and then Kick a ligftt bulb and break it, but we never did. QUERY Never did break one? 315 �CARR But we sure did bang a lot of those covers off and have them slide down the handles. QUERY Now, let's see, the 20-watt bulbs had the metallic screens over the glass. Isn't that right, Dennis? You had a screen over the glass on that large one. Did the tracking and the acquisition lights operate properly? The blinking lights? POGUE Yes. CARR We kind of figured there would be - it would make tracking a little more difficult having an occulting light. And, as I remember, you made a comment that by golly, Just like the simulator, it made it a little more difficult to track when it was occulting. QUERY Oh, it did make it more difficult? POGUE Well, yes, the thing is, when you're tracking with the little control. You're ready, being ready to mark, and the period of the flashes is such that during the dark period, you don't know where the target is for control. So, everytime it blinks, you know you're - you're chasing it back to the crosshairs. So then when it blinks, if it's on a crosshairs, you mark real fast. 316 That's the problem. �CARR The message here is that the occulting period of the light for tracking lights should be, I think, sped up. POGUE Yes, it was like a strobe, you know, about 3 cycles a second. Even if it was only on for a thousandth of a second, it would enhance the tracking operation. QUERY Give you a more continuous light so you could get your mark. POGUE Yes. CARR I guess the reason for the occulting, the flashing of the light, was to - so that we could tell it from a star at night, but the thing was we Just had a - the frequency was much too - too low. And it was off too long and if you were trying to track that rascal into a crosshairs to make a mark, it would go out Just as you were getting into a crosshairs to make a mark, it would go out Just as you were getting into the crosshairs and you would say well, shall I mark or shall I not and if you don't it will almost always end up outside on the other side or something. POGUE That's compounded by attitude control system thruster fire, the RCS thruster fires in the command module. 317 So �POGUE (CONT'D) if you have a fire in - while the thing is off and you mark, you can - you could induce a large error in the solution. QUERY Okay. You got to be very careful. Did any of your airlock status lights burn out much on the panels? We'll say 203, Ul6, 205, 206, those status lights? POGUE No, we watched those; we kept them down and out, respec tively , the ones that had the rheostats and so forth. So they didn't burn out like they did on the simulator. QUERY Or like they did at the Cape, too. POGUE Yes. QUERY Next question concerns electrical connectors. Right. Which type of connector is preferred for connecting and disconnecting by the crew, the zero-g or the microdot airlock or the Bendix with the crew assist ring? Would you care to comment about connectors, in general, that you had to mate and demate. CARR I personally preferred the zero-g. POGUE The zero-g is almost impossible to screw up, but there's there's a slight modification that would really in^rove that, in that if you were in an awkward posture, in other 318 �POGUE (CONT'D) words, if I was trying to put it in that way and I was reaching around "because of inaccessibility- It's - it's a little bit difficult to clock that thing and get it in right before you can start moving the lever, and there seemed to be a lock up feature because of the linkage. It would sometimes Jam that — the lever that puts it in that position. We knew that before flight, but that appears to be a pretty safe connector and almost impossible to ruin, I mean, you know, to put on incorrectly. CARR I'd say it's far superior to the other types. It's got a little way to go yet, but it's a far superior way of making connections than some of the others. POGUE But it does - it should have those little - a couple of little things removed from it, that is, it's sort of difficult to get it in the riggit position. You know, you got to put one of the little lugs in and then sort of rotate it into the position. QUERY Yes. POGUE And then you got to push the QUERY All the way up before you can operate the handle, if you had - - 319 �POGUE All the way up. QUERY So I remember, I guess, if you operate the handle too That's correct. early you - CARR Yes. POGUE But you can get it in the right position and start to You ... yourself up and have to start over. move the handle to move the connector into position and it won't move. It sort of goes over center, locks out over center, and then you got to sort of lift it and play with it a little bit, and as soon as you get it out of the over the center position, then it pushes - moves in rather easily. CARR Okay. QUERY Was - I believe I covered the connectors - was meter lighting used in the STS? POGUE Meter? QUERY Meter lighting? POGUE Yes, I did occasionally. QUERY Was it adequate? POGUE Yes. 320 Did you use the �QUERY Is meter lighting considered necessary? Do you find that - POGUE Not in the STS. It certainly was necessary in the airlock, I would say, prior to EVA egress. Here, let me - the reason, now, is this, don't take that as the gospel. reason I say it was Because the 1 right was because there was enough ambient light in that area usually so you could read the meters. QUERY Yes. POGUE We really didn't need meter lights. I used them for general illumination when we were - a low light level illumination when we were doing comet photography; that's the only time I ever used them. But that isn't using them for reading the meters, however, if you had a dark area, you'd want a meter lighting, so that's why I say, I don't want you know, to be - want to be misunderstood on it. QUERY Okay. Were the - this is airlock again - were the variable dimming controls for - provided for STS and meter limiting utilized? That's for the handrails, the panel, the forward and the aft lights had the variable dimming controls. 321 �CARR POGUE Yes, I think we all used them at one time or another. Why didn't we have variable dimming on the status lights? That would have been nice. You know the green-amber lights if for no other reason than it would have improved life time in the bulbs. Of course, if - what I'm saying is, if one had to monitor systems manually. We didn't have to do that; we never faced the problem. Ground took very good care of this system. If we had had to go manual on EPS, we would have had a problem, because we could have always been turning status lights on and off evezytime we went up there because we were afraid the bulbs would o have burned out. It would have been nice if we could have dimmed them and preserved the filaments, assuming that would do it. I don't know if that would have worked or not, but I just think that putting lower power on the filaments would have increased the lifetime. QUERY It may or may not. QUERY What it would have prolonged the life, you mean? QUERY It may not. QUERY But he asked the question why we didn't have variable controls. V You remember that? 322 You got any background? �J POGUE There's another operational impact and that is those are awfully bright lights. It's amazing what a tiny, bright light will do to distract you. We had one on a timer on the ATM panel and it would have been nice for that reason also, and again that's assuming manual control with EPS. CARR Although the record light on the SIAs too. POGUE Oh, yes. CARR Sometimes you'd have to put tape over that when you were in there trying to do comet photography and you wanted it perfectly dark. J QUERY In this area I have smother question, and that is - I think you've answered it - is it a desirable feature and do you even recommend it for consideration even for meter lighting, that the dimming control is a desirable feature? CARR Sure. POGUE I think it is. I think you get operational situations where it is going to be a necessity. QUERY The next questions have to do with control and display. Any general comments about physical arrangement of switches and circuit breakers and the identification of switch - systems on the control and display panel? 323 �CARR We covered that adequately in the technical debriefing. I don't think we need to waste any time at this meeting doing it. We really preached a sermon on that one. QUERY I recall reading some of it about the nomenclature. CARR The main thing that we said was that the C&D panel should have a design goal of giving the operator visibility into the system. And our best example of an ideally designed C&D panel is panel 225 in the STS. The fact that you've got all the pipes and the plumbing laid out and can see what the switch does when you do it, and that is a neat design goal; we recognize that you can't always attain that goal, but that's the goal. We got some panels in the workshop that looking at them gives you no hint as to what you're doing when you're throwing a switch. Some times even the words don't tell you a whole hell of a lot about what you're doing. POGUE Sometimes they mess you up. CARR Yes. But I think we've covered that pretty adequately, and we probably shouldn't use the time today to do that, QUERY All right. 32k V �P0GUE 1 W°Uld Just like to and 202 to task. emphasize where we've taken 200, 201 The caution and warning is a case in point, though, where we could really have used some help with an ordinate-abscissa technique for identifying the inhibit switch. panel. It was hard to find a switch on that The ground would call you to go and inhibit such and such and golly, you know, it's like taking 52 cards and spreading them out on a table and say take out the ace of spades. QUERY Maybe you covered this but I don't recall such illegi bility of panel marking of switch and circuit breaker nomenclature under lighting conditions encountered during the mission. In other words, with the lighting that you experienced there, were you able to read, even though you didn't like the nomenclature and some of the arrangements? CARR Seems to me we always had light available to read a panel with. I'm trying to think if there's any panels anywhere in the workshop where we had to worry about that. Some thing strikes me that we did somewhere, and I can't remember now where it is. But we always had lighting available that I can think of where - you could bring to bear on the panel to read it. 325 �POGUE One thing that would he nice - airlock was a problem because we'd go in - we always kept the lights out in there most of the time. The light switch itself should be distinctively marked because it - it's, you know, like going into a dark room and finding the light switch if you don't know where it is. So you've got to have a light switch on before you can find a light switch. And that was not that much of a problem, but it was a little bit of a problem, because I remember several times, thrashing around in the air, because you could be clocked, see, when you went into the airlock module you didn't know which end was up and which panel had the light switch on it. It would have been nice to have a general illumi nation switch for an area, marked. there was really no big problem. Other than that, That's the only one I remember. CARR QUERY yes. Switch and circuit breaker grouping versus task. Is the identification and grouping of frequently used switches and circuit breakers, adequate to preclude inadvertent operation of adjacent circuit breakers or switches? POGUE No, it was not adequate. 326 �CARR No. Again, that's pretty well called out in the tech debriefing along with our idea that you got to have visibility into the circuits that you are operating. POGUE Yes, there were two problems. One is the visibility in the system was not provided and the other was ambiguous nomenclature and again I think we've gone into that. QUERY I think you've covered that. Por assessing the adequacy of onboard meter ranges and color banding. CARR Well, there's nothing more impersonal on a meter than to read percentage if you don't have a feel for what it means. That is certainly an advantage from a design standpoint, because you've only got so many volts to work with and percentage is a lot easier, but it certainly does limit your visibility as to what you are looking at. If you have to remember that - that the 50 percent means 2 volts in this system and lU volts in this system, and 7 psi in that system. That certainly does inhibit your visibility. Color banding - I have always been a pro ponent of color banding wherever possible if - if it will improve your visibility into a system. We played lots of color banding games with the lunar module and 327 �CARR (CONT'D) the color banding that ve used in the workshop in the 600 Series panels I thought was pretty good, but you have to be careful about parallax - is the biter there. And what we usually ended up with on a doggone colorbanding thing is it's always an afterthought; it always gets put on the glass instead on the meter so you always have parallax and color banding Just bites you. thing with airplanes today too. Same Somebody always decides to put the color banding on an exhaust gas temperature gage or a pressure gage after the thing has been built and so it depends on how you're sitting in the seat of the airplane whether or not you're in or out of the color band and you always have to worry about parallax. So there is a pitfall and the workshop have the same problems. POGUE QUERY POGUE It was an interesting - - Were you going to add something there with your sketch? All right, let's say that because of the change in the acceptable parameters, this sounds contradictory, what Jer says but it doesn't have to be. If you could design something to - if you, for instance, if you had a green band hidden by two movable tapes which would identify a - in other words, the green would be blocked out 328 �POGUE (CONT'D) everywhere these two tapes were, but left open where they weren't, then you could adjust for green-band operation. I'm really for green banding in a meter BO you don't have to go interpret the meter every time you look at it. You can Just see if the needle is in the green, you forget it. But it looked to me like we were - in some of the systems we accepted the changes in what were the acceptable ranges. And it would be nice if you could change those things manually for - for quick observation and then interpretation of the gages. QUERY By some scheme of tape or something? Open it up? POGUE Yes, but we had a fairly interesting scheme down in the refrigeration system in that there were staggered bands, if I remember correctly. And there was Just a little bit of a confusion factor there on the staggered bands, but then I got used to it real quick. I thought it - overall it was a good idea it - but you had to watch what you were doing there; you could interpret a reading as satisfactory when it wasn't really satisfactory range. QUERY Do you recall any nuisance circuit breaker trips? that popped open? 329 Any �CARR No, usually when they popped there was a reason and I don't - we didn't lose many. POGUE We - we never pushed a - I guesB we never pushed a breaker back in without around - - POGUE - - Concurrence. CARR Yes, we usually got air-to-ground concurrence. POGUE If we - I think we would have noticed that, that's what I'm saying and the ground would have - - CARR We had some - - QUERY I don't think we had any, but I've asked this question of each of the crews. CARR Yes, we had a multiplexer problem or something with the communications about midway through the mission, and they had us cycling breakers and that's the nearest thing we came to having any sort of breaker problems. Finally after we cycled a whole bunch of breakers, the problem went away and I don't know if the ground ever figured out what it was, but it had to do with the communications and the way you folks vere getting your data. One of those multiplexers or something was - - 330 �POGUE I tell you one thing that was a bit of - not of a nui sance, but a sort of a pitfall, and that is you could throw those Gemini-type circuit breakers by touching them with a finger if you had happened accidently to use panel 200, 201, or 202 as a handhold. Just a very light pressure would flick it sometimes. I'm sure that would squarewave anybody if they were watching that system at the time. I did that a couple of times. CARR I guess I don't really like that kind of circuit breaker. QUERY My question really was for a tripping out, you know, from a spike or a current or something like that. POGUE Yes. QUERY Okay. CARR I guess I don't even like that kind of circuit breaker, that little switch thing. fragile. They're Just too doggone But I recognize that the other kind is awful beefy and takes up a lot more space. QUERY Was - the solar flare alert panel - was it adequate? POGUE Down in the workshop? QUERY Yes. 331 �POGUE We never really used It. That was actuated by a system which was not all that good of an indicator of a flare. CARR Boy, I tell you, the South Atlantic anomaly was so much of a nuisance that we essentially killed the system down in the workshop in the experiment compartment because it was Just a noisy nuisance. QUERY The flare alert? CARR The fire alert, no, we got a couple of fire alarms there. QUERY I said the flare, the solar flare alert. POGUE Oh, yes. QUERY Because of the South Atlantic anomaly? CARR Yes, and there's also some horns up in the Northern We Just - - Hemisphere someplace. POGUE Yes, that will really throw you off. SPEAKER Come over Canada and get a flare and you know you'd look - it Just bugged you and so we Just turned it off and left it off. We could hear the one going in the MDA when it went. QUERY Was it the radio noise that first bothered you? 332 �POGUE No. CARR No, the - either one. POGUE Yes, that's right; it would throw it off. It was the either RF or - We didn't set that up too much either, because that thing again - that would go off on the nightside for some reason or the other. You got an awful lot of RF on nightside of the Earth. QUERY Did you - I guess I don't remember it - I got a question here on inadvertent operation of the switches and circuit breakers in reference to the guards. Were the guards - proper? CARR Sometimes if you succumbed to the temptation of using a guard for a handrail, you were in danger flicking one of those little breakers. We did have a couple of instances of inadvertent switch operation in the STS area. One was the - what was the one you threw one time? POGUE The timer, I advanced the day one flick. CARR Yes, that's right. POGUE I was up there doing something, working with the con densate system and I reached over and advanced the day of the year one. 333 �CARR Also the guards restricted your visibility of the nomen. clature on the svltch or breaker ,nd you flnd yourself Playing this game, trying to check circuit breakers to see If any one vas open or something like that. POGUE QUERY It was hard to read the - - We can understand that after looking at the closeout photographs. CARR Yes. QUERY For proper position. CARR lee, it vas tough, but you've got to protect those dogSone things and that looks like something you Just kind of have to buy. QUERY Were there any failures when lamp tests vere performed! CARR POGUE No. N°» I don't recall any. CARR * «« fat; that vas a periodic thing; it vas a house- the lamps and report - report the anomalies and I don't remember reporting an anomaly vhen I did remember anybody else reporting anything. 33k lt, nor do T �<1 QUERY Were any problems encountered because of the proximity of the rotating litter chair to the power and display console? CARR No. QUERY My next question here has to do with the digital address system. Did you use it a great deal or - the DAS system with the switch selectors, would its use - CARR With switch selectors, let's see, we helped the ground sometimes when they couldn't get to the switch selectors to turn the CMG heaters off and on. And we used it to help the ground once in a while when we - when they wanted us to cycle or inhibit doors and motors and things on the ATM. POGUE Not much though. QUERY You used it some for problem - troubleshooting problems? CARR We didn't have to do much troubleshooting; things were working pretty well and only once or twice did we go into malfunction procedures. S082 A or B door, one of the doors. We had a long pass between the door failure and when we could get to the ground and we went in with a malfunction 335 �CARR (CONT'D) procedure and fooled with the switch selectors there. But really the occasions were few and far between. Most of the DAS usage we got was in relation to the APCS. We did a lot of DAS entry work doing maneuvers and things like that. POGUE And monitor, but that's APCS though because we were monitoring maneuvers. Ed - Dr. Gibson's given a very good debriefing on the ATM panel which I'm sure includes the DAS. And if you have not seen that, I suggest that you read that because he's gone into great detail. There's about a 2-1/2, 3 hour debriefing on the ATM panel in general. CARR This he did up there. think. It's on day of the year 19, I You might ask for those transcripts - very, very in-depth discourse on the ATM panel. QUERY I have some questions, more on lighting again. Assess the adequacy of the control and illumination levels via control panel switches and light integral switches. This must be ATM adequacy. CARR Well, they weren't too terribly adequate, because one by one they crapped out on us and we had to tape them over and we ended up with only fixed lighting available to us. 336 �CARR (CONT'D) Fixed numerical, the fixed integrated died. We had neither fixed nor variable integrated, nor did we have variable numerics. One of the areas that we wished that we'd had some sort of a central control panel right at the ATM was MDA lighting because we found that each of us liked to have lighting at the MDA different when we were operating the ATM panel. And it would have been nice if we hadn't had to float around and one by one turn lights on and off at their stations because - POGUE The closest we had to that was a couple of switches there on the STS whereby you could turn - turn them on selectively in groups. We would like to have had indi vidual control at the ATM panel. QUERY Did any of the OWS and MDA general illumination bulbs fail? Any of them flicker? This is the fluorescent Job. CARR Not a one. POGUE No, I was, in fact near the end of the flight, I remember thinking I expected them to go out and they didn't. QUERY Well, I think a lot of people had expected it. CARR Yeah. 337 �QUERY I guess we've had a report of a report of one failure the entire 8-1/2 months. CARR And the lighting in general in the workshop was very, very good, quite adequate. And in our MU87 habitability debriefing, there's one question about the lighting and you can get some in-depth comments from QUERY I guess if there's a comparison from your previous answer on incandescent that, you - you like the fluorescent better than the incandescent? POGUE I think so. CARR Yeah, in general. QUERY Assess the adequacy of the illumination of the OWS C&D panel. POGUE Oh, gosh, fine. CARR No problem. There's lots of light down there in the experiment compartment. QUERY If the portable lights were used, any comments on ease of usage or the light output. Did you have occasion to use the other? I'm not talking about the high-intensity photo lamps. 338 �POGUE Yeah, I understand. CARR I never used them, but Ed did on - - POGUE I did and Ed did. I used Did you use them any time? And the biggest problem was finding the cables, hooking the cables and stringing them up. And I think you had to hook the lights on to a universal photographic - photography mount. worked. No problems. They They - I remember they were sort of awkward. You bend it around and twist and everything to get the thing pointed the right way, but then we did that with the same - that was the problem with mount, not the light. CARR Also, in the tech debriefing, we made a pitch for cable caddies, instead of fooling with all of those utilities cables that we had that had to be coiled and strapped. The - the cable caddy is one that you pull on that's got an inertial lock like a seat belt in your car. POGUE And each one of them ought to be pattern coded, or color coded, so that you know whether you have a utility cable, a high-power cable, a television, a camera cable, et cetera et cetera. Because they are all white, well, of course, some of them are bigger than the others, but it is nice to have them that way. 339 �QUERY You'd recommend a color coding? POGUE A color coding or a pattern coded. QUERY Okay. Assess the adequacy of the portable high-intensity photo light. CARR They were quite adequate. They were rather directional in nature, so they caused shadowing for photographing. POGUE I got one big bug-a-boo about the high-intensity light. Functionally, they were great. The photography was good. But it - every time I turned those on, I got - was reaching over and getting a wrong switch and everything. In a way, it seemed like you always put the thing in position quick before you turn it on and you're always facing the front of it and the switches were always in the back, or hard to get to. CARR Out of sight. POGUE Out of sight. It would have been much nicer if the control would have been easily accessible from the business end of it. QUERY Because that's the end you were always facing. Speaking of the switches, what operating modes - Do you recall what operating modes you used? 3U0 �POGUE Always the high, on. QUERY High stop put at half? CARR ..Yeah. Both channels, both ... QUERY Was there a problem of heat out of thOBe? POGUE ... heat. CARR Yeah, but they sure did some - It sure makes beautiful light for a photograph. The documentary photos are all very well lighted. We were very well pleased. And the Ml51 people are very pleased, too, because the light gave them some real good data, particularly M092. POGUE Along that line, another thing too, with these cable caddies and all, there should be central repository for placing and stowing these things. You know, like you'd have one locker dedicated for all these cable caddies and so forth. It was a little bit of a management problem, in that you didn't know who had had it last and he had left it - where he had left it and so forth. We had a sort of a system, but it was not designed into it. That should be designed into it, a locker or something like that. 3Ul �Have some questions on wire harnesses and installations, any comments on any electrical equipment or wiring there to that appeared to be an annoyance or hindrance to movement in the workshop. Well, we had the - you had the - this thing that you did right near the end where you had the cable stretched to the airlock. When we were doing the 516, multipurpose furnace experiments, 556 and all, a big number of them, we had the cable stretched through from the OWS dome area all the way up to around the tape recorder. But the reason we had it for the video tape recorder was because we had taken the power out for the tape recorder and had hooked up 516 to it. That was a bit of an annoyance. Yeah, when we put the rate gyro six pack in, when Bean and his guys put it in, that automatically tied up one - one high-power outlet. And so what we had to do in order to get high power into the MDA for the things that we wanted was to run a big extension cord in from the dome. Yeah. That was a bother. 3U2 �QUERY Actually, this question was down in the workshop, but that's good to get those comments, too. CARR Oh, I don't remember any annoying wire runs at all down in the workshop. POGUE The only - we had to camera thread - the threading camera had to have a cable run from a particular position. Again, this would have been, I think, adequately taken care of if we would have had cable caddies, but we're thrashing around taking them out and putting them in and that sort of thing. CARR The cable runs that bugged us the most are the ones we had to run ourselves. QUERY Yeah, that'd be natural. Was - and again this was OWS cable - was any excessive fraying or damage observed to Fiberglas cloth covers or wire harnesses at penetrations in the floor or other areas? CARR No, they were very well ... QUERY One of the other crewmembers said coming out of the waste management area and something that they used one of the cables as kind of a handhold and that it did start kind of wearing somewhere down in — in the living area there. 3U3 �CARH The only cable that I can think of Is that one right there by the light switch there on the right-hand side of the door. And I didn't notice any problems. use that for a handhold. QUERY I didn't I used the ... itself. That's where they come through the floor in the Fiberglas covers, you don't recall any damage to those? POGUE No. QUERY Okay. Did the convoluted boots come loose from any exposed connectors, in the workshop again? POGUE No, not that I know of. QUERY Any difficulty with the elect connectors for the food trays or the urine centrifugal separator? POGUE No, except that I - the connector for the urine centrifugal separator - the power connector, way back in the back there, was sort of hard to get to and I bad mouthed that way early in the program, but, of course, in other words, dual con nectors, and you only put it in one. one bus to the other. It was changing from And there was a little Dialatch, a holder for the cable, that was a bit of a nuisance, but a6 far as the electrical integrity of it, itself, there was no problem. 3UU �QUERY Was the clearance adequate for mating and demating of connectors on the intercom boxes? CARR Again, this is the OWS. There's two intercom boxes that we played with, the M131 or SIA number 131 had to be changed out and then the other one down in the experiment compartment by M131. We disconnected and connected that up for a documentary photography and in those cases there were no problems. QUERY Now a few miscellaneous questions. Assess the utility outlet adequacy, accessibility, number and location of utility outlets. POGUE There's no problem with any of them. There was no problem with any of the outlets. It would be nice to have one more on the minus-Z SAL, because that's where all of our activity was and we ended up a lot of times having to un - disconnect certain things in order to connect other things up. CARR That's only - - Well, see if you had a cable caddy right there for each one of the outlets - if it had Just - was right into a cable caddy, then it would have been very handy because whenever you finish with it, you Just let it go back into the caddy and what you would do is size your caddy so that it can make the minus-Z SAL or over to the film 3U5 �CARR (CONT'D) threading station or places like that. And it would have been very - a whole lot more handy that way. The way it was - the way we used it, you had to string a cable and you hope that it would stay there and nobody would need it. But it never failed, somebody else always needed the cable and would take it down and use it. Then you - next time you wanted to use it there, you'd have to go find the cable and put it back in. And this is overhead time that you don't want to spend in space, stringing cables. QUERY You have answered part of this now; I'll just give - Any problems or comments or problems with replacement of intercom boxes? I guess you discovered that you didn't have any - or heaters. Did you replace any heaters? POGUE No, I don't think any of them ever came on. CARR Yeah. QUERY I know the duct heaters didn't. CARR The only heater that we did - did anything to was that probe into waste - - POGUE That's right. We took that out at first and then put it back in near the end. 3U6 �CARR And we were prepared to change out the probe on the urine dump system, but it - it cleared so we didn't have to go through with that. QUERY Any problem encountered with static discharge? You talked about it being so dry. CARP. Surprisingly enough, there was no static discharge. QUERY We haven't had any report previously. ROGUE The only time that you got any indication of electro statics was when we took off our shirts, you could feel the hair standing up on your arms, but I never heard any crackling. CARR IJo popping or cracking or anything, but you could sure make your hair on your arms stand up and on your head as you pulled the shirt over the top, your hair would Just go right up sometimes. QUERY Was the OWS thermal control system ever checked out? It's on reference system checklist sheet 9 through 13. Did you ever - do you recall that you ever checked out the thermal control system? POGUE I don't recall. And if it's not - if it wasn't in the checkout and activation - 3U7 �QUERY This would be the OWS now is what CARR Yeah. POGUE Yeah. CARR Well, I don't remember ever - - POGUE Not unless it was in activation. QUERY When the Earth terrain camera was operated during EREP passes, the OWS bus loads increased more than the amount required for the camera. Now, we don't have any idea and we've got a question here. Can you think of any associated load that would cause this increase? I know that's a hard question for you, but - CARR QUERY This is down the OWS? Whenever you turned the Earth terrain camera on, we always got a greater load than we had expected from Just the camera. POGUE Well, we've already mentioned that it sounded like a rock crusher, the shutter motor or whatever it was and we always felt it wasn't working right, but apparently it took real good pictures. 31*8 �QUERY ... I t might have been a hearing problem, increased the load because of friction? POGUE That might be - might be Could very well be, because other than that, all that Ed did, that I can recall, is that he would Just go down through the hatch and look out the wardroom window and verify the scene and go back up, you know, it's all - all Just turn the switch on and off. QUERY Might be the connection. How long before each meal were the food tray heaters turned on? CARR Oh, that varied. tray usually. We tried to keep it to Just to one food We would - breakfast and lunch very seldom did we ever turn the food tray heaters on. The only time for lunch that we did it is when somebody had chili or something - POGUE Macaroni, something that really required heat and in order to get it palatable. CARR Now supper time, we usually managed to remember about b o'clock in the afternoon that we needed put our food in and do something about it. So we would take the three frozen items for the evening meal and put it in, usually in my tray and turn it on. 3U9 And then that tray stayed on �CARR (CONT'D) usually up to and through the meal time and during the meal when we transferred, divvied up the frozen food, each guy would turn on his own tray that he put it into. So we did not use the tray heaters a whole lot. POGUE Somebody got a mistaken impression from one of my Ml»87 debriefings. And if that's still surfaced, I would like to put that one to bed. I never - apparently made the statement to the effect that we Just turned the heaters in the food tray on and left them on, although I qualified it. The qualification apparently didn't get through. The point was what Jer was saying there, usually we were forgotten until it was too late we Just stuck them all in there and turn all the heaters on, rather than put it in auto and set the timers. QUERY This is not associated with something like that. This is a standard question. QUERY POGUE QUERY QUERY We've asked this all three times. Yeah. But we did not leave food tray heaters on continuously. We didn't have it - - Well, premission we kind of planned that you would leave, you know, put your breakfast in like before and set the timers and the heaters would come on 350 �POGUE I think I remembered twice. CARR We Just never operated in that mode. Most of the re- hydratable stuff, we rehydrated Just before we ate it. Some of it wasn't too terribly tasty because we didn't heat it for a long time. QUERY I don't suppose you noticed any degradation in the food tray heaters since you didn't use them so much you wouldn't have a feel for them whether it degraded or not. CARR Sure didn't. No, mine were quite adequate at the end of the mission. POGUE Somebody says the water heater was going to pot near the end. CARR But we didn't notice that either. No, the water was nice and hot, but somebody said that it looked to them like the water heater was beginning to crump [?] out. QUERY Were the portable circulation fans used during the mission? CARR/POGUE Yes. CARR We used one fan in the experiment compartment to blow on the guy pedaling the bike. 351 He had the option of turning �CARR (CONT'D) that on if he wanted to. And we used another one up at the dome hatch to try to move air from the dome area on to the OWS heat exchangers. POGUE And we, at first and at the - we had the one up there running on the - no, I guess that was Just the normal diffuser on the rate gyro package. CARR Then you had your rate gyro cooling fan running when we got there and when we left, we left it running. We set it up and left it running again. QUERY It didn't run during the mission? CARR No. POGUE No. QUERY Did you take it down? CARR Oh, yes. POGUE Yes. CARR Oh, yes, it was in the way. POGUE Mounted on ATM floor grid. QUERY When operating the ATM C&D, was it noticeable if the MDA vail heaters cycled? Could you tell us that they were cycling by sitting at the ...? 352 �POGUE I couldn't tell. CARR I sure couldn't either. QUERY When passing through the airlock, was it noticeable when the ATM wall heaters were on? Could you get a feel for the - CARR No, could never have told you if they were on. Did they ever come on? Does your data tell you if they ever came on? QUERY The A ... QUERY AM wall heaters did. CARR Did they? QUERY Oh yeah, yeah, they were on. QUERY The AM we didn't have any street [?] on. The MDA we followed pretty closely, but the AM are, you know 15 different little heaters individually controlled. Sometimes when we'd inhibit them from the ground, like during the EREP pass, we'd try to watch the current and get an idea of how many of them were actually on at that time. POGUE When you turn them on. 353 �QUERY And it was very difficult for us to tell if they were ever cycling, but we expected them to kind of follow the same cycle pattern as the MDA's which we could track. But we never really could get a confirmation of whether they were burning or not. Relative to the small individual loads, the half amp each, it would be difficult to see one of them coming off and on, but we thought when we commanded them off and on we should be able to see it but we never ... CARR POGUE We sure didn't know they were - - You know it would be nice in the future when you have the sad thing was a little liquid crystal thing in a little parallel shunt line, something that Just takes no power at all but gives a positive indication, low-power drain. QUERY When you guys were working the EREP passes during the day, a lot of times we came to you and you remember the reg adjust box that were up there on the STS panels? A lot of times we would come to you and have you adjust those things twice a day ... after each EREP and sometimes even three times a day and we did this quite frequently and we had kind of a minor war going in the MOCR over this; but from your point of view did having to do this quite frequently - did that pose any kind of annoyance to you? 35^ �CARR It was a minor nuisance. POGUE It was particularly an annoyance for Ed when he was workr ing ATM. CARR Yeah. QUERY Yeah, we could have minimized that, but, you know, every time we called up to you you guys seemed so cheerful to do it. (Laughter) I don't know if you Just - - POGUE You didn't hear the background comment. QUERY That's obvious. POGUE No, it was no problem. CARR It was a minor annoyance. I guess it bugged Ed more than us because sometimes he'd get into an ATM program he was working on and one day the CAP COMM would come up with a reg adjust and you could almost hear him grumble and a lot of times Bill and I would try to get up there and do it so he wouldn't have to get up there and fool with it. POGUE The thing is, we were so delighted that the ground took such good care of the system, we didn't mind doing that kind of thing. CARR Yeah, it was no big thing. 355 i �POGUE Here's one suggestion. It would have really helped and it's sort of a suggestion for future designs, to have a movable scale underneath this thing for rereferencing. Man, we had so many pencil marks on that thing, you know. We'd erase it. QUERY That was my next question. end up with? CARR We got almost down to the metal. (Laughter) How many marks did you guys I think every time ... mark it. We usually had about a half dozen marks on it, but every once in a while you'd Just wipe the slate clean and start over. POGUE Yeah, if you could have Just had a little circular index under there that you could have rotated around, say now zero and now I said 30 degrees to the right well the thing is - or 15 degrees or 7-1/2. We never did - very, very seldom - we'd get it right the first time. If we'd had a very good scale down here, I think we could have minimized that. QUERY For about the first week we had to ask you for re ..., but seemed like after that you guys kind of had a calibrated eye on that. You usually hit it right off the bat, the first time. 356 �m m & QUERY That concludes; thank you, gentlemen. CARR Okay. QUERY Okay, thank you, Al. QUERY Now you guys can all stay if you like there is plenty of room and there is no problem. 3 QUERY What's next? QUERY Crew systems EVA and inflight maintenance. 357 �QUERY Okay. We have Dick Heckman from Marshall and Hoot Gibson, of course you know, from JSC you have some more questions you want to take care of ...? QUERY Yes. I'll - i'n cover the crew provision - equipment first. The cuffs on the Skylab Jackets - Do you all con sider them necessary or they're Just a luxury? CARR You mean the knitted cuffs? QUERY Yes. CARR Yes, no. (Laughter) POGUE Now, wait a minute, now. the overcuffs. I like - I didn't like the - And the knitted cuff was too tight for me to get my watch through; that's the reason I didn't like it. QUERY I liked the idea. It Just turned out, on my - - ... too tight. POGUE particular Jacket, I ended up cutting - taking scissors and cutting the solid overcuffs. I'm talking about? QUERY Yes. 358 You know what �POGUE And then the sweat shirt knitted-cuff-type underneath, bothered rae a little bit because of the - of the watch. CARR I don't think that's something you really need to legislate That's kind of personal preference. I know if you've got - got the capability of putting them in the design, just ask the crewman what he wants. QUERY Okay ... CARR But I - I liked them. It kept the sleeves from riding up too much on me and the trouser legs from riding up, and so I liked them. But these guys found them to be somewhat of a hindrance. POGUE I was more put out with them on the trousers than I was on the sleeves of the Jackets, because I couldn't take my trousers off without taking my shoes off, you know, undressing for PT. CARR But let's face it. If you do them, somebody's going to bitch; if you take them off, somebody's going to bitch. QUERY The other crews - the other crews took them off. CARR Yes. 359 �QUERY Second queston: That HP-35 calculator - Did you have to - ever have to recharge it? POGUE He kept it plugged in. CARR Yes, he kept it plugged in at the ATM all the time for use, and just - you know, the little recharge module? He just kept it connected all the time. QUERY Hmmm. QUERY Did he have - Did he have any troubles - any problems there with the recharge? CARR Not to my knowledge. POGUE It's still sitting right there. CARR . . . - yes, that's right; it's still sitting right there. It worked - - All we did was pull the plug on i t . QUERY Could you estimate about how many hours you put on that thing? POGUE I didn't put too much - - CARR Ed was probably pretty much the big user of it. POGUE I counted my fingers testing the device. 360 �(Laughter) It was a nice device. With respect to the hard toothpaste tubes, what resupply kit did you get those out of? Was it the one ... or was it one of the ones you took out of one of the other, earlier ...? Well, you didn't send any supply kit up with us that I know of. Okay. Yes. We - - We sent one up on SL-3. And that's the one we used. It had about two or three tubes in it that were hard as bricks. And poor old unlucky Ed was the guy who would select that tube of toothpaste every time, and I couldn't understand why he was in there grunting and squeezing on the toothpaste tube. And I just worked mine ... - - But it is the one we took from SL-3? Yes. Okay. Garment pockets - You had a lot to say in the debriefing. Yes. 361 �QUERY In the tech debriefing. Was there some unique problem in flight that we CARR No. QUERY CARR No, ... just as soon as we got them over in the trainer. Nobody did anything about it. POGUE Specify which pockets you mean, now, Hoot. CARR We're talking about ... QUERY POGUE CARR Yes ... they were already made. They were already made and being packed in the workshop. It was too late to do anything. This was all done at the last minute. POGUE Now, it was even earlier than that. When we first started wearing those over there in the minisims, the little pocket in the front which was really - would have been nice to use for a flashlight, we couldn't use it for a flashlight. And if I was - If I remember correctly, I asked the garment man about it, and he said that wasn't really made for a flashlight; it was made for pencils. 362 And that that was �POGUE (CONT'D) why the flashlight didn't fit in it, because it looked Just right for a flashlight, except the little cover the flap wasn't long enough. QUERY Okay. I think we need to get back and talk with y'all more in detail on design ... - POGUE We made beaucoup comments on ... - - QUERY - - . . . s e e i t was my impression t h a t we had not received any comments in that area. So, we'll - we'll get back with you in detail on that. POGUE Okay, QUERY Okay. Yesterday, you had - Bill, you had mentioned that when you - with respect to the goggles - you - put too much antifog on them. POGUE The visor. QUERY No, the goggles - the goggles; you know, on this M509? POGUE — No, I didn't put any antifog on the goggles. I'm sorry; I mislead you. QUERY Okay. Well, there is some distortion in those goggles and I thought maybe it might've been from that. 363 �POGUE No. QUERY Is it - Was it just POGUE That's just the way they were. QUERY those goggles? CARR Yes. QUERY Okay. CARR The darn thing would clog up on you too. You'd work up any kind of a sweat and your goggles would fog up. And if you - you look at some of the pictures and movies, you'll see I did a lot of the flying without them, or I had them up on my forehead. You'd get started and the darn things would fog in on you, and you'd just have to pull them up out of the way. POGUE The - the subject could go - get by without using them. The observer - As a safety precaution, I've used them, even after I got a GO for taking them off when I was the sub - the subject to avoid getting dust in the eyes when impinging the thruster - impingement from the thruster. QUERY Okay. EMU. Now the next questions are relating to the EVA and On your suits, how wet did they get during the 361* �QUERY (CONT'D) EVAs? Did you - could you differentiate between the wetness of them before you put them on and then afterwards? CARR Well, yes. I think they were all wetter, you know, when you took them off. There - It was a certain amount of sweating going on in there. I have always been the low sweater in our - in our bunch, and my suit was never as wet as the others. Ed always does the most sweating, and after an EVA, his suit was the wettest. The reason why I know all this is because I'm the guy that always did the suit drying and the suit - the PGA work in the post-EVA. Bill's was in between. It always impressed me that the guy who was EV-3, the guy who stayed inside, was usually wetter than when he went outside on an EVA. It seems that when you're in the closed suit and you've got the whole loop going, you stay drier than you do if you're just in the - in the suit with LCG running and standing at the ATM. QUERY Do you think that the desiccants that we had would've been sufficient without the suit drying using the blower? CARR I don't have any feel for that or not. I never - never - It never was clear to me that the desiccants did anything; the suit was already plenty dry before you ever put the 365 �CARR desiccants in. And, of course, the desiccant - there was no color change or anything. They were all sewed in a opaque bag - little sausage - QUERY . . . primarily to maintain their dryness. CARR Yes. POGUE If you're saying would you - If you're asking could you And - - have dried them with the desiccant alone, I'd say no. CARR Yes. I couldn't say that. I wouldn't know - I don't know how good a desiccant you got. any judgment whatsoever on that. I - I couldn't make But I'll tell you one thing, those desiccants were a pain in the neck to put in the fecal ovens, because you really had to work some times to get a seal on the oven. POGUE Another thing, too, that's - When you put the desiccants in the suit, instead of - It would have been nice to have a little retention device or something. I put them in the* once and went to all the trouble of putting them down the sleeve and in the leg and - And then Ed came along and got that suit out and it all shaped around and realigned themselves down the feet or something. 366 �QUERY Was there ever any noticeable increase in cooling - Well, let's see; this was to the - Okay. you or Ed. It could have been to This is concerning the - the water leakage that we had on the PCU/LSU ... Was there ever any notice able increase in cooling when you were in EVA NORM and had noticed the water leak prior to diverter valve change? CARR No, I don't think so, and I don't think Ed mentioned it either. We knew we had the leak, you know, and the water was gone, but we had never impacted - hadn't impacted the the suit LSU cooling system enough to where we were being hurt. In my case, we found later, you know, that a lot of the water was gone out of the LSU system, but, apparently, we hadn't lost enough so that it affected my suit cooling. And the big thing that ... kept bugging me about was to keep - to try to keep my coolant loop cooler, because it appeared that I was - the delta-T across my gas loops was not what the medics liked. But we didn't notice any funny changes in the temperature in the suit at all. And on Ed's case, there near the end the ground said, get your suit cooling down to the lowest level, because we're going to - we're afraid we're going to loose the loop, and so Ed, essentially, put himself on gas cooling. 367 �QUERY Did he notice his gas being cooler? Did he ever - did he mention ...? CARR No, he said it was getting hot in there, and he - he - - QUERY Okay. He didn't notice that his gas coming - coming over his head, just the direct flow there? CARR I never heard anything about that from him. I don't think so. O QUERY Okay. CARR Now I - I noticed - in fact, I debriefed this on occasion on one occasion, and that is that - this was on EVA number 3, when I was the guy in the airlock module - I made - made one note that when I get into a big flurry of activity, you know, most of the time I was fairly quiet, but every once in a while, I'd have to do a lot of things, and I could feel my heat load building up. And then I could feel it get transferred to the gas, and I felt the gas was much warmer. And then - I felt like the thermal inertia of the system had a fairly long time constant, because I could feel - feel that I was storing heat and then I was transferring more to the air than to the liquid, and I could feel the - the gas in there with me was fairly warm. 368 �CARR (CONT'D) And then after a few minutes, 5 or so minutes, things would have moved back into equilibrium again. But I seemed to have a - a heat constant that changed quicker than the system did. could feel it. And I - made note of the fact that I And I was asking - In fact, in one of the private medical conferences, I asked the doctors if they had any indications that - that I was storing heat and that the system was taking a little time to get it out again later. And they said they looked at it and they didn't - they couldn't tell too much about that at all. But I am a heat storer compared to Ed and Bill. Bill sweat quicker than I do. Ed and I seem to store the heat for a longer period of time before I break a sweat and start cooling off by evaporative cooling. I do that athletically around here, and I did it in the suit too. And that's why I think my suit was a whole lot drier. QUERY Did you notice a change in thermal environment as you went from day to night, looking at it from a heat-leak standpoint? CARR Yes, yes. QUERY You could? You could tell. 369 �CARR Yes. You could tell that things cooled right down as soon as it got dark. You could feel the - the radiant heating from the - When I was out on the Sun end especially, I could feel the heat - Just like you stand out on pavement oomewhere, when the Sun hits the pavement and reflects back on you - I felt the same thing at the Sun end when I was working there. POGUE You can really notice it if you're in the FAS and moving your hands in and out ... contrast. QUERY Did you know the FCS was used as a comfort pad rather than a FCS? CARR QUERY Yes. Do you feel like that you would need one for a 6-hour EVA? CARR No, I went 7 hours and never needed one. QUERY Would you feel comfortable in going out, you know, ... for a planned EVA? CARR Yes. QUERY Say 6 hours or 7 hours without that? CARR Yes. I never - I never wore the FCS. 370 I always �POGUE Never wore it. CARh 95 percent of the time in training, I did not wear it, and I didn't wear it in flight, because I didn't need that kind of comfort. I had no crotch distress because I had a good suit fit. And I had no distress in that area that - that made me feel I needed the - the padding. QUERY Did you ever notice any uncomfortable surface temperatures when you came in contact with the vehicle, in other words, with your hands or feet? CARR Not uncomfortable. the glove. When you - You could feel hot places through You could feel that this one - this thing's a little warmer than something else. But there were no extremes that caused any discomfort of any kind. Did you have any? POGUE No, same - same observation. QUERY One time there you mentioned, in prep or some time earlier, that one of you had grown, physically - length lengthwise. POGUE Oh. QUERY Did that seem to restrict your suit mobility or cause any pressure points? 371 �Just getting in and out. Yes. It was — it was really tough. We had the same problem the other guys did, and that was bending - bending our trunks enough to get in. It - Up there in zero g, apparently, the back muscles all stiffen up some and you're not as limber, and I'm still having trouble touching the floor now when I've got gravity to help pull my trunk over. I'm still working on my muscles in the back of my legs and my hips and back to get limber enough to touch the floor with the palm of my hands like I used to be able to do. And we found it didn't take long at all until it was difficult to bend over enough to work your way into the suit. And, of course, when you've got to stress the suit that hard, we began to worry about the two ends of '"he zippers for fear we would damage those things. the LPGs we wore were - Well, I WOre And Paul Weitz's, and Paul Weitz is a bigger guy than I am. And I had a lot of extra stuff in that suit with me, which was very uncomfortable. It got in the way, but pressure points due to the lengthening seemed to work out okay because it didn't catch me in the crotch. pressure. It was all heel-to-shoulder And as soon as we pressurized, the heel-to- shoulder pressure was gone and I felt quite comfortable in suit. And my suit - with all the bulk of the LCG in 372 �CARR (CONT'D) with me, I had a good fit around the chest, so I had good trunk mobility, I felt. I wasn't rattling around in my suit. QUERY One final question. Do you believe that separate mobile legs on the EV suit are necessary for working EVA; that is, except for foot restraints, an attachment for the separate legs used during EVA? CARR Separate mobile legs? In other words - - QUERY Yes. Like - like we've got. CARR Yes. In other words, the other choice is ... - - QUERY As opposed t o Just a . . . QUERY A mummy-log-type thing. MS CARR Oh, heavens, yes. (Laughter) CARR I wrapped my legs arouhd things and I straddled things out out there to hold on, especially on that EVA where I was taking those movies. then. 373 I was doing all sorts of things �POGUE Not to mention all the body English you use. You use inertia of the legs a lot of times to torque yourself around, you don't even realize unless you're using them. CARR Yes. POGUE Man, don't ever let anybody ... for that. QUERY (Laughter) QUERY Legs then - legs then definitely do have a use in a ... - CARR Oh, yes. QUERY Right. CARR I did a lot of straddling, where I'd wrap my legs around Yes. something, then let go with my hands. QUERY ... CARR Okay. QUERY On EVA, in the lock compartment, did you feel the ventdown Do you have any more? That's a l l we have. Thank you rate in the manual valve control that you have is satis factory? CARR Any comments at all on that? Yes, I think so. I think that we — we wasted some time. It took - took a little - sometimes, I felt like it took too much time to vent down. The - Actually, the repress was the thing that I felt took too much time. 37h The �CARR (CONT'D) venting down - I was kind of grateful that it went slow, because I - I had to work hard to keep my ears clear due to the congestion - the blood engorgement of my tissue in my membrane - in the nasal and ear areas. But I think we could probably go with bigger - bigger valves with more controllability, so that if everybody was clear and could do it, you'd go ahead and open it wide and do it fast, instead of wasting so much time just laying there while it, you know, dribbles out through a little valve. Of course, I think you'd probably - the bigger your valve, then you'd have to go more towards the - the screen routine that we had where you had one screen that worked for a while and then you'd remove it when the ice built up to a given level and go to the next screen. QUERY POGUE QUERY Okay. a good fix. Do you feel that the foot restraints, such as we had for ATM, are adequate for the type of tasks that we had there, or do you feel that there might be some tasks where you might need additional restraints beside the foot restraints, such as a waist restraint or anything like that? Can you think of anything where the foot restraints wouldn't do - - 375 �CARR No, the places where we used the foot restraints - they'd had enough work done on them so that they were in the right place. There was one restraint in the FAS that bothered both Bill and Ed. Their foot kept coming out of it. POGUE I think it was my right one that kept coming out. CARR It seemed to me Ed was having trouble with - - POGUE I don't think that was as much a function of the foot restraint as it was of the individual body posture that resulted from trying to move yourself to face the task at hand. I think that maybe a little bit more work can be done with those foot restraints, but I don't know what. I can't suggest it. It seems like that it's such - it's a very, very close tolerance thing. I had trouble in the water tank at Marshall with that foot, and I had trouble with the same foot in flight. It's just exactly the same. CARR It was really pretty much the same for me too, in the ones that I fooled with. the same as in flight. The water tank was pretty much I didn't have much trouble because I didn't have any - any work - much work to do in the FAS area. 376 �QUERY The FAS area had much more of a reach envelope requirement - - CARR Yes. QUERY - - more than we intended because of the additional stuff that we were taking out too. I know Ed mentioned in the technical debriefing that the methods of transferring of equipment - why, we had the booms; we had the clotheslines; and we also had manual transfer. Do you feel that the manual transfer i s a good method, and do you feel that i t ' s satisfactory for something like, say, the S052 camera or camera, one or the other cameras like that? CARR Sure. QUERY . . . be okay? CARR Yes, I think i t ' s okay as a backup. I think - I think the boom was a - is a very good piece of equipment. It was very handy, and we could move gear from one place to another very quickly and smartly. POGUE But I think in moving the foot restraint around for the 193 repair - that was a good test of that particular task. CARR Yes. 3TT �QUERY Yes, for - for equipment like that there's no problem of damage - when you have lenses and things like that on camera - I guess that's one of the reasons we went to those, and do you feel that you'd be able to work with fairly sensitive equipment without some kind of a separa tion of the crew transfer and the equipment transfer ...? POGUE As long as we had a good palpate for it, or something like that. QUERY Okay. POGUE I ' d be - I ' d be more concerned about . . . antennas and stuff like that. CARR Yes. CARR We were - we were very pleasantly surprised by our mobility along the EVA trail, the fact that we could move so quickly from one place to another. I could make it from the center workstation into the FAS in less than a minute, just really hustling right along, and once we got rid of the buoyancy problem like we had in the buoyancy trainer, it was really very, very easy to do. 378 �QUERY We spent a fair amount of time working on the tactile and visual feedback in, particularly, the ATM cameras, detents, flags, hardstops, and so forth like that; would you comment on that, perhaps? CARR I think that was good work. You - you could feel when those cameras went home, and you could feel them latch in. And those are good feelings, because then you're willing to let go of it when you know that it - it's being retained. I think that that time was well spent. QUERY Okay. You don't feel that we went too far? CARR Not at all. QUERY Did you find any latch or handle forces that you felt were either too high or too low? This is, again, mainly the ATM retrieval area. CARR No. Again, you folks worked the trainer over to the point to where, when we got up there, there just weren't any surprises. The only surprise up there was that S082 door that hung up - the 82B. And - But as far as latches and handles and things, everything up there felt the same as it did in the water. The only thing that was different was the buoyancy problem, you know, that - that we had 379 �CARR (CONT'D) with the water. And we fought it all the time, and we knew it was going to bother us. And it was such a pleasure not to sweat buoyancy up there, that it made our mobility much better. You could move along the EVA trails Just hustling - hand over hand, Just like this. felt very comfortable doing it. And you You know, you hit the straightaway once you get beyond the twin pole sail; it was nothing Just to whistle right on out there. And you remember all the trouble I had getting into the transfer workstation? It was nothing; you Just swing right down and, clunk, your feet went in. And once you Just got rid of the buoyancy problem, it was Just a piece of cake. QUERY Okay. On lighting, could you comment on the - I think that we've got pretty good comments from you on the lighting at the workstations, how about the SI93 area? And if you have any comments on the workstations, any additional ones, fine. POGUE The lighting was completely adequate. On the day - when the dayside - of course, that was supposedly on the sha dowed portion, but plenty of lights. No problem at all. And at night, we even played with the flashlights trying to find this ttylar that supposedly Jammed in this ... and 380 �POGUE (CONT'D) trying to convince myself it was or wasn't in there and using the flashlight. It's amazing - what we actually did - That was a fairly good exercise and in - in - indi cative of EVA capability. QUERY Did you get much scattering from adjacent structure and from the suits on the Sun side into shaded areas? Was that - did that give you pretty good - into these areas where we didn't have lighting, particularly? Did you have ... - CARR Yeah, I don't remember there being any dark holes that I couldn't see into. There was always enough scattered light in there that you could see. QUERY Thank you. CARR These guys working on the other side of the workshop had so much earthshine, they had no problem at all seeing anything, either. QUERY Bill, are you saying that you had plenty of light in the S193 area? POGUE Yes, sir. CARR In the daylight. That's what I'm saying. 381 �POGUE QUERY . . . one of the debriefings where you didn't - you - you didn't have - - CARR I think he was talking about night where we had - there were no fixed lights - - POGUE There are no lights in that area. CARR And our pitch is, don't ever lull yourself into thinking that there's no place that you'll ever go around the work - around the vehicle on EVA, because we've already proved several times that there's no way you can legislate that somebody will not go somewhere on EVA. POGUE And it should - lighting should be provided, so that you can work full day/night cycle EVA in an - any area exter nal to the vehicle. QUERY But - yeah, we - I hope -I'm sorry if we gave you the impression - - POGUE CARR Yeah, that's too bad. that it's poorly lighted in that area during the day light pass, because it was well lighted. It's the night time when they had to get the flashlights out and work. 382 �POGUE Point ... was that it had been earlier legislated that there would be no EVA done on EREP. So then that Justi fied not putting any .light over there, and we said, don't ever do that again. CARR Yeah - - POGUE And that was our recommendation. CARR - - ... don't legislate that sort of thing. already done it in Shuttle. They've They've already legislated that there are certain places you'll never go, and we said, hogwash. You can make it a design goal, but you better face the facts and put some lights in such a way that you can use them if you need them. QUERY How about portable lights? CARR Yeah. POGUE That's - There's a good case to be made for them. QUERY There's another - of course, it's something else to handle and take care of, and fixed lights would probably be better. POGUE Oh, but what about putting them on your sleeve, and I can Just envision all kinds of good space lanterns. 383 You know, �POGUE (CONT'D) I mean, you would have one right up there. In fact, we had the - the medical (laughter) light for working in the - down in the scuppers - plenum area. The trouble is that you can't hold a flashlight in your mouth while you're EVA, otherwise - QUERY (Laughter) CARR It kind of limits your suit integrity. I tried to scratch my nose several times ... QUERY What you're saying is you'd like a suit-mounted, PGAmounted light. POGUE Why not? CARR Yeah. P0GUE You kn°w> Why not? Why not? something? have some kind of integral light in the helmet or I mean, I don't know. That's your area. QUERY Have you - you been talking to the Russians again? POGUE No. Either that or Just put like Jack plug boxes or Junction boxes around the workshop or around whatever the vehicle is. But you go out with a portable light like you have 381+ �f mm CARR (CONT'D) in your garage to put on the car. And you go out and you mount the light somewhere, and you plug it in. POGUE There's only one thing about that - and remember that there are - you could always get yourself in a position, suited, where you're looking into the light. That's why you're always going to have a need for an auxiliary portable light. QUERY Do you have any comments on handrails, handholds, any reach envelopes that we had, other than you mentioned, that probably because of some reach, you had some trouble with putting one foot in the FAS? Any other comments on gen eral reach on the nominal EVA area? POGUE Yeah, I have. The - You tried to standardize the geometry of the handhold. I don't think that was quite achieved. It looked to me like there was variations in the size of the handhold. that's good. That's noble target - noble goal; I think It screwed us up using the - the camera mounts. Some of the times it would make it flop around and Jiggle. And sometimes you couldn't get the lock closed. 385 That's a �POGUE (CONT'D) whole other area to talk about. There was one other thing. Oh, please give us great big numbers on the hand holds. You're talking about F-7 and all that. You're looking all over; it takes 15 minutes to find F-7, for crying out loud. CARR We could never remember where they were. We'd always have to go look for the number. POGUE Great big numbers, for people that are over Uo. No, it's Just - there's Just no sense, I mean, you got all that space there, why not put great big number there and put one, instead of putting that little tiny? ) CARR No sense in wasting time looking for a handrail, when you're outside. POGUE That time's too valuable. And another - another case finding it, the paint fades. It's got to be a very high contrast thing. QUERY Which handrails faded? CARR Everything out in the direct Sun, faded. toward green. POGUE Yeah. MS 386 ) r Turned more �QUERY Some of them were anodized. And - - CARR Well, even the anodized ones turned toward a green. POGUE Sure did. QUERY Yes. They - they should lighten. We expected that they would probably lighten some. CARR They sure did. QUERY Because of the fact they were anodized. CARR And if they're aluminum that was unanodized or it was anodized so that it still had a satin finish, it turned more toward a yellow. And that - that all stands to reason; you take blue and add yellow, and it goes toward a green. And if it's unpainted or untinted, it will go toward a yellow. 'QUERY Do you feel you needed - that you lost contrast in the handrails and that that was not a good - CABR Well, as far as finding the handrail, it was - there was no problem there. But seeing the number, the little F-7 or the F-5 or something on the handrail, was difficult. But the handrails we had, I thought were perfectly ade quate. The EVA trail was excellent; we just - no problems 387 �o CARR (CONT'D) with that whatsoever. The trouble is, the EVA trail didn't go far enough; and when we had to go around to 193, that was a different ball game. And the guys that went down and pulled that wing out POGUE Another thing that you might think about, Dick: you know that foot mount that I took down there for that 193. I - I watched Jer and Ed work in training, working the - Was it Q02hl And this - there's a good argument to be made for being able to take the foot restraint and putting it around on trussworks and so forth. In other words, have some kind of universal mounting capability for a foot restraint, because watching them work on - on that partic o ular one was Just - You know, you'd Just sit there, and it - you'd get a - build up a frustration case yourself, Just watching the other guy. That's such a poor purchase on - in the area. QUERY Okay. I think we've covered the clotheslines versus film-transfer booms in the tech debrief pretty well unless you have any other comments. You did get some entangle ment which was - CARR Which can be dangerous, and that's - - QUERY - - what we were worried about. 388 �- - the biggest disadvantage of the clothesline. It's not only a nuisance, but it can be dangerous. You mentioned that you did have that sticking problem with the pin on the Sun-end clothesline boom when you handed ... - Yes. It wasn't as bad as I had in the water, but my first yank, I said, "Aw, heck, here we go again, Just like This thing's Just like the simulator." the other hand over there. And then I got And because I had no buoyancy problem, I was able to better position myself. And when I heaved a little harder on it, it popped right out. But positioning helped a great deal there. There was some comment, and I think it was Ed that had some problem with the Velcro on the clothesline stowage box. Do you know anything about that, Jer? Oh, it was tough. He really had to pull on that. That was about all there was to it. Yes. He Just - - Just - You know, you get that old sloppy Velcro under water, and it gets real loosey-goosey and it comes right off. And up there the Velcro was holding the way it was designed, and he had to really yank on it. 389 �o POGUE Yes. I've got a comment to make on those umbilical clamps. tank. CARR POGUE I - I didn't - never did like those in the water I didn't like them up there. They weren't any better up there. You know, it's just like you - they'd come up slightly underdesigned - in size, geometry. And they'd Just say, well, if they've got them, use them. impression I always got. That's - that's the The thing that - You'd open it up and get ready to put the hose in position, and the thing would slide back down on its own, you know. It was always a bit of an irritation to work it. 1 CARR Might have been better to go with a clamp - like you ha-e the clothesline clamps up there, those clothesline hooks for pulling them tight. Just that sort of a broom-clip thing might have been Just as good for the umbilicals. You never put that much strain on it - to hurt anything. POGUE CARR POGUE You'd want it to pull out, anyway. Yes. Either that - What is it,.eleat! used on a ship or a boat? 1 390 Is that a thing that's �QUERY Yes. That would get pretty big if you have an umbilical of any great amount. CARR Yes. QUERY With any radius in it. CARR It looks like one time there was a clamp on the S230 exper iment up there that was placed in a position to shadow to shadow the collection foil and to give them a little sort of a calibration of shadow. And it appears that our umbilical at one time or another went by there and flipped that thing off, and we never saw it go. looks like it must have happened on EVA-3 And it because we have photographs of the clip in place and then when I went out to retrieve the clip, it wasn't there on the next EVA. QUERY On the - Do you have any way that you think that EVA prep and post times would be reduced at all? That's really kind of CARR Oh, yes. Yes. By designing a spacecraft that - that is better designed for EVA, you can - you can cut that prep and post down a lot. We spent an awful lot of time put ting tinker toys and erector sets together and lashing them down the airlock module and then after the thing was 391 �CARR (CONT'D) over, taking them apart and putting them away. And in our tech debrief, we discussed the idea that the EVA lock Bhould not be between two living areas. isolate two living areas. where. You should not It should be on the end some And it should be located in such a manner, designed in such a manner, that the stuff that you're going to use on EVA is stowed in it, with lockers and things right in there, so that you don't have to be taking things apart and putting them together and stowing them in a high-traffic area. POGUE Reconfiguring ECS ducts, taking that elephant trunk out, putting it back in, and all that other nonsense; all that took time. CARR POGUE CARR Yes. The suits - There's a lot overhead in suit prep. Stowage was the ... And stowage of suits. the suits. There's no good stowage area for You know, that - that game we had to play of moving the suits up into the MDA and stowing it underneath the foot restraints for the ATM panel in little nooks and crannies was not too terribly sterling. time is Just costly to you. All that overhead The - That was really the main thing; we spent so much time putting things together and prepping them that - 392 �POGUE I guess that - No. I was going to say that traffic - you know, getting ready, going to the sleep compartment, coning up, getting radiation dosimeter, and all that I suppose there's no way to avoid a lot of that. But there's - Just relocating the airlock would have elimina ted a lot of the wasted time. QUERY Okay. The S082A and B overcans, the big Jerry cans, didn't have a lot of lead-in on the guides; they were a fairly close fit, whereas the S082A and B cameras in the canister had quite a bit of lead-in. Could you comment at all on - on differences or any difficulties in inser ting the cameras into the 82A and B? CARR There was no problem. I know in the procedures we always had a little comment in there about making sure they were flush before you tried to close the door, and that Just never - never reared up. It was always straightforward; they'd Just slide right in and you - they'd be flush and you could lock it up. No problem. QUERY Visibility was good both places, and - - CARR Yeah. 393 �QUERY - - so you didn't really need quite all the amount of flaring that we put on the - on the 82A and B cameras, perhaps, and in the canisters. CARR Yeah, that's right. But I tell you, it's easier to - to design your stuff with a good lead-in and flare and all that in the beginning than it is to find out it's a little too snug and you're going to have to redesign it later. QUERY And I guess Ed was the only person that used the replace ment workstation foot restraint, when he went up and got the clotheslines. And maybe we can catch him later and just see how that compared and what he thought of that typical - that particular method of restraining the feet. CARR Oh, yeah. Well, he put one foot in it, and it came out again in a little while. QUERY Yeah. CARR Of course, I was right there, right next to his foot, watching it. need it. It was no big thing; you really didn't When his foot came out, he didn't worry about re-reinserting his foot; he just kept on working with the clothesline and got - got it out. QUERY So it wasn't very positive, and it came back in. You mentioned that there were hot spots and you feel different 391* �hot spots. Were any of - Did you notice any of those on handrails or any of the - like the tree or anything like that? CARR No. For the most part, it was on white, white places that were reflecting the heat. I wouldn't even call them hot spots; they were warm spots, really. QUERY On stowage and - and hardware restraints. Can you com ment on any problems that you had with stowage containers, if any? CARR Any that stick out in your mind at all? No, most of the trees and things worked; the trees and the pallets and everything worked. QUERY We're moving now inside, too; so - out of the EVA area. CARR Okay. Inside it was Just a mess, a general mess. And of course, by properly designing an EVA area, you can you can design a lot of these messes out so that you don'1; have all that foolishness going on. But we would do a real neat Job of lashing down T025 or something like that. And then on one case we used it - a pip pin with a chain on it; wrapped it around a piece of equip ment and then stuck it back in its hole, forgetting the fact that a guy with a big gloved hand was going to have a hard time working that pip pin. 395 And that almost caused �, (CONT'D) us to have to omit doing an experiment. The ad lib stuff, I guess, was the more dangerous of anything. We were thankful we had plenty of wrist tethers because the tools we were carting around out there, I was always afraid I was going to lose one. And when I was doing the S05U camera fix, it was a real pain in the neck not having a good place to retain those tools, because I would have the flashlight mirror flopping from this wrist and I'd have the screwdriver in my hand, trying to do the thing with the screwdriver when I was levering the filter wheel along. And I would have this other thing hanging on my wrist. It was very helpful to have Bill there holding me while I was doing that. The loose items - The tool caddy problem is a problem, and I guess it always will be. When I was trying to take the zero-g fixture cover off on the last EVA and I was prying, I had the gray tape on it as we'd - it said to do. But you know, gray tape when it gets hot or cold doesn't stick. And they forgot to tell me that under the zero-g fixture was a 2-inch block of some phenolic material that went on down; it was a plug. And I was busy prying, and I couldn't figure out why that cover wouldn't come off. And all of a sudden - pop - off it went; and I caught it in mid-air, and it was on its way. 396 And I was just thankful �) CARR (CONT'D) I was able to catch it, because I would have had to go find another cover and start all over again if I had lost it. Just those handy little restraint things - tool restraints. QUERY How did you find that Job of removing that fixture cover? CARR No problem. that door. I had to move that B-l or whatever it is We had to pull the pin on that door and move it out of the way. And then I took the screwdriver, and I dug the paint out of the slots; and then the things came right up. QUERY We were a little curious as to how that was going to go. We thought you'd be able to do it but it might be difficult because you had to maintain the pressure on the screws all the time because they were slotted screws. :ARR It wasn't as bad as I thought it would be. Once you got it loosed, you could reach down with your glove and go like that on the screw. And it would Just keep going and Just work its way out. Then when it got up about a foot, you'd take your hand and go bam, like that, and off it'd go. But it was kind of fun. Once you got the screw up to where you could get your fingers on it, you could Just ) 397 �CARR (CONT'D) give it a couple of twists like that, and it would Just work itself up and Just come spinning right up. QUERY Going into the internal stowage and all, the restraints on the stowage - like in the ring lockers and so forth, like that - do you have any comments on any of the internal stowage? You made a number of comments about the stowage in the film vault; I think we've got all that stuff documented. Anything else that specifically comes up - POGUE Dome lockers? QUERY Or anywhere else; the ring lockers. POGUE The PCU that was stowed in the dome ring locker, the one that I had to get out to replace the one that leaked on Jer, that was sort of hard to get out of there. In fact, if I recall, the tool that was specified in procedure didn't work. why. And I'm not sure - I can't recall quite I guess the whole point in this is that when a - a consideration when designing launch stowage is removal and replacement. CARR Just that simple. We got the definite impression on a couple of things there that people had overlooked the requirement to reuse lock stowage hardware, for nominal retention - - 398 �POGUE Stowage. CARR And you took care of all the bridgevork, the civil engineering part, the heavy-duty stuff, in getting it off. And then when you had to put another piece in there, you had to kind of redo it. One case in point is the fans we replaced in the OWS heat exchanger. It was very unhandy to take the fans we took out and stow them in that dome locker, and we were reluctant to throw them away because we knew they were still working. And so - and I don't think anybody expected us - had planned on us putting those back in the same place. But the thing is, I think, if - you probably ought to figure on that kind of flexibility. POGUE What would be nice - The ideal would be if part and parcel of the lock stowage seating was a loose friction clamp so that the rest of the civil engineering bridgework that held it down, you know - That would hold it for 50-g acceleration and all this other nonsense if you could - if those would come off and be removed easily and be color coded. But when I remove those, I still have a nice stowage for retaining the objects. CARR Zero-g stowage. 399 �POGUE Zero-g stowage. CARR The one thing we all overlooked, which we were very, very sorry about, was the 230 experiment where we fastened it to a - the grillwork over a light. And none of us saw it when we were going all through training; was that location where we were stowing that S230 foil was right beside the repress - the repress valve in the hatch. And Bill opened that son of a gun up, and we had a 3-inch Jet of high-speed - high-velocity air going right through the hatch ... POGUE CARR POGUE Just was in the right position. And it Just flat shredded one of Don Lind's 230 samples. The probability of getting that configuration by accident must be 10 to the minus 10. Boy, it was right there, Just lined up, and air went right through it, Just shredded little bits of it. CARR So we felt very badly about that. And you know, every body had looked at that thing, but nobody considered the repress situation, when you'd be really blasting that high-velocity air in there. us. And it really did it to So that's a point right there to put in your design U00 �CARR (CONT'D) books for the next system, and that is, don't plan on retaining any equipment around the business end of that thing, especially anything that could be damaged by highvelocity jets. QUERY If you take and put a deflector over it or something like that, why then 90 chances out of a 100, why that'll be what we have to go in and do something to, too. CARR Yeah. POGUE One thing that I would like to hit in the airlock module was the stowage caps, or whatever you call them, for the umbilicals, LCG connectors, and all that - that fiber glass thing that's Calfaxed down. difficult to work with. Those were very, very Well, first off, it was designed to receive about six fittings; I forget what it was. I don't think anybody could put all those fittings on there and get that into position; in other words, it looked like from the start there was a design error. But the fix was, you don't put two of them on there; you leave two of them off, leave them dangling around and fit them in right. Well, that - you know, that sort of leaves you with a bad taste in your mouth, to think that they can't - you know, they give you something like that to work with. But even leaving those off, it seemed 1*01 �POGUE (CONT'D) like that things were always twiBted and bend around in, well, not a very satisfactory manner. And then on top of that, you had to use an awful lot of force to get into position. Calfax I don't like anyway, but you had to U3e Calfax. And you ended up actually putting an awful lot of physical force on those to get them into position; took two of us sometimes. CARR I think the sphere idea of stowing those hoses was an excellent idea. POGUE CARR Good idea. But it's Just that awful fitting on it that you covered it with, that you theoretically had to connect all the hoses to. You Just put so many strains in so many dif ferent directions on it that it Just became nearly impos sible to close that thing. It would have been better if you'd Just capped off each hose and stuffed it in the sphere and have one of them lanyarded to a loose cap that went on real easy. POGUE Yeah, that's a good idea. QUERY Yeah, the lanyard would have done the - - POGUE Yeah. There was no need for them to h02 �QUERY Everybody was afraid you might lose the ends down in there and you'd - POGUE Ahhhh. CARR And a lanyard would have been good - a nice strong lanyard. QUERY And I'm sure that we overdid the Calfax and had too many on there, too. CARR Yeah. QUERY Gives you more alignment trouble. On the various latches and fasteners that we had inside, did you see any par ticular ones that you'd like to flag as really good or really bad? You mentioned the dial latches and the Calfax in the tech debriefing ... - CARR The dial latches were Just too doggone fragile. The Calfax were too fragile, too; you kept losing those little bitty washers, the grip washers, on - that retain it - the canister. POGUE Not only that, but the alignment of a Calfax is extra ordinarily critical. There were - The heat exchanger vane - OWS heat-exchanger-vane cover panel, I think, had four Calfax on it and then one hinged panel - one hinge 1+03 �POGUE (CONT'D) line. There was one Calfax that - I don't know if any of us ever got that one in. And there was only one order of tightening which would work in attaching that cover, which - and I can't see that it's much different than it was when it left the factory. There was another area - This has nothing to do with EVA, but the ATM coolant reservoir, we never could get those to work; they flat ve just couldn't do it. But I didn't like the dial latches for that reason. QUERY The Calfax is supposed to have 1/16 of an inch of slop around. And we noticed that most of the complaints are around that little ring that carried them on CARR QUERY POGUE CARR Uh-huh. - - because it seemed to come off. Cam locks also gave us fits. The most handy doors to open and close were those big lockers in the MDA that Just had a - two big pieces of metal that closed over each other, and you ran a pip through them. QUERY Super simple. The film vaults. kok pin �CARR Yeah. I don't know why you didn't have that on the film vault down in the workshop or nothing but Just a plain old bar-over-the-hook gate latch to hold it shut. But those little Calfax, it - it ever swung closed while you were swinging the doors closed. And you'd hit it. It got inside - POGUE Fit tight. CARR It Just bent it. And then you'd have to straighten it out, loosen the screws that hold it, and readjust the whole thing. QUERY Okay. How about the - Let's see. Internally - We didn't have any magnetic latches internally, really; we had some on the outside, on the ATM doors. CARR The - - Yeah, if it doesn't screw up your instrumentation, those magnetic latches are a very good way of latching. QUERY About hardware restraint methods, any particular comments on best or worst? Did you ever use the tool that was provided for removing screws, those special screws that were in the airlock around the CARR J You mean the high torque? lt05 �QUERY High torques. POGUE Yeah. Right. Well, I had to take some of them out when I was servicing Coolanol. CARR Oh, yeah. But Bean and his guys had taken most of them out - POGUE Yeah, and they had the same trouble I did, in that those high-torque wrenches had paint in the slots and they'd been worked over a couple of times, and I really had fits with a few of those. QUERY Did you use the little tool that was provided for yours, with the - that gripped around the outside of the head rather than in the center of it? POGUE No. QUERY Never used that. CARR No. QUERY Let's see. That's the one that was sent up to take the kickplate off - QUERY The kick plate off the C&D panels. POGUE Son of a gun. I didn't even know it was there. 1+06 �QUERY They didn't have to take the kick plate off. QUERY No, we didn't have - - POGUE I wish I had known about that, because that's a good idea. I had an awful time with those high torque QUERY I believe you guys carried that tool up there. CARR Yes, we did. POGUE You see, I didn't ever work on the kick plate. I didn't know it was in there. ) MS (Laughter) QUERY I remember when we ... it up. POGUE I could have sure used it. CARR Specialization bites us again. MS (Laughter) POGUE One problem you had with those high-torque screws or bolts or whatever they are, and that is that it takes an awful lot of compression force when you're loosening on it. QUERY And I'm sure that's why you came up with that tool. Right. U07 �POGUE Because it - Boy, it was really giving me fits, I had my legs strapped to handholds and everything to get the right force. QUERY ' That's probably why you commented on the lack of restraint in the airlock module and having to tie yourself to the airlock ... POGUE Yes, I remember pausing quite a few times to reflect on that. MS (Laughter) QUERY Because we - nobody else has commented about the lack of restraint in the airlock. MS (Laughter) QUERY We forgot about that Coolanol servicing. CARR Tools in general, I can - I'll Just - we made a lot of comments in the tech debriefing on what we thought we should have had in the way of tools. We asked for a soldering iron a long time ago and didn't get it - a soldering gun. POGUE Files. 1+08 �We asked for a drill; we didn't get it. We asked for files and didn't get them; luckily, we had a Swiss army knife that had a file on it. didn't have thera. We asked for hacksaws and And we could have used all those items. And a crimper cutter - the type that an electrician uses or electronics guy does to put terminals on the end of wires and to splice wires together and all that kind of stuff - with a selection of splices - should have had all that stuff. And I don't give a dang whether anybody can in advance Justify the use of that stuff or not. If you're going to go up and set up housekeeping somewhere like that, you need an adequate bunch of tools, because, as I said before, it's Just like at home in your garage: You can do a Job very quickly if you got the right kind of tools; if you don't, it takes you three times as much time and a lot of cussing to get the same Job done. I got a whole bunch of things here on inflight mainte nance that I guess we'll get to a little bit farther on. So we can get in some more of them. Were there any mechanisms in stowage locations which you felt had accessibility problems? Oh, let's see. U09 �J POGUE Yes. CARR Oh, yes. POGUE Yes, I do. Panel 217. Yeah. If you could see your hands - All you got to do is Just take a picture. I should have taken a picture of my hands after I got through doing the servicing in there, because there's no way of working in there - Well, I could use work gloves, I guess; I should have used work gloves. I used the photo gloves. But that should have been caught by ground safety, that's so bad. There wasn't enough room in there to make them - to make and break J those QDs for the liquid gas separator. It was Just a sorry place to work; there's Just no two ways about it. CARR The stowage in general - The biggest single problem with stowage is retention in the zero-g situation. We need to do a lot of thinking and get some inventiveness brought to play here on how to retain things - little things. Of course, the film vault is a prime example of that. But some of those big film vaults up in the MDA were Just great big empty boxes, and it got to the point where you Just pushed something in there and closed the door real quick. And then you knew the next time you had to open the door, you had to be on your guard. And little things 3 1*10 �CA™ (CONT'D) that we put in there, we would stick tape on them and tape them to the door because we knew that we were liable to lose them. In our sleep compartments there was no stowage for personal items. And there was no place to write or have your own little desk or to keep little things that you wanted to have. And there was no personal place. A Ben Franklin desk sort of thing would have been - could have been very easily designed into one of the lockers, you know, where you pull the locker door down. Instead of having the locker door go all the way down, Just have it come down part way and stay level so you could use it for a writing surface. And have a module of something you could put in there with lots of little pigeonholes and cubbyholes to put small things that you might want to keep, because you gather things over a period of time. Like I had a couple of spare triangles in mine, and I had a little lanyard with a dog leash clip on one end and a ring on the other one. And I wanted to keep that because I wanted to have it when I was ready to come back and put it in the command module. And I had some items of a personal nature that I wanted to keep, and all I had was big open locker. And every time I opened that, I had to watch it because I had in airflow coming up from the floor. And as soon as I opened that locker, Lll �I'd get a venturi effect in the locker; and all the small things would start coming out at me and - Just because of the airflow that moved through the area. And I kept a logbook in there so that I could write notes. And any thing that's small like that is Just going to start coming out at you. And after a while, when you get a lot of stuff in there, you dread opening it, because you know you're going to have to fight it to the death in order to keep everything in and get the door closed back up again. I think all three of us ended up going into the tissue dispensers in those areas and removing the tissue boxes and cutting the spring out and using that little flapper door as a real handy way to get in and keep things in the small tissue-dispenser areas. And I ended up Just main taining one tissue dispenser, and I cut the springs out of the other two so that I had little pigeonholes to put personal items that I wanted to be able to get to - like the Swiss army knife and pieces of paper, things that I wanted to keep from the teleprinter - teleprinter pads and things like that. I think in the area of stowage that any habitable area, place where you got - that's your own, your own bedroom, there ought to be some sort of a personal area there where you can keep your personal items and do your writing and your reading and keep your kl2 �CARE (CONT'D) pencils and all that sort of thing. Just like you do, say, aboard ship, where you have a little stateroom. And in the - most all staterooms in a ship have got a little built-in desk. QUERY That's it on stowage as far as I - - POGUE I can go back to a couple of maintenance - routine main tenance and servicing ideas that caused us trouble. QD, the panel 217 problem, a lot of that was associated with affixing and - removing and reattaching QDs in a verylimited-access area, also where there were a lot of sharp edges. Another area where the problem arose was that for - underwater tank 9, which was Just above the food lockers. We had to remove and attach the water QD there quite often during - let's say a half dozen times - during the flight, for water-servicing exercises of one sort or the other. The area was restricted in access and it was difficult to remove the QD and reattach the QD to the water tank. I should say that there's always going to be an area where it's - you have limited access for removal and attachment of QDs. At one time - Who's the little guy that worked over there and quit about a year ago? little tool - a QD tool. They had made a We had - I had so much trouble with panel 21? that the guys had rigged up a QD tool. 1+13 �>r) (CoS'D) ^ P°lnt l8' 1 tMnk th6re 18 Pr°bably •" to be made for developing one of these tools to give you a better mechanical advantage and purchase in operating QDs in limited access areas. That's just sort of a problem area I identify because, again I - I actually cut my arm up there working that water tank 9 because you were working at arm's - at extended arm length, working the QPs like this along an axis like so, which wasn't too neat. The other area up in the MDA for servicing and maintenance that gave us a little bit of a management problem was the vetting of the water separator plates. J You had so much hardware there all around us, with the water separator plate and the spare condensate module and all this other stuff - you might look at that one as sort of an extra an example of a maintenance - that was a routine exercise that was part of the activation - which could have used a little thought as far as preparing work surfaces and areas, restraints. Oh, another thing. The plenum area should have been lighted. You know, we - that we worked down there occasionally, and there wouldn't have had to have been but a couple of lights down there. I was - we were actually working with - There were areas down there which were potential areas for maintenance, and that's 1 UlU �POGUE (CONT'D) where the heater probes were located. We didn't have any restraints down there and I don't think we really needed any. The - the little cables we had strung around there for the bags were great. QUERY But you'd have liked to have a light rather than POGUE Yes; I mean why - why carry the doctor's light down there on your head like a miner, you know. And Just one or two light bulbs down there would have been sufficient. CARR Yes, it's like having a house with a basement and no lights in the basement. If you're going to go down there to do anything, you probably ought to put a light - one or two lights anyway. QUERY Okay. Were the friction and detent provisions on the stowage container doors and the hatches and all satisfactory? POGUE No. The M131 door, the latch on that thing gave us trouble. In fact, I don't think I ever got that thing latched. We always pushed it up there in position. The T025 - When you have the cam lock latches on four or I guess three sides of the door, almost always one of ^15 �POGUE (CONT'D) them is out of view. And the thing haa so little friction in the camlike hinges - the cam-lock hinges - that they would flip back and reattach themselves after you thought you had unfastened them. CARR These were the Dialatches. POGUE I'm sorry, Dialatches. QUERY The Dialatch problems - We got that. CARR Should have put friction in the hinge. QUERY )) ) How about the friction in the - for the MDA film vault doors, the friction on those? POGUE Yes. CARR Yes. They're pretty good? �POGUE No problem on that. CARR They'd stay where you left them. POGUE But they should've - One thing that I didn't like about Oh, I guess we've debriefed that enough - you couldn't had access to both sides at the same time. Sometimes you wanted to - transfers from one to the other. CARR That's in the film vault. POGUE Fi lm vault. CARR He was talking about the MDA film vault. POGUE Okay, OWS film vault. QUERY Were there any indications of fraying or breaking of fabric materials in hardware restraints? In other words, a lot of fabric tiedowns and so forth, like did you notice any of them that seemed to be frayed or broken? POGUE Yes, the - the tool box up in the MDA; you know, it had the pins on them, and they weren't captive pins, which is sort of a problem. We didn't go in there too often, so it really didn't give us that much of a problem. If we're going to use that very much, that would have been unsatisfactory. ) The - the - Those drawers had fabric overlays - 1+17 �QUERY Right. POGUE - - and they were frayed. CARR They were a real bother too. POGUE Yes, that's CARR We'd have been better off with Mosite inserts. QUERY The - Did you have much trouble with the snaps - Velcro or decals that were bonded on coming off? CARR Yes, we sure did. We had a lot of them come unbonded, and finally by the time SL-U came around, Kenny Kleinknecht and people had beat the system down to the point where they let us take some glue up with-us. And we managed • to glue some of them back, and they held very nicely. QUERY Okay, habitability, and generally, you covered a lot of this with Ml+87. We've got a few general comments we'd like to ask you to consider. What changes in general accept ability of your surroundings did you notice over time? Any particular things? CARR Well, one of the things is color. colors up there. We got tired of the There wasn't much variation, and our clothing was all the same color, and the walls were all ; 1*18 �CARR (CONT'D) the same color. And it would've been, I think, good to have had some color - a little more color up there. And of course, the submarine folks are learning that lesson or have learned it. Atmospheric environment surroundings, once we got used to the humidity, we were quite comfortable. Color - Odor was another one. no odor. We got sick and tired of And we made a pitch towards that in the personal hygiene area and all of that. Doggone it, we should have disinfectants and we should have soaps and things like that that got the smells we are used to down here. crying out loud! worse? For Why make everything smell like iodine or And, of course, we provided enough smells of our own there that where a few bits of Airwick or something like that could have been awfully nice on occasion. And like Bill has said on a couple of times that there were a couple of t h e more pleasant interludes was when i t ' s time to defog the helmets. Everybody would come up and smell the detergent that we used to defog the helmets because that Joy really smelled good after all the other 0GUE Yes> it got pretty gross at times. (Laughter) ARR Well, heck, deodorants and aftershave and Pinesol disin fectant to clean stuff with and all of that, we just didn't have i t . We r e a l l y m i s s e d t h a t ; we r e a l l y d i d miss i t . 1+19 �•-f-V.f" r QUERY Was there anything that you would have liked to change periodically? Or had the ability to change, Just to alter? CARR Let's see. POGUE General area of habitability you're talking about now? QUERY Yes. POGUE Well, I can't think of anything right off. CARR The color changes would have helped, you know; if you'd Provide more variation perhaps. have had maybe variations in color of clothing where you could - POGUE Well, I tell you; in a general area what we really would have liked - and it's not really the question you're • asking, but it answers - it satisfies the requirement, and that is television for entertainment - and more tapes. That sort of thing. That's what satisfied that sort of craving for variety. CARR Yes. The single best sorts of entertainment we had up there, as we've mentioned many times, was looking out the window. And that was constantly changing and it was very, very interesting to us. ) U20 �3 POGUE And magnetic tapes were nice - the music. CARR Yes, the music was great. POGUE Another thing would have been nice, would have been to We really enjoyed that. have a built-in capability in each sleep compartment. The way it was, it was very inconvenient to - to move the tape recorders in there so that - I only did it once and that was for the light flash experiment, because I didn't want to go to sleep during the middle of the experiment, mainly. But that was the only time I really took it in the sleep compartment. 3 CARR William Tell overture with light flashes. POGUE It increases the count anyway. QUERY The - What are some of the things that you missed the (Laughter) most up there. (Laughter) QUERY There are a couple of things that's so obvious - (Laughter) CARR I - I still - I'd - I think that NASA knuckled under to a very small but vocal area of public opinion when they wouldn't let us have any wine or anything up there. ) 1+21 I �CARR (CONT'D) think that's dumb. For those who like it, I think they should have been able to have. For those who don't like it, fine; they don't have to have it. But, Just a few little of the niceties like that, not overdone - — POGUE Yes, in the area of food, if I'd have had some more candy up there I think I would have functioned at 50 percent higher level. CARR Yes, Bill's a candy eater; he enjoys candy and gets a lot of energy from it. not there. And that was - That sort of thing was I think, again, the television would have been a very good thing; it would have been a valuable thing from a training standpoint. It would have been a valuable thing from a records and data-keeping standpoint and also very nice from an entertainment standpoint, because the three of us all like football and we would have enjoyed some of the football games. I think that kind of thing - the touch with the ground was probably the thing we missed a lot of. And, of course, the CAP COMMs helped a lot by playing music once in a while. The getup music was lots of fun because we never knew what old Crip was going to play next. And the little newscasts were very good. 1+22 We �CARR (CONT'D) enjoyed very much hearing the news. And we always were disappointed when the guys would only pass up ahout two items of news, because we knew damn good and well there's more than that going on down here. MS (Laughter) CARR I guess that's the things we really POGUE Yes; obviously the - you know, of course, being with the family in the evening, that was the thing that probably got us more than anything else, but that's all tied to gether part and parcel. CARR Just connection with the folks back down home, the odors, the colors, the TV, the little things - - POGUE Familiarity, yes. CARR The familiar things that you like. You're so - It's such a sterile environment up there that you begin to get very detached. I think back on that thing now and I find it difficult to connect that part of my life with the main stream of my life down here. It's just like you've been sort of schizophrenic for a while and you've got to you've lived a dual life for a little while. have to be that way. U23 And it doesn't �POGUE It's like you only have an intellectual appreciation for what was going on, although at the time it seemed like a very deep emotional involvement. MS (Laughter) QUERY What did you find the most satisfying up there, if that is different from things that you found enjoyable? You mentioned looking out the windows as being one of the most enjoyable things. CARR That was the most satisfying for Bill and me. Ed's solar observations, I think, were the most satisfying for him, and then the Earth observations. I think the Earth's observations work was probably the most satisfying for Bill and me. POGUE And then I would say, what? Well, I enjoyed the ATM and Earth resources experiment operations. Those had some type of creative operator content and contribution. CARR That's right. I guess the big key word is creativity. You know, the Earth observations were a creative thing. All they did was give us cameras, film, and an introduction as to what sort of things they were worried about - not worried about, but what they wanted to know about. they turned us loose, and we got pictures. k2h And And that was �CARR (CONT'D) kind of creative. And Ed's ATM was designed for creative use, and he got to use it creatively later; so that was very satisfying to him to be able to do it. The POGUE The science demos too. CARR The science demos were satisfying because we could be a little creative there. The stuff where you Just followed the clock and threw the switch was not very satisfying at all, as one would expect. Being the observer in a medical thing was not very satisfying. QUERY It got very boring. I'm going t o scratch out some of these I think we've covered. Did you all - Well, you mentioned in the electrical portion that you had some bumping of those airlock circuit breakers and switching them off occa sionally. And that was partially due to the switch and was that - the traffic area and the bar guard design, did that anything to do with it? POGUE Yes, because you're tempted to grab the bar guard; that's how I got trapped in this, I think, when I reached over to grab ahold of it and it flipped the circuit breaker. QUERY Do you think that the wicket type of guarding would have been better than the type of guarding -chey had on, or would it have made much difference? 1*25 �CARR It might have "been better because it requires that you get the finger in the - in between the wickets to throw a switch; whereas, if you bump it with a foot or something, it will protect it. But you've got an engineering tradeoff there because a whole bunch of wickets are such much heavier and space - use up a lot more space than just a bar across the top. QUERY True. You commented in the debriefings on the ATM foot restraint position and the fact that it generally was too high for all of you by about 8 or 10 inches. Did you move the ATM foot restraint from its position and what position did you use? CARR It was all the way down, as far down as it could get. QUERY It was all the way down? CARR Yes. See the thing is your natural posture is essentially - standing is just very slightly bowed, with your back hunched just a little bit, your legs flexed Just a little bit. And what we ended up with was the eye level right at the top of the panel instead of where we had had all of our training where you're sitting in a chair and you're looking at the panel like this. You had to look at it like that. And the same thing in the food area too. 1+26 You're not sitting �POGUE And the thigh restraint didn't help that any? CARR Yes. QUERY That's one thing, which crewman's restraint methods worked best and worst? Did you have any? POGUE Triangle shoes. CARR Oh, they were by far the best, yes. It took a little �) CARR (CONT'D) down and fiddle around with your foot until you finally got it to drop in the triangle and then lock it. you get an eye for it later on. But You got to the point where 50 percent of the time you could float free right down the floor and hit the triangle and lock yourself in without ever having to grab something and make sure you didn't And the other 50 percent of the time you missed the triangle and propelled yourself back up. POGUE Yes, and if you have both hands full, you're off and running again; couldn't grab anything. 3 QUERY Do you have one that you selected the candidate as being the one that we shouldn't look at anymore? CARR Restraint? QUERY Yes, restraint types. POGUE Straps. CARR Those foot straps are no good. Yes, in the waste management compartment. Also don't ever cover up triangles for another kind of foot restraints. POGUE Yes. The waste management compartment is the worst in the whole vehicle. I think that's even worse than the MDA/STS, if it could be. 3 b28 �And the floor, you know the plates you had on the floor around the food pedestal? Once we got rid of those things, we probably quadrupled the number of triangles that were available to us to anchor ourselves in. And we still didn't have very many because of those intercostal beams that are in there that blocked off the triangles. Bill, you mentioned that the M512 foot restraint was a little bit off for some of your work with the furnace, that you had Just used one triangle I believe, and you felt the body position was a little wrong. Yes; now Jerry, I think, used it all right. No, I had the same problem though; all I could anchor was my right foot. Okay. The other one was off I ended up not even using it for the 516, because the 516 work was so limited. Now the flammability, that was another matter entirely, because that required the continual presence there at the panel, and Jer spent several hours doing that. So on 516, it wasn't even worth the problem. The work chamber, the furnace chamber was here. And the floor started here at my ri$it foot and went off that way. So I could anchor - The most comfortable thing was to U29 �CARR (CONT'D) anchor ay foot in the forward left-hand corner, and then the rest of me was hanging out over the end, and I was working with one foot restraint. We Just didn't have it in the right place, that's all. QUERY Apparently they - when it was originally planned, it was organized for CARR QUERY The C&D panel. And for the activity back there in the back and the preparation and not actually for POGUE CARR QUERY Oh, for all that stowage and everything. Yes. ^es. For handling all the other stuff. And maybe that is why, because of the particular type of experiments that were flown on your mission, we didn't have any comment about it on either of the other two missions. POGUE You know, thinking out loud and not trying to redesign, but, I guess, really suggesting it; you could have something like that foot restraint there, but where you had different levels of the triangles that would telescope and slide out, giving you a longer - which could be rigid!zed by tethers, maybe. But the idea was excellent. 1*30 !./ The triangle - when �POGUE (CONT'D) that thing was moved around for C&D work, it was great when - as long as you were right at the C&D panel. that's all it was good for. But But it was excellent for that. CARR Yes, we really fell into it, I think, on the triangle shoes thing and the triangle grid. That was - that just really came out beautiful. POGUE Yes, that was really so convenient. CARR Far and away the best restraint system that we have ever seen. POGUE I used the mushrooms once. I think I would have used them more, except that you couldn't use them with the bicycle. CARR And it was inconvenient to change - - POGUE And it was Just that simple. QUERY Right. CARR What you had on your shoes. POGUE We needed two pair of shoes is what we needed. CARR Yes. U31 �QUERY You want to cover anything on this? QUERY Could you give us a little information, a little more discussion on the comparisons of volumes between the sleep, the wardroom, the waste management compartment, experiment area, and the airlock? You know, Just the - the adequacy and whether you felt that they were oversized or smaller; good the way they were. ROGUE I think the - - CARR Well POGUE Go ahead. CARR Go ahead. That's all right. I was going to say that I thought the worst area was the wardroom. Although I liked the wardroom, there were a couple of things about that and all of them are architec tural. Ed did not have access to his food trays, and he was always either coming around float - he always felt like he was an interloper. In other words, he had to come around behind me or Jer, over the top of the food table when, if we were all eating together, was a mess. And it - a lot of times, if you want to reach over and get another drink or something like that, it wasn't convenient. 1*32 �") CARR It was very inconvenient for him. The size of the ward room, I think, was reasonable for the purposes of having a place to eat. POGUE Ed's already made several points regarding use of floors and ceiling for additional stowage, which I thought were well taken. And, of course, this has nothing to do with the wardroom as such, and, of course, we were delighted to have the wardroom window, but it would have greatly en hanced the usability of the wardroom window had there been a large radial area clear around so that we could have with our nose in the window - we could have put our feet around a 360 degree swath. CARR Because as beta angle changes, the horizon changes as it comes up and through the window, and it's most natural looking outside to look at your horizon this way, with sky up here and Earth down here. POGUE You always move around to look that way. CARR You can ... yourself around in the window to get that. It looks more natural, and that way the Earth is either moving away from you or towards you this way. POGUE 3 Strange thing, too, is that you'd recognize that there's, you know, an area, a land mass area down there until you U33 �moved around and got it so the top was up. You couldn't recognize it as easy even though the continent itself may be upside down. Yes. That's interesting. Waste management compartment: Traffic was the thing there. The use of the - the fecal and urine collector and somebody washing at the same time really wasn't compatible at all. And as far as using the urine collectors, I had no objection to somebody going in there to use the urine collector while I was washing. It didn't offend me at all; and when you got three guys living together that much, it doesn't bother you at all. But the thing was, it was inconvenient because the guy standing there trying to wash himself really had to paste himself against the wall for the guy to go behind him or in front of him to get over to the urine collector. So you had sort of a traffic problem there in the bathroom. That was architectural, too, because there was that pedestal, or that one column of equipment, stowage and the heater panel, and so forth there, the 800 series, was in the way. U3U �CARR That's the only thing I had in the waste management k compartment as far as volume is concerned. POGUE The experiment compartment was great. CARR Of course, we've already hit people over the head and shoulders about the floor and the fact that you had no foot restraints that were worth anything in there. sleep compartments: The if all they're designed for is sleep ing, or reading a book when you're in your bed, or writing letters, or doing whatever you're going to do while you're in your bed, they were about the right size. But if you wanted it for a place for a person to go in anytime during the day and maybe sit somewhere or lock himself somewhere else besides in his bed, it weren't big enough. The only restraint system you had was the bed, so if you wanted to be by yourself in your room, you had to get in bed. One other thing that we recommended too from an architec tural standpoint is that the sleep compartments be spread around the workshop, so one guy thrashing around in his bunk doesn't disturb the other guy. If you're just a thin aluminum wall away, it can get pretty noisy and bothersome. The - yes, experiment compartment was - no volume problems there at all. h35 �POGUE The only thing that bugged me in there was having to remove the SOP, the secondary oxygen pack, in order to do the 131 chair experiments. And that was it; the rest of it seemed like it was pretty well arranged. CARR Trash retention was a problem. When you fill a trash bag, and it's ready to go down the trash airlock, and you want to Just stow the bag for a while until you're ready to open the trash airlock and have a dump, where you dump three or four or five bags, all we had was the well around there. And POGUE Netting would have been nice. CARR Once you fill that thing up, you know, it was time to dump the trash. But the problem is there was no place to put the guy dumping the trash. get leverage or anything like that. There was no place to And I had to wedge myself into the well, which meant I had to displace three of the bags in order to get myself in there so that I < could operate the levers and provide back forces or counterforces to the forces that I was putting on the levers. And so that - really the working arrangement around the trash airlock was not too steany at all. As far as volume in the forward compartment, I guess on occasion there was too much volume. ^36 If you ever let yourself get �loose, got distracted and you drifted out of a foot re straint and you didn't notice it, all of a sudden you're out there by yourself and you could do nothing about it. All the swimming and fluttering and flopping did you no good, and.all you could do is swear and one of your buddies would come by and give you a shove and get you back to the wall. Otherwise you were doomed to stay there and free- floating for 5 or so minutes until you finally got close to something to grab. And it happened to all of us at one time or another. Had a few midairs too. guy goes boom. One guy comes down, and another No way of making midcourses. Once you kick free from the dome or from the trash airlock down there, you're - there's no midcourse; and if the other guy doesn't look before he jumps, then you're both committed and every man for himself then. How about the airlock/MDA area, any particular comments on volume there? I don't think the volume was too bad. It was just the lack of proper restraint up there, proper ways to restrain yourself while you're working. Yes, and - - U37 �I think the VTS operator was shortchanged on restraints. Right, and the work in even the aft airlock compartment on that recharge station - Oh, yes. There weren't enough restraints there, and, of course, the station itself gave us fits. And the other is forces re quired to put the umbilical storage plate cover back on. Yes. On the - in the ATM/MDA area there, did concurrent ex periment operation or experiment prep cause very many problems, interaction between people? Not too many. thing else. I think the noise got them more than any Ed would be trying to work ATM, and Bill and I'd be talking to each other or we'd have that 191 cooler running, and it got awfully noisy up there. But the idea of having one guy working the ATM and another guy working up there doing something else really wasn't a bad deal; we didn't interfere with each other except we made noise. And when one guy said he was trying to talk to the ground or trying to record and somebody else was up there making a lot of racket, it's hard to 1+38 �POGUE It's distracting. CARR Yes. POGUE In lighting, while we're do - trying to do the comet photography, the lighting conflicts was a problem. CARR You wanted the MDA black when you're looking for the comet. And if the ATM operator was trying to get in there early or late or stay in there a little bit late trying to either debrief or get in early and get set up for the ATM pass, and the guy that was in there was trying to do the comet work, it was mutually exclusive; because you didn't want any of the integral lights up. You wanted to put tape over the record light on the SIA, and you wanted to turn off all of the lights, all the indicator lights. The yellow lights on the recorder, when they would flash, it would bother you, and you'd want to put tape over them. QUERY How about any other cluster areas? Can you think of where concurrent operations kind of bit you? POGUE Well, working the SAL, minus-Z SAL, when there was a light ing constraint was a tremendous impact on other activities in the workshop. And we've already indicated that we think a solution to that is to use dark hoods and that sort of thing. U39 �QUERY Yes, we got that in the transcripts. CARR Yes, there were days when we had stuff with lighting con straints going on during the meal hour, and the guys had to stand out in the wardroom and eat in the dark while the other guy was up doing a minus-Z SAL experiment. QUERY Okay. QUERY Dick, before we go to - are you ready to go to another area? QUERY Yes. QUERY Maybe we'd better assess where we are here. how much more time do you anticipate? It's 12:10; I think some of these things that you have left have been covered already. QUERY Yes, most everything but some of the inflight maintenance, I think, is pretty well covered. There are a couple of comments on waste management. QUERY How much time do you estimate at the rate we're going at? QUERY Probably another half an hour or 1+0 minutes. CARR I ' d J u s t as soon finish up than q u i t and come back. QUERY That's great. It's your call. 1+UO �CARR Okay. QUERY I guess one thing - about the only thing that I haven't seen covered on the shower was the shower foot restraint. How useful did you find that? And was it satisfactory? POGUE Satisfactory. QUERY Any comments on it? CARR I think it would have been nicer if it had been a little softer. You kind of abraded your toes a little bit trying to come under there. POGUE And I tried to use it to squeeze a - shove it under and squeeze out washcloths and try to soak, you know, pick up the water. That didn't work too well, but it is an idea - it gives you an idea of a configuration that would be useful. QUERY But for a foothold, I guess, it was satisfactory. Do you think that concept of the type of restraint for temporary use would be adequate for other - - POGUE Yes, make it - as Jerry said, if you could make it a little softer. QUERY Yes, right. UUl �) POGUE One where you - you know you could feel comfortable about Jamming your toes into it. CARR Yes, that's not a bad system at all. I might mention one thing about the shower, and that is the QD's for the water were sure hard to work. That was a very, very tough QD to make, both in the water heater when you were drawing water out in waste management compartment, and also when you were connecting the water tank up to the shower. POGUE That was a pretty hard connection. Yes, I had put ny feet in - you know, when I was in the waste management compartment, I put ny feet up on a wall 1 over - if you were facing the lavatories, the basin, the one way over high on the left - I actually put ny feet' over there in order to get the QD on. That's how hard it was. CARR Just like a lot of spring in the QD. POGUE Yes, it Just took a tremendous force. QUERY On the waste management Bystem, you originally were dump ing the urine bags, and then you went to using the urine dump. On about day 50, you had a little problem with the urine dump system, and, as far as we know, it operated 1 1+U2 �satisfactorily after that. Did you have any idea of what caused it to clog, or did you have any other problems that we didn't hear about? No, the only thing I can think of is we may have turned off the heater too soon on the previous dump, and we just ended up with a solid slug of ice in there, and it took 6 or 8 hours of constant heater operation to finally dis lodge it so that we could start using the system again. From then on, we left the heater on forever, and it worked very nicely. Did you have any difficulty obtaining half samples in the full sample bags on urine systems? No, that was no great problem. We had to use kind of a goofy system to get the urine into the bags without bubbles. It was kind of dangerous, I thought. We broke several sample bags. Okay. Were there any problems - this is on the fecal collector - in maintaining the permanence of the seat airflow orifices of the bag seal? None whatsoever; it worked very well. kk3 �) QUERY With the waste processor, could you give us some estimate of how long the specimens were processed? POGUE CARR QUERY 18 hours on ny part, about 16 to 18 hours. I think the range was anywhere from 11 to 18 or 19 hours. And I think we've covered a lot of the stuff on suit drying, but just what would you assess the suit conditions with respect to moisture on starting drying and at the finish of the drying with the blower and the system in there? Did you notice much difference? CARR 3 Well, the blue innerliner on the suit - on Ed's was always the wettest and Bill's was next and mine was next. And I always felt after 10 hours of suit blower operation tnat the liner was quite dry and that was on the first suit. And by the time we got to the second suit, its liner had already gotten dry Just from ambient air. And the 10 hours of suit blower, suit drying operation, then seemed to be a little bit excessive, but we went ahead and played the game. None of the suits got smelly at all. The drying and the using of the desiccant seemed to keep them pretty good. Even the fact that we had those mildewed LCGs on - a lot of that mildew smell did not transfer to the suits as I had expected. 3) It also did not transfer from the LCGs; kkk �CARR (CONT'D) they smelled rotten every time we put them on. Surprisingly, it didn't bother you once you got in the suit with it. Apparently there was enough flow that you'd get used to what little odor there was and it was gone. But I remember every time I put that thing on saying, Oh, bey. I got to wear this mildewed thing again. QUERY Did the blower get down into the extremities fairly well? Did it seem like they were - - CARR Seemed to, yes. QUERY - - fairly good. CARR Right near the end on the last - well, actually after the third EVA when we were drying the third suit, it sounded like the blower bearing was getting ready to go. started picking up a real high pitch noise. We It just sounded like a high speed bearing starting to screech. And it settled down after a while and finished up in good shape. Then the - after the last EVA, we started drying again. When we first turned it on, we got a lot of the squeal; and then after it ran for a while it died out and ran. We got the drying done, but I'll bet you that a few more drying cycles and the bearing in the blower would have gone. 1+1+5 �) QUERY CARR Okay. But it ran. It ran an awful long time. I would say the average, it was 12 to ll* per suit rather than 10. Because «• I remember, I left one running in the suit for about 17 or 18 hours. You get so used to hearing the blower, you forget it's running. And then one day, I went by and said, Good heavens, that suit should have been dried 6 hours ago, and i t ' s s t i l l running. So I go over and turn i t off. And the ground always wanted us to report start and termi nation of suit drying. But you report the start, and they sure didn't remind you when 10 hours was up. ) don't know what good the data was doing them. So I You know, I always figured they wanted to know when we started so they could remind us t o turn i t off. QUERY On the water subsystem, could you tell us how the color compared or seemed to work? Could you distinguish colors well at the low end? POGUE Pretty well. I never had any trouble convincing nyself with - within one or two - within two of them. In other words, there may have been a choice between one or two; I always picked the low end Just to be on the safe side. No, no problem at all. 0 hk6 �QUERY Okay. Did you notice any condensation associated with chiller? CARR Oh, yes. There was lots of condensation inside of it. It was always wet. POGUE Now, just a second now. Do you mean the water chiller in the food prep table? QUERY Yes, the water chiller in the - - CARR Oh, I thought you talking about the chiller chiller, in the top box - - QUERY No, not - no, just the water chiller - - CARR - - in the - - POGUE No, I did not notice any. QUERY Okay. CARR But the walls of the refrigerator - let's call it, the food chiller was always wet. POGUE Yes, they were always wet. CARR They were always wet. In fact, a lot of the dumb tin cans we kept in there got rusty. tin cans. You know, the plain old �QUERY On the washcloth squeezer, did you have any problems installing that squeezer bag? CARR No, no, it was very easy. POGUE Well, I would like to take exception to the design - - CARR Well, you were the one - you had trouble when you first put it in, didn't you? POGUE Yes. That little spread clamp or whatever it was - I'm not sure I ever figured out how that thing worked, quite. I think I did, but I had a lot of trouble with it in training. They were made out of a different kind of metal that galled. Anyway, we - I got it installed. I think there should have been a backup tool for moving those little ears - spreader. CARR The big problem with the water - washcloth squeezer was there were too many nooks and crannies to catch dirty, soapy water and it got smelly after a while. QUERY Was the bag fully expanded prior to dumping it? Did you fill it, in general, or did you Just CARR Oh, it varied. Sometimes it was full; sometimes it wasn't. Sometimes I'd Just skip a squeezer dunp if it was sched uled and when I'd look at the bag and it was still U8 �CARR (CONT'D) concave, I'd Just leave it. Bill and I made pretty- heavy use of the water squeezer and Ed didn't particularly cere to use it too much. QUERY Did you perform any maintenance on the trash lock at all? CARR No. QUERY You just cleaned it a few times? CARR Just cleaned it, yes. QUERY Do you remember how many times you cleaned it? Or about roughly - CARR Well, we cleaned it twice on a scheduled basis and then once when we had a urine spill inside the trash airlock, we cleaned it once and then again 2 days later and then again about a week later, and we never did get rid of the smell. But there was a regular housekeeping task that included biociding the trash airlock and cleaning it. QUERY Right. Besides those, you had it for three times when you spilled that urine and that's it. CARR Yes. hkg �0 QUERY I think we got everything on the vacuum cleaner out of the debriefing. And you commented about the biocide wipes How about the usage rate of the wipes versus the planned? Did you have anything? CARR I don't really know what the planned usage was. We had to replace the unit once in the waste management compart ment and that was it, just one time. I'd say we used about a carton and a half. POGUE Did we have a planned rate or something? QUERY I think there was a scheduled - - CARR Yes, there's a habitability consumables page in stowage book that I'm pretty sure had it. QUERY Right. Did you have any problems with planned inflight maintenance? Either scheduled or unscheduled? Ones that were - I think, basically you said you didn't have any trouble with any of the maintenance really, right? What was in your water separator ...? POGUE 217 - that was the biggest buggaboo. CARR That was the one he dreaded the most and that was the one that caused the most trouble. U50 �POGUE One of the things, again - in the same general area of table caddies and that was the water servicing hose and the water system, the nomenclature on water system, I've already covered that in the debriefing. But the hose itself, that reel was not designed for zero gravity. It would have been nice if we had some kind of caddy device where you could unreel a - feet and have some facility or mechanism for holding the rest of i t i n the reel. I'd usually end up - the reel would gradually unwind and throw itself over to the side of the workshop and have all the spaghetti hanging down around in the workshop, and I had to come down and rewind the whole thing. an amusing thing. We had a sort of There was a thing called the water relief valve which was called - the nomenclature was in the spacecraft was water release r-e-l-e-a-s-e valve and this thing was - and I noticed in the trainer and I got all upset about it and turned out they were very faithful when they were reproducing the vehicle, because that's the way it was in the vehicle. was wrong in the spacecraft. The nomenclature And another thing that was - I've hit this before and I'd like to hit it again, and that is there is no excuse for not having the proper nomenclature on all these pieces, because the water system itself - the worst thing about it was identifying ^51 1L �POGUE (CONT'D) the various bits and pieces. One piece I never did find, or if I did, I didn't know it because it had serial numbers on it. QUERY Yes. I've already talked at length about that. We noticed that you had a good bit on that in the debriefing. And we got the list of tools, I believe, that you felt should have been on board. CARR Just on the tools thing, too. I don't know what it is that causes us to go galloping off and buy tools that are off-brand tools, real funny-looking things, but the first pair of dikes, wire cutters, we got were not much better than toenail clippers - POGUE Looked like manicure clippers. CARR And so we said, all right, we want a new set of dikes up there. And the CCB says, get a new set of dikes and get a good set right off the shelf. And dadgummed'. If they didn't get some off-brand thing that really wasn't a very good set either and it wasn't a whole lot bigger than the original set. And I don't know what's wrong with Proto or Craftsman or some of these good brands, but we got more offbrands of tools than I've seen and I don't understand why. 1*52 �5 QUERY It's probably buying them by Federal 3tock numbers. I'm not sure. CARR Probably is. But you know, we got some real good tool people in this country and we buy all sorts of other funny tools - wrenches with very heavy webbings and you know you'll never use that up there, open-end wrenches that are much too heavy for the kind of work you're going to do. QUERY I think those wrenches were just off-the-shelf wrenches that they changed the coding on, however. So wrenches down here are designed to be beat on with a hammer, I think; so that's what you have - you get if you get one off the shelf. CARR Oh another - another tool we sure could have used up there was a a rubber hammer sort of thing, a mallet. QUERY A soft hammer? CARR Yes, a soft hammer of some kind. QUERY That's a good point. POGUE By the way, anyone gives you an argument about having files and drills about - because of particulate, just refer them to the return procedure for sampling the ^53 �POGUE (CONT'D) charcoal canisters. Because that really contaminated the entire area when I'd knocked a hole in those with that big awl or whatever it was. So I mean we can live with that kind of thing. QUERY How did that go? You say there was a good bit of - good bit of charcoal lost? Originally we had planned to put vacuum cleaner bags over the hole, slip through, and drive through that so that that would keep the material in. CARR I don't think that would have solved it either - - POGUE I don't think that would have done it. CARR Oh, you start fooling with particulate matter that's as fine as that charcoal was and there's Just not much you can do about it. POGUE It was - it varied from powder to very small grain size, say 2 millimeters in diameter. QUERY But you didn't see problem though - - CARR We had no trouble whatsoever up there with the particulate matter getting in your eyes. We built that Christmas tree up there and we were popping all sorts of little aluminum slivers and things around while we were cutting 1+51* �CARR those herringbones to make the Christmas tree with and (CONT'D) I did some hacksawing on Fiberglas with the saw and my knife blade. We did all sorts of things like that. And everything Just kind of naturally gravitates up to the filters. POGUE By the way - - CARR It can be vacuumed off and it Just doesn't bother you. And we can use some big - or some - various sizes of metal shears. We were actually using the surgical scissors for cutting metal. They worked quite well. You got a good mechanical advantage. CARR Yes. QUERY Were there any instances during the IVAs, Just during - * internal action, where any special designed tools would have been desirable? I think a minute ago you said just use regular tools. POGUE Well, the QD tool - - QUERY QD tool, well - - POGUE Is there anything specific? was the one that I mentioned. ^55 That's a kind. �CARR And of course the special tools we had done for the connector pliers. TSie one with the straight connector pliers and the other one with the 90-degree angle on them. Those are special kind of tools. I think for the most part if we needed a special tool, we probably put it down on the down tape. QUERY You've mentioned a few instances when you didn't have a tool, like the ice removal, the tool you were talking about a while ago ... POGUE Ice removal - - CARR Yes, ice removal. We really had to improvise to get a good ice removal tool. That snap T-bar that the snaps were fastened to worked great until Bill discovered that the little clipboard worked better. The little kneeboard - POGUE Kneeboard - not the big one. CARR The little kneeboard that we had up there was a piece of aluminum about about It by 6, something like that U by 8. POGUE Yes. CARR Worked out very nicely. 1*56 �How did those connector pliers work? Pretty well? Yes, Ed used them on the S082 - I think it was S082B auxiliary timer. Worked out pretty well. I tore the insert out of them along toward the end and replaced it and taped it in with narrow strips of gray tape. Oh, you're talking about about the regular connector pliers? Yes. Were you talking about that special EVA I thought you were talking about the right angle ones. Okay. Yes. Because we never used them EVA after - — That's right, after Jack used his - used his for the rate gyros. Right. But the stuff you used them on inside, they worked fine? Seemed to work fine. 1+57 �QUERY Were there any - were the tools provided found to be inadequate? The dikes you mentioned - even the replacement dikes didn't seem to be too good - - CARR They weren't very strong. QUERY Anything else that you felt didn't really hack it? POGUE You know you had some washers - some - you call them C-clamp washers, the kind we pulled off the 183 carrousel. We didn't have a tool for removing and replacing those things. But we had some of them in our stowage. Bottom - I forget what drawer it was. CARR Let's see, inadequate tools? POGUE So it's a C-clamp tool. CARR No, most all the tools we had up there that we used, we had no complaints with. Other than that some of them seemed kind of cheesy, I thought; and I mentioned that. QUERY Okay. Were there any instances where reaction forces presented any problems? POGUE Yes. QUERY On the high-torque screws you mentioned? U58 �POGUE On that, on removing PCU, on removing Just about anything from the dome ring locker. If you were high; you see you had the blue ring with the real nice foot restraints in there. By the way, they held your toes in a position so that you came out real easy. having them. Oh, I was grateful for I forget exactly what it was. always coming out of them. But you were You had to consciously hold your feet in the right - legs in the right posture to stay in them. But if the equipment that you were trying to remove from dome ring locker, assuming you had to use tool and high-torque grasp, you could come out - It was hard to get to. And one of those was the OWS heat exchanger fan. CARR But it's the same old thing, that if you can't lock your self in order to put torque on something, then you've got to use one hand for restraint or counterforce and the other hand - and it reduces the amount of torque that you can bring to bear when you've got to use one hand for countertorque. QUERY Right. The - you mentioned about strength being required for your for that - for your Coolanol work and all extra restraints that you made up. veniently located? 1) 1*59 Tool kits and spares con �No, I don't think so. I thought the tool kit, if we had located them more centrally, I think it would have been better off. I think they were kind of down in one end of the workshop. Yes, I guess it would have been best - It would have been better if we could have had them up in the dome somewhere, maybe all that big wall space in the dome, part of that could have been used for a tool box. Yes, that was all wasted. And you could have spread the tools out more instead of having to concentrate them so tightly. No reason why you couldn't had a pegboard Just like you do in your own garage, or tool or workroom. We had them all spread out - with a lot of visibility because getting them in and out - putting them in and out of the drawers was a mess. I've already debriefed the drawers, too. Right. And restraint. kSo �y QUERY Stowage, launch stowage is, of course, one of the things that ... requirements between launch stowage and the other ... - - CARR That's correct. You could have started out with launch stowage and then over a period of time you can begin to utilize your wall space better. QUERY Did you see any need for tool tethers inside? Or any of your maintenance inside of the spacecraft? CARR Yes, but I can't tell you what's a good design yet. tool caddy didn't work well. ~y QUERY The We didn't like it. Individual tethers on tools on - individually on tools did you see any need for it at all - - POGUE For your work inside, really I don't think you need it. QUERY You need a good tool caddy? POGUE That's right. QUERY But the one we had wasn't so good? CARR No, no. POGUE It just didn't work. The idea, the motive behind it was good. U61 J �CARR We found that we'd just stuff them in our waistbelt or stick them to the wall near the work area with tape. QUERY How about the Velcro that was on the tools, was that any use to you or did you find that it was just in the way? POGUE I used it occasionally. CARR Yes, I did, too. POGUE It's particularly good but you have to have Velcro in an area where you're going to work. If you're doing work around the SAL, you're in business. QUERY Were there any IVA actions which should have been antic ipated and - Well, we've pretty well answered that one, i think. What onboard capability we'd have? We're going back to the same - CARR I might mention about tools and Velcro - Let's talk about writing tools and that's the ballpoint pens. They had little itsy-bitsy bits of Velcro hook on them and you couldn't get them to hook anywhere. Whereas the pencils - apparently somebody else in some other department put the Velcro on the pencils and and there was adequate Velcro so that you could stick a mechanical pencil where you b62 �CARR wanted to and it would stay. But you had about 30 percent of that Velcro stuck on the - stuck on the pen and a ballpoint pen was difficult to retrain - retain anywhere. It was an aggravation to us to - POGUE We finally took a piece off of a food bag and put on the one that we had in the head for recording fecal weight and all that. QUERY Can you think of any tasks which were unscheduled which really should have been scheduled? around. Or the other way Any specific things that come to mind. Ones that were not supposed to be scheduled that we ended up doing on a regular basis or anything like that. CARR No, I can't. I can't think of anything right off hand. By the time you got to us, I think you had most of that stuff ironed out. QUERY Was the failure detection and fault isolation a problem or do you have any recommendations for any improvement on that? CARR Again, we didn't get involved too much in failure detectior and fault isolation because the ground handled it. 1*63 �POGUE This is sort of related. The condensate holding tank quantity - you know, you had to go down and get the little stud finder to find - to locate the position of the bellows divider. That - there ought to have been a printed decal or something to say where to put the stud finder because A1 Bean had tracked this thing out. hours to do it. It must have taken But it was — it was a real wavy curve that you had to move the stud finder down in order to locate the - the bellows. That sort of thing, you shouldn't have to do that in flight. There should be a path for the - the metal detector inside. QUERY Well, you made a lot of comments also about the need for feedback, Bill, which I think is related to this question. The answer - the answer that you've already given, you know, about if you could do something, some positive feedback that would tell you if you've had a failure or Just what your problem is. QUERY From the C&D standpoint QUERY Yes. CARR Right. QUERY Well, any - anything like that then. k6k �CARR I think the - the idea of trying to - all these different water accumulators, where we had to go look at them and see what percent full they were - They were terrible for ... - - POGUE Oh, yes, you couldn't - Yes. CARR You couldn't even tell with a mirror, some of those things, how much water was in them. POGUE Those - That's a good point. Those were very bad. QUERY All of those, their - It's apparently generic to the whole thing, the condensate tank and all the others. POGUE The ATM was the easiest; but the other two, the LOG loop, were very bad. CARR You couldn't even get your head in there to really see enough of it. POGUE You had to reach - You had to hold the flashlight in and and illuminate the right area and keep looking at a mirror here to tell where the - what the position of the billows was. QUERY Should more detailed maintenance procedures - Well, you covered that in detail on the transcripts; so we won't discuss that much more unless you - - US5 �Yes, areas like this is where that - that cassette TV really pays for itself. If something breaks down, the folks down on the ground could do a repair job on one and televise it and then send it up saying, this is how you do it. It sure cuts your training requirements down One little area of confusion that we never did really get - get sorted out or - at least to get a satisfactory answer on - was the tape recorder changeover connectors. And there was inconsistency in the nomenclature and the color coding. Do you remember that? When you changed the cables over - - Oh yes, the - this is the EDDU, EREP tape recorder bit, when you change from tape recorder 1 to tape recorder 2-. If you blindly followed the color dots, you were okay; but if you tried to - to hook P-5 with J-5 or something like that, you were all messed up. Something like that. There was a mistake. We finally - In order to use the nomen - the J whatever it was, you had to cross connectors; and we figured that wasn't right The color coding that - that time saved us the problem, I'm sure. U66 �QUERY Were there any damaged or broken tools other than the You mentioned you lost an insert on the cable pliers. Anything else that you can think of? POGUE A bent screwdriver. CARR Yes, the 3/l6 screwdriver got bent. It was used for a prying tool and got bent, and I hammered that back into shape again. POGUE I think we lost one of the little pinchbars. Never did find it. CARR Yes. QUERY Well, there was one of - One of those two was put - left outside on the first EVA, when we erected the beam. POGUE No, no, this - Well, maybe it was. QUERY And there should have only been one pinchbar - bar on board; so - QUERY After these guys got here. QUERY Yes, when we - when they got here. We started once with two, and one was outside after Pete's mission. U6T �CARR The side cutters - the vire cutters that we brought up were already getting dull. much. They hadn't been used very Even the Phillips-head screwdrivers were hanging in there pretty well, and you know how Phillips-head screw drivers are. They're awfully easy to mess up. But they were still in reasonably good condition after the use we put them to. I was pleasantly surprised by that. So it was pretty - pretty good grade of steel that was used in that. QUERY And I think you've mentioned this several times on the tech debriefing, but you talked about the value of a workbench and the use of the screen for a workbench. Do you have any recommendations? CARR It Just looks like the aerodynamics style of workbenches is the best way to go. We used the - the screen up there - I should say Ed used the screen for a workbench, and i t worked very nicely. He had to make a little card board corral to keep the small things in because you could - you could bump or cause the screen to ripple a little bit and i t would make the small - the small-inertia items fly. And so he Just made a little cardboard corral and stuck i t up there, and then all of his little nuts and bolts and washers, he put in there; and it managed to keep them all together. 1*68 �CARR (CONT'D) The bigger stuff you can just lay on there, and it's got enough surface area so that the air pressure held it down. It's very handy, and it's - it's — it's — I think it's essential that we have a place to work. QUERY You deal - You do feel a dedicated place like that is is a very ... CARR I think so. It ought to be an electromechanical sort of a workbench; that is, it should have - be somewhat of a cross between a mechanical workbench with a vise and an electronics workbench where you've got some power sources, different voltages, and you've got multimeter capability and things like that in the same bench so that you can bring units and — and test them. And if in the future we get to a type spacecraft design where we're replacing modules and things like that, I imagine the ground is going to - going to have us doing some module testing. And you might as well design your bench to do that. Not only that, I think Bill had a good point too, that you need a portable bench to take around with you when you got a job that can't be brought to the bench. And that can be something that just hooks onto the vacuum cleaner. Now all you got to do is have a flat surface with the airflow work - working through it, and you could use it for a workbench. U69 �QUERY I think you've already commented on the arrangement of the tools and the tool kits. Did you use - Well, you used the digital multimeter some. How did that work out? CARR Very well. QUERY Do you have any comments on access on any maintenance Yes, we were - I was very glad to see that. task other than the 217? I think we've covered that one pretty well. CARR Yes. QUERY And I think we've covered the last one on maintenance capabilities here, too; so that's all I have. Are there any other questions that anybody has? CARR There's one in the back there. QUERY Not a question, but Just a comment to Jerry. On the dump tape - QUERY Should we come up to a mike? QUERY - - zero - Okay, this is just a comment to Jerry. Dump tape 030-k, I think it was, you did an Mk87-3D, and that thing turned out awful - had an awful lot of background noise. Now I think it was Bill's fault because he did something up there. Do you remember? 1+70 You started it off, �QUERY (CONT'D) and you said, "Hey, what'd you do?" happened up there? You know. What And apparently, they must have done something bad, because you kept turning your head and, you know, looking at him. Anyhow, the people that tran scribed the thing couldn't understand you; so a whole bunch of dots came in there. And you're talking about the tools and this and that and the other. So if somebody asks you why you needed oil up there, it was a file that turned out to be oil in the transcript. CARR Oh. QUERY Also, I think it was a wire crusher and several other things. So something in the tool area that - that somebody read, you know, you know where it came from. CARR Okay. QUERY It was a bad tape. Maybe we ought to get it squared away later on, but CARR I imagine Bill was probably working the Mark I exerciser. That was an annoyance some - - QUERY Oh, he did some black magic there after awhile. picked that up, but - CARR Can't think of what it was. it 71 They �QUERY Well, anyway - - CARR Okay. QUERY It's awful garbled and - P0GUE What - what was it you were doing at the time? CARR 1 was POGUE Oh. 5UERY Yes- debriefing on MU87, talking about the tools. ^d we took it over the kkO and tried to get some of the background noise out of there, but not well enough. So when the girls apparently typed it, the file - I could 0 understand you saying file, but the world now sees where you want oil up there. o QUERY That's what the world wants - oil. QUERY Thank you, gentlemen. ^ That's all we have. JERY We thank you very much. QUERY No. Bruce, do you have any questions? QUERY No ... you and I ... QUERY Okay. 1+72 �QUERY I guess that ends it then for all the systems, and thank you, guys, for hanging in there with us for the last couple of days. POGUE Okay. CARR Thank you. You've been tolerant and patient. QUERY GIBSON Yes? QUERY Let's have some lunch ... find out what it is ... McDonald ... GIBSON Okay. ft tt ti NASA— MSFC—C ^73 ft U.S. gQVHMMtm PSINTlflG OfFICE: 1974—778-215/2473 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Richard Heckman Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000063 Title A name given to the resource "Skylab 4 Systems Debrief Transcript." Description An account of the resource This is a series of interviews with the crew of Skylab 4. The interviews focus on the onboard systems and equipment. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-03-06 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource Houston (Tex.) Manned Spacecraft Center (U.S.) Skylab Program Skylab 4 Carr, Gerald P. Gibson, Edward G. Pogue, William R. Apollo Telescope Mount Extravehicular mobility units Space habitats Type The nature or genre of the resource Reports Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Richard Heckman Collection Box 1, Folder 5 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/203/14407/sdsp_skyl_000072_001.pdf 85959cbac50c01a2d4a7596b518dac69 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Paul Todd Collection Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Paul Todd Collection Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000072 Title A name given to the resource "Skylab Experiments Volume 1 Physical Science, Solar Astronomy Information for Teachers." Description An account of the resource This is a workbook for science teachers to create lesson plans around. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973-05-01 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Education Programs Division University of Colorado Skylab Program Science—Study and teaching Earth Resources Program Experimentation Apollo Telescope Mount Multiple docking adapters Airlock modules Space habitats Extravehicular mobility units Type The nature or genre of the resource Workbooks Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Paul Todd Collection Box 4, Folder 77 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary https://digitalprojects.uah.edu/files/original/21/14411/sdsp_skyl_000076_001.pdf 9e342fbc4bbc5654e9c49bef4997154e PDF Text Text Sc.-/ • I SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 12:47 GET 17:00 MC10/1 PAO Mark. Standing by now for confirmation of ATM deployment. We're 17 minutes 35 seconds. The deployment motors of the Apollo telescope mount now running. This deploy ment sequence in toto takes about 4 minutes. Deployment being activated by two Apollo telescope mount motors which are presently running. We're 18 minutes 20 seconds now ground elapsed time. The booster now being maneuvered to a solar inertial attitude. We're at 19 minutes 10 seconds ground elapsed time. Mark 20 minutes ground elapsed time. We should be less than a minute away now from deployment. Mark 20 minutes 12 seconds ground elapsed time. Our data displays, Mission Control, now show the ATM has deployed and locked. The Apollo telescope mount has been deployed and securely latched. The 24,500 pound ATM reaching out now at a 90»sdegree angle from the orbital workshop. We're at 20 minutes 35 seconds. We've had confirmation. We have data here in Mission Control that the ATM has deployed and latched. Mark 20 minutes 50 seconds. The next event to occur will be the deployment of the four wings of the telescope mount solar array system. We're standing by now for that deployment. Mark, we're at 21 minutes 40 seconds ground elapsed time. Prelim inary tracking data shows an orbit for the orbital workshop of 237 nautical miles by 236.3 nautical miles near circular. We repeat 237 nautical miles by 236.3 nautical miles. We're at 24 minutes 30 seconds now ground elapsed time. Continuing with the solar inertial maneuver, reports booster. Twentyfive minutes ground elapsed time. We've got 1 minute until loss of signal with Madrid. Mark, we're 25 minutes 45 seconds. The deployment motors have been turned on. The solar array system wings on the Apollo telescope mount are now extended. Standing by, continuing to monitor. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 12:57 GET 27:00 MC11/1 Mark we're at 26 minutes 30 seconds under acquisition now by an ARIA aircraft following loss of signal with Madrid. Okay, all four Apollo telescope mount solar array wings *re out and securely locked. Mark we're 27 min utes 20 seconds now ground elapsed time. The Apollo telescope mount has been deployed and securely latched. The solar array system for the telescope mount, the four wings, has been deployed and securely locked. The next thing we should be seeing in Mission Control - We'll be receiving telemetry data from the tele scope mount and this should occur within the next several minutes. We are presently receiving data through an ARIA aircraft beyond Madrid tracking station. Mark 28 minutes 10 seconds. We now show an orbit of 237.1 nautical miles by 236.6 nautical miles for the orbital workshop. Mark 29 minutes 20 seconds. We've had some dropout in data from the ARIA aircraft, presently showing static displays in Mission Control. The procedures officer here working to get locked up on the data at this time. We're at 29 minutes 40 seconds ground elapsed time. We repeat that the Apollo telescope mount has been deployed. The solar array system from the telescope mount also deployed at this time. The next deployto °ocur will be the solar array system for the workshop. ?S ground elapsed time. We presently show an K „ ^ * nautical miles by 236.8 nautical miles for the orbital workshop now in its first revolution. Mark 34 minutes 20 seconds ground elapsed time. Flight Director Don Puddy speaking to his flight control team in mission control saying everything looks good up to this point. We're standing by now for definite indication through ARIA aircraft WP'JiCniS ^ telemetry data from the Apollo telescope mount. We re now at 34 minutes 40 seconds ground elapsed time. Continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 13;07 GET 36:00 MC-12/1 PAO This is Skylab Control, Houston, at 36 minutes ground elapsed time, still standing by for a definite indication of receipt of telemetry from the Apollo telescope mount. Following this we will see the deployment of the meteoroid shields and the deployment of the solar array system wings aboard the workshop. Thus far, we've seen the successful activation of the Apollo telescope mount as well as the solar array system for that mount. We're at 36 minutes 35 seconds, continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. PAO This is Skylab Control, Houston; 41 minutes ground elapsed time. We presently show an orbit of 236.2 nautical miles by 237 nautical miles. We are some 12 minutes 26 seconds away now from acquisition Carnarvon at which time we should be able to verify telemetry being received from the Apollo telescope mount. This is Skylab Control, Houston, at 41 minutes 35 seconds ground elapsed time. END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 13:24 GET 53:00 MC13/1 PAO Skylab Control, Houston, at 53 minutes ground elapsed time. We're less than a minute away now from acquisition by Carnarvon tracking. We'll keep the line open. Stand by, continue to monitor. A quick status check in Mission Control by a Flight Director, Don Puddy, led him to say every thing looks "super good" so far. We presently show an orbit based on increased tracking data of 236.5 nautical miles by 236.2 nautical miles. Standing by continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. We are now acquiring data through Carnarvon. Booster reports the vehicle is now in solar inertial attitude. We are now receiving telemetry data from the Apollo telescope mount. The Environmental Officer reports the data receiving looks good. The habitation area vent valves have been closed as scheduled. We're now at 55 minutes ground elapsed time. This is Skylab Control, Houston. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 13:29 GET 58:00 MC14/1 PAO Skylab Control, Houston, at 59 minutes ground elapsed time. We have no confirmation yet on the deployment of the airlock solar array system. We'll stand by and con tinue to monitor at 59 minutes ground elapsed time. This is Skylab Control, Houston. Skylab Control, Houston, at 1 hour 4 minutes ground elapsed time. We're less than a minute away now from acquisition by Honeysuckle. This ke j* very short acquisition time, some 1 minute 11 seconds. Follow ing Honeysuckle, the next station to receive data will be Texas, and that would be 30 minutes 30 seconds from this time. We're now at 1 hour 4 minutes ground elapsed time. Continuing to monitor, this is Skylab Control, Houston. We have acqui sition through Honeysuckle at this time. We're 1 hour 5 min utes ground elapsed time. Skylab Control, Houston, at 1 hour 7 minutes ground elapsed time we've passed out of station contact with Honeysuckle at this time. The next sta tion to acquire will be Texas at 27 minutes 42 seconds from this time. We've still received, through data, no definite indication on the airlock solar array system deployment; however, this pass, as well as Carnarvon, was through dark ness and the Sun will be the first definite way of giving an indication as to whether or not the airlock module solar array system has been deployed. We would expect to take a good hard look at this through our first stateside pass. We're now at 1 hour 7 minutes ground elapsed time. This is Skylab Control, Houston. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 14:05 CST 1:34 GET MC15/1 PAO This is Skylab Control, Houston, at 1 hour 34 minutes ground elapsed time. Less than a minute away now from acquisition by Texas, We show an orbit of 237,1 nautical miles by 236.2 nautical miles. To quickly recount what we've seen during this first revolution of the workshop orbit. The payload shroud jettisoned on schedule. The ATM Apollo telescope mount has deployed. The solar array system for the ATM has also deployed. We have no indication yet on the deploy ment of the two solar array wings attached to the workshop. We will look at this - at display data for about 10 minutes under sunlight on this stateside pass to endeavor to confirm or not confirm that deployment. Given a nonconfirmation, of course, backup commanding could be necessary from the Control Center. We're at 1 hour 35 minutes ground elapsed time. This is Skylab Control, Houston. PAO Skylab Control, Houston, 1 hour 38 minutes ground elapsed time. Flight Director, Don Puddy, talking to the Booster System Engineer here in Mission Control. We have no indication of deployment of the workshop solar array system wings. No indication of deployment of those wings. The Booster now going through some backup command procedures. We've also had an indication of partial deployment of the meteoroid shield. We're at 1 hour 39 minutes ground elapsed time, continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. PAO Skylab Control, Houston. Now 1 hour 40 minutes ground elapsed time. The orbital workshop now on it's first stateside pass since launch and insertion into orbit. We are presently looking at the orbital workshop solar array system. No indication at this time of deployment. The Booster Systems Engineer here in Mission Control going through backup procedures to issue a command for deployment. Standing by, continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. PAO Skylab Control, Houston, now 1 hour 46 minutes ground elapsed time. Continuing to monitor on this first stateside pass, the orbital workshop. Again, we repeat the orbital workshop solar array system wings have not deployed. Command procedures are being followed presently on the ground by the Booster Systems Engineer. Standing by, continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 C5T 14:20 GET 1:48 MC16/1 PAO Skylab Control, Houston, now 1 hour 53 minutes ground elapsed time. Receiving good data now through New foundland. Booster at this time issuing commands to the workshop. To repeat what we said earlier, the orbital workshop solar array system wings have not yet deployed. Standing by, continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. Skylab Control, Houston, 1 hour 57 minutes ground elapsed time. We now have acquisition with Madrid. Standing by, continuing to monitor. This is Skylab Control, Houston. END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 14:35 GET 2:03 MC17/1 PAO Skylab Control, Houston, at 2 hours 7 minutes ground elapsed time. We've passed out of acquisition with Madrid tracking. The commanding by the booster systems engineer was verified. The commands did get in; however, we still have no indication of deployment of the orbital workshop solar array system wings. It is known, of course, that the commands did get in. At the present time, however, with the Apollo telescope mount solar array system deployed successfully, we do have a power system to support the vehicle. We're now at 2 hours 8 minutes ground elapsed time and this is Skylab Control, Houston. END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 CST 15:12 GET 2:41 MC18/1 This is Skylab Control. Two hours 41 minutes ground elapsed time in the mission of Skylab 1. Skylab space station now in orbit, coming up on the Honeysuckle, Australia, tracking station. Still some doubt in the minds of Flight Controllers here in Mission Control as to whether the main solar panels on the workshop have indeed deployed. They have had no confirmation on the ground from telemetry that this is the case; the solar panels on the telescope mount have deployed normally. Also, the micrometeoroid shield around the workshop has partially deployed. The large wings of three sections of solar panels on each wing, one on each side of the workshop, generate anywhere from 51 to 125 volts depending on the Sun angle at the time. This power goes through chargers which in turn keeps storage batteries in the workshop built up to supply power throughout the mission, half of each orbit approximately is in darkness when no power can be generated by the solar panels. The two solar panel wings are deployed out to the side of the workshop, and each panel on the wings operates similar to a scissors action. It's spring loaded to extend the panels. We should be getting data now through Honeysuckle. We'll stand by for comments to the Flight Director from the Flight Controllers who are concerned with the workshop electrical power system, and relay this information as it - No change reported in the solar panel wing status. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 15:27 CST 2:56 GET MC19/1 PAO This is Skylab Control. Three minutes 2 hour - Three hours 2 minutes ground elapsed time, and the mission of Skylab 1. Skylab space station now being tracked by the Hawaii tracking station. Waiting for the systems engineers to report the space station status back to the Flight Director as the data comes in. PAO It appears that a plan will be formulated later on in the day and this evening by which the existing available power coming into the Skyiab workshop will be conserved to the greatest extent, on the assumption that we may not be able to get the main solar panels deployed, we'll continue to standby the remainder of the Hawaii pass, which is a fairly low elevation angle. Coming up in a few moments to Goldstone, in approximately 5-1/2 minutes for a fairly lengthy stateside pass over the tracking stations in the contintental United States. At 3 hours 5 minutes ground elapsed time, this is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 15:41 CST 03:10 GET MC20/1 This is Skylab Control, 3 hours 10 minutes, ground elapsed time. Acquisition of signal over Goldstone Tracking Station for the second stateside pass after launch. We'll stand by here as the data comes in for any further developments in the situation in which the main solar panels on the workshop apparently have not deployed. PA0 END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 4/14/73 15:56 CST 3:24 GET MC-21/1 PAO This is Skylab Control. Three hours 31 min utes, ground elapsed time. Skylab space station presently crossing over the combined coverage of Canary Island track ing station and Madrid, Spain, tracking station. Flight Controllers, here, continuing to assess the possible effects on the mission on the apparent nondeployment of the large solar panels on the workshop. As the afternoon and evening wears on, there likely will be some considerable amount of sorting out as to what course should be taken to get the most out of the mission. As these facts develop, as the plans are worked out, they will be relayed on over the circuit at 3 hours 32 minutes, ground elapsed time, with some 5 minutes and a half remaining over Madrid. And, standing by; this is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 15:00 CST 16:10 GET 3:39 MC22/1 PAO This is Skylab Control, 3 hours 42 minutes, ground elapsed time. Skylab space station now over the hill from the Canary Island tracking station. Thirty-four minutes away from being acquired again by the Honeysuckle, Australia, tracking station. No further resolution at this time on the solar pnel deployment problem, which likely will affect the course of the mission. As the planning develops, on how to best manage the mission for the maximum return, we'll bring these details to you on this circuit. And, at 3 hours 40 minutes, ground elapsed time, on the mission of Skylab 1, this is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 16:42 CST 4:11 GET MC-23/1 PA0 This is Skylab Control. Four hours 14 min utes ground elapsed time - the Skylab space station mission. Here in the Control Center, the problems associated with the failure of the Saturn workshop solar panels to deploy are being discussed, at some length, by management and flight controllers. Preliminary telemetry indications are that there could have been a malfunction with one solar array beam fairing and the meteroid shield, which could have led to such anomalies. These malfunctions are indicated to have occurred 1 minute and 3 seconds after lift-off, based on postlaunch examination of telemetry. The Planned 28-day mission is not possible with«„4. ^PA? out deployment of the workshop main solar panels. Project ° lcl^ls arf considering an alternate mission using the command service module power system to augment the limited power supply provided by the Apollo telescope mount solar panels aboard the workshop, through a system of managing the two power sources for the optimum usage. An announce ment will be made as soon as these decisions have been reached. The decision on such an alternate mission is expected to be had by about 9:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, at which time a news conference will be held at the Cape, exPected that Skylab Program Director, Bill cu chnieder, will take part. We're starting to get data, now, through the Honeysuckle, Australia tracking station. This is a rather low elevation angle pass of little over 4 degrees, or approximately - I stand corrected, 86 degrees, the max elevation on this particular pass, almost directly overhead, at Honeysuckle. Almost 9 minutes remaining in this pass across Honeysuckle station. We'll stand by on Skylab Control circuit for the Honeysuckle, followed by Hawaii, and the next stateside pass. At 4 hours 18 minutes ground elapsed time, this is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 15:00 CST 16:57 GET 4:26 MC24/1 PAO This is Skylab Control at 4 hours 28 minutes ground elapsed time, as the Skylab workshop heads across the south-central Pacific toward the Hawaii tracking station coming up in about 8 minutes over that station. To reiterate what was stated before about the current situation in the Skylab-1 mission, preliminary telemetry playback indications are there could have been a malfunction with one solar array beam fairing. That is the cover that is - that houses the solar array beam before it swings outward from the workshop itself. And the meteroid shield, which could have led to the subsequent anomalies that have been witnessed this afternoon. And, namely, the failure of the large solar panels to properly deploy. The malfunction was measured to have taken place 1 minute and 3 seconds after lift-off, based on examination of the telemetry records and tapes played back post-launch. Now, the current posture in the mission is as follows: the planned 28-day mission is not possible without full deployment of the solar panels on the workshop. At the same time, all the other work shop systems and deployment sequences are fully nominal. Pro ject officials are considering an alternate mission, using the power supply aboard the command service module to augment, or supply additional power to the workshop, through managing of the various electrical buses aboard. The ATM solar panels are deployed, and are generating power. This power supply, tied with that brought up by the command module when it docks with the workshop, would supply power for a reduced mission. However, an announcement will be made as soon as a decision on how the mission will be managed. This decision on alternate mission is expected by about 9 o'clock Eastern Daylight Time. Our news conference at Kennedy Space Center newsroom, with Skylab Program Director, Bill Schneider, will take place at this time. Five minutes out from Hawaii, and at 4 hours 32 minutes, ground elapsed time. This is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 17:12 CST 04:41 GET MC25/1 PAO This is Skylab Control, 4 Hours 48 minutes, ground elapsed time. Skylab space station now being tracked by the Goldstone tracking station in the Mohave Desert, California. No apparent change in the mission status at this time. The large solar panels on the workshop still undeployed. And among the considerations to be looked at later in the evening by the Mission Director and other members of management on the Skylab team, will be whether or not to launch Skylab 2 on schedule tommorow, or to delay the manned mission until some later time, after a new flight plan for a shortened mission can be formulated and designed. At 4 hours 49 minutes, this is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE �SKYLAB MISSION COMMENTARY 5/14/73 17:45 CST 05:14 GET MC26/1 PAO This is Skylab Control, 5 hours 14 minutes, ground elapsed time, in the mission of the Skylab space station, presently over the Canary Island tracking station. Some 3 minutes remaining until loss of signal, crossing over into Ascension Island tracking station coverage. At 5 hours and 9 minutes, ground elapsed time, it was reported that the Skylab workshop has settled down into solar inertial attitude, that is, that the Apollo telescope mount portion points at the Sun continuosly. To recap again the current posture in this mission, it appears that a malfuntion in one of the fairings covering the solar arrays on Saturn workshop may have malfunctioned at about a minute and 3 seconds after lift-off. Playback of the telemetry data has shown that there was an apparent malfunction of this fairing, also, the meteoroid shield malfunctioned at the same time. As it stands now, the planned 28-day mission for Skylab 2, still scheduled for launch tomorrow, at this time, would not be possible for the full 28 days without deploy ment of the workshop solar panels. Skylab program officials are looking at all of the alternate missions that would be feasible and possible to conduct. The main guiding factor would be the amount of electrical power available from the fully deployed, and presently generating Apollo telescope mount solar panels, put together with the power available from the command service module, when it docks with the cluster. The decision on whether to continue with a some what abbreviated mission tomorrow on schedule, or whether a delay is necessary to regroup, will be made later in the evening. Decisions on alternate missions, on an abbreviated mission, is expected around 9:00 eastern daylight time. A news conference with Skylab Program Manager, Bill Schneider, is expected to take place at 9:00 o'clock eastern time at the Kennedy Space Center newsroom. That is currently the status in the mission of Skylab 1, the Skylab space station. And at 5 hours 18 minutes, ground elapsed time, this is Skylab Control. END OF TAPE � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Skylab Collection Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973-1979 Relation A related resource https://libguides.uah.edu/ld.php?content_id=10578214 <a href="http://libarchstor.uah.edu:8081/repositories/2/resources/80">View the Skylab Collection finding aid on ArchivesSpace</a> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Skylab Collection Description An account of the resource Skylab was the first space station operated by NASA; it was launched without a crew on May 14, 1973. Skylab had three manned missions: Skylab 2, launched May 25, 1973, lasting 28 days, Skylab 3, launched July 28, 1973, lasting 60 days, and Skylab 4, launched November 16, 1973, lasting 84 days. Crews on Skylab conducted a variety of experiments during their missions, including experiments in human physiology, circadian rhythms, solar physics and astronomy, and material sciences. Important earth resources studies were conducting including studies on geology, hurricanes, and land and vegetation patterns. Two of the more important components for conducting research on Skylab were the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) and the Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP). The ATM was a multi-spectral solar observatory, and NASA’s first full-scale manned astronomical observatory in space. The ATM yielded a significant number of images and provided useful data for understanding our sun. The EREP provided thousands of images of the Earth’s surface in visible, infrared, and microwave spectral regions. Skylab remained in orbit, unoccupied after the Skylab 4 mission, until July 11, 1973, when the space station reentered Earth’s atmosphere. References: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skylab#Manned_missions https://www.nasa.gov/missions/shuttle/f_skylab1.html https://history.nasa.gov/SP-402/ch4.htm Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context sdsp_skyl_000076 Title A name given to the resource "Skylab Mission Commentary 5/14/73 1:10 CST 18:04 GET 5:32 MC27/1" - "Skylab Mission Commentary 5/15/73 1:20 CST MC38/1." Description An account of the resource This mission commentary depicts the initial discovery of Skylab 1's Orbital Workshop Solar arrays not deploying as intended. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973-05-14 Temporal Coverage Temporal characteristics of the resource. 1970-1979 Subject The topic of the resource John F. Kennedy Space Center Skylab Program Skylab 1 Apollo Telescope Mount Type The nature or genre of the resource Transcripts Text Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Skylab Collection Box 17, Folder 1 University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections, Huntsville, Alabama Language A language of the resource en Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource This material may be protected under U. S. Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code) which governs the making of photocopies or reproductions of copyrighted materials. You may use the digitized material for private study, scholarship, or research. Though the University of Alabama in Huntsville Archives and Special Collections has physical ownership of the material in its collections, in some cases we may not own the copyright to the material. It is the patron's obligation to determine and satisfy copyright restrictions when publishing or otherwise distributing materials found in our collections. Relation A related resource Skylab Document Scanning Project Metadata Skylab 50th Anniversary